From patchwork Fri Oct 12 18:24:09 2018 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Dave Jiang X-Patchwork-Id: 10639093 Return-Path: Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.125]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id D0B6D157A for ; Fri, 12 Oct 2018 18:24:11 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id C16062C3F4 for ; Fri, 12 Oct 2018 18:24:11 +0000 (UTC) Received: by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix, from userid 486) id B5B5C2C412; Fri, 12 Oct 2018 18:24:11 +0000 (UTC) X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.9 required=2.0 tests=BAYES_00,MAILING_LIST_MULTI, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 Received: from ml01.01.org (ml01.01.org [198.145.21.10]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 6BA722C3F4 for ; Fri, 12 Oct 2018 18:24:11 +0000 (UTC) Received: from [127.0.0.1] (localhost [IPv6:::1]) by ml01.01.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 487D32116DF8D; Fri, 12 Oct 2018 11:24:11 -0700 (PDT) X-Original-To: linux-nvdimm@lists.01.org Delivered-To: linux-nvdimm@lists.01.org Received-SPF: Pass (sender SPF authorized) identity=mailfrom; client-ip=192.55.52.115; helo=mga14.intel.com; envelope-from=dave.jiang@intel.com; receiver=linux-nvdimm@lists.01.org Received: from mga14.intel.com (mga14.intel.com [192.55.52.115]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ml01.01.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 53A652116DF85 for ; Fri, 12 Oct 2018 11:24:10 -0700 (PDT) X-Amp-Result: SKIPPED(no attachment in message) X-Amp-File-Uploaded: False Received: from orsmga006.jf.intel.com ([10.7.209.51]) by fmsmga103.fm.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 12 Oct 2018 11:24:09 -0700 X-ExtLoop1: 1 X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.54,373,1534834800"; d="scan'208";a="82148819" Received: from djiang5-desk3.ch.intel.com ([143.182.136.93]) by orsmga006.jf.intel.com with ESMTP; 12 Oct 2018 11:24:09 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 4/5] libnvdimm: remove code to pull user key when there's no kernel key From: Dave Jiang To: dan.j.williams@intel.com Date: Fri, 12 Oct 2018 11:24:09 -0700 Message-ID: <153936864924.55836.10713157239316653961.stgit@djiang5-desk3.ch.intel.com> In-Reply-To: <153936863308.55836.2972520178944977338.stgit@djiang5-desk3.ch.intel.com> References: <153936863308.55836.2972520178944977338.stgit@djiang5-desk3.ch.intel.com> User-Agent: StGit/unknown-version MIME-Version: 1.0 X-BeenThere: linux-nvdimm@lists.01.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29 Precedence: list List-Id: "Linux-nvdimm developer list." List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Cc: linux-nvdimm@lists.01.org Errors-To: linux-nvdimm-bounces@lists.01.org Sender: "Linux-nvdimm" X-Virus-Scanned: ClamAV using ClamSMTP Remove extraneous code that used to expect nvdimm_get_and_verify_key() to return NULL when there's no kernel key. We want to enforce the behavior that when there is no kernel key we should fail security ops. Signed-off-by: Dave Jiang --- drivers/nvdimm/security.c | 35 ++++------------------------------- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 31 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/nvdimm/security.c b/drivers/nvdimm/security.c index f9ca1575012e..7b5d7c77514d 100644 --- a/drivers/nvdimm/security.c +++ b/drivers/nvdimm/security.c @@ -135,7 +135,6 @@ int nvdimm_security_erase(struct nvdimm *nvdimm, unsigned int keyid) struct key *key; struct user_key_payload *payload; struct device *dev = &nvdimm->dev; - bool is_userkey = false; if (!nvdimm->security_ops) return -EOPNOTSUPP; @@ -161,18 +160,6 @@ int nvdimm_security_erase(struct nvdimm *nvdimm, unsigned int keyid) rc = PTR_ERR(key); goto out; } - if (!key) { - dev_dbg(dev, "No cached key found\n"); - /* get old user key */ - key = nvdimm_lookup_user_key(dev, keyid); - if (!key) { - dev_dbg(dev, "Unable to retrieve user key: %#x\n", - keyid); - rc = -ENOKEY; - goto out; - } - is_userkey = true; - } down_read(&key->sem); payload = key->payload.data[0]; @@ -181,10 +168,8 @@ int nvdimm_security_erase(struct nvdimm *nvdimm, unsigned int keyid) up_read(&key->sem); /* remove key since secure erase kills the passphrase */ - if (!is_userkey) { - key_invalidate(key); - nvdimm->key = NULL; - } + key_invalidate(key); + nvdimm->key = NULL; key_put(key); out: @@ -218,7 +203,6 @@ int nvdimm_security_disable(struct nvdimm *nvdimm, unsigned int keyid) struct key *key; struct user_key_payload *payload; struct device *dev = &nvdimm->dev; - bool is_userkey = false; if (!nvdimm->security_ops) return -EOPNOTSUPP; @@ -233,15 +217,6 @@ int nvdimm_security_disable(struct nvdimm *nvdimm, unsigned int keyid) mutex_unlock(&nvdimm->key_mutex); return PTR_ERR(key); } - if (!key) { - /* get old user key */ - key = nvdimm_lookup_user_key(dev, keyid); - if (!key) { - mutex_unlock(&nvdimm->key_mutex); - return -ENOKEY; - } - is_userkey = true; - } down_read(&key->sem); payload = key->payload.data[0]; @@ -255,10 +230,8 @@ int nvdimm_security_disable(struct nvdimm *nvdimm, unsigned int keyid) } /* If we succeed then remove the key */ - if (!is_userkey) { - key_invalidate(key); - nvdimm->key = NULL; - } + key_invalidate(key); + nvdimm->key = NULL; key_put(key); out: