From patchwork Fri Nov 9 22:14:29 2018 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Dave Jiang X-Patchwork-Id: 10676637 Return-Path: Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.125]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 5D5DD139B for ; Fri, 9 Nov 2018 22:14:31 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 4C7222F2CD for ; Fri, 9 Nov 2018 22:14:31 +0000 (UTC) Received: by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix, from userid 486) id 3F6E52F1A5; Fri, 9 Nov 2018 22:14:31 +0000 (UTC) X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.9 required=2.0 tests=BAYES_00,MAILING_LIST_MULTI, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 Received: from ml01.01.org (ml01.01.org [198.145.21.10]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id DAF792F1A5 for ; Fri, 9 Nov 2018 22:14:30 +0000 (UTC) Received: from [127.0.0.1] (localhost [IPv6:::1]) by ml01.01.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id CC59B21A07A92; Fri, 9 Nov 2018 14:14:30 -0800 (PST) X-Original-To: linux-nvdimm@lists.01.org Delivered-To: linux-nvdimm@lists.01.org Received-SPF: Pass (sender SPF authorized) identity=mailfrom; client-ip=192.55.52.93; helo=mga11.intel.com; envelope-from=dave.jiang@intel.com; receiver=linux-nvdimm@lists.01.org Received: from mga11.intel.com (mga11.intel.com [192.55.52.93]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ml01.01.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id A0BDB21184E66 for ; Fri, 9 Nov 2018 14:14:29 -0800 (PST) X-Amp-Result: SKIPPED(no attachment in message) X-Amp-File-Uploaded: False Received: from fmsmga005.fm.intel.com ([10.253.24.32]) by fmsmga102.fm.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 09 Nov 2018 14:14:29 -0800 X-ExtLoop1: 1 X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.54,484,1534834800"; d="scan'208";a="278596826" Received: from djiang5-desk3.ch.intel.com ([143.182.136.93]) by fmsmga005.fm.intel.com with ESMTP; 09 Nov 2018 14:14:29 -0800 Subject: [PATCH 08/11] libnvdimm/security: add documentation for ovewrite From: Dave Jiang To: dan.j.williams@intel.com, zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com Date: Fri, 09 Nov 2018 15:14:29 -0700 Message-ID: <154180166906.70506.2262123031486305806.stgit@djiang5-desk3.ch.intel.com> In-Reply-To: <154180093865.70506.6858789591063128903.stgit@djiang5-desk3.ch.intel.com> References: <154180093865.70506.6858789591063128903.stgit@djiang5-desk3.ch.intel.com> User-Agent: StGit/unknown-version MIME-Version: 1.0 X-BeenThere: linux-nvdimm@lists.01.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29 Precedence: list List-Id: "Linux-nvdimm developer list." List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Cc: linux-nvdimm@lists.01.org Errors-To: linux-nvdimm-bounces@lists.01.org Sender: "Linux-nvdimm" X-Virus-Scanned: ClamAV using ClamSMTP Add overwrite command usages to security documentation. Signed-off-by: Dave Jiang --- Documentation/nvdimm/security.txt | 16 +++++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/Documentation/nvdimm/security.txt b/Documentation/nvdimm/security.txt index 11240ce48755..dfe70a8fa25b 100644 --- a/Documentation/nvdimm/security.txt +++ b/Documentation/nvdimm/security.txt @@ -96,9 +96,19 @@ its keyid should be passed in via sysfs. The command format for doing a secure erase is: erase -An "old" key with the passphrase payload that is tied to the nvdimm should be -injected with a key description that does not have the "nvdimm:" prefix and -its keyid should be passed in via sysfs. +9. Overwrite +------------ +The command format for doing an overwrite is: +overwrite + +Overwrite can be done without a key if security is not enabled. A key serial +of 0 can be passed in to indicate no key. + +The sysfs attribute "security" can be polled to wait on overwrite completion. +Overwrite can last tens of minutes or more depending on nvdimm size. + +An encrypted key with the current key passphrase that is tied to the nvdimm +should be injected and its keyid should be passed in via sysfs. [1]: http://pmem.io/documents/NVDIMM_DSM_Interface-V1.7.pdf [2]: http://www.t13.org/documents/UploadedDocuments/docs2006/e05179r4-ACS-SecurityClarifications.pdf