From patchwork Tue Aug 27 00:55:00 2019 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Dan Williams X-Patchwork-Id: 11115921 Return-Path: Received: from mail.kernel.org (pdx-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.123]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 46D1414F7 for ; Tue, 27 Aug 2019 01:09:20 +0000 (UTC) Received: from ml01.01.org (ml01.01.org [198.145.21.10]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 2EA5B20644 for ; Tue, 27 Aug 2019 01:09:20 +0000 (UTC) DMARC-Filter: OpenDMARC Filter v1.3.2 mail.kernel.org 2EA5B20644 Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dmarc=fail (p=none dis=none) header.from=intel.com Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; spf=none smtp.mailfrom=linux-nvdimm-bounces@lists.01.org Received: from [127.0.0.1] (localhost [IPv6:::1]) by ml01.01.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id AD36721A02937; Mon, 26 Aug 2019 18:11:33 -0700 (PDT) X-Original-To: linux-nvdimm@lists.01.org Delivered-To: linux-nvdimm@lists.01.org Received-SPF: Pass (sender SPF authorized) identity=mailfrom; client-ip=192.55.52.120; helo=mga04.intel.com; envelope-from=dan.j.williams@intel.com; receiver=linux-nvdimm@lists.01.org Received: from mga04.intel.com (mga04.intel.com [192.55.52.120]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ml01.01.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 0ACDE21A02937 for ; Mon, 26 Aug 2019 18:11:31 -0700 (PDT) X-Amp-Result: SKIPPED(no attachment in message) X-Amp-File-Uploaded: False Received: from orsmga006.jf.intel.com ([10.7.209.51]) by fmsmga104.fm.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 26 Aug 2019 18:09:17 -0700 X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.64,435,1559545200"; d="scan'208";a="185131879" Received: from dwillia2-desk3.jf.intel.com (HELO dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com) ([10.54.39.16]) by orsmga006-auth.jf.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 26 Aug 2019 18:09:17 -0700 Subject: [PATCH v2 2/3] libnvdimm/security: Tighten scope of nvdimm->busy vs security operations From: Dan Williams To: linux-nvdimm@lists.01.org Date: Mon, 26 Aug 2019 17:55:00 -0700 Message-ID: <156686729996.184120.3458026302402493937.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com> In-Reply-To: <156686728950.184120.5188743631586996901.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com> References: <156686728950.184120.5188743631586996901.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com> User-Agent: StGit/0.18-2-gc94f MIME-Version: 1.0 X-BeenThere: linux-nvdimm@lists.01.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29 Precedence: list List-Id: "Linux-nvdimm developer list." List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Errors-To: linux-nvdimm-bounces@lists.01.org Sender: "Linux-nvdimm" An attempt to freeze DIMMs currently runs afoul of default blocking of all security operations in the entry to the 'store' routine for the 'security' sysfs attribute. The blanket blocking of all security operations while the DIMM is in active use in a region is too restrictive. The only security operations that need to be aware of the ->busy state are those that mutate the state of data, i.e. erase and overwrite. Refactor the ->busy checks to be applied at the entry common entry point in __security_store() rather than each of the helper routines to enable freeze to be run regardless of busy state. Reviewed-by: Dave Jiang Signed-off-by: Dan Williams Reviewed-by: Jeff Moyer --- drivers/nvdimm/dimm_devs.c | 33 ++++++++++++++++----------------- drivers/nvdimm/security.c | 10 ---------- 2 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 27 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/nvdimm/dimm_devs.c b/drivers/nvdimm/dimm_devs.c index 53330625fe07..d837cb9be83d 100644 --- a/drivers/nvdimm/dimm_devs.c +++ b/drivers/nvdimm/dimm_devs.c @@ -424,9 +424,6 @@ static ssize_t __security_store(struct device *dev, const char *buf, size_t len) unsigned int key, newkey; int i; - if (atomic_read(&nvdimm->busy)) - return -EBUSY; - rc = sscanf(buf, "%"__stringify(SEC_CMD_SIZE)"s" " %"__stringify(KEY_ID_SIZE)"s" " %"__stringify(KEY_ID_SIZE)"s", @@ -451,23 +448,25 @@ static ssize_t __security_store(struct device *dev, const char *buf, size_t len) } else if (i == OP_DISABLE) { dev_dbg(dev, "disable %u\n", key); rc = nvdimm_security_disable(nvdimm, key); - } else if (i == OP_UPDATE) { - dev_dbg(dev, "update %u %u\n", key, newkey); - rc = nvdimm_security_update(nvdimm, key, newkey, NVDIMM_USER); - } else if (i == OP_ERASE) { - dev_dbg(dev, "erase %u\n", key); - rc = nvdimm_security_erase(nvdimm, key, NVDIMM_USER); + } else if (i == OP_UPDATE || i == OP_MASTER_UPDATE) { + dev_dbg(dev, "%s %u %u\n", ops[i].name, key, newkey); + rc = nvdimm_security_update(nvdimm, key, newkey, i == OP_UPDATE + ? NVDIMM_USER : NVDIMM_MASTER); + } else if (i == OP_ERASE || i == OP_MASTER_ERASE) { + dev_dbg(dev, "%s %u\n", ops[i].name, key); + if (atomic_read(&nvdimm->busy)) { + dev_dbg(dev, "Unable to secure erase while DIMM active.\n"); + return -EBUSY; + } + rc = nvdimm_security_erase(nvdimm, key, i == OP_ERASE + ? NVDIMM_USER : NVDIMM_MASTER); } else if (i == OP_OVERWRITE) { dev_dbg(dev, "overwrite %u\n", key); + if (atomic_read(&nvdimm->busy)) { + dev_dbg(dev, "Unable to overwrite while DIMM active.\n"); + return -EBUSY; + } rc = nvdimm_security_overwrite(nvdimm, key); - } else if (i == OP_MASTER_UPDATE) { - dev_dbg(dev, "master_update %u %u\n", key, newkey); - rc = nvdimm_security_update(nvdimm, key, newkey, - NVDIMM_MASTER); - } else if (i == OP_MASTER_ERASE) { - dev_dbg(dev, "master_erase %u\n", key); - rc = nvdimm_security_erase(nvdimm, key, - NVDIMM_MASTER); } else return -EINVAL; diff --git a/drivers/nvdimm/security.c b/drivers/nvdimm/security.c index 5862d0eee9db..2166e627383a 100644 --- a/drivers/nvdimm/security.c +++ b/drivers/nvdimm/security.c @@ -334,11 +334,6 @@ int nvdimm_security_erase(struct nvdimm *nvdimm, unsigned int keyid, || !nvdimm->sec.flags) return -EOPNOTSUPP; - if (atomic_read(&nvdimm->busy)) { - dev_dbg(dev, "Unable to secure erase while DIMM active.\n"); - return -EBUSY; - } - rc = check_security_state(nvdimm); if (rc) return rc; @@ -380,11 +375,6 @@ int nvdimm_security_overwrite(struct nvdimm *nvdimm, unsigned int keyid) || !nvdimm->sec.flags) return -EOPNOTSUPP; - if (atomic_read(&nvdimm->busy)) { - dev_dbg(dev, "Unable to overwrite while DIMM active.\n"); - return -EBUSY; - } - if (dev->driver == NULL) { dev_dbg(dev, "Unable to overwrite while DIMM active.\n"); return -EINVAL;