| Message ID | 20210216014538.268106-6-ben.widawsky@intel.com (mailing list archive) |
|---|---|
| State | Superseded |
| Headers | show |
| Series | CXL 2.0 Support | expand |
On Mon, 15 Feb 2021 17:45:34 -0800 Ben Widawsky <ben.widawsky@intel.com> wrote: > The CXL memory device send interface will have a number of supported > commands. The raw command is not such a command. Raw commands allow > userspace to send a specified opcode to the underlying hardware and > bypass all driver checks on the command. The primary use for this > command is to [begrudgingly] allow undocumented vendor specific hardware > commands. > > While not the main motivation, it also allows prototyping new hardware > commands without a driver patch and rebuild. > > While this all sounds very powerful it comes with a couple of caveats: > 1. Bug reports using raw commands will not get the same level of > attention as bug reports using supported commands (via taint). > 2. Supported commands will be rejected by the RAW command. > > With this comes new debugfs knob to allow full access to your toes with > your weapon of choice. > > Cc: Ariel Sibley <Ariel.Sibley@microchip.com> > Signed-off-by: Ben Widawsky <ben.widawsky@intel.com> > Reviewed-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> (v2) Whilst I'm definitely dubious about introducing this interface so early in development, I haven't found any problems with 'how' it has been done. I guess it's now just up to us to hassle our hardware colleagues into only using this facility when absolutely necessary... Reviewed-by: Jonathan Cameron <Jonathan.Cameron@huawei.com> > --- > drivers/cxl/Kconfig | 18 +++++ > drivers/cxl/mem.c | 132 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ > include/uapi/linux/cxl_mem.h | 12 +++- > 3 files changed, 161 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) > > diff --git a/drivers/cxl/Kconfig b/drivers/cxl/Kconfig > index 9e80b311e928..97dc4d751651 100644 > --- a/drivers/cxl/Kconfig > +++ b/drivers/cxl/Kconfig > @@ -32,4 +32,22 @@ config CXL_MEM > Chapter 2.3 Type 3 CXL Device in the CXL 2.0 specification. > > If unsure say 'm'. > + > +config CXL_MEM_RAW_COMMANDS > + bool "RAW Command Interface for Memory Devices" > + depends on CXL_MEM > + help > + Enable CXL RAW command interface. > + > + The CXL driver ioctl interface may assign a kernel ioctl command > + number for each specification defined opcode. At any given point in > + time the number of opcodes that the specification defines and a device > + may implement may exceed the kernel's set of associated ioctl function > + numbers. The mismatch is either by omission, specification is too new, > + or by design. When prototyping new hardware, or developing / debugging > + the driver it is useful to be able to submit any possible command to > + the hardware, even commands that may crash the kernel due to their > + potential impact to memory currently in use by the kernel. > + > + If developing CXL hardware or the driver say Y, otherwise say N. > endif > diff --git a/drivers/cxl/mem.c b/drivers/cxl/mem.c > index a4298cb1182d..6b4feb0ce47d 100644 > --- a/drivers/cxl/mem.c > +++ b/drivers/cxl/mem.c > @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ > // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only > /* Copyright(c) 2020 Intel Corporation. All rights reserved. */ > #include <uapi/linux/cxl_mem.h> > +#include <linux/security.h> > +#include <linux/debugfs.h> > #include <linux/module.h> > #include <linux/mutex.h> > #include <linux/cdev.h> > @@ -42,7 +44,14 @@ > > enum opcode { > CXL_MBOX_OP_INVALID = 0x0000, > + CXL_MBOX_OP_RAW = CXL_MBOX_OP_INVALID, > + CXL_MBOX_OP_ACTIVATE_FW = 0x0202, > CXL_MBOX_OP_IDENTIFY = 0x4000, > + CXL_MBOX_OP_SET_PARTITION_INFO = 0x4101, > + CXL_MBOX_OP_SET_LSA = 0x4103, > + CXL_MBOX_OP_SET_SHUTDOWN_STATE = 0x4204, > + CXL_MBOX_OP_SCAN_MEDIA = 0x4304, > + CXL_MBOX_OP_GET_SCAN_MEDIA = 0x4305, > CXL_MBOX_OP_MAX = 0x10000 > }; > > @@ -92,6 +101,8 @@ struct cxl_memdev { > > static int cxl_mem_major; > static DEFINE_IDA(cxl_memdev_ida); > +static struct dentry *cxl_debugfs; > +static bool cxl_raw_allow_all; > > /** > * struct cxl_mem_command - Driver representation of a memory device command > @@ -128,6 +139,49 @@ struct cxl_mem_command { > */ > static struct cxl_mem_command mem_commands[] = { > CXL_CMD(IDENTIFY, 0, 0x43), > +#ifdef CONFIG_CXL_MEM_RAW_COMMANDS > + CXL_CMD(RAW, ~0, ~0), > +#endif > +}; > + > +/* > + * Commands that RAW doesn't permit. The rationale for each: > + * > + * CXL_MBOX_OP_ACTIVATE_FW: Firmware activation requires adjustment / > + * coordination of transaction timeout values at the root bridge level. > + * > + * CXL_MBOX_OP_SET_PARTITION_INFO: The device memory map may change live > + * and needs to be coordinated with HDM updates. > + * > + * CXL_MBOX_OP_SET_LSA: The label storage area may be cached by the > + * driver and any writes from userspace invalidates those contents. > + * > + * CXL_MBOX_OP_SET_SHUTDOWN_STATE: Set shutdown state assumes no writes > + * to the device after it is marked clean, userspace can not make that > + * assertion. > + * > + * CXL_MBOX_OP_[GET_]SCAN_MEDIA: The kernel provides a native error list that > + * is kept up to date with patrol notifications and error management. > + */ > +static u16 cxl_disabled_raw_commands[] = { > + CXL_MBOX_OP_ACTIVATE_FW, > + CXL_MBOX_OP_SET_PARTITION_INFO, > + CXL_MBOX_OP_SET_LSA, > + CXL_MBOX_OP_SET_SHUTDOWN_STATE, > + CXL_MBOX_OP_SCAN_MEDIA, > + CXL_MBOX_OP_GET_SCAN_MEDIA, > +}; > + > +/* > + * Command sets that RAW doesn't permit. All opcodes in this set are > + * disabled because they pass plain text security payloads over the > + * user/kernel boundary. This functionality is intended to be wrapped > + * behind the keys ABI which allows for encrypted payloads in the UAPI > + */ > +static u8 security_command_sets[] = { > + 0x44, /* Sanitize */ > + 0x45, /* Persistent Memory Data-at-rest Security */ > + 0x46, /* Security Passthrough */ > }; > > #define cxl_for_each_cmd(cmd) \ > @@ -158,6 +212,16 @@ static int cxl_mem_wait_for_doorbell(struct cxl_mem *cxlm) > return 0; > } > > +static bool cxl_is_security_command(u16 opcode) > +{ > + int i; > + > + for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(security_command_sets); i++) > + if (security_command_sets[i] == (opcode >> 8)) > + return true; > + return false; > +} > + > static void cxl_mem_mbox_timeout(struct cxl_mem *cxlm, > struct mbox_cmd *mbox_cmd) > { > @@ -426,6 +490,9 @@ static int handle_mailbox_cmd_from_user(struct cxl_mem *cxlm, > cxl_command_names[cmd->info.id].name, mbox_cmd.opcode, > cmd->info.size_in); > > + dev_WARN_ONCE(dev, cmd->info.id == CXL_MEM_COMMAND_ID_RAW, > + "raw command path used\n"); > + > rc = __cxl_mem_mbox_send_cmd(cxlm, &mbox_cmd); > cxl_mem_mbox_put(cxlm); > if (rc) > @@ -457,6 +524,29 @@ static int handle_mailbox_cmd_from_user(struct cxl_mem *cxlm, > return rc; > } > > +static bool cxl_mem_raw_command_allowed(u16 opcode) > +{ > + int i; > + > + if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CXL_MEM_RAW_COMMANDS)) > + return false; > + > + if (security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_NONE)) > + return false; > + > + if (cxl_raw_allow_all) > + return true; > + > + if (cxl_is_security_command(opcode)) > + return false; > + > + for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(cxl_disabled_raw_commands); i++) > + if (cxl_disabled_raw_commands[i] == opcode) > + return false; > + > + return true; > +} > + > /** > * cxl_validate_cmd_from_user() - Check fields for CXL_MEM_SEND_COMMAND. > * @cxlm: &struct cxl_mem device whose mailbox will be used. > @@ -468,6 +558,7 @@ static int handle_mailbox_cmd_from_user(struct cxl_mem *cxlm, > * * %-ENOTTY - Invalid command specified. > * * %-EINVAL - Reserved fields or invalid values were used. > * * %-ENOMEM - Input or output buffer wasn't sized properly. > + * * %-EPERM - Attempted to use a protected command. > * > * The result of this command is a fully validated command in @out_cmd that is > * safe to send to the hardware. > @@ -492,6 +583,40 @@ static int cxl_validate_cmd_from_user(struct cxl_mem *cxlm, > if (send_cmd->in.size > cxlm->payload_size) > return -EINVAL; > > + /* > + * Checks are bypassed for raw commands but a WARN/taint will occur > + * later in the callchain > + */ > + if (send_cmd->id == CXL_MEM_COMMAND_ID_RAW) { > + const struct cxl_mem_command temp = { > + .info = { > + .id = CXL_MEM_COMMAND_ID_RAW, > + .flags = 0, > + .size_in = send_cmd->in.size, > + .size_out = send_cmd->out.size, > + }, > + .opcode = send_cmd->raw.opcode > + }; > + > + if (send_cmd->raw.rsvd) > + return -EINVAL; > + > + /* > + * Unlike supported commands, the output size of RAW commands > + * gets passed along without further checking, so it must be > + * validated here. > + */ > + if (send_cmd->out.size > cxlm->payload_size) > + return -EINVAL; > + > + if (!cxl_mem_raw_command_allowed(send_cmd->raw.opcode)) > + return -EPERM; > + > + memcpy(out_cmd, &temp, sizeof(temp)); > + > + return 0; > + } > + > if (send_cmd->flags & ~CXL_MEM_COMMAND_FLAG_MASK) > return -EINVAL; > > @@ -1153,6 +1278,7 @@ static struct pci_driver cxl_mem_driver = { > > static __init int cxl_mem_init(void) > { > + struct dentry *mbox_debugfs; > dev_t devt; > int rc; > > @@ -1169,11 +1295,17 @@ static __init int cxl_mem_init(void) > return rc; > } > > + cxl_debugfs = debugfs_create_dir("cxl", NULL); > + mbox_debugfs = debugfs_create_dir("mbox", cxl_debugfs); > + debugfs_create_bool("raw_allow_all", 0600, mbox_debugfs, > + &cxl_raw_allow_all); > + > return 0; > } > > static __exit void cxl_mem_exit(void) > { > + debugfs_remove_recursive(cxl_debugfs); > pci_unregister_driver(&cxl_mem_driver); > unregister_chrdev_region(MKDEV(cxl_mem_major, 0), CXL_MEM_MAX_DEVS); > } > diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/cxl_mem.h b/include/uapi/linux/cxl_mem.h > index 18cea908ad0b..8eb669150ecb 100644 > --- a/include/uapi/linux/cxl_mem.h > +++ b/include/uapi/linux/cxl_mem.h > @@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ > #define CXL_CMDS \ > ___C(INVALID, "Invalid Command"), \ > ___C(IDENTIFY, "Identify Command"), \ > + ___C(RAW, "Raw device command"), \ > ___C(MAX, "invalid / last command") > > #define ___C(a, b) CXL_MEM_COMMAND_ID_##a > @@ -115,6 +116,9 @@ struct cxl_mem_query_commands { > * @id: The command to send to the memory device. This must be one of the > * commands returned by the query command. > * @flags: Flags for the command (input). > + * @raw: Special fields for raw commands > + * @raw.opcode: Opcode passed to hardware when using the RAW command. > + * @raw.rsvd: Must be zero. > * @rsvd: Must be zero. > * @retval: Return value from the memory device (output). > * @in.size: Size of the payload to provide to the device (input). > @@ -135,7 +139,13 @@ struct cxl_mem_query_commands { > struct cxl_send_command { > __u32 id; > __u32 flags; > - __u32 rsvd; > + union { > + struct { > + __u16 opcode; > + __u16 rsvd; > + } raw; > + __u32 rsvd; > + }; > __u32 retval; > > struct {
On 21-02-16 15:30:26, Jonathan Cameron wrote: > On Mon, 15 Feb 2021 17:45:34 -0800 > Ben Widawsky <ben.widawsky@intel.com> wrote: > > > The CXL memory device send interface will have a number of supported > > commands. The raw command is not such a command. Raw commands allow > > userspace to send a specified opcode to the underlying hardware and > > bypass all driver checks on the command. The primary use for this > > command is to [begrudgingly] allow undocumented vendor specific hardware > > commands. > > > > While not the main motivation, it also allows prototyping new hardware > > commands without a driver patch and rebuild. > > > > While this all sounds very powerful it comes with a couple of caveats: > > 1. Bug reports using raw commands will not get the same level of > > attention as bug reports using supported commands (via taint). > > 2. Supported commands will be rejected by the RAW command. > > > > With this comes new debugfs knob to allow full access to your toes with > > your weapon of choice. > > > > Cc: Ariel Sibley <Ariel.Sibley@microchip.com> > > Signed-off-by: Ben Widawsky <ben.widawsky@intel.com> > > Reviewed-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> (v2) > > Whilst I'm definitely dubious about introducing this interface > so early in development, I haven't found any problems with 'how' it > has been done. > FWIW, it's already helpful for regression testing. ndctl/cxl(1) will make use of it for validating driver internals and our QEMU emulation. I don't mean to imply that's the only usage. > I guess it's now just up to us to hassle our hardware colleagues into > only using this facility when absolutely necessary... Yes. I think having distros not enable the Kconfig option is going to be the best path in the early days so they don't get used to having it available. > > Reviewed-by: Jonathan Cameron <Jonathan.Cameron@huawei.com> > > > --- > > drivers/cxl/Kconfig | 18 +++++ > > drivers/cxl/mem.c | 132 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ > > include/uapi/linux/cxl_mem.h | 12 +++- > > 3 files changed, 161 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) > > > > diff --git a/drivers/cxl/Kconfig b/drivers/cxl/Kconfig > > index 9e80b311e928..97dc4d751651 100644 > > --- a/drivers/cxl/Kconfig > > +++ b/drivers/cxl/Kconfig > > @@ -32,4 +32,22 @@ config CXL_MEM > > Chapter 2.3 Type 3 CXL Device in the CXL 2.0 specification. > > > > If unsure say 'm'. > > + > > +config CXL_MEM_RAW_COMMANDS > > + bool "RAW Command Interface for Memory Devices" > > + depends on CXL_MEM > > + help > > + Enable CXL RAW command interface. > > + > > + The CXL driver ioctl interface may assign a kernel ioctl command > > + number for each specification defined opcode. At any given point in > > + time the number of opcodes that the specification defines and a device > > + may implement may exceed the kernel's set of associated ioctl function > > + numbers. The mismatch is either by omission, specification is too new, > > + or by design. When prototyping new hardware, or developing / debugging > > + the driver it is useful to be able to submit any possible command to > > + the hardware, even commands that may crash the kernel due to their > > + potential impact to memory currently in use by the kernel. > > + > > + If developing CXL hardware or the driver say Y, otherwise say N. > > endif > > diff --git a/drivers/cxl/mem.c b/drivers/cxl/mem.c > > index a4298cb1182d..6b4feb0ce47d 100644 > > --- a/drivers/cxl/mem.c > > +++ b/drivers/cxl/mem.c > > @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ > > // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only > > /* Copyright(c) 2020 Intel Corporation. All rights reserved. */ > > #include <uapi/linux/cxl_mem.h> > > +#include <linux/security.h> > > +#include <linux/debugfs.h> > > #include <linux/module.h> > > #include <linux/mutex.h> > > #include <linux/cdev.h> > > @@ -42,7 +44,14 @@ > > > > enum opcode { > > CXL_MBOX_OP_INVALID = 0x0000, > > + CXL_MBOX_OP_RAW = CXL_MBOX_OP_INVALID, > > + CXL_MBOX_OP_ACTIVATE_FW = 0x0202, > > CXL_MBOX_OP_IDENTIFY = 0x4000, > > + CXL_MBOX_OP_SET_PARTITION_INFO = 0x4101, > > + CXL_MBOX_OP_SET_LSA = 0x4103, > > + CXL_MBOX_OP_SET_SHUTDOWN_STATE = 0x4204, > > + CXL_MBOX_OP_SCAN_MEDIA = 0x4304, > > + CXL_MBOX_OP_GET_SCAN_MEDIA = 0x4305, > > CXL_MBOX_OP_MAX = 0x10000 > > }; > > > > @@ -92,6 +101,8 @@ struct cxl_memdev { > > > > static int cxl_mem_major; > > static DEFINE_IDA(cxl_memdev_ida); > > +static struct dentry *cxl_debugfs; > > +static bool cxl_raw_allow_all; > > > > /** > > * struct cxl_mem_command - Driver representation of a memory device command > > @@ -128,6 +139,49 @@ struct cxl_mem_command { > > */ > > static struct cxl_mem_command mem_commands[] = { > > CXL_CMD(IDENTIFY, 0, 0x43), > > +#ifdef CONFIG_CXL_MEM_RAW_COMMANDS > > + CXL_CMD(RAW, ~0, ~0), > > +#endif > > +}; > > + > > +/* > > + * Commands that RAW doesn't permit. The rationale for each: > > + * > > + * CXL_MBOX_OP_ACTIVATE_FW: Firmware activation requires adjustment / > > + * coordination of transaction timeout values at the root bridge level. > > + * > > + * CXL_MBOX_OP_SET_PARTITION_INFO: The device memory map may change live > > + * and needs to be coordinated with HDM updates. > > + * > > + * CXL_MBOX_OP_SET_LSA: The label storage area may be cached by the > > + * driver and any writes from userspace invalidates those contents. > > + * > > + * CXL_MBOX_OP_SET_SHUTDOWN_STATE: Set shutdown state assumes no writes > > + * to the device after it is marked clean, userspace can not make that > > + * assertion. > > + * > > + * CXL_MBOX_OP_[GET_]SCAN_MEDIA: The kernel provides a native error list that > > + * is kept up to date with patrol notifications and error management. > > + */ > > +static u16 cxl_disabled_raw_commands[] = { > > + CXL_MBOX_OP_ACTIVATE_FW, > > + CXL_MBOX_OP_SET_PARTITION_INFO, > > + CXL_MBOX_OP_SET_LSA, > > + CXL_MBOX_OP_SET_SHUTDOWN_STATE, > > + CXL_MBOX_OP_SCAN_MEDIA, > > + CXL_MBOX_OP_GET_SCAN_MEDIA, > > +}; > > + > > +/* > > + * Command sets that RAW doesn't permit. All opcodes in this set are > > + * disabled because they pass plain text security payloads over the > > + * user/kernel boundary. This functionality is intended to be wrapped > > + * behind the keys ABI which allows for encrypted payloads in the UAPI > > + */ > > +static u8 security_command_sets[] = { > > + 0x44, /* Sanitize */ > > + 0x45, /* Persistent Memory Data-at-rest Security */ > > + 0x46, /* Security Passthrough */ > > }; > > > > #define cxl_for_each_cmd(cmd) \ > > @@ -158,6 +212,16 @@ static int cxl_mem_wait_for_doorbell(struct cxl_mem *cxlm) > > return 0; > > } > > > > +static bool cxl_is_security_command(u16 opcode) > > +{ > > + int i; > > + > > + for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(security_command_sets); i++) > > + if (security_command_sets[i] == (opcode >> 8)) > > + return true; > > + return false; > > +} > > + > > static void cxl_mem_mbox_timeout(struct cxl_mem *cxlm, > > struct mbox_cmd *mbox_cmd) > > { > > @@ -426,6 +490,9 @@ static int handle_mailbox_cmd_from_user(struct cxl_mem *cxlm, > > cxl_command_names[cmd->info.id].name, mbox_cmd.opcode, > > cmd->info.size_in); > > > > + dev_WARN_ONCE(dev, cmd->info.id == CXL_MEM_COMMAND_ID_RAW, > > + "raw command path used\n"); > > + > > rc = __cxl_mem_mbox_send_cmd(cxlm, &mbox_cmd); > > cxl_mem_mbox_put(cxlm); > > if (rc) > > @@ -457,6 +524,29 @@ static int handle_mailbox_cmd_from_user(struct cxl_mem *cxlm, > > return rc; > > } > > > > +static bool cxl_mem_raw_command_allowed(u16 opcode) > > +{ > > + int i; > > + > > + if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CXL_MEM_RAW_COMMANDS)) > > + return false; > > + > > + if (security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_NONE)) > > + return false; > > + > > + if (cxl_raw_allow_all) > > + return true; > > + > > + if (cxl_is_security_command(opcode)) > > + return false; > > + > > + for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(cxl_disabled_raw_commands); i++) > > + if (cxl_disabled_raw_commands[i] == opcode) > > + return false; > > + > > + return true; > > +} > > + > > /** > > * cxl_validate_cmd_from_user() - Check fields for CXL_MEM_SEND_COMMAND. > > * @cxlm: &struct cxl_mem device whose mailbox will be used. > > @@ -468,6 +558,7 @@ static int handle_mailbox_cmd_from_user(struct cxl_mem *cxlm, > > * * %-ENOTTY - Invalid command specified. > > * * %-EINVAL - Reserved fields or invalid values were used. > > * * %-ENOMEM - Input or output buffer wasn't sized properly. > > + * * %-EPERM - Attempted to use a protected command. > > * > > * The result of this command is a fully validated command in @out_cmd that is > > * safe to send to the hardware. > > @@ -492,6 +583,40 @@ static int cxl_validate_cmd_from_user(struct cxl_mem *cxlm, > > if (send_cmd->in.size > cxlm->payload_size) > > return -EINVAL; > > > > + /* > > + * Checks are bypassed for raw commands but a WARN/taint will occur > > + * later in the callchain > > + */ > > + if (send_cmd->id == CXL_MEM_COMMAND_ID_RAW) { > > + const struct cxl_mem_command temp = { > > + .info = { > > + .id = CXL_MEM_COMMAND_ID_RAW, > > + .flags = 0, > > + .size_in = send_cmd->in.size, > > + .size_out = send_cmd->out.size, > > + }, > > + .opcode = send_cmd->raw.opcode > > + }; > > + > > + if (send_cmd->raw.rsvd) > > + return -EINVAL; > > + > > + /* > > + * Unlike supported commands, the output size of RAW commands > > + * gets passed along without further checking, so it must be > > + * validated here. > > + */ > > + if (send_cmd->out.size > cxlm->payload_size) > > + return -EINVAL; > > + > > + if (!cxl_mem_raw_command_allowed(send_cmd->raw.opcode)) > > + return -EPERM; > > + > > + memcpy(out_cmd, &temp, sizeof(temp)); > > + > > + return 0; > > + } > > + > > if (send_cmd->flags & ~CXL_MEM_COMMAND_FLAG_MASK) > > return -EINVAL; > > > > @@ -1153,6 +1278,7 @@ static struct pci_driver cxl_mem_driver = { > > > > static __init int cxl_mem_init(void) > > { > > + struct dentry *mbox_debugfs; > > dev_t devt; > > int rc; > > > > @@ -1169,11 +1295,17 @@ static __init int cxl_mem_init(void) > > return rc; > > } > > > > + cxl_debugfs = debugfs_create_dir("cxl", NULL); > > + mbox_debugfs = debugfs_create_dir("mbox", cxl_debugfs); > > + debugfs_create_bool("raw_allow_all", 0600, mbox_debugfs, > > + &cxl_raw_allow_all); > > + > > return 0; > > } > > > > static __exit void cxl_mem_exit(void) > > { > > + debugfs_remove_recursive(cxl_debugfs); > > pci_unregister_driver(&cxl_mem_driver); > > unregister_chrdev_region(MKDEV(cxl_mem_major, 0), CXL_MEM_MAX_DEVS); > > } > > diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/cxl_mem.h b/include/uapi/linux/cxl_mem.h > > index 18cea908ad0b..8eb669150ecb 100644 > > --- a/include/uapi/linux/cxl_mem.h > > +++ b/include/uapi/linux/cxl_mem.h > > @@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ > > #define CXL_CMDS \ > > ___C(INVALID, "Invalid Command"), \ > > ___C(IDENTIFY, "Identify Command"), \ > > + ___C(RAW, "Raw device command"), \ > > ___C(MAX, "invalid / last command") > > > > #define ___C(a, b) CXL_MEM_COMMAND_ID_##a > > @@ -115,6 +116,9 @@ struct cxl_mem_query_commands { > > * @id: The command to send to the memory device. This must be one of the > > * commands returned by the query command. > > * @flags: Flags for the command (input). > > + * @raw: Special fields for raw commands > > + * @raw.opcode: Opcode passed to hardware when using the RAW command. > > + * @raw.rsvd: Must be zero. > > * @rsvd: Must be zero. > > * @retval: Return value from the memory device (output). > > * @in.size: Size of the payload to provide to the device (input). > > @@ -135,7 +139,13 @@ struct cxl_mem_query_commands { > > struct cxl_send_command { > > __u32 id; > > __u32 flags; > > - __u32 rsvd; > > + union { > > + struct { > > + __u16 opcode; > > + __u16 rsvd; > > + } raw; > > + __u32 rsvd; > > + }; > > __u32 retval; > > > > struct { >
diff --git a/drivers/cxl/Kconfig b/drivers/cxl/Kconfig index 9e80b311e928..97dc4d751651 100644 --- a/drivers/cxl/Kconfig +++ b/drivers/cxl/Kconfig @@ -32,4 +32,22 @@ config CXL_MEM Chapter 2.3 Type 3 CXL Device in the CXL 2.0 specification. If unsure say 'm'. + +config CXL_MEM_RAW_COMMANDS + bool "RAW Command Interface for Memory Devices" + depends on CXL_MEM + help + Enable CXL RAW command interface. + + The CXL driver ioctl interface may assign a kernel ioctl command + number for each specification defined opcode. At any given point in + time the number of opcodes that the specification defines and a device + may implement may exceed the kernel's set of associated ioctl function + numbers. The mismatch is either by omission, specification is too new, + or by design. When prototyping new hardware, or developing / debugging + the driver it is useful to be able to submit any possible command to + the hardware, even commands that may crash the kernel due to their + potential impact to memory currently in use by the kernel. + + If developing CXL hardware or the driver say Y, otherwise say N. endif diff --git a/drivers/cxl/mem.c b/drivers/cxl/mem.c index a4298cb1182d..6b4feb0ce47d 100644 --- a/drivers/cxl/mem.c +++ b/drivers/cxl/mem.c @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only /* Copyright(c) 2020 Intel Corporation. All rights reserved. */ #include <uapi/linux/cxl_mem.h> +#include <linux/security.h> +#include <linux/debugfs.h> #include <linux/module.h> #include <linux/mutex.h> #include <linux/cdev.h> @@ -42,7 +44,14 @@ enum opcode { CXL_MBOX_OP_INVALID = 0x0000, + CXL_MBOX_OP_RAW = CXL_MBOX_OP_INVALID, + CXL_MBOX_OP_ACTIVATE_FW = 0x0202, CXL_MBOX_OP_IDENTIFY = 0x4000, + CXL_MBOX_OP_SET_PARTITION_INFO = 0x4101, + CXL_MBOX_OP_SET_LSA = 0x4103, + CXL_MBOX_OP_SET_SHUTDOWN_STATE = 0x4204, + CXL_MBOX_OP_SCAN_MEDIA = 0x4304, + CXL_MBOX_OP_GET_SCAN_MEDIA = 0x4305, CXL_MBOX_OP_MAX = 0x10000 }; @@ -92,6 +101,8 @@ struct cxl_memdev { static int cxl_mem_major; static DEFINE_IDA(cxl_memdev_ida); +static struct dentry *cxl_debugfs; +static bool cxl_raw_allow_all; /** * struct cxl_mem_command - Driver representation of a memory device command @@ -128,6 +139,49 @@ struct cxl_mem_command { */ static struct cxl_mem_command mem_commands[] = { CXL_CMD(IDENTIFY, 0, 0x43), +#ifdef CONFIG_CXL_MEM_RAW_COMMANDS + CXL_CMD(RAW, ~0, ~0), +#endif +}; + +/* + * Commands that RAW doesn't permit. The rationale for each: + * + * CXL_MBOX_OP_ACTIVATE_FW: Firmware activation requires adjustment / + * coordination of transaction timeout values at the root bridge level. + * + * CXL_MBOX_OP_SET_PARTITION_INFO: The device memory map may change live + * and needs to be coordinated with HDM updates. + * + * CXL_MBOX_OP_SET_LSA: The label storage area may be cached by the + * driver and any writes from userspace invalidates those contents. + * + * CXL_MBOX_OP_SET_SHUTDOWN_STATE: Set shutdown state assumes no writes + * to the device after it is marked clean, userspace can not make that + * assertion. + * + * CXL_MBOX_OP_[GET_]SCAN_MEDIA: The kernel provides a native error list that + * is kept up to date with patrol notifications and error management. + */ +static u16 cxl_disabled_raw_commands[] = { + CXL_MBOX_OP_ACTIVATE_FW, + CXL_MBOX_OP_SET_PARTITION_INFO, + CXL_MBOX_OP_SET_LSA, + CXL_MBOX_OP_SET_SHUTDOWN_STATE, + CXL_MBOX_OP_SCAN_MEDIA, + CXL_MBOX_OP_GET_SCAN_MEDIA, +}; + +/* + * Command sets that RAW doesn't permit. All opcodes in this set are + * disabled because they pass plain text security payloads over the + * user/kernel boundary. This functionality is intended to be wrapped + * behind the keys ABI which allows for encrypted payloads in the UAPI + */ +static u8 security_command_sets[] = { + 0x44, /* Sanitize */ + 0x45, /* Persistent Memory Data-at-rest Security */ + 0x46, /* Security Passthrough */ }; #define cxl_for_each_cmd(cmd) \ @@ -158,6 +212,16 @@ static int cxl_mem_wait_for_doorbell(struct cxl_mem *cxlm) return 0; } +static bool cxl_is_security_command(u16 opcode) +{ + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(security_command_sets); i++) + if (security_command_sets[i] == (opcode >> 8)) + return true; + return false; +} + static void cxl_mem_mbox_timeout(struct cxl_mem *cxlm, struct mbox_cmd *mbox_cmd) { @@ -426,6 +490,9 @@ static int handle_mailbox_cmd_from_user(struct cxl_mem *cxlm, cxl_command_names[cmd->info.id].name, mbox_cmd.opcode, cmd->info.size_in); + dev_WARN_ONCE(dev, cmd->info.id == CXL_MEM_COMMAND_ID_RAW, + "raw command path used\n"); + rc = __cxl_mem_mbox_send_cmd(cxlm, &mbox_cmd); cxl_mem_mbox_put(cxlm); if (rc) @@ -457,6 +524,29 @@ static int handle_mailbox_cmd_from_user(struct cxl_mem *cxlm, return rc; } +static bool cxl_mem_raw_command_allowed(u16 opcode) +{ + int i; + + if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CXL_MEM_RAW_COMMANDS)) + return false; + + if (security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_NONE)) + return false; + + if (cxl_raw_allow_all) + return true; + + if (cxl_is_security_command(opcode)) + return false; + + for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(cxl_disabled_raw_commands); i++) + if (cxl_disabled_raw_commands[i] == opcode) + return false; + + return true; +} + /** * cxl_validate_cmd_from_user() - Check fields for CXL_MEM_SEND_COMMAND. * @cxlm: &struct cxl_mem device whose mailbox will be used. @@ -468,6 +558,7 @@ static int handle_mailbox_cmd_from_user(struct cxl_mem *cxlm, * * %-ENOTTY - Invalid command specified. * * %-EINVAL - Reserved fields or invalid values were used. * * %-ENOMEM - Input or output buffer wasn't sized properly. + * * %-EPERM - Attempted to use a protected command. * * The result of this command is a fully validated command in @out_cmd that is * safe to send to the hardware. @@ -492,6 +583,40 @@ static int cxl_validate_cmd_from_user(struct cxl_mem *cxlm, if (send_cmd->in.size > cxlm->payload_size) return -EINVAL; + /* + * Checks are bypassed for raw commands but a WARN/taint will occur + * later in the callchain + */ + if (send_cmd->id == CXL_MEM_COMMAND_ID_RAW) { + const struct cxl_mem_command temp = { + .info = { + .id = CXL_MEM_COMMAND_ID_RAW, + .flags = 0, + .size_in = send_cmd->in.size, + .size_out = send_cmd->out.size, + }, + .opcode = send_cmd->raw.opcode + }; + + if (send_cmd->raw.rsvd) + return -EINVAL; + + /* + * Unlike supported commands, the output size of RAW commands + * gets passed along without further checking, so it must be + * validated here. + */ + if (send_cmd->out.size > cxlm->payload_size) + return -EINVAL; + + if (!cxl_mem_raw_command_allowed(send_cmd->raw.opcode)) + return -EPERM; + + memcpy(out_cmd, &temp, sizeof(temp)); + + return 0; + } + if (send_cmd->flags & ~CXL_MEM_COMMAND_FLAG_MASK) return -EINVAL; @@ -1153,6 +1278,7 @@ static struct pci_driver cxl_mem_driver = { static __init int cxl_mem_init(void) { + struct dentry *mbox_debugfs; dev_t devt; int rc; @@ -1169,11 +1295,17 @@ static __init int cxl_mem_init(void) return rc; } + cxl_debugfs = debugfs_create_dir("cxl", NULL); + mbox_debugfs = debugfs_create_dir("mbox", cxl_debugfs); + debugfs_create_bool("raw_allow_all", 0600, mbox_debugfs, + &cxl_raw_allow_all); + return 0; } static __exit void cxl_mem_exit(void) { + debugfs_remove_recursive(cxl_debugfs); pci_unregister_driver(&cxl_mem_driver); unregister_chrdev_region(MKDEV(cxl_mem_major, 0), CXL_MEM_MAX_DEVS); } diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/cxl_mem.h b/include/uapi/linux/cxl_mem.h index 18cea908ad0b..8eb669150ecb 100644 --- a/include/uapi/linux/cxl_mem.h +++ b/include/uapi/linux/cxl_mem.h @@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ #define CXL_CMDS \ ___C(INVALID, "Invalid Command"), \ ___C(IDENTIFY, "Identify Command"), \ + ___C(RAW, "Raw device command"), \ ___C(MAX, "invalid / last command") #define ___C(a, b) CXL_MEM_COMMAND_ID_##a @@ -115,6 +116,9 @@ struct cxl_mem_query_commands { * @id: The command to send to the memory device. This must be one of the * commands returned by the query command. * @flags: Flags for the command (input). + * @raw: Special fields for raw commands + * @raw.opcode: Opcode passed to hardware when using the RAW command. + * @raw.rsvd: Must be zero. * @rsvd: Must be zero. * @retval: Return value from the memory device (output). * @in.size: Size of the payload to provide to the device (input). @@ -135,7 +139,13 @@ struct cxl_mem_query_commands { struct cxl_send_command { __u32 id; __u32 flags; - __u32 rsvd; + union { + struct { + __u16 opcode; + __u16 rsvd; + } raw; + __u32 rsvd; + }; __u32 retval; struct {