| Message ID | 29e45605-7a3c-944b-7bea-5959f8ff0793@linux.intel.com (mailing list archive) |
|---|---|
| State | Not Applicable |
| Headers | show |
| Series | Introduce CAP_PERFMON to secure system performance monitoring and observability | expand |
On Mon, 17 Feb 2020, Alexey Budankov wrote: > For backward compatibility reasons access to the monitoring remains > open for CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged processes but CAP_SYS_ADMIN usage > for secure monitoring is discouraged with respect to CAP_PERFMON > capability. > > Signed-off-by: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
diff --git a/arch/parisc/kernel/perf.c b/arch/parisc/kernel/perf.c index e1a8fee3ad49..d46b6709ec56 100644 --- a/arch/parisc/kernel/perf.c +++ b/arch/parisc/kernel/perf.c @@ -300,7 +300,7 @@ static ssize_t perf_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, else return -EFAULT; - if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) + if (!perfmon_capable()) return -EACCES; if (count != sizeof(uint32_t))
Open access to monitoring for CAP_PERFMON privileged process. Providing the access under CAP_PERFMON capability singly, without the rest of CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials, excludes chances to misuse the credentials and makes operation more secure. CAP_PERFMON implements the principal of least privilege for performance monitoring and observability operations (POSIX IEEE 1003.1e 2.2.2.39 principle of least privilege: A security design principle that states that a process or program be granted only those privileges (e.g., capabilities) necessary to accomplish its legitimate function, and only for the time that such privileges are actually required) For backward compatibility reasons access to the monitoring remains open for CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged processes but CAP_SYS_ADMIN usage for secure monitoring is discouraged with respect to CAP_PERFMON capability. Signed-off-by: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com> --- arch/parisc/kernel/perf.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)