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[v3,1/7] capabilities: introduce CAP_SYS_PERFMON to kernel and user space

Message ID bd8adfde-f562-0e56-75aa-371c5354f350@linux.intel.com (mailing list archive)
State Awaiting Upstream
Headers show
Series Introduce CAP_SYS_PERFMON to secure system performance monitoring and observability | expand

Commit Message

Alexey Budankov Dec. 16, 2019, 7:58 p.m. UTC
Introduce CAP_SYS_PERFMON capability devoted to secure system performance
monitoring and observability so that CAP_SYS_PERFMON would assist
CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability in its governing role for perf_events, i915_perf
and other subsystems of the kernel.

CAP_SYS_PERFMON intends to harden system security and integrity during
system performance monitoring and observability by decreasing attack surface
that is available to CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged processes.

CAP_SYS_PERFMON intends to take over CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials related to
system performance monitoring and observability and balance amount of
CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials in accordance with the recommendations provided
in the man page for CAP_SYS_ADMIN [1]: "Note: this capability is overloaded;
see Notes to kernel developers, below."

[1] http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man7/capabilities.7.html

Signed-off-by: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com>
---
 include/linux/capability.h          | 1 +
 include/uapi/linux/capability.h     | 8 +++++++-
 security/selinux/include/classmap.h | 4 ++--
 3 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

Comments

Stephen Smalley Dec. 17, 2019, 3:02 p.m. UTC | #1
On 12/16/19 2:58 PM, Alexey Budankov wrote:
> 
> Introduce CAP_SYS_PERFMON capability devoted to secure system performance
> monitoring and observability so that CAP_SYS_PERFMON would assist
> CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability in its governing role for perf_events, i915_perf
> and other subsystems of the kernel.
> 
> CAP_SYS_PERFMON intends to harden system security and integrity during
> system performance monitoring and observability by decreasing attack surface
> that is available to CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged processes.
> 
> CAP_SYS_PERFMON intends to take over CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials related to
> system performance monitoring and observability and balance amount of
> CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials in accordance with the recommendations provided
> in the man page for CAP_SYS_ADMIN [1]: "Note: this capability is overloaded;
> see Notes to kernel developers, below."
> 
> [1] http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man7/capabilities.7.html
> 
> Signed-off-by: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com>
> ---
>   include/linux/capability.h          | 1 +
>   include/uapi/linux/capability.h     | 8 +++++++-
>   security/selinux/include/classmap.h | 4 ++--
>   3 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/include/linux/capability.h b/include/linux/capability.h
> index ecce0f43c73a..6342502c4c2a 100644
> --- a/include/linux/capability.h
> +++ b/include/linux/capability.h
> @@ -251,6 +251,7 @@ extern bool privileged_wrt_inode_uidgid(struct user_namespace *ns, const struct
>   extern bool capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(const struct inode *inode, int cap);
>   extern bool file_ns_capable(const struct file *file, struct user_namespace *ns, int cap);
>   extern bool ptracer_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, struct user_namespace *ns);
> +#define perfmon_capable() (capable(CAP_SYS_PERFMON) || capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))

I think making it a static inline bool function instead of a macro would 
be preferred?

Otherwise,
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

>   
>   /* audit system wants to get cap info from files as well */
>   extern int get_vfs_caps_from_disk(const struct dentry *dentry, struct cpu_vfs_cap_data *cpu_caps);
> diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/capability.h b/include/uapi/linux/capability.h
> index 240fdb9a60f6..98e03cc76c7c 100644
> --- a/include/uapi/linux/capability.h
> +++ b/include/uapi/linux/capability.h
> @@ -366,8 +366,14 @@ struct vfs_ns_cap_data {
>   
>   #define CAP_AUDIT_READ		37
>   
> +/*
> + * Allow system performance and observability privileged operations
> + * using perf_events, i915_perf and other kernel subsystems
> + */
> +
> +#define CAP_SYS_PERFMON		38
>   
> -#define CAP_LAST_CAP         CAP_AUDIT_READ
> +#define CAP_LAST_CAP         CAP_SYS_PERFMON
>   
>   #define cap_valid(x) ((x) >= 0 && (x) <= CAP_LAST_CAP)
>   
> diff --git a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
> index 7db24855e12d..bae602c623b0 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
> +++ b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
> @@ -27,9 +27,9 @@
>   	    "audit_control", "setfcap"
>   
>   #define COMMON_CAP2_PERMS  "mac_override", "mac_admin", "syslog", \
> -		"wake_alarm", "block_suspend", "audit_read"
> +		"wake_alarm", "block_suspend", "audit_read", "sys_perfmon"
>   
> -#if CAP_LAST_CAP > CAP_AUDIT_READ
> +#if CAP_LAST_CAP > CAP_SYS_PERFMON
>   #error New capability defined, please update COMMON_CAP2_PERMS.
>   #endif
>   
>
diff mbox series

Patch

diff --git a/include/linux/capability.h b/include/linux/capability.h
index ecce0f43c73a..6342502c4c2a 100644
--- a/include/linux/capability.h
+++ b/include/linux/capability.h
@@ -251,6 +251,7 @@  extern bool privileged_wrt_inode_uidgid(struct user_namespace *ns, const struct
 extern bool capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(const struct inode *inode, int cap);
 extern bool file_ns_capable(const struct file *file, struct user_namespace *ns, int cap);
 extern bool ptracer_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, struct user_namespace *ns);
+#define perfmon_capable() (capable(CAP_SYS_PERFMON) || capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
 
 /* audit system wants to get cap info from files as well */
 extern int get_vfs_caps_from_disk(const struct dentry *dentry, struct cpu_vfs_cap_data *cpu_caps);
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/capability.h b/include/uapi/linux/capability.h
index 240fdb9a60f6..98e03cc76c7c 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/capability.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/capability.h
@@ -366,8 +366,14 @@  struct vfs_ns_cap_data {
 
 #define CAP_AUDIT_READ		37
 
+/*
+ * Allow system performance and observability privileged operations
+ * using perf_events, i915_perf and other kernel subsystems
+ */
+
+#define CAP_SYS_PERFMON		38
 
-#define CAP_LAST_CAP         CAP_AUDIT_READ
+#define CAP_LAST_CAP         CAP_SYS_PERFMON
 
 #define cap_valid(x) ((x) >= 0 && (x) <= CAP_LAST_CAP)
 
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
index 7db24855e12d..bae602c623b0 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
@@ -27,9 +27,9 @@ 
 	    "audit_control", "setfcap"
 
 #define COMMON_CAP2_PERMS  "mac_override", "mac_admin", "syslog", \
-		"wake_alarm", "block_suspend", "audit_read"
+		"wake_alarm", "block_suspend", "audit_read", "sys_perfmon"
 
-#if CAP_LAST_CAP > CAP_AUDIT_READ
+#if CAP_LAST_CAP > CAP_SYS_PERFMON
 #error New capability defined, please update COMMON_CAP2_PERMS.
 #endif