| Message ID | 20211009003711.1390019-2-sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com (mailing list archive) |
|---|---|
| State | Not Applicable |
| Delegated to: | Bjorn Helgaas |
| Headers | show |
| Series | Add TDX Guest Support (shared-mm support) | expand |
On 10/8/21 7:36 PM, Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan wrote: > From: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> > > Intel TDX doesn't allow VMM to access guest private memory. Any memory > that is required for communication with VMM must be shared explicitly > by setting the bit in page table entry. After setting the shared bit, > the conversion must be completed with MapGPA hypercall. Details about > MapGPA hypercall can be found in [1], sec 3.2. > > The call informs VMM about the conversion between private/shared > mappings. The shared memory is similar to unencrypted memory in AMD > SME/SEV terminology but the underlying process of sharing/un-sharing > the memory is different for Intel TDX guest platform. > > SEV assumes that I/O devices can only do DMA to "decrypted" physical > addresses without the C-bit set. In order for the CPU to interact with > this memory, the CPU needs a decrypted mapping. To add this support, > AMD SME code forces force_dma_unencrypted() to return true for > platforms that support AMD SEV feature. It will be used for DMA memory > allocation API to trigger set_memory_decrypted() for platforms that > support AMD SEV feature. > > TDX is similar. So, to communicate with I/O devices, related pages need > to be marked as shared. As mentioned above, shared memory in TDX > architecture is similar to decrypted memory in AMD SME/SEV. So similar > to AMD SEV, force_dma_unencrypted() has to forced to return true. This > support is added in other patches in this series. > > So move force_dma_unencrypted() out of AMD specific code and call AMD > specific (amd_force_dma_unencrypted()) initialization function from it. > force_dma_unencrypted() will be modified by later patches to include > Intel TDX guest platform specific initialization. > > Also, introduce new config option X86_MEM_ENCRYPT_COMMON that has to be > selected by all x86 memory encryption features. This will be selected > by both AMD SEV and Intel TDX guest config options. > > This is preparation for TDX changes in DMA code and it has no > functional change. Can force_dma_unencrypted() be moved to arch/x86/kernel/cc_platform.c, instead of creating a new file? It might fit better with patch #6. Thanks, Tom > > [1] - https://software.intel.com/content/dam/develop/external/us/en/documents/intel-tdx-guest-hypervisor-communication-interface.pdf > > Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> > Reviewed-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> > Reviewed-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> > Signed-off-by: Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan <sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com> > --- > > Changes since v4: > * Removed used we/you from commit log. > > Change since v3: > * None > > Changes since v1: > * Removed sev_active(), sme_active() checks in force_dma_unencrypted(). > > arch/x86/Kconfig | 8 ++++++-- > arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt_common.h | 18 ++++++++++++++++++ > arch/x86/mm/Makefile | 2 ++ > arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c | 3 ++- > arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_common.c | 17 +++++++++++++++++ > 5 files changed, 45 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) > create mode 100644 arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt_common.h > create mode 100644 arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_common.c > > diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig > index af49ad084919..37b27412f52e 100644 > --- a/arch/x86/Kconfig > +++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig > @@ -1519,16 +1519,20 @@ config X86_CPA_STATISTICS > helps to determine the effectiveness of preserving large and huge > page mappings when mapping protections are changed. > > +config X86_MEM_ENCRYPT_COMMON > + select ARCH_HAS_FORCE_DMA_UNENCRYPTED > + select DYNAMIC_PHYSICAL_MASK > + def_bool n > + > config AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT > bool "AMD Secure Memory Encryption (SME) support" > depends on X86_64 && CPU_SUP_AMD > select DMA_COHERENT_POOL > - select DYNAMIC_PHYSICAL_MASK > select ARCH_USE_MEMREMAP_PROT > - select ARCH_HAS_FORCE_DMA_UNENCRYPTED > select INSTRUCTION_DECODER > select ARCH_HAS_RESTRICTED_VIRTIO_MEMORY_ACCESS > select ARCH_HAS_CC_PLATFORM > + select X86_MEM_ENCRYPT_COMMON > help > Say yes to enable support for the encryption of system memory. > This requires an AMD processor that supports Secure Memory > diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt_common.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt_common.h > new file mode 100644 > index 000000000000..697bc40a4e3d > --- /dev/null > +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt_common.h > @@ -0,0 +1,18 @@ > +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ > +/* Copyright (C) 2020 Intel Corporation */ > +#ifndef _ASM_X86_MEM_ENCRYPT_COMMON_H > +#define _ASM_X86_MEM_ENCRYPT_COMMON_H > + > +#include <linux/mem_encrypt.h> > +#include <linux/device.h> > + > +#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT > +bool amd_force_dma_unencrypted(struct device *dev); > +#else /* CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT */ > +static inline bool amd_force_dma_unencrypted(struct device *dev) > +{ > + return false; > +} > +#endif /* CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT */ > + > +#endif > diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/Makefile b/arch/x86/mm/Makefile > index 5864219221ca..b31cb52bf1bd 100644 > --- a/arch/x86/mm/Makefile > +++ b/arch/x86/mm/Makefile > @@ -52,6 +52,8 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_X86_INTEL_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS) += pkeys.o > obj-$(CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_MEMORY) += kaslr.o > obj-$(CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION) += pti.o > > +obj-$(CONFIG_X86_MEM_ENCRYPT_COMMON) += mem_encrypt_common.o > + > obj-$(CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT) += mem_encrypt.o > obj-$(CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT) += mem_encrypt_identity.o > obj-$(CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT) += mem_encrypt_boot.o > diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c > index 23d54b810f08..5d7fbed73949 100644 > --- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c > +++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c > @@ -31,6 +31,7 @@ > #include <asm/processor-flags.h> > #include <asm/msr.h> > #include <asm/cmdline.h> > +#include <asm/mem_encrypt_common.h> > > #include "mm_internal.h" > > @@ -362,7 +363,7 @@ int __init early_set_memory_encrypted(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long size) > } > > /* Override for DMA direct allocation check - ARCH_HAS_FORCE_DMA_UNENCRYPTED */ > -bool force_dma_unencrypted(struct device *dev) > +bool amd_force_dma_unencrypted(struct device *dev) > { > /* > * For SEV, all DMA must be to unencrypted addresses. > diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_common.c b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_common.c > new file mode 100644 > index 000000000000..f063c885b0a5 > --- /dev/null > +++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_common.c > @@ -0,0 +1,17 @@ > +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only > +/* > + * Memory Encryption Support Common Code > + * > + * Copyright (C) 2021 Intel Corporation > + * > + * Author: Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan <sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com> > + */ > + > +#include <asm/mem_encrypt_common.h> > +#include <linux/dma-mapping.h> > + > +/* Override for DMA direct allocation check - ARCH_HAS_FORCE_DMA_UNENCRYPTED */ > +bool force_dma_unencrypted(struct device *dev) > +{ > + return amd_force_dma_unencrypted(dev); > +} >
On 10/20/21 9:11 AM, Tom Lendacky wrote: >> Intel TDX doesn't allow VMM to access guest private memory. Any memory >> that is required for communication with VMM must be shared explicitly >> by setting the bit in page table entry. After setting the shared bit, >> the conversion must be completed with MapGPA hypercall. Details about >> MapGPA hypercall can be found in [1], sec 3.2. >> >> The call informs VMM about the conversion between private/shared >> mappings. The shared memory is similar to unencrypted memory in AMD >> SME/SEV terminology but the underlying process of sharing/un-sharing >> the memory is different for Intel TDX guest platform. >> >> SEV assumes that I/O devices can only do DMA to "decrypted" physical >> addresses without the C-bit set. In order for the CPU to interact with >> this memory, the CPU needs a decrypted mapping. To add this support, >> AMD SME code forces force_dma_unencrypted() to return true for >> platforms that support AMD SEV feature. It will be used for DMA memory >> allocation API to trigger set_memory_decrypted() for platforms that >> support AMD SEV feature. >> >> TDX is similar. So, to communicate with I/O devices, related pages need >> to be marked as shared. As mentioned above, shared memory in TDX >> architecture is similar to decrypted memory in AMD SME/SEV. So similar >> to AMD SEV, force_dma_unencrypted() has to forced to return true. This >> support is added in other patches in this series. >> >> So move force_dma_unencrypted() out of AMD specific code and call AMD >> specific (amd_force_dma_unencrypted()) initialization function from it. >> force_dma_unencrypted() will be modified by later patches to include >> Intel TDX guest platform specific initialization. >> >> Also, introduce new config option X86_MEM_ENCRYPT_COMMON that has to be >> selected by all x86 memory encryption features. This will be selected >> by both AMD SEV and Intel TDX guest config options. >> >> This is preparation for TDX changes in DMA code and it has no >> functional change. > > Can force_dma_unencrypted() be moved to arch/x86/kernel/cc_platform.c, > instead of creating a new file? It might fit better with patch #6. Please check the final version of mem_encrypt_common.c https://github.com/intel/tdx/blob/guest/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_common.c I am not sure whether it is alright to move mem_encrypt_init() and arch_has_restricted_virtio_memory_access() to cc_platform.c If this is fine, I can get rid of mem_encrypt_common.c
diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig index af49ad084919..37b27412f52e 100644 --- a/arch/x86/Kconfig +++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig @@ -1519,16 +1519,20 @@ config X86_CPA_STATISTICS helps to determine the effectiveness of preserving large and huge page mappings when mapping protections are changed. +config X86_MEM_ENCRYPT_COMMON + select ARCH_HAS_FORCE_DMA_UNENCRYPTED + select DYNAMIC_PHYSICAL_MASK + def_bool n + config AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT bool "AMD Secure Memory Encryption (SME) support" depends on X86_64 && CPU_SUP_AMD select DMA_COHERENT_POOL - select DYNAMIC_PHYSICAL_MASK select ARCH_USE_MEMREMAP_PROT - select ARCH_HAS_FORCE_DMA_UNENCRYPTED select INSTRUCTION_DECODER select ARCH_HAS_RESTRICTED_VIRTIO_MEMORY_ACCESS select ARCH_HAS_CC_PLATFORM + select X86_MEM_ENCRYPT_COMMON help Say yes to enable support for the encryption of system memory. This requires an AMD processor that supports Secure Memory diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt_common.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt_common.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..697bc40a4e3d --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt_common.h @@ -0,0 +1,18 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +/* Copyright (C) 2020 Intel Corporation */ +#ifndef _ASM_X86_MEM_ENCRYPT_COMMON_H +#define _ASM_X86_MEM_ENCRYPT_COMMON_H + +#include <linux/mem_encrypt.h> +#include <linux/device.h> + +#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT +bool amd_force_dma_unencrypted(struct device *dev); +#else /* CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT */ +static inline bool amd_force_dma_unencrypted(struct device *dev) +{ + return false; +} +#endif /* CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT */ + +#endif diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/Makefile b/arch/x86/mm/Makefile index 5864219221ca..b31cb52bf1bd 100644 --- a/arch/x86/mm/Makefile +++ b/arch/x86/mm/Makefile @@ -52,6 +52,8 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_X86_INTEL_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS) += pkeys.o obj-$(CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_MEMORY) += kaslr.o obj-$(CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION) += pti.o +obj-$(CONFIG_X86_MEM_ENCRYPT_COMMON) += mem_encrypt_common.o + obj-$(CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT) += mem_encrypt.o obj-$(CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT) += mem_encrypt_identity.o obj-$(CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT) += mem_encrypt_boot.o diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c index 23d54b810f08..5d7fbed73949 100644 --- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c +++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c @@ -31,6 +31,7 @@ #include <asm/processor-flags.h> #include <asm/msr.h> #include <asm/cmdline.h> +#include <asm/mem_encrypt_common.h> #include "mm_internal.h" @@ -362,7 +363,7 @@ int __init early_set_memory_encrypted(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long size) } /* Override for DMA direct allocation check - ARCH_HAS_FORCE_DMA_UNENCRYPTED */ -bool force_dma_unencrypted(struct device *dev) +bool amd_force_dma_unencrypted(struct device *dev) { /* * For SEV, all DMA must be to unencrypted addresses. diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_common.c b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_common.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..f063c885b0a5 --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_common.c @@ -0,0 +1,17 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only +/* + * Memory Encryption Support Common Code + * + * Copyright (C) 2021 Intel Corporation + * + * Author: Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan <sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com> + */ + +#include <asm/mem_encrypt_common.h> +#include <linux/dma-mapping.h> + +/* Override for DMA direct allocation check - ARCH_HAS_FORCE_DMA_UNENCRYPTED */ +bool force_dma_unencrypted(struct device *dev) +{ + return amd_force_dma_unencrypted(dev); +}