Message ID | 20230628131442.3022772-4-sameo@rivosinc.com (mailing list archive) |
---|---|
State | Superseded |
Headers | show |
Series | RISC-V: archrandom support | expand |
Context | Check | Description |
---|---|---|
conchuod/cover_letter | success | Series has a cover letter |
conchuod/tree_selection | success | Guessed tree name to be for-next at HEAD 488833ccdcac |
conchuod/fixes_present | success | Fixes tag not required for -next series |
conchuod/maintainers_pattern | success | MAINTAINERS pattern errors before the patch: 6 and now 6 |
conchuod/verify_signedoff | success | Signed-off-by tag matches author and committer |
conchuod/kdoc | success | Errors and warnings before: 0 this patch: 0 |
conchuod/build_rv64_clang_allmodconfig | success | Errors and warnings before: 2857 this patch: 2857 |
conchuod/module_param | success | Was 0 now: 0 |
conchuod/build_rv64_gcc_allmodconfig | success | Errors and warnings before: 16720 this patch: 16719 |
conchuod/build_rv32_defconfig | success | Build OK |
conchuod/dtb_warn_rv64 | success | Errors and warnings before: 20 this patch: 20 |
conchuod/header_inline | success | No static functions without inline keyword in header files |
conchuod/checkpatch | warning | WARNING: added, moved or deleted file(s), does MAINTAINERS need updating? |
conchuod/build_rv64_nommu_k210_defconfig | success | Build OK |
conchuod/verify_fixes | success | No Fixes tag |
conchuod/build_rv64_nommu_virt_defconfig | success | Build OK |
On Wed, Jun 28, 2023 at 03:14:35PM +0200, Samuel Ortiz wrote: > The Zkr extension is ratified and provides 16 bits of entropy seed when > reading the SEED CSR. > > We can implement arch_get_random_seed_longs() by doing multiple csrrw to > that CSR and filling an unsigned long with valid entropy bits. > > Signed-off-by: Samuel Ortiz <sameo@rivosinc.com> Acked-by: Conor Dooley <conor.dooley@microchip.com> Cheers, Conor.
On Wed, Jun 28, 2023 at 9:15 AM Samuel Ortiz <sameo@rivosinc.com> wrote: > > The Zkr extension is ratified and provides 16 bits of entropy seed when > reading the SEED CSR. > > We can implement arch_get_random_seed_longs() by doing multiple csrrw to > that CSR and filling an unsigned long with valid entropy bits. > > Signed-off-by: Samuel Ortiz <sameo@rivosinc.com> > --- > arch/riscv/include/asm/archrandom.h | 70 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ > arch/riscv/include/asm/csr.h | 9 ++++ > 2 files changed, 79 insertions(+) > create mode 100644 arch/riscv/include/asm/archrandom.h > > diff --git a/arch/riscv/include/asm/archrandom.h b/arch/riscv/include/asm/archrandom.h > new file mode 100644 > index 000000000000..8987cd0b891d > --- /dev/null > +++ b/arch/riscv/include/asm/archrandom.h > @@ -0,0 +1,70 @@ > +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ > +/* > + * Kernel interface for the RISCV arch_random_* functions > + * > + * Copyright (c) 2023 by Rivos Inc. > + * > + */ > + > +#ifndef ASM_RISCV_ARCHRANDOM_H > +#define ASM_RISCV_ARCHRANDOM_H > + > +#include <asm/csr.h> > + > +#define SEED_RETRY_LOOPS 10 > + > +static inline bool __must_check csr_seed_long(unsigned long *v) > +{ > + unsigned int retry = SEED_RETRY_LOOPS, valid_seeds = 0; > + const int needed_seeds = sizeof(long) / sizeof(u16); > + u16 *entropy = (u16 *)v; > + > + do { > + /* > + * The SEED CSR (0x015) must be accessed with a read-write > + * instruction. > + */ > + unsigned long csr_seed = csr_swap(CSR_SEED, 0); > + > + switch (csr_seed & SEED_OPST_MASK) { > + case SEED_OPST_ES16: > + entropy[valid_seeds++] = csr_seed & SEED_ENTROPY_MASK; > + if (valid_seeds == needed_seeds) max_longs = 1? needed_seeds only could be 2/4. > + return true; > + break; > + > + case SEED_OPST_DEAD: > + pr_err_once("archrandom: Unrecoverable error\n"); Do we need this pr_err? Could we treat it as a return false? Yes, it's a hardware problem, but not serious. > + return false; > + > + case SEED_OPST_BIST: > + case SEED_OPST_WAIT: > + default: > + continue; > + } > + } while (--retry); > + > + return false; > +} > + > +static inline size_t __must_check arch_get_random_longs(unsigned long *v, size_t max_longs) > +{ > + return 0; > +} > + > +static inline size_t __must_check arch_get_random_seed_longs(unsigned long *v, size_t max_longs) > +{ > + if (!max_longs ) if (max_longs == 1) ? > + return 0; > + > + /* > + * If Zkr is supported and csr_seed_long succeeds, we return one long > + * worth of entropy. > + */ > + if (riscv_has_extension_likely(RISCV_ISA_EXT_ZKR) && csr_seed_long(v)) > + return 1; > + > + return 0; > +} > + > +#endif /* ASM_RISCV_ARCHRANDOM_H */ > diff --git a/arch/riscv/include/asm/csr.h b/arch/riscv/include/asm/csr.h > index b98b3b6c9da2..7d0ca9082c66 100644 > --- a/arch/riscv/include/asm/csr.h > +++ b/arch/riscv/include/asm/csr.h > @@ -389,6 +389,15 @@ > #define CSR_VTYPE 0xc21 > #define CSR_VLENB 0xc22 > > +/* Scalar Crypto Extension - Entropy */ > +#define CSR_SEED 0x015 > +#define SEED_OPST_MASK _AC(0xC0000000, UL) > +#define SEED_OPST_BIST _AC(0x00000000, UL) > +#define SEED_OPST_WAIT _AC(0x40000000, UL) > +#define SEED_OPST_ES16 _AC(0x80000000, UL) > +#define SEED_OPST_DEAD _AC(0xC0000000, UL) > +#define SEED_ENTROPY_MASK _AC(0xFFFF, UL) > + > #ifdef CONFIG_RISCV_M_MODE > # define CSR_STATUS CSR_MSTATUS > # define CSR_IE CSR_MIE > -- > 2.41.0 > Reviewed-by: Guo Ren <guoren@kernel.org>
diff --git a/arch/riscv/include/asm/archrandom.h b/arch/riscv/include/asm/archrandom.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..8987cd0b891d --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/riscv/include/asm/archrandom.h @@ -0,0 +1,70 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +/* + * Kernel interface for the RISCV arch_random_* functions + * + * Copyright (c) 2023 by Rivos Inc. + * + */ + +#ifndef ASM_RISCV_ARCHRANDOM_H +#define ASM_RISCV_ARCHRANDOM_H + +#include <asm/csr.h> + +#define SEED_RETRY_LOOPS 10 + +static inline bool __must_check csr_seed_long(unsigned long *v) +{ + unsigned int retry = SEED_RETRY_LOOPS, valid_seeds = 0; + const int needed_seeds = sizeof(long) / sizeof(u16); + u16 *entropy = (u16 *)v; + + do { + /* + * The SEED CSR (0x015) must be accessed with a read-write + * instruction. + */ + unsigned long csr_seed = csr_swap(CSR_SEED, 0); + + switch (csr_seed & SEED_OPST_MASK) { + case SEED_OPST_ES16: + entropy[valid_seeds++] = csr_seed & SEED_ENTROPY_MASK; + if (valid_seeds == needed_seeds) + return true; + break; + + case SEED_OPST_DEAD: + pr_err_once("archrandom: Unrecoverable error\n"); + return false; + + case SEED_OPST_BIST: + case SEED_OPST_WAIT: + default: + continue; + } + } while (--retry); + + return false; +} + +static inline size_t __must_check arch_get_random_longs(unsigned long *v, size_t max_longs) +{ + return 0; +} + +static inline size_t __must_check arch_get_random_seed_longs(unsigned long *v, size_t max_longs) +{ + if (!max_longs) + return 0; + + /* + * If Zkr is supported and csr_seed_long succeeds, we return one long + * worth of entropy. + */ + if (riscv_has_extension_likely(RISCV_ISA_EXT_ZKR) && csr_seed_long(v)) + return 1; + + return 0; +} + +#endif /* ASM_RISCV_ARCHRANDOM_H */ diff --git a/arch/riscv/include/asm/csr.h b/arch/riscv/include/asm/csr.h index b98b3b6c9da2..7d0ca9082c66 100644 --- a/arch/riscv/include/asm/csr.h +++ b/arch/riscv/include/asm/csr.h @@ -389,6 +389,15 @@ #define CSR_VTYPE 0xc21 #define CSR_VLENB 0xc22 +/* Scalar Crypto Extension - Entropy */ +#define CSR_SEED 0x015 +#define SEED_OPST_MASK _AC(0xC0000000, UL) +#define SEED_OPST_BIST _AC(0x00000000, UL) +#define SEED_OPST_WAIT _AC(0x40000000, UL) +#define SEED_OPST_ES16 _AC(0x80000000, UL) +#define SEED_OPST_DEAD _AC(0xC0000000, UL) +#define SEED_ENTROPY_MASK _AC(0xFFFF, UL) + #ifdef CONFIG_RISCV_M_MODE # define CSR_STATUS CSR_MSTATUS # define CSR_IE CSR_MIE
The Zkr extension is ratified and provides 16 bits of entropy seed when reading the SEED CSR. We can implement arch_get_random_seed_longs() by doing multiple csrrw to that CSR and filling an unsigned long with valid entropy bits. Signed-off-by: Samuel Ortiz <sameo@rivosinc.com> --- arch/riscv/include/asm/archrandom.h | 70 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/riscv/include/asm/csr.h | 9 ++++ 2 files changed, 79 insertions(+) create mode 100644 arch/riscv/include/asm/archrandom.h