From patchwork Wed Nov 22 09:42:33 2023 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Mark Brown X-Patchwork-Id: 13464489 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from bombadil.infradead.org (bombadil.infradead.org [198.137.202.133]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 783DAC61D9D for ; Wed, 22 Nov 2023 09:46:39 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; q=dns/txt; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=lists.infradead.org; s=bombadil.20210309; h=Sender: Content-Transfer-Encoding:Content-Type:List-Subscribe:List-Help:List-Post: List-Archive:List-Unsubscribe:List-Id:Cc:To:In-Reply-To:References:Message-Id :MIME-Version:Subject:Date:From:Reply-To:Content-ID:Content-Description: Resent-Date:Resent-From:Resent-Sender:Resent-To:Resent-Cc:Resent-Message-ID: List-Owner; bh=RTio1E24R7LtuazDKkKXPjuFKDtH2udJrrV+h3T/mcc=; b=nA9MQzEao683PE P32Lpfp0/2Z1qtByeFdoY0VQkYqbaCqHhAX7Wvsz4xWjfjMSre9CVlQmKwu43dIJk3RLBwk2siq+J Mco8iA0VfPohZ7jqiCOzX/j6HDugs/CuQZUG3xcKRC8255Jb2bJ5H0SxZR/w7I0MRZtKLyj/t3izv WIwQG7AhHk3+/iKj6YnP2y5QJkimSu5jc9NUHkArx6UzX6mYvA0Zi5XrTMqJlBXNMx93WmhM4QeWD L85O6Chx2+XAZj/USpGIW/IesIPbpCesr4VF15vodPRiohLoabAkYy9TNHicKWm3qq3z+rApBxaK4 GeB6YBNw5P3nZk8x8u0g==; Received: from localhost ([::1] helo=bombadil.infradead.org) by bombadil.infradead.org with esmtp (Exim 4.96 #2 (Red Hat Linux)) id 1r5joU-001Icr-2h; Wed, 22 Nov 2023 09:46:30 +0000 Received: from ams.source.kernel.org ([2604:1380:4601:e00::1]) by bombadil.infradead.org with esmtps (Exim 4.96 #2 (Red Hat Linux)) id 1r5jno-001HrA-0A; Wed, 22 Nov 2023 09:45:52 +0000 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (transwarp.subspace.kernel.org [100.75.92.58]) by ams.source.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id E388EB8118A; Wed, 22 Nov 2023 09:45:45 +0000 (UTC) Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 5FF98C43395; Wed, 22 Nov 2023 09:45:37 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=k20201202; t=1700646345; bh=NWVJpdky41RR5z+76XsSxPAX8JBO81FQgE/78Pibz4I=; h=From:Date:Subject:References:In-Reply-To:To:Cc:From; b=K/G00O1WsBVKAEIul9z7M9wwqUCctNvCWPIaRc94+Gvlyf4ztcyShJLjmynNGk+0B 7hq8h2uawUA22gE15dEZ51ZTQ925UaN/8M9vgcTDnOwWQsuUaff39e7A4k0MYaYQei kbeJ26pPSy+RavFC5jiQzP68OxdewcWNTDUx+97/iR+Wod7dBZrpJhL+zFSllgaOU4 tTAwtGqFpeCW/XVRsAzFRAm4U0v25Q+Vt+EYrKl876crUoM8lp3JjUPcemuqRNmigp osHPuhMKVym0baNytxZlIId5GP3XNo+tBA2/HwMdSZQ13zyKoep+bol7KRP3sZl1Y6 5c5nQ4gyCyVog== From: Mark Brown Date: Wed, 22 Nov 2023 09:42:33 +0000 Subject: [PATCH v7 23/39] arm64/mm: Implement map_shadow_stack() MIME-Version: 1.0 Message-Id: <20231122-arm64-gcs-v7-23-201c483bd775@kernel.org> References: <20231122-arm64-gcs-v7-0-201c483bd775@kernel.org> In-Reply-To: <20231122-arm64-gcs-v7-0-201c483bd775@kernel.org> To: Catalin Marinas , Will Deacon , Jonathan Corbet , Andrew Morton , Marc Zyngier , Oliver Upton , James Morse , Suzuki K Poulose , Arnd Bergmann , Oleg Nesterov , Eric Biederman , Kees Cook , Shuah Khan , "Rick P. Edgecombe" , Deepak Gupta , Ard Biesheuvel , Szabolcs Nagy Cc: "H.J. Lu" , Paul Walmsley , Palmer Dabbelt , Albert Ou , Florian Weimer , Christian Brauner , Thiago Jung Bauermann , linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, kvmarm@lists.linux.dev, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org, Mark Brown X-Mailer: b4 0.13-dev-0438c X-Developer-Signature: v=1; a=openpgp-sha256; l=3103; i=broonie@kernel.org; h=from:subject:message-id; bh=NWVJpdky41RR5z+76XsSxPAX8JBO81FQgE/78Pibz4I=; b=owEBbQGS/pANAwAKASTWi3JdVIfQAcsmYgBlXc0Ip6PqHo/mfAIYxGDeH30hQhlkTVEtnfk4p U/mjwHwk4uJATMEAAEKAB0WIQSt5miqZ1cYtZ/in+ok1otyXVSH0AUCZV3NCAAKCRAk1otyXVSH 0MvzB/9fzWnM1qf2rhce2NWjEOKbFvvKGljLcOVUTHACXD9yQBR9F7owkcySZ9VXjzQbfvkKGXP 9KBhY9vBnEONt/apYyW01/mhfN+uI9680+VgwQRrwPP2yyMoTRFej/ZISyD4X7zqhOohmgBMTls we4TRIcF7x/2ZIRovz3jyjHZW4De+AalqERXlrJXgUEBHNiMQyi97JE+muLMn0kqMhzS0KM0fqo EUqWgO/phoFoU4p6c8gieIGuKOJ8elT3uUiZAeB+kK2rCc7bZbL9koFjnhS4mYcFlRDToQhQpFv GD6HdRG8hNRI9z4hGkH/MB88HcPqkexmwToLVqmqilFiuS8b X-Developer-Key: i=broonie@kernel.org; a=openpgp; fpr=3F2568AAC26998F9E813A1C5C3F436CA30F5D8EB X-CRM114-Version: 20100106-BlameMichelson ( TRE 0.8.0 (BSD) ) MR-646709E3 X-CRM114-CacheID: sfid-20231122_014548_386568_5C163013 X-CRM114-Status: GOOD ( 18.66 ) X-BeenThere: linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.34 Precedence: list List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Sender: "linux-riscv" Errors-To: linux-riscv-bounces+linux-riscv=archiver.kernel.org@lists.infradead.org As discussed extensively in the changelog for the addition of this syscall on x86 ("x86/shstk: Introduce map_shadow_stack syscall") the existing mmap() and madvise() syscalls do not map entirely well onto the security requirements for guarded control stacks since they lead to windows where memory is allocated but not yet protected or stacks which are not properly and safely initialised. Instead a new syscall map_shadow_stack() has been defined which allocates and initialises a shadow stack page. Implement this for arm64. Two flags are provided, allowing applications to request that the stack be initialised with a valid cap token at the top of the stack and optionally also an end of stack marker above that. We support requesting an end of stack marker alone but since this is a NULL pointer it is indistinguishable from not initialising anything by itself. Since the x86 code has not yet been rebased to v6.5-rc1 this includes the architecture neutral parts of Rick Edgecmbe's "x86/shstk: Introduce map_shadow_stack syscall". Signed-off-by: Mark Brown --- arch/arm64/mm/gcs.c | 61 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 61 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/arm64/mm/gcs.c b/arch/arm64/mm/gcs.c index 315bd698de86..02f8f6046c10 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/mm/gcs.c +++ b/arch/arm64/mm/gcs.c @@ -84,6 +84,67 @@ unsigned long gcs_alloc_thread_stack(struct task_struct *tsk, return addr; } +SYSCALL_DEFINE3(map_shadow_stack, unsigned long, addr, unsigned long, size, unsigned int, flags) +{ + unsigned long alloc_size; + unsigned long __user *cap_ptr; + unsigned long cap_val; + int ret = 0; + int cap_offset; + + if (!system_supports_gcs()) + return -EOPNOTSUPP; + + if (flags & ~(SHADOW_STACK_SET_TOKEN | SHADOW_STACK_SET_MARKER)) + return -EINVAL; + + if (addr && (addr % PAGE_SIZE)) + return -EINVAL; + + if (size == 8 || size % 8) + return -EINVAL; + + /* + * An overflow would result in attempting to write the restore token + * to the wrong location. Not catastrophic, but just return the right + * error code and block it. + */ + alloc_size = PAGE_ALIGN(size); + if (alloc_size < size) + return -EOVERFLOW; + + addr = alloc_gcs(addr, alloc_size, 0, false); + if (IS_ERR_VALUE(addr)) + return addr; + + /* + * Put a cap token at the end of the allocated region so it + * can be switched to. + */ + if (flags & SHADOW_STACK_SET_TOKEN) { + /* Leave an extra empty frame as a top of stack marker? */ + if (flags & SHADOW_STACK_SET_MARKER) + cap_offset = 2; + else + cap_offset = 1; + + cap_ptr = (unsigned long __user *)(addr + size - + (cap_offset * sizeof(unsigned long))); + cap_val = GCS_CAP(cap_ptr); + + put_user_gcs(cap_val, cap_ptr, &ret); + if (ret != 0) { + vm_munmap(addr, size); + return -EFAULT; + } + + /* Ensure the new cap is viaible for GCS */ + gcsb_dsync(); + } + + return addr; +} + /* * Apply the GCS mode configured for the specified task to the * hardware.