| Message ID | 20240403234054.2020347-28-debug@rivosinc.com (mailing list archive) |
|---|---|
| State | RFC |
| Headers | show |
| Series | riscv control-flow integrity for usermode | expand |
| Context | Check | Description |
|---|---|---|
| conchuod/vmtest-fixes-PR | fail | merge-conflict |
On Wed, Apr 03, 2024 at 04:35:15PM -0700, Deepak Gupta wrote: > Adding documentation on landing pad aka indirect branch tracking on riscv > and kernel interfaces exposed so that user tasks can enable it. > > Signed-off-by: Deepak Gupta <debug@rivosinc.com> > --- > Documentation/arch/riscv/zicfilp.rst | 104 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++ > 1 file changed, 104 insertions(+) > create mode 100644 Documentation/arch/riscv/zicfilp.rst > > diff --git a/Documentation/arch/riscv/zicfilp.rst b/Documentation/arch/riscv/zicfilp.rst > new file mode 100644 > index 000000000000..3007c81f0465 > --- /dev/null > +++ b/Documentation/arch/riscv/zicfilp.rst > @@ -0,0 +1,104 @@ > +.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 > + > +:Author: Deepak Gupta <debug@rivosinc.com> > +:Date: 12 January 2024 > + > +==================================================== > +Tracking indirect control transfers on RISC-V Linux > +==================================================== > + > +This document briefly describes the interface provided to userspace by Linux > +to enable indirect branch tracking for user mode applications on RISV-V > + > +1. Feature Overview > +-------------------- > + > +Memory corruption issues usually result in to crashes, however when in hands of > +an adversary and if used creatively can result into variety security issues. > + > +One of those security issues can be code re-use attacks on program where adversary > +can use corrupt function pointers and chain them together to perform jump oriented > +programming (JOP) or call oriented programming (COP) and thus compromising control > +flow integrity (CFI) of the program. > + > +Function pointers live in read-write memory and thus are susceptible to corruption > +and allows an adversary to reach any program counter (PC) in address space. On > +RISC-V zicfilp extension enforces a restriction on such indirect control transfers > + > + - indirect control transfers must land on a landing pad instruction `lpad`. > + There are two exception to this rule > + - rs1 = x1 or rs1 = x5, i.e. a return from a function and returns are What is a return that is not a return from a function? > + protected using shadow stack (see zicfiss.rst) > + > + - rs1 = x7. On RISC-V compiler usually does below to reach function > + which is beyond the offset possible J-type instruction. > + > + "auipc x7, <imm>" > + "jalr (x7)" > + > + Such form of indirect control transfer are still immutable and don't rely > + on memory and thus rs1=x7 is exempted from tracking and considered software > + guarded jumps. > + > +`lpad` instruction is pseudo of `auipc rd, <imm_20bit>` and is a HINT nop. `lpad` I think this should say "x0" or instead of "rd", or mention that rd=x0. > +instruction must be aligned on 4 byte boundary and compares 20 bit immediate with x7. > +If `imm_20bit` == 0, CPU don't perform any comparision with x7. If `imm_20bit` != 0, > +then `imm_20bit` must match x7 else CPU will raise `software check exception` > +(cause=18)with `*tval = 2`. > + > +Compiler can generate a hash over function signatures and setup them (truncated > +to 20bit) in x7 at callsites and function proglogs can have `lpad` with same "prologues" instead of "proglogs" > +function hash. This further reduces number of program counters a call site can > +reach. > + > +2. ELF and psABI > +----------------- > + > +Toolchain sets up `GNU_PROPERTY_RISCV_FEATURE_1_FCFI` for property > +`GNU_PROPERTY_RISCV_FEATURE_1_AND` in notes section of the object file. > + > +3. Linux enabling > +------------------ > + > +User space programs can have multiple shared objects loaded in its address space > +and it's a difficult task to make sure all the dependencies have been compiled > +with support of indirect branch. Thus it's left to dynamic loader to enable > +indirect branch tracking for the program. > + > +4. prctl() enabling > +-------------------- > + > +`PR_SET_INDIR_BR_LP_STATUS` / `PR_GET_INDIR_BR_LP_STATUS` / > +`PR_LOCK_INDIR_BR_LP_STATUS` are three prctls added to manage indirect branch > +tracking. prctls are arch agnostic and returns -EINVAL on other arches. > + > +`PR_SET_INDIR_BR_LP_STATUS`: If arg1 `PR_INDIR_BR_LP_ENABLE` and if CPU supports > +`zicfilp` then kernel will enabled indirect branch tracking for the task. > +Dynamic loader can issue this `prctl` once it has determined that all the objects > +loaded in address space support indirect branch tracking. Additionally if there is > +a `dlopen` to an object which wasn't compiled with `zicfilp`, dynamic loader can > +issue this prctl with arg1 set to 0 (i.e. `PR_INDIR_BR_LP_ENABLE` being clear) > + > +`PR_GET_INDIR_BR_LP_STATUS`: Returns current status of indirect branch tracking. > +If enabled it'll return `PR_INDIR_BR_LP_ENABLE` > + > +`PR_LOCK_INDIR_BR_LP_STATUS`: Locks current status of indirect branch tracking on > +the task. User space may want to run with strict security posture and wouldn't want > +loading of objects without `zicfilp` support in it and thus would want to disallow > +disabling of indirect branch tracking. In that case user space can use this prctl > +to lock current settings. > + > +5. violations related to indirect branch tracking > +-------------------------------------------------- > + > +Pertaining to indirect branch tracking, CPU raises software check exception in > +following conditions > + - missing `lpad` after indirect call / jmp > + - `lpad` not on 4 byte boundary > + - `imm_20bit` embedded in `lpad` instruction doesn't match with `x7` > + > +In all 3 cases, `*tval = 2` is captured and software check exception is raised > +(cause=18) > + > +Linux kernel will treat this as `SIGSEV`` with code = `SEGV_CPERR` and follow > +normal course of signal delivery. > -- > 2.43.2 >
On Fri, May 10, 2024 at 01:30:32PM -0700, Charlie Jenkins wrote: >On Wed, Apr 03, 2024 at 04:35:15PM -0700, Deepak Gupta wrote: >> Adding documentation on landing pad aka indirect branch tracking on riscv >> and kernel interfaces exposed so that user tasks can enable it. >> >> Signed-off-by: Deepak Gupta <debug@rivosinc.com> >> --- >> Documentation/arch/riscv/zicfilp.rst | 104 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++ >> 1 file changed, 104 insertions(+) >> create mode 100644 Documentation/arch/riscv/zicfilp.rst >> >> diff --git a/Documentation/arch/riscv/zicfilp.rst b/Documentation/arch/riscv/zicfilp.rst >> new file mode 100644 >> index 000000000000..3007c81f0465 >> --- /dev/null >> +++ b/Documentation/arch/riscv/zicfilp.rst >> @@ -0,0 +1,104 @@ >> +.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 >> + >> +:Author: Deepak Gupta <debug@rivosinc.com> >> +:Date: 12 January 2024 >> + >> +==================================================== >> +Tracking indirect control transfers on RISC-V Linux >> +==================================================== >> + >> +This document briefly describes the interface provided to userspace by Linux >> +to enable indirect branch tracking for user mode applications on RISV-V >> + >> +1. Feature Overview >> +-------------------- >> + >> +Memory corruption issues usually result in to crashes, however when in hands of >> +an adversary and if used creatively can result into variety security issues. >> + >> +One of those security issues can be code re-use attacks on program where adversary >> +can use corrupt function pointers and chain them together to perform jump oriented >> +programming (JOP) or call oriented programming (COP) and thus compromising control >> +flow integrity (CFI) of the program. >> + >> +Function pointers live in read-write memory and thus are susceptible to corruption >> +and allows an adversary to reach any program counter (PC) in address space. On >> +RISC-V zicfilp extension enforces a restriction on such indirect control transfers >> + >> + - indirect control transfers must land on a landing pad instruction `lpad`. >> + There are two exception to this rule >> + - rs1 = x1 or rs1 = x5, i.e. a return from a function and returns are > >What is a return that is not a return from a function? Those would be a jump or call (depending on convention of whether return is saved in x1/x5) > >> + protected using shadow stack (see zicfiss.rst) >> + >> + - rs1 = x7. On RISC-V compiler usually does below to reach function >> + which is beyond the offset possible J-type instruction. >> + >> + "auipc x7, <imm>" >> + "jalr (x7)" >> + >> + Such form of indirect control transfer are still immutable and don't rely >> + on memory and thus rs1=x7 is exempted from tracking and considered software >> + guarded jumps. >> + >> +`lpad` instruction is pseudo of `auipc rd, <imm_20bit>` and is a HINT nop. `lpad` > >I think this should say "x0" or instead of "rd", or mention that rd=x0. Yeah I missed that. will fix it. > >> +instruction must be aligned on 4 byte boundary and compares 20 bit immediate with x7. >> +If `imm_20bit` == 0, CPU don't perform any comparision with x7. If `imm_20bit` != 0, >> +then `imm_20bit` must match x7 else CPU will raise `software check exception` >> +(cause=18)with `*tval = 2`. >> + >> +Compiler can generate a hash over function signatures and setup them (truncated >> +to 20bit) in x7 at callsites and function proglogs can have `lpad` with same > >"prologues" instead of "proglogs" Will fix it. > >> +function hash. This further reduces number of program counters a call site can >> +reach. >> + >> +2. ELF and psABI >> +----------------- >> + >> +Toolchain sets up `GNU_PROPERTY_RISCV_FEATURE_1_FCFI` for property >> +`GNU_PROPERTY_RISCV_FEATURE_1_AND` in notes section of the object file. >> + >> +3. Linux enabling >> +------------------ >> + >> +User space programs can have multiple shared objects loaded in its address space >> +and it's a difficult task to make sure all the dependencies have been compiled >> +with support of indirect branch. Thus it's left to dynamic loader to enable >> +indirect branch tracking for the program. >> + >> +4. prctl() enabling >> +-------------------- >> + >> +`PR_SET_INDIR_BR_LP_STATUS` / `PR_GET_INDIR_BR_LP_STATUS` / >> +`PR_LOCK_INDIR_BR_LP_STATUS` are three prctls added to manage indirect branch >> +tracking. prctls are arch agnostic and returns -EINVAL on other arches. >> + >> +`PR_SET_INDIR_BR_LP_STATUS`: If arg1 `PR_INDIR_BR_LP_ENABLE` and if CPU supports >> +`zicfilp` then kernel will enabled indirect branch tracking for the task. >> +Dynamic loader can issue this `prctl` once it has determined that all the objects >> +loaded in address space support indirect branch tracking. Additionally if there is >> +a `dlopen` to an object which wasn't compiled with `zicfilp`, dynamic loader can >> +issue this prctl with arg1 set to 0 (i.e. `PR_INDIR_BR_LP_ENABLE` being clear) >> + >> +`PR_GET_INDIR_BR_LP_STATUS`: Returns current status of indirect branch tracking. >> +If enabled it'll return `PR_INDIR_BR_LP_ENABLE` >> + >> +`PR_LOCK_INDIR_BR_LP_STATUS`: Locks current status of indirect branch tracking on >> +the task. User space may want to run with strict security posture and wouldn't want >> +loading of objects without `zicfilp` support in it and thus would want to disallow >> +disabling of indirect branch tracking. In that case user space can use this prctl >> +to lock current settings. >> + >> +5. violations related to indirect branch tracking >> +-------------------------------------------------- >> + >> +Pertaining to indirect branch tracking, CPU raises software check exception in >> +following conditions >> + - missing `lpad` after indirect call / jmp >> + - `lpad` not on 4 byte boundary >> + - `imm_20bit` embedded in `lpad` instruction doesn't match with `x7` >> + >> +In all 3 cases, `*tval = 2` is captured and software check exception is raised >> +(cause=18) >> + >> +Linux kernel will treat this as `SIGSEV`` with code = `SEGV_CPERR` and follow >> +normal course of signal delivery. >> -- >> 2.43.2 >>
diff --git a/Documentation/arch/riscv/zicfilp.rst b/Documentation/arch/riscv/zicfilp.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..3007c81f0465 --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/arch/riscv/zicfilp.rst @@ -0,0 +1,104 @@ +.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 + +:Author: Deepak Gupta <debug@rivosinc.com> +:Date: 12 January 2024 + +==================================================== +Tracking indirect control transfers on RISC-V Linux +==================================================== + +This document briefly describes the interface provided to userspace by Linux +to enable indirect branch tracking for user mode applications on RISV-V + +1. Feature Overview +-------------------- + +Memory corruption issues usually result in to crashes, however when in hands of +an adversary and if used creatively can result into variety security issues. + +One of those security issues can be code re-use attacks on program where adversary +can use corrupt function pointers and chain them together to perform jump oriented +programming (JOP) or call oriented programming (COP) and thus compromising control +flow integrity (CFI) of the program. + +Function pointers live in read-write memory and thus are susceptible to corruption +and allows an adversary to reach any program counter (PC) in address space. On +RISC-V zicfilp extension enforces a restriction on such indirect control transfers + + - indirect control transfers must land on a landing pad instruction `lpad`. + There are two exception to this rule + - rs1 = x1 or rs1 = x5, i.e. a return from a function and returns are + protected using shadow stack (see zicfiss.rst) + + - rs1 = x7. On RISC-V compiler usually does below to reach function + which is beyond the offset possible J-type instruction. + + "auipc x7, <imm>" + "jalr (x7)" + + Such form of indirect control transfer are still immutable and don't rely + on memory and thus rs1=x7 is exempted from tracking and considered software + guarded jumps. + +`lpad` instruction is pseudo of `auipc rd, <imm_20bit>` and is a HINT nop. `lpad` +instruction must be aligned on 4 byte boundary and compares 20 bit immediate with x7. +If `imm_20bit` == 0, CPU don't perform any comparision with x7. If `imm_20bit` != 0, +then `imm_20bit` must match x7 else CPU will raise `software check exception` +(cause=18)with `*tval = 2`. + +Compiler can generate a hash over function signatures and setup them (truncated +to 20bit) in x7 at callsites and function proglogs can have `lpad` with same +function hash. This further reduces number of program counters a call site can +reach. + +2. ELF and psABI +----------------- + +Toolchain sets up `GNU_PROPERTY_RISCV_FEATURE_1_FCFI` for property +`GNU_PROPERTY_RISCV_FEATURE_1_AND` in notes section of the object file. + +3. Linux enabling +------------------ + +User space programs can have multiple shared objects loaded in its address space +and it's a difficult task to make sure all the dependencies have been compiled +with support of indirect branch. Thus it's left to dynamic loader to enable +indirect branch tracking for the program. + +4. prctl() enabling +-------------------- + +`PR_SET_INDIR_BR_LP_STATUS` / `PR_GET_INDIR_BR_LP_STATUS` / +`PR_LOCK_INDIR_BR_LP_STATUS` are three prctls added to manage indirect branch +tracking. prctls are arch agnostic and returns -EINVAL on other arches. + +`PR_SET_INDIR_BR_LP_STATUS`: If arg1 `PR_INDIR_BR_LP_ENABLE` and if CPU supports +`zicfilp` then kernel will enabled indirect branch tracking for the task. +Dynamic loader can issue this `prctl` once it has determined that all the objects +loaded in address space support indirect branch tracking. Additionally if there is +a `dlopen` to an object which wasn't compiled with `zicfilp`, dynamic loader can +issue this prctl with arg1 set to 0 (i.e. `PR_INDIR_BR_LP_ENABLE` being clear) + +`PR_GET_INDIR_BR_LP_STATUS`: Returns current status of indirect branch tracking. +If enabled it'll return `PR_INDIR_BR_LP_ENABLE` + +`PR_LOCK_INDIR_BR_LP_STATUS`: Locks current status of indirect branch tracking on +the task. User space may want to run with strict security posture and wouldn't want +loading of objects without `zicfilp` support in it and thus would want to disallow +disabling of indirect branch tracking. In that case user space can use this prctl +to lock current settings. + +5. violations related to indirect branch tracking +-------------------------------------------------- + +Pertaining to indirect branch tracking, CPU raises software check exception in +following conditions + - missing `lpad` after indirect call / jmp + - `lpad` not on 4 byte boundary + - `imm_20bit` embedded in `lpad` instruction doesn't match with `x7` + +In all 3 cases, `*tval = 2` is captured and software check exception is raised +(cause=18) + +Linux kernel will treat this as `SIGSEV`` with code = `SEGV_CPERR` and follow +normal course of signal delivery.
Adding documentation on landing pad aka indirect branch tracking on riscv and kernel interfaces exposed so that user tasks can enable it. Signed-off-by: Deepak Gupta <debug@rivosinc.com> --- Documentation/arch/riscv/zicfilp.rst | 104 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 104 insertions(+) create mode 100644 Documentation/arch/riscv/zicfilp.rst