From patchwork Tue Jun 25 14:57:49 2024 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Mark Brown X-Patchwork-Id: 13711491 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from bombadil.infradead.org (bombadil.infradead.org [198.137.202.133]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 6A45EC3064D for ; Tue, 25 Jun 2024 15:06:09 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; q=dns/txt; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=lists.infradead.org; s=bombadil.20210309; h=Sender: Content-Transfer-Encoding:Content-Type:List-Subscribe:List-Help:List-Post: List-Archive:List-Unsubscribe:List-Id:Cc:To:In-Reply-To:References:Message-Id :MIME-Version:Subject:Date:From:Reply-To:Content-ID:Content-Description: Resent-Date:Resent-From:Resent-Sender:Resent-To:Resent-Cc:Resent-Message-ID: List-Owner; bh=SsDxfurp7LOZMwCRZ8F9Z2Dpwc6DkhbgSWKnekjeKhE=; b=JwT7O4CWqgYgtb C1Xfjvg0q9C0YwfuIrXOrHsLbTsL/y5kyF8WAj8M7NndHT8/0faTDVsAivpzJqLMY2e7qv1ssZO8d v7UTOPCDvRAkagtqDE7hoz7OCzvn7G4wACQ8f6nCfn6po0yTcLyeZr4Z8RG1R+d64DgkJNpm/Qnzk h6UOsoudWckl6TxS9kUJLnPehSXdqhErVrzqKpUrdSn+7fDPHLoU7iG6Oy149DbI7g6kv6DHQzifk PZnYm0sY87+TmkgSC7F2UKvpI9Bf7wSdv8wC4FKrcmBf6gmftNof3jLYf5KNJ2coAYYF03fobrJtm 93l7OrdjVrEGahrPeTIA==; Received: from localhost ([::1] helo=bombadil.infradead.org) by bombadil.infradead.org with esmtp (Exim 4.97.1 #2 (Red Hat Linux)) id 1sM7kD-00000003NEt-2nPb; Tue, 25 Jun 2024 15:06:05 +0000 Received: from dfw.source.kernel.org ([2604:1380:4641:c500::1]) by bombadil.infradead.org with esmtps (Exim 4.97.1 #2 (Red Hat Linux)) id 1sM7hO-00000003L6i-2xJR; Tue, 25 Jun 2024 15:03:12 +0000 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (transwarp.subspace.kernel.org [100.75.92.58]) by dfw.source.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 1999361461; Tue, 25 Jun 2024 15:03:10 +0000 (UTC) Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id D801EC32786; Tue, 25 Jun 2024 15:03:01 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=k20201202; t=1719327789; bh=74i/o5o+GAjLuG4LcdrjtJS8isttL5m8bKZPRodV91A=; h=From:Date:Subject:References:In-Reply-To:To:Cc:From; b=p8Zd/jPqBWiv6p4ms8GUw7vIIxGC5btR+4/4QhxrtRFIULgo4t5OYBdjQ1NjzUEMh hdjCWg4UQbaCpOTCol5u3Sa3+ag1HxAgOV3Q0JHCYm2XsRVM6ltPV+R2/agqh++JcZ WdrNYNo2brKoe0x0c+RaYvXbUq7Q9E6TkdEO2j4Y3y3Y5I7C8QezK+zXWWZ13ZC/LB 5zTeifMzG1qugKL0a3R655vLcgF8BhddRWxkhwpdZ/rlikEbXQovm7MGipXm87WXk1 oikjW3UbIFBBigwerloHD3nK5jG9/M9wepMz04ATFgDE7Op0WmpfM/5Q3XfOBpyEBu DgRrKFvUQeNyQ== From: Mark Brown Date: Tue, 25 Jun 2024 15:57:49 +0100 Subject: [PATCH v9 21/39] arm64/gcs: Implement shadow stack prctl() interface MIME-Version: 1.0 Message-Id: <20240625-arm64-gcs-v9-21-0f634469b8f0@kernel.org> References: <20240625-arm64-gcs-v9-0-0f634469b8f0@kernel.org> In-Reply-To: <20240625-arm64-gcs-v9-0-0f634469b8f0@kernel.org> To: Catalin Marinas , Will Deacon , Jonathan Corbet , Andrew Morton , Marc Zyngier , Oliver Upton , James Morse , Suzuki K Poulose , Arnd Bergmann , Oleg Nesterov , Eric Biederman , Shuah Khan , "Rick P. Edgecombe" , Deepak Gupta , Ard Biesheuvel , Szabolcs Nagy , Kees Cook Cc: "H.J. Lu" , Paul Walmsley , Palmer Dabbelt , Albert Ou , Florian Weimer , Christian Brauner , Thiago Jung Bauermann , Ross Burton , linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, kvmarm@lists.linux.dev, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org, Mark Brown X-Mailer: b4 0.14-dev-d4707 X-Developer-Signature: v=1; a=openpgp-sha256; l=5714; i=broonie@kernel.org; h=from:subject:message-id; bh=74i/o5o+GAjLuG4LcdrjtJS8isttL5m8bKZPRodV91A=; b=owEBbQGS/pANAwAKASTWi3JdVIfQAcsmYgBmetuCFKqjdims19CgzTU6ifsr5pf8QuwxxzCjXEqT wrF/+EqJATMEAAEKAB0WIQSt5miqZ1cYtZ/in+ok1otyXVSH0AUCZnrbggAKCRAk1otyXVSH0GchB/ 9aDc/X/c+aXCj96fsTSKFZkg0nIo1y7eH/uk7em610g3Amo1IdUZAS4Js/GL5lBxhXiv5YdRU4/raR SYtM+eLsKatF67WosEiYbum13OxZbM/LBmfCDHZ5Gc3Xw7i1U+NAtt0wkYsyxwreHxb+sEbpAm3Z9e 2aijxqHhPbqBEXQRCQllMvj0/pvAjWwklmpGt2sL1fUSR0jGljCAK1NONQw5L7EY5kHr0WndUNxqHz 3cxDXq4wuQJTADELQzTMInAfgbM4GGYfH7Q3xganDRJChWu0mGSy9ytOnBQL/v0PA7OMlYJoJy2Fc/ L1y/xFkZwE9aXSs7JdxPF/WB56Ks44 X-Developer-Key: i=broonie@kernel.org; a=openpgp; fpr=3F2568AAC26998F9E813A1C5C3F436CA30F5D8EB X-CRM114-Version: 20100106-BlameMichelson ( TRE 0.8.0 (BSD) ) MR-646709E3 X-CRM114-CacheID: sfid-20240625_080310_936540_F806E8D1 X-CRM114-Status: GOOD ( 20.90 ) X-BeenThere: linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.34 Precedence: list List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Sender: "linux-riscv" Errors-To: linux-riscv-bounces+linux-riscv=archiver.kernel.org@lists.infradead.org Implement the architecture neutral prtctl() interface for setting the shadow stack status, this supports setting and reading the current GCS configuration for the current thread. Userspace can enable basic GCS functionality and additionally also support for GCS pushes and arbitrary GCS stores. It is expected that this prctl() will be called very early in application startup, for example by the dynamic linker, and not subsequently adjusted during normal operation. Users should carefully note that after enabling GCS for a thread GCS will become active with no call stack so it is not normally possible to return from the function that invoked the prctl(). State is stored per thread, enabling GCS for a thread causes a GCS to be allocated for that thread. Userspace may lock the current GCS configuration by specifying PR_SHADOW_STACK_ENABLE_LOCK, this prevents any further changes to the GCS configuration via any means. If GCS is not being enabled then all flags other than _LOCK are ignored, it is not possible to enable stores or pops without enabling GCS. When disabling the GCS we do not free the allocated stack, this allows for inspection of the GCS after disabling as part of fault reporting. Since it is not an expected use case and since it presents some complications in determining what to do with previously initialsed data on the GCS attempts to reenable GCS after this are rejected. This can be revisted if a use case arises. Reviewed-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann Signed-off-by: Mark Brown --- arch/arm64/include/asm/gcs.h | 22 +++++++++++ arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h | 1 + arch/arm64/mm/gcs.c | 81 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 104 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/gcs.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/gcs.h index c1f274fdb9c0..48c97e63e56a 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/gcs.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/gcs.h @@ -50,6 +50,9 @@ static inline u64 gcsss2(void) return Xt; } +#define PR_SHADOW_STACK_SUPPORTED_STATUS_MASK \ + (PR_SHADOW_STACK_ENABLE | PR_SHADOW_STACK_WRITE | PR_SHADOW_STACK_PUSH) + #ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_GCS static inline bool task_gcs_el0_enabled(struct task_struct *task) @@ -63,6 +66,20 @@ void gcs_preserve_current_state(void); unsigned long gcs_alloc_thread_stack(struct task_struct *tsk, const struct kernel_clone_args *args); +static inline int gcs_check_locked(struct task_struct *task, + unsigned long new_val) +{ + unsigned long cur_val = task->thread.gcs_el0_mode; + + cur_val &= task->thread.gcs_el0_locked; + new_val &= task->thread.gcs_el0_locked; + + if (cur_val != new_val) + return -EBUSY; + + return 0; +} + #else static inline bool task_gcs_el0_enabled(struct task_struct *task) @@ -78,6 +95,11 @@ static inline unsigned long gcs_alloc_thread_stack(struct task_struct *tsk, { return -ENOTSUPP; } +static inline int gcs_check_locked(struct task_struct *task, + unsigned long new_val) +{ + return 0; +} #endif diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h index c55e3600604a..58eb48cd539f 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h @@ -186,6 +186,7 @@ struct thread_struct { u64 tpidr2_el0; #ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_GCS unsigned int gcs_el0_mode; + unsigned int gcs_el0_locked; u64 gcspr_el0; u64 gcs_base; u64 gcs_size; diff --git a/arch/arm64/mm/gcs.c b/arch/arm64/mm/gcs.c index 4a3ce8e3bdfb..c6fae0eb9bd6 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/mm/gcs.c +++ b/arch/arm64/mm/gcs.c @@ -180,3 +180,84 @@ void gcs_free(struct task_struct *task) task->thread.gcs_base = 0; task->thread.gcs_size = 0; } + +int arch_set_shadow_stack_status(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long arg) +{ + unsigned long gcs, size; + int ret; + + if (!system_supports_gcs()) + return -EINVAL; + + if (is_compat_thread(task_thread_info(task))) + return -EINVAL; + + /* Reject unknown flags */ + if (arg & ~PR_SHADOW_STACK_SUPPORTED_STATUS_MASK) + return -EINVAL; + + ret = gcs_check_locked(task, arg); + if (ret != 0) + return ret; + + /* If we are enabling GCS then make sure we have a stack */ + if (arg & PR_SHADOW_STACK_ENABLE) { + if (!task_gcs_el0_enabled(task)) { + /* Do not allow GCS to be reenabled */ + if (task->thread.gcs_base) + return -EINVAL; + + if (task != current) + return -EBUSY; + + size = gcs_size(0); + gcs = alloc_gcs(0, size, 0, 0); + if (!gcs) + return -ENOMEM; + + task->thread.gcspr_el0 = gcs + size - sizeof(u64); + task->thread.gcs_base = gcs; + task->thread.gcs_size = size; + if (task == current) + write_sysreg_s(task->thread.gcspr_el0, + SYS_GCSPR_EL0); + + } + } + + task->thread.gcs_el0_mode = arg; + if (task == current) + gcs_set_el0_mode(task); + + return 0; +} + +int arch_get_shadow_stack_status(struct task_struct *task, + unsigned long __user *arg) +{ + if (!system_supports_gcs()) + return -EINVAL; + + if (is_compat_thread(task_thread_info(task))) + return -EINVAL; + + return put_user(task->thread.gcs_el0_mode, arg); +} + +int arch_lock_shadow_stack_status(struct task_struct *task, + unsigned long arg) +{ + if (!system_supports_gcs()) + return -EINVAL; + + if (is_compat_thread(task_thread_info(task))) + return -EINVAL; + + /* + * We support locking unknown bits so applications can prevent + * any changes in a future proof manner. + */ + task->thread.gcs_el0_locked |= arg; + + return 0; +}