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Peter Anvin" , Andy Lutomirski , Peter Zijlstra , Richard Henderson , Matt Turner , Vineet Gupta , Russell King , Catalin Marinas , Will Deacon , Guo Ren , Brian Cain , Huacai Chen , WANG Xuerui , Geert Uytterhoeven , Michal Simek , Thomas Bogendoerfer , Dinh Nguyen , Jonas Bonn , Stefan Kristiansson , Stafford Horne , "James E.J. Bottomley" , Helge Deller , Michael Ellerman , Nicholas Piggin , Christophe Leroy , Naveen N Rao , Madhavan Srinivasan , Paul Walmsley , Palmer Dabbelt , Albert Ou , Heiko Carstens , Vasily Gorbik , Alexander Gordeev , Christian Borntraeger , Sven Schnelle , Yoshinori Sato , Rich Felker , John Paul Adrian Glaubitz , "David S. Miller" , Andreas Larsson , Richard Weinberger , Anton Ivanov , Johannes Berg , Chris Zankel , Max Filippov , Arnd Bergmann , Andrew Morton , Juri Lelli , Vincent Guittot , Dietmar Eggemann , Steven Rostedt , Ben Segall , Mel Gorman , Valentin Schneider , Uladzislau Rezki , Christoph Hellwig , Masami Hiramatsu , Mathieu Desnoyers , Mike Rapoport , Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo , Namhyung Kim , Mark Rutland , Alexander Shishkin , Jiri Olsa , Ian Rogers , Adrian Hunter , Dennis Zhou , Tejun Heo , Christoph Lameter , Sean Christopherson , Paolo Bonzini , Ard Biesheuvel , Josh Poimboeuf , Pawan Gupta Cc: x86@kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-alpha@vger.kernel.org, linux-snps-arc@lists.infradead.org, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-csky@vger.kernel.org, linux-hexagon@vger.kernel.org, loongarch@lists.linux.dev, linux-m68k@lists.linux-m68k.org, linux-mips@vger.kernel.org, linux-openrisc@vger.kernel.org, linux-parisc@vger.kernel.org, linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org, linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org, linux-s390@vger.kernel.org, linux-sh@vger.kernel.org, sparclinux@vger.kernel.org, linux-um@lists.infradead.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-trace-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-perf-users@vger.kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, Brendan Jackman , Ofir Weisse X-CRM114-Version: 20100106-BlameMichelson ( TRE 0.8.0 (BSD) ) MR-646709E3 X-CRM114-CacheID: sfid-20250110_184110_565015_F8603E54 X-CRM114-Status: GOOD ( 35.71 ) X-Mailman-Approved-At: Fri, 10 Jan 2025 15:19:44 -0800 X-BeenThere: linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.34 Precedence: list List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Sender: "linux-riscv" Errors-To: linux-riscv-bounces+linux-riscv=archiver.kernel.org@lists.infradead.org From: Ofir Weisse On a page-fault - do asi_exit(). Then check if now after the exit the address is accessible. We do this by refactoring spurious_kernel_fault() into two parts: 1. Verify that the error code value is something that could arise from a lazy TLB update. 2. Walk the page table and verify permissions, which is now called is_address_accessible(). We also define PTE_PRESENT() and PMD_PRESENT() which are suitable for checking userspace pages. For the sake of spurious faults, pte_present() and pmd_present() are only good for kernelspace pages. This is because these macros might return true even if the present bit is 0 (only relevant for userspace). checkpatch.pl VSPRINTF_SPECIFIER_PX - it's in a WARN that only fires in a debug build of the kernel when we hit a disastrous bug, seems OK to leak addresses. RFC note: A separate refactoring/prep commit should be split out of this patch. Checkpatch-args: --ignore=VSPRINTF_SPECIFIER_PX Signed-off-by: Ofir Weisse Signed-off-by: Brendan Jackman --- arch/x86/mm/fault.c | 118 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------- 1 file changed, 103 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/fault.c b/arch/x86/mm/fault.c index e6c469b323ccb748de22adc7d9f0a16dd195edad..ee8f5417174e2956391d538f41e2475553ca4972 100644 --- a/arch/x86/mm/fault.c +++ b/arch/x86/mm/fault.c @@ -948,7 +948,7 @@ do_sigbus(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code, unsigned long address, force_sig_fault(SIGBUS, BUS_ADRERR, (void __user *)address); } -static int spurious_kernel_fault_check(unsigned long error_code, pte_t *pte) +static __always_inline int kernel_protection_ok(unsigned long error_code, pte_t *pte) { if ((error_code & X86_PF_WRITE) && !pte_write(*pte)) return 0; @@ -959,6 +959,8 @@ static int spurious_kernel_fault_check(unsigned long error_code, pte_t *pte) return 1; } +static int kernel_access_ok(unsigned long error_code, unsigned long address, pgd_t *pgd); + /* * Handle a spurious fault caused by a stale TLB entry. * @@ -984,11 +986,6 @@ static noinline int spurious_kernel_fault(unsigned long error_code, unsigned long address) { pgd_t *pgd; - p4d_t *p4d; - pud_t *pud; - pmd_t *pmd; - pte_t *pte; - int ret; /* * Only writes to RO or instruction fetches from NX may cause @@ -1004,6 +1001,50 @@ spurious_kernel_fault(unsigned long error_code, unsigned long address) return 0; pgd = init_mm.pgd + pgd_index(address); + return kernel_access_ok(error_code, address, pgd); +} +NOKPROBE_SYMBOL(spurious_kernel_fault); + +/* + * For kernel addresses, pte_present and pmd_present are sufficient for + * is_address_accessible. For user addresses these functions will return true + * even though the pte is not actually accessible by hardware (i.e _PAGE_PRESENT + * is not set). This happens in cases where the pages are physically present in + * memory, but they are not made accessible to hardware as they need software + * handling first: + * + * - ptes/pmds with _PAGE_PROTNONE need autonuma balancing (see pte_protnone(), + * change_prot_numa(), and do_numa_page()). + * + * - pmds with _PAGE_PSE & !_PAGE_PRESENT are undergoing splitting (see + * split_huge_page()). + * + * Here, we care about whether the hardware can actually access the page right + * now. + * + * These issues aren't currently present for PUD but we also have a custom + * PUD_PRESENT for a layer of future-proofing. + */ +#define PUD_PRESENT(pud) (pud_flags(pud) & _PAGE_PRESENT) +#define PMD_PRESENT(pmd) (pmd_flags(pmd) & _PAGE_PRESENT) +#define PTE_PRESENT(pte) (pte_flags(pte) & _PAGE_PRESENT) + +/* + * Check if an access by the kernel would cause a page fault. The access is + * described by a page fault error code (whether it was a write/instruction + * fetch) and address. This doesn't check for types of faults that are not + * expected to affect the kernel, e.g. PKU. The address can be user or kernel + * space, if user then we assume the access would happen via the uaccess API. + */ +static noinstr int +kernel_access_ok(unsigned long error_code, unsigned long address, pgd_t *pgd) +{ + p4d_t *p4d; + pud_t *pud; + pmd_t *pmd; + pte_t *pte; + int ret; + if (!pgd_present(*pgd)) return 0; @@ -1012,27 +1053,27 @@ spurious_kernel_fault(unsigned long error_code, unsigned long address) return 0; if (p4d_leaf(*p4d)) - return spurious_kernel_fault_check(error_code, (pte_t *) p4d); + return kernel_protection_ok(error_code, (pte_t *) p4d); pud = pud_offset(p4d, address); - if (!pud_present(*pud)) + if (!PUD_PRESENT(*pud)) return 0; if (pud_leaf(*pud)) - return spurious_kernel_fault_check(error_code, (pte_t *) pud); + return kernel_protection_ok(error_code, (pte_t *) pud); pmd = pmd_offset(pud, address); - if (!pmd_present(*pmd)) + if (!PMD_PRESENT(*pmd)) return 0; if (pmd_leaf(*pmd)) - return spurious_kernel_fault_check(error_code, (pte_t *) pmd); + return kernel_protection_ok(error_code, (pte_t *) pmd); pte = pte_offset_kernel(pmd, address); - if (!pte_present(*pte)) + if (!PTE_PRESENT(*pte)) return 0; - ret = spurious_kernel_fault_check(error_code, pte); + ret = kernel_protection_ok(error_code, pte); if (!ret) return 0; @@ -1040,12 +1081,11 @@ spurious_kernel_fault(unsigned long error_code, unsigned long address) * Make sure we have permissions in PMD. * If not, then there's a bug in the page tables: */ - ret = spurious_kernel_fault_check(error_code, (pte_t *) pmd); + ret = kernel_protection_ok(error_code, (pte_t *) pmd); WARN_ONCE(!ret, "PMD has incorrect permission bits\n"); return ret; } -NOKPROBE_SYMBOL(spurious_kernel_fault); int show_unhandled_signals = 1; @@ -1490,6 +1530,29 @@ handle_page_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code, } } +static __always_inline void warn_if_bad_asi_pf( + unsigned long error_code, unsigned long address) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_ADDRESS_SPACE_ISOLATION + struct asi *target; + + /* + * It's a bug to access sensitive data from the "critical section", i.e. + * on the path between asi_enter and asi_relax, where untrusted code + * gets run. #PF in this state sees asi_intr_nest_depth() as 1 because + * #PF increments it. We can't think of a better way to determine if + * this has happened than to check the ASI pagetables, hence we can't + * really have this check in non-debug builds unfortunately. + */ + VM_WARN_ONCE( + (target = asi_get_target(current)) != NULL && + asi_intr_nest_depth() == 1 && + !kernel_access_ok(error_code, address, asi_pgd(target)), + "ASI-sensitive data access from critical section, addr=%px error_code=%lx class=%s", + (void *) address, error_code, asi_class_name(target->class_id)); +#endif +} + DEFINE_IDTENTRY_RAW_ERRORCODE(exc_page_fault) { irqentry_state_t state; @@ -1497,6 +1560,31 @@ DEFINE_IDTENTRY_RAW_ERRORCODE(exc_page_fault) address = cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_FRED) ? fred_event_data(regs) : read_cr2(); + if (static_asi_enabled() && !user_mode(regs)) { + pgd_t *pgd; + + /* Can be a NOP even for ASI faults, because of NMIs */ + asi_exit(); + + /* + * handle_page_fault() might oops if we run it for a kernel + * address in kernel mode. This might be the case if we got here + * due to an ASI fault. We avoid this case by checking whether + * the address is now, after asi_exit(), accessible by hardware. + * If it is - there's nothing to do. Note that this is a bit of + * a shotgun; we can also bail early from user-address faults + * here that weren't actually caused by ASI. So we might wanna + * move this logic later in the handler. In particular, we might + * be losing some stats here. However for now this keeps ASI + * page faults nice and fast. + */ + pgd = (pgd_t *)__va(read_cr3_pa()) + pgd_index(address); + if (!user_mode(regs) && kernel_access_ok(error_code, address, pgd)) { + warn_if_bad_asi_pf(error_code, address); + return; + } + } + prefetchw(¤t->mm->mmap_lock); /*