| Message ID | 20180723170637.GA19396@embeddedor.com (mailing list archive) |
|---|---|
| State | Deferred |
| Headers | show |
| Series | scsi: mptfusion: Fix potential Spectre v1 | expand |
diff --git a/drivers/message/fusion/mptctl.c b/drivers/message/fusion/mptctl.c index 4470630..6751a40 100644 --- a/drivers/message/fusion/mptctl.c +++ b/drivers/message/fusion/mptctl.c @@ -66,6 +66,9 @@ #include <scsi/scsi_host.h> #include <scsi/scsi_tcq.h> +/* Hardening for Spectre-v1 */ +#include <linux/nospec.h> + #define COPYRIGHT "Copyright (c) 1999-2008 LSI Corporation" #define MODULEAUTHOR "LSI Corporation" #include "mptbase.h" @@ -1306,7 +1309,7 @@ mptctl_getiocinfo (unsigned long arg, unsigned int data_size) kfree(karg); return -EINVAL; } - port = karg->hdr.port; + port = array_index_nospec(karg->hdr.port, 2); karg->port = port; pdev = (struct pci_dev *) ioc->pcidev;
port can be indirectly controlled by user-space, hence leading to a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability. This issue was detected with the help of Smatch: drivers/message/fusion/mptctl.c:1360 mptctl_getiocinfo() warn: potential spectre issue 'ioc->pfacts' Fix this by sanitizing port before using it to index ioc->pfacts Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be completed with a dependent load/store [1]. [1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=152449131114778&w=2 Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com> --- drivers/message/fusion/mptctl.c | 5 ++++- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)