From patchwork Thu Aug 29 15:59:29 2019 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Maurizio Lombardi X-Patchwork-Id: 11121825 Return-Path: Received: from mail.kernel.org (pdx-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.123]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 4C7DB184E for ; Thu, 29 Aug 2019 15:59:50 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 35F93205ED for ; Thu, 29 Aug 2019 15:59:50 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1728228AbfH2P7t (ORCPT ); Thu, 29 Aug 2019 11:59:49 -0400 Received: from mx1.redhat.com ([209.132.183.28]:37544 "EHLO mx1.redhat.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1727600AbfH2P7t (ORCPT ); Thu, 29 Aug 2019 11:59:49 -0400 Received: from smtp.corp.redhat.com (int-mx05.intmail.prod.int.phx2.redhat.com [10.5.11.15]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher AECDH-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mx1.redhat.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id E467210F23E2; Thu, 29 Aug 2019 15:59:48 +0000 (UTC) Received: from manaslu.redhat.com (unknown [10.35.206.41]) by smtp.corp.redhat.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id AFB715D721; Thu, 29 Aug 2019 15:59:46 +0000 (UTC) From: Maurizio Lombardi To: cleech@redhat.com Cc: mchristi@redhat.com, linux-scsi@vger.kernel.org, target-devel@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH 4/4] target-iscsi: rename some variables to avoid confusion. Date: Thu, 29 Aug 2019 17:59:29 +0200 Message-Id: <20190829155929.27701-5-mlombard@redhat.com> In-Reply-To: <20190829155929.27701-1-mlombard@redhat.com> References: <20190829155929.27701-1-mlombard@redhat.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Scanned-By: MIMEDefang 2.79 on 10.5.11.15 X-Greylist: Sender IP whitelisted, not delayed by milter-greylist-4.6.2 (mx1.redhat.com [10.5.110.66]); Thu, 29 Aug 2019 15:59:48 +0000 (UTC) Sender: linux-scsi-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-scsi@vger.kernel.org This patch renames some variables in chap_server_compute_hash() to make it harder to confuse the initiator's challenge with the target's challenge when the mutual chap authentication is used. Signed-off-by: Maurizio Lombardi --- drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target_auth.c | 40 ++++++++++++------------ 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target_auth.c b/drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target_auth.c index 976c8c73d261..7ccef7b1c60b 100644 --- a/drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target_auth.c +++ b/drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target_auth.c @@ -207,8 +207,8 @@ static int chap_server_compute_hash( unsigned long id; unsigned char id_as_uchar; unsigned char type; - unsigned char identifier[10], *challenge = NULL; - unsigned char *challenge_binhex = NULL; + unsigned char identifier[10], *initiatorchg = NULL; + unsigned char *initiatorchg_binhex = NULL; unsigned char *digest = NULL; unsigned char *response = NULL; unsigned char *client_digest = NULL; @@ -218,7 +218,7 @@ static int chap_server_compute_hash( struct iscsi_chap *chap = conn->auth_protocol; struct crypto_shash *tfm = NULL; struct shash_desc *desc = NULL; - int auth_ret = -1, ret, challenge_len; + int auth_ret = -1, ret, initiatorchg_len; digest = kzalloc(chap->digest_size, GFP_KERNEL); if (!digest) { @@ -248,15 +248,15 @@ static int chap_server_compute_hash( memset(chap_n, 0, MAX_CHAP_N_SIZE); memset(chap_r, 0, MAX_RESPONSE_LENGTH); - challenge = kzalloc(CHAP_CHALLENGE_STR_LEN, GFP_KERNEL); - if (!challenge) { + initiatorchg = kzalloc(CHAP_CHALLENGE_STR_LEN, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!initiatorchg) { pr_err("Unable to allocate challenge buffer\n"); goto out; } - challenge_binhex = kzalloc(CHAP_CHALLENGE_STR_LEN, GFP_KERNEL); - if (!challenge_binhex) { - pr_err("Unable to allocate challenge_binhex buffer\n"); + initiatorchg_binhex = kzalloc(CHAP_CHALLENGE_STR_LEN, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!initiatorchg_binhex) { + pr_err("Unable to allocate initiatorchg_binhex buffer\n"); goto out; } /* @@ -391,7 +391,7 @@ static int chap_server_compute_hash( * Get CHAP_C. */ if (extract_param(nr_in_ptr, "CHAP_C", CHAP_CHALLENGE_STR_LEN, - challenge, &type) < 0) { + initiatorchg, &type) < 0) { pr_err("Could not find CHAP_C.\n"); goto out; } @@ -400,28 +400,28 @@ static int chap_server_compute_hash( pr_err("Could not find CHAP_C.\n"); goto out; } - challenge_len = DIV_ROUND_UP(strlen(challenge), 2); - if (!challenge_len) { + initiatorchg_len = DIV_ROUND_UP(strlen(initiatorchg), 2); + if (!initiatorchg_len) { pr_err("Unable to convert incoming challenge\n"); goto out; } - if (challenge_len > 1024) { + if (initiatorchg_len > 1024) { pr_err("CHAP_C exceeds maximum binary size of 1024 bytes\n"); goto out; } - if (hex2bin(challenge_binhex, challenge, challenge_len) < 0) { + if (hex2bin(initiatorchg_binhex, initiatorchg, initiatorchg_len) < 0) { pr_err("Malformed CHAP_C\n"); goto out; } - pr_debug("[server] Got CHAP_C=%s\n", challenge); + pr_debug("[server] Got CHAP_C=%s\n", initiatorchg); /* * During mutual authentication, the CHAP_C generated by the * initiator must not match the original CHAP_C generated by * the target. */ - if (challenge_len == chap->challenge_len && - !memcmp(challenge_binhex, chap->challenge, - challenge_len)) { + if (initiatorchg_len == chap->challenge_len && + !memcmp(initiatorchg_binhex, chap->challenge, + initiatorchg_len)) { pr_err("initiator CHAP_C matches target CHAP_C, failing" " login attempt\n"); goto out; @@ -453,7 +453,7 @@ static int chap_server_compute_hash( /* * Convert received challenge to binary hex. */ - ret = crypto_shash_finup(desc, challenge_binhex, challenge_len, + ret = crypto_shash_finup(desc, initiatorchg_binhex, initiatorchg_len, digest); if (ret < 0) { pr_err("crypto_shash_finup() failed for ma challenge\n"); @@ -479,8 +479,8 @@ static int chap_server_compute_hash( kzfree(desc); if (tfm) crypto_free_shash(tfm); - kfree(challenge); - kfree(challenge_binhex); + kfree(initiatorchg); + kfree(initiatorchg_binhex); kfree(digest); kfree(response); kfree(server_digest);