[V32,0/27] Lockdown patches for 5.2

Message ID	20190404003249.14356-1-matthewgarrett@google.com (mailing list archive)
Headers	show Return-Path: <linux-security-module-owner@kernel.org> Date: Wed, 3 Apr 2019 17:32:22 -0700 Message-Id: <20190404003249.14356-1-matthewgarrett@google.com> Mime-Version: 1.0 Subject: [PATCH V32 0/27] Lockdown patches for 5.2 From: Matthew Garrett <matthewgarrett@google.com> To: jmorris@namei.org Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, dhowells@redhat.com, linux-api@vger.kernel.org, luto@kernel.org Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Sender: owner-linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk
Series	Lockdown patches for 5.2 \| expand [V32,0/27] Lockdown patches for 5.2 [V32,01/27] Add the ability to lock down access to the running kernel image [V32,02/27] Enforce module signatures if the kernel is locked down [V32,03/27] Restrict /dev/{mem,kmem,port} when the kernel is locked down [V32,04/27] kexec_load: Disable at runtime if the kernel is locked down [V32,05/27] Copy secure_boot flag in boot params across kexec reboot [V32,06/27] kexec_file: split KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG into KEXEC_SIG and KEXEC_SIG_FORCE [V32,07/27] kexec_file: Restrict at runtime if the kernel is locked down [V32,08/27] hibernate: Disable when the kernel is locked down [V32,09/27] uswsusp: Disable when the kernel is locked down [V32,10/27] PCI: Lock down BAR access when the kernel is locked down [V32,11/27] x86: Lock down IO port access when the kernel is locked down [V32,12/27] x86/msr: Restrict MSR access when the kernel is locked down [V32,13/27] ACPI: Limit access to custom_method when the kernel is locked down [V32,14/27] acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel param when the kernel has been locked down [V32,15/27] acpi: Disable ACPI table override if the kernel is locked down [V32,16/27] Prohibit PCMCIA CIS storage when the kernel is locked down [V32,17/27] Lock down TIOCSSERIAL [V32,18/27] Lock down module params that specify hardware parameters (eg. ioport) [V32,19/27] x86/mmiotrace: Lock down the testmmiotrace module [V32,20/27] Lock down /proc/kcore [V32,21/27] Lock down tracing and perf kprobes when in confidentiality mode [V32,22/27] bpf: Restrict bpf when kernel lockdown is in confidentiality mode [V32,23/27] Lock down perf when in confidentiality mode [V32,24/27] kexec: Allow kexec_file() with appropriate IMA policy when locked down [V32,25/27] lockdown: Print current->comm in restriction messages [V32,26/27] debugfs: Restrict debugfs when the kernel is locked down [V32,27/27] tracefs: Restrict tracefs when the kernel is locked down

Message ID

20190404003249.14356-1-matthewgarrett@google.com (mailing list archive)

Headers

Date: Wed,  3 Apr 2019 17:32:22 -0700
Message-Id: <20190404003249.14356-1-matthewgarrett@google.com>
Mime-Version: 1.0
Subject: [PATCH V32 0/27] Lockdown patches for 5.2
From: Matthew Garrett <matthewgarrett@google.com>
To: jmorris@namei.org
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
        linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, dhowells@redhat.com,
        linux-api@vger.kernel.org, luto@kernel.org
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8"
Sender: owner-linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Precedence: bulk

Series

Lockdown patches for 5.2 | expand

Message

Matthew Garrett April 4, 2019, 12:32 a.m. UTC

Fairly minimal changes since the last set: tracefs is restricted at
Steven's suggestion (but could do with a once-over, I'm very much not a
vfs person), debugfs is back to Dave's original implementation. I've
also fixed up a malformed patch that resulted from me getting confused
during rebase, and added some further documentation to the initial patch
in order to give a reference for the design goals.