Message ID | 20200304015528.29661-1-kpsingh@chromium.org (mailing list archive) |
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Headers | show
Return-Path: <SRS0=IE2G=4V=vger.kernel.org=linux-security-module-owner@kernel.org> Received: from mail.kernel.org (pdx-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.123]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 5239014E3 for <patchwork-linux-security-module@patchwork.kernel.org>; Wed, 4 Mar 2020 01:55:37 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 32CAA20CC7 for <patchwork-linux-security-module@patchwork.kernel.org>; Wed, 4 Mar 2020 01:55:37 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=chromium.org header.i=@chromium.org header.b="EcGjoIb6" Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S2387524AbgCDBzg (ORCPT <rfc822;patchwork-linux-security-module@patchwork.kernel.org>); Tue, 3 Mar 2020 20:55:36 -0500 Received: from mail-wm1-f67.google.com ([209.85.128.67]:39520 "EHLO mail-wm1-f67.google.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S2387523AbgCDBzg (ORCPT <rfc822;linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>); Tue, 3 Mar 2020 20:55:36 -0500 Received: by mail-wm1-f67.google.com with SMTP id j1so148399wmi.4 for <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>; Tue, 03 Mar 2020 17:55:35 -0800 (PST) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=chromium.org; s=google; h=from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:mime-version :content-transfer-encoding; bh=+ULM9+8eqPT9CsVtMTvsIR7p53e8plFynKvOU9FgO6s=; b=EcGjoIb6GySi296NeymUIZeDg4qK2dUIITK6rKY1iPmg9S3lywvp8xL6Lw18YVkuZb 8dk+cQKL3lYuPTryI6D21RFHF6c806hlp5XtmG/mzG7wUJFHzAPCtt7h8B/EmoMUH2Qu dZiBQtkK6PIlbmRgxPL+3ug4U3nTZtNeg0Fkk= X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:mime-version :content-transfer-encoding; bh=+ULM9+8eqPT9CsVtMTvsIR7p53e8plFynKvOU9FgO6s=; b=V5rBet0gO66H3tS1yNAmzN0nORmGdOWqDH/fyQydoiwbljsXs1eSAIAnhdDx4RqKj1 oCImStjvTw38NiKwGuIWFGsCzRFuN6PIEEHR17bsCNUhUH5qYi7xxxfKcY598CXJl7wl ILD8lJdVlTlc47m2TcF8SnFivbe7jmhNgO1FxpchsjPdq0FpNiEajh/J96v2Ak7O9/IT T6Ct+sIthoGsMhI3R5/QeMt04mETnE01K02Tg+LGeSzfP4Nw7BqNjwgH/thQ7IuRupVf eMUkFcgedjg9cL16KdD4tuyDfConoPbi5aFcW4h7hEFyaaEkLtxyHvtKQz/pFRU0kLt+ U3ZA== X-Gm-Message-State: ANhLgQ0sEqKK+QleyUkV6pls2TrX+MCRcDXCGZ24eM8PPlCiWVaBZvGz iZH9b6EDDF2yfnx7yVngU27KK2S+O9E= X-Google-Smtp-Source: ADFU+vs/DttNPA1ej1oCMfwJsHfsV7V/d2SAFp2Fohk2+Jq7MI54p0V100pBLoGa53y2dK3+svb/pg== X-Received: by 2002:a05:600c:146:: with SMTP id w6mr619008wmm.180.1583286934589; Tue, 03 Mar 2020 17:55:34 -0800 (PST) Received: from kpsingh-kernel.localdomain (77-56-209-237.dclient.hispeed.ch. [77.56.209.237]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id a184sm1475444wmf.29.2020.03.03.17.55.33 (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 bits=256/256); Tue, 03 Mar 2020 17:55:33 -0800 (PST) From: KP Singh <kpsingh@chromium.org> To: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, bpf@vger.kernel.org Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>, Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>, Paul Turner <pjt@google.com>, Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>, Florent Revest <revest@chromium.org>, Brendan Jackman <jackmanb@chromium.org> Subject: [PATCH bpf-next v2 0/7] Introduce BPF_MODIFY_RET tracing progs Date: Wed, 4 Mar 2020 02:55:21 +0100 Message-Id: <20200304015528.29661-1-kpsingh@chromium.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.20.1 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Sender: owner-linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: <linux-security-module.vger.kernel.org> |
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Introduce BPF_MODIFY_RET tracing progs
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From: KP Singh <kpsingh@google.com> v1 -> v2: * Adressed Andrii's feedback. * Fixed a bug that Alexei noticed about nop generation. * Rebase. This was brought up in the KRSI v4 discussion and found to be useful both for security and tracing programs. https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200225193108.GB22391@chromium.org/ The modify_return programs are allowed for security hooks (with an extra CAP_MAC_ADMIN check) and functions whitelisted for error injection (ALLOW_ERROR_INJECTION). The "security_" check is expected to be cleaned up with the KRSI patch series. Here is an example of how a fmod_ret program behaves: int func_to_be_attached(int a, int b) { <--- do_fentry do_fmod_ret: <update ret by calling fmod_ret> if (ret != 0) goto do_fexit; original_function: <side_effects_happen_here> } <--- do_fexit ALLOW_ERROR_INJECTION(func_to_be_attached, ERRNO) The fmod_ret program attached to this function can be defined as: SEC("fmod_ret/func_to_be_attached") int BPF_PROG(func_name, int a, int b, int ret) { // This will skip the original function logic. return -1; } KP Singh (7): bpf: Refactor trampoline update code bpf: JIT helpers for fmod_ret progs bpf: Introduce BPF_MODIFY_RETURN bpf: Attachment verification for BPF_MODIFY_RETURN tools/libbpf: Add support for BPF_MODIFY_RETURN bpf: Add test ops for BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING bpf: Add selftests for BPF_MODIFY_RETURN arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c | 279 +++++++++++++----- include/linux/bpf.h | 24 +- include/uapi/linux/bpf.h | 1 + kernel/bpf/bpf_struct_ops.c | 12 +- kernel/bpf/btf.c | 27 +- kernel/bpf/syscall.c | 1 + kernel/bpf/trampoline.c | 65 ++-- kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 32 ++ kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c | 1 + net/bpf/test_run.c | 57 +++- tools/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h | 1 + tools/lib/bpf/libbpf.c | 4 + .../selftests/bpf/prog_tests/fentry_fexit.c | 12 +- .../selftests/bpf/prog_tests/fentry_test.c | 14 +- .../selftests/bpf/prog_tests/fexit_test.c | 69 ++--- .../selftests/bpf/prog_tests/modify_return.c | 65 ++++ .../selftests/bpf/progs/modify_return.c | 49 +++ 17 files changed, 526 insertions(+), 187 deletions(-) create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/modify_return.c create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/modify_return.c