From patchwork Thu Oct 7 06:18:34 2021 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Dov Murik X-Patchwork-Id: 12540975 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id D5E81C433F5 for ; Thu, 7 Oct 2021 06:19:10 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id BF9576105A for ; Thu, 7 Oct 2021 06:19:10 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S240217AbhJGGVD (ORCPT ); Thu, 7 Oct 2021 02:21:03 -0400 Received: from mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com ([148.163.156.1]:36734 "EHLO mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S240203AbhJGGVC (ORCPT ); Thu, 7 Oct 2021 02:21:02 -0400 Received: from pps.filterd (m0098410.ppops.net [127.0.0.1]) by mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com (8.16.1.2/8.16.1.2) with SMTP id 1975douw019084; Thu, 7 Oct 2021 02:18:45 -0400 DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=ibm.com; h=from : to : cc : subject : date : message-id : content-transfer-encoding : mime-version; s=pp1; bh=g3OfHoJPvrV8tRdPiXlhQT3CLKaqzhip7yaVidL+hG0=; b=e+VLBKQ2XO2evYBqYGqPDwEukY1vxt4yc1BIUmtDGkMQ6cL5YaLXmIMO/e7DB/Jf4DMD llVU1NbDQiaDejg18rvk9bD5V3llvjJ3wsVFqMElC8fQGT4z56LN6ZVdNEVPYG1jYlTB hnyO157xbnS9B0JqPqOs9oiX34fbB40/OeztohGOUEPFpXWGl5udUC6CiZVPDqCKbapZ hLCcfy2lEXwftMmLDmGoBlrlcWQKtEd15uAqJIIYRcqU00SwXXTNWycBEpzBWB63oqId V17qtGZwVqxKVGAxKak3KOp2tiZ0oWbvzMjUdet2chDWGBjJM7Hg6iEXODSW+mTbrxPv 2A== Received: from pps.reinject (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com with ESMTP id 3bhp04eck6-1 (version=TLSv1.2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=NOT); Thu, 07 Oct 2021 02:18:45 -0400 Received: from m0098410.ppops.net (m0098410.ppops.net [127.0.0.1]) by pps.reinject (8.16.0.43/8.16.0.43) with SMTP id 1975wlwK017115; Thu, 7 Oct 2021 02:18:44 -0400 Received: from ppma01dal.us.ibm.com (83.d6.3fa9.ip4.static.sl-reverse.com [169.63.214.131]) by mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com with ESMTP id 3bhp04ecjv-1 (version=TLSv1.2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=NOT); Thu, 07 Oct 2021 02:18:44 -0400 Received: from pps.filterd (ppma01dal.us.ibm.com [127.0.0.1]) by ppma01dal.us.ibm.com (8.16.1.2/8.16.1.2) with SMTP id 1976IEXJ026505; Thu, 7 Oct 2021 06:18:43 GMT Received: from b01cxnp23034.gho.pok.ibm.com (b01cxnp23034.gho.pok.ibm.com [9.57.198.29]) by ppma01dal.us.ibm.com with ESMTP id 3bef2efmfe-1 (version=TLSv1.2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=NOT); Thu, 07 Oct 2021 06:18:43 +0000 Received: from b01ledav005.gho.pok.ibm.com (b01ledav005.gho.pok.ibm.com [9.57.199.110]) by b01cxnp23034.gho.pok.ibm.com (8.14.9/8.14.9/NCO v10.0) with ESMTP id 1976If7e41353714 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=OK); Thu, 7 Oct 2021 06:18:41 GMT Received: from b01ledav005.gho.pok.ibm.com (unknown [127.0.0.1]) by IMSVA (Postfix) with ESMTP id 0FC19AE062; Thu, 7 Oct 2021 06:18:41 +0000 (GMT) Received: from b01ledav005.gho.pok.ibm.com (unknown [127.0.0.1]) by IMSVA (Postfix) with ESMTP id AE71AAE05C; Thu, 7 Oct 2021 06:18:40 +0000 (GMT) Received: from amdrome3.watson.ibm.com (unknown [9.2.130.16]) by b01ledav005.gho.pok.ibm.com (Postfix) with ESMTP; Thu, 7 Oct 2021 06:18:40 +0000 (GMT) From: Dov Murik To: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Cc: Dov Murik , Borislav Petkov , Ashish Kalra , Brijesh Singh , Tom Lendacky , Ard Biesheuvel , James Morris , "Serge E. Hallyn" , Andi Kleen , Greg KH , Andrew Scull , "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" , James Bottomley , Tobin Feldman-Fitzthum , Jim Cadden , Daniele Buono , linux-coco@lists.linux.dev, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v2 0/4] Allow access to confidential computing secret area in SEV guests Date: Thu, 7 Oct 2021 06:18:34 +0000 Message-Id: <20211007061838.1381129-1-dovmurik@linux.ibm.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.25.1 X-TM-AS-GCONF: 00 X-Proofpoint-GUID: vrzvuigXL_kjcBhWCQLVlf-tx_m249zl X-Proofpoint-ORIG-GUID: kFaosjDh9HkQJ35h7nn0vFc0USuGC6RD X-Proofpoint-UnRewURL: 0 URL was un-rewritten MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Proofpoint-Virus-Version: vendor=baseguard engine=ICAP:2.0.182.1,Aquarius:18.0.790,Hydra:6.0.391,FMLib:17.0.607.475 definitions=2021-10-06_04,2021-10-07_01,2020-04-07_01 X-Proofpoint-Spam-Details: rule=outbound_notspam policy=outbound score=0 clxscore=1015 lowpriorityscore=0 impostorscore=0 phishscore=0 mlxscore=0 suspectscore=0 priorityscore=1501 mlxlogscore=999 spamscore=0 bulkscore=0 adultscore=0 malwarescore=0 classifier=spam adjust=0 reason=mlx scancount=1 engine=8.12.0-2109230001 definitions=main-2110070039 Precedence: bulk List-ID: Confidential computing (coco) hardware such as AMD SEV (Secure Encrypted Virtualization) allows guest owners to inject secrets into the VMs memory without the host/hypervisor being able to read them. In SEV, secret injection is performed early in the VM launch process, before the guest starts running. OVMF already reserves designated area for secret injection (in its AmdSev package; see edk2 commit 01726b6d23d4 "OvmfPkg/AmdSev: Expose the Sev Secret area using a configuration table" [1]), but the secrets were not available in the guest kernel. The patch series copies the secrets from the EFI-provided memory to kernel reserved memory, and optionally exposes them to userspace via securityfs using a new sev_secret kernel module. Patch 1 exports the clean_cache_range function which will be used in patch 4. Patch 2 in efi/libstub copies the secret area from the EFI memory to specially allocated memory; patch 3 reserves that memory block. Finally, patch 4 introduces the new sev_secret module that exposes the content of the secret entries as securityfs files, and allows clearing out secrets with a file unlink interface. As a usage example, consider a guest performing computations on encrypted files. The Guest Owner provides the decryption key (= secret) using the secret injection mechanism. The guest application reads the secret from the sev_secret filesystem and proceeds to decrypt the files into memory and then performs the needed computations on the content. In this example, the host can't read the files from the disk image because they are encrypted. Host can't read the decryption key because it is passed using the secret injection mechanism (= secure channel). Host can't read the decrypted content from memory because it's a confidential (memory-encrypted) guest. This has been tested with AMD SEV and SEV-ES guests, but the kernel side of handling the secret area has no SEV-specific dependencies, and therefore might be usable (perhaps with minor changes) for any confidential computing hardware that can publish the secret area via the standard EFI config table entry. Here is a simple example for usage of the sev_secret module in a guest to which a secret are with 4 secrets was injected during launch: # modprobe sev_secret # ls -la /sys/kernel/security/coco/sev_secret total 0 drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 . drwxr-xr-x 3 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 .. -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 736870e5-84f0-4973-92ec-06879ce3da0b -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 83c83f7f-1356-4975-8b7e-d3a0b54312c6 -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 9553f55d-3da2-43ee-ab5d-ff17f78864d2 -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 e6f5a162-d67f-4750-a67c-5d065f2a9910 # xxd /sys/kernel/security/coco/sev_secret/e6f5a162-d67f-4750-a67c-5d065f2a9910 00000000: 7468 6573 652d 6172 652d 7468 652d 6b61 these-are-the-ka 00000010: 7461 2d73 6563 7265 7473 0001 0203 0405 ta-secrets...... 00000020: 0607 .. # rm /sys/kernel/security/coco/sev_secret/e6f5a162-d67f-4750-a67c-5d065f2a9910 # ls -la /sys/kernel/security/coco/sev_secret total 0 drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 0 Jun 28 11:55 . drwxr-xr-x 3 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 .. -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 736870e5-84f0-4973-92ec-06879ce3da0b -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 83c83f7f-1356-4975-8b7e-d3a0b54312c6 -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 9553f55d-3da2-43ee-ab5d-ff17f78864d2 [1] https://github.com/tianocore/edk2/commit/01726b6d23d4 --- v2 changes: - Export clean_cache_range() - When deleteing a secret, call clean_cache_range() after explicit_memzero - Add Documentation/ABI/testing/securityfs-coco-sev_secret v1: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-coco/20210809190157.279332-1-dovmurik@linux.ibm.com/ RFC: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-coco/20210628183431.953934-1-dovmurik@linux.ibm.com/ Dov Murik (4): x86: Export clean_cache_range() efi/libstub: Copy confidential computing secret area efi: Reserve confidential computing secret area virt: Add sev_secret module to expose confidential computing secrets .../ABI/testing/securityfs-coco-sev_secret | 49 +++ arch/x86/include/asm/cacheflush.h | 1 + arch/x86/lib/usercopy_64.c | 21 -- arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c | 30 ++ arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c | 1 + drivers/firmware/efi/Makefile | 2 +- drivers/firmware/efi/coco.c | 41 +++ drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c | 3 + drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile | 2 +- drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/coco.c | 68 ++++ drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/efi-stub.c | 2 + drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/efistub.h | 2 + drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/x86-stub.c | 2 + drivers/virt/Kconfig | 3 + drivers/virt/Makefile | 1 + drivers/virt/coco/sev_secret/Kconfig | 11 + drivers/virt/coco/sev_secret/Makefile | 2 + drivers/virt/coco/sev_secret/sev_secret.c | 320 ++++++++++++++++++ include/linux/efi.h | 9 + 19 files changed, 547 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-) create mode 100644 Documentation/ABI/testing/securityfs-coco-sev_secret create mode 100644 drivers/firmware/efi/coco.c create mode 100644 drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/coco.c create mode 100644 drivers/virt/coco/sev_secret/Kconfig create mode 100644 drivers/virt/coco/sev_secret/Makefile create mode 100644 drivers/virt/coco/sev_secret/sev_secret.c base-commit: 60a9483534ed0d99090a2ee1d4bb0b8179195f51