From patchwork Mon Nov 29 11:42:46 2021 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Dov Murik X-Patchwork-Id: 12644291 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 0B56EC433EF for ; Mon, 29 Nov 2021 11:46:29 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S232760AbhK2Ltn (ORCPT ); Mon, 29 Nov 2021 06:49:43 -0500 Received: from mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com ([148.163.156.1]:36874 "EHLO mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S231970AbhK2Lrj (ORCPT ); Mon, 29 Nov 2021 06:47:39 -0500 Received: from pps.filterd (m0098410.ppops.net [127.0.0.1]) by mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com (8.16.1.2/8.16.1.2) with SMTP id 1ATBMXXN021178; Mon, 29 Nov 2021 11:43:04 GMT DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=ibm.com; h=from : to : cc : subject : date : message-id : content-transfer-encoding : mime-version; s=pp1; bh=QkgCNX39Ds3w5IajFtTaNxfUo2zlSU3d42VvCxSZEcw=; b=KgFR57Nc//IEruZLkCXoseRTdDPApp+2UGzVZj0tHxT72smxNKsRxvPgRqUcfO26scNN q3USocMUzVD6e1MfOCVtmDzkmbqo4TgXy0JIaWcvCXRg/vFo/ElflkkW2M1L+qOp/wga x6x8H6flz2GaXEXt/95JRbdSpZiFjdni2XG2TtJ45WsuZJDk/zYLQJ6+TQ1fDmsN8ThS /bXUe/p/ioraxPiU4fUZn+kJKAyp1cpKvva37tyu7NAB3hzQS8PBZe/1jjx2a+Q0oR30 FeCIM8ms7S4e0wkMdfwWqiZptoH6RdnALOkN/GJ4GrGgb+MrjMRON2e5xL0adepTU2LI fA== Received: from pps.reinject (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com with ESMTP id 3cmwxd8dna-1 (version=TLSv1.2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=NOT); Mon, 29 Nov 2021 11:43:03 +0000 Received: from m0098410.ppops.net (m0098410.ppops.net [127.0.0.1]) by pps.reinject (8.16.0.43/8.16.0.43) with SMTP id 1ATBRcYU003926; Mon, 29 Nov 2021 11:43:03 GMT Received: from ppma01wdc.us.ibm.com (fd.55.37a9.ip4.static.sl-reverse.com [169.55.85.253]) by mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com with ESMTP id 3cmwxd8dmu-1 (version=TLSv1.2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=NOT); Mon, 29 Nov 2021 11:43:03 +0000 Received: from pps.filterd (ppma01wdc.us.ibm.com [127.0.0.1]) by ppma01wdc.us.ibm.com (8.16.1.2/8.16.1.2) with SMTP id 1ATBXsD4008620; Mon, 29 Nov 2021 11:43:01 GMT Received: from b01cxnp22034.gho.pok.ibm.com (b01cxnp22034.gho.pok.ibm.com [9.57.198.24]) by ppma01wdc.us.ibm.com with ESMTP id 3ckca9yc9h-1 (version=TLSv1.2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=NOT); Mon, 29 Nov 2021 11:43:01 +0000 Received: from b01ledav002.gho.pok.ibm.com (b01ledav002.gho.pok.ibm.com [9.57.199.107]) by b01cxnp22034.gho.pok.ibm.com (8.14.9/8.14.9/NCO v10.0) with ESMTP id 1ATBgxQ041222452 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=OK); Mon, 29 Nov 2021 11:42:59 GMT Received: from b01ledav002.gho.pok.ibm.com (unknown [127.0.0.1]) by IMSVA (Postfix) with ESMTP id 77285124053; Mon, 29 Nov 2021 11:42:59 +0000 (GMT) Received: from b01ledav002.gho.pok.ibm.com (unknown [127.0.0.1]) by IMSVA (Postfix) with ESMTP id 1850112405B; Mon, 29 Nov 2021 11:42:59 +0000 (GMT) Received: from amdrome3.watson.ibm.com (unknown [9.2.130.16]) by b01ledav002.gho.pok.ibm.com (Postfix) with ESMTP; Mon, 29 Nov 2021 11:42:59 +0000 (GMT) From: Dov Murik To: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Cc: Dov Murik , Borislav Petkov , Ashish Kalra , Brijesh Singh , Tom Lendacky , Ard Biesheuvel , James Morris , "Serge E. Hallyn" , Andi Kleen , Greg KH , Andrew Scull , Dave Hansen , "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" , James Bottomley , Tobin Feldman-Fitzthum , Jim Cadden , Daniele Buono , linux-coco@lists.linux.dev, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v6 0/5] Allow guest access to EFI confidential computing secret area Date: Mon, 29 Nov 2021 11:42:46 +0000 Message-Id: <20211129114251.3741721-1-dovmurik@linux.ibm.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.25.1 X-TM-AS-GCONF: 00 X-Proofpoint-GUID: jd8LkPIZyXb4_PGZNelfu-pMVwc7xHXv X-Proofpoint-ORIG-GUID: FJxzge9UL3qFr_1GtlB0wPTCJKOoONI9 X-Proofpoint-UnRewURL: 0 URL was un-rewritten MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Proofpoint-Virus-Version: vendor=baseguard engine=ICAP:2.0.205,Aquarius:18.0.790,Hydra:6.0.425,FMLib:17.0.607.475 definitions=2021-11-29_07,2021-11-28_01,2020-04-07_01 X-Proofpoint-Spam-Details: rule=outbound_notspam policy=outbound score=0 mlxscore=0 malwarescore=0 phishscore=0 priorityscore=1501 adultscore=0 lowpriorityscore=0 spamscore=0 clxscore=1015 impostorscore=0 suspectscore=0 mlxlogscore=999 bulkscore=0 classifier=spam adjust=0 reason=mlx scancount=1 engine=8.12.0-2110150000 definitions=main-2111290058 Precedence: bulk List-ID: Confidential computing (coco) hardware such as AMD SEV (Secure Encrypted Virtualization) allows guest owners to inject secrets into the VMs memory without the host/hypervisor being able to read them. In SEV, secret injection is performed early in the VM launch process, before the guest starts running. OVMF already reserves designated area for secret injection (in its AmdSev package; see edk2 commit 01726b6d23d4 "OvmfPkg/AmdSev: Expose the Sev Secret area using a configuration table" [1]), but the secrets were not available in the guest kernel. The patch series keeps the address of the EFI-provided memory for injected secrets, and exposes the secrets to userspace via securityfs using a new efi_secret kernel module. The module is autoloaded (by the EFI driver) if the secret area is populated. The first patch in EFI keeps the address of the secret area as passed in the EFI configuration table. The second patch is a quirk fix for older firmwares didn't mark the secrets page as EFI_RESERVED_TYPE. The third patch introduces the new efi_secret module that exposes the content of the secret entries as securityfs files, and allows clearing out secrets with a file unlink interface. The fourth patch auto-loads the efi_secret module during startup if the injected secrets area is populated. The last patch documents the data flow of confidential computing secret injection. As a usage example, consider a guest performing computations on encrypted files. The Guest Owner provides the decryption key (= secret) using the secret injection mechanism. The guest application reads the secret from the efi_secret filesystem and proceeds to decrypt the files into memory and then performs the needed computations on the content. In this example, the host can't read the files from the disk image because they are encrypted. Host can't read the decryption key because it is passed using the secret injection mechanism (= secure channel). Host can't read the decrypted content from memory because it's a confidential (memory-encrypted) guest. This has been tested with AMD SEV and SEV-ES guests, but the kernel side of handling the secret area has no SEV-specific dependencies, and therefore might be usable (perhaps with minor changes) for any confidential computing hardware that can publish the secret area via the standard EFI config table entry. To enable this functionality, set CONFIG_EFI_SECRET=m when building the guest kernel. Here is a simple example for usage of the efi_secret module in a guest to which an EFI secret area with 4 secrets was injected during launch: # ls -la /sys/kernel/security/coco/efi_secret total 0 drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 . drwxr-xr-x 3 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 .. -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 736870e5-84f0-4973-92ec-06879ce3da0b -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 83c83f7f-1356-4975-8b7e-d3a0b54312c6 -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 9553f55d-3da2-43ee-ab5d-ff17f78864d2 -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 e6f5a162-d67f-4750-a67c-5d065f2a9910 # xxd /sys/kernel/security/coco/efi_secret/e6f5a162-d67f-4750-a67c-5d065f2a9910 00000000: 7468 6573 652d 6172 652d 7468 652d 6b61 these-are-the-ka 00000010: 7461 2d73 6563 7265 7473 0001 0203 0405 ta-secrets...... 00000020: 0607 .. # rm /sys/kernel/security/coco/efi_secret/e6f5a162-d67f-4750-a67c-5d065f2a9910 # ls -la /sys/kernel/security/coco/efi_secret total 0 drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 0 Jun 28 11:55 . drwxr-xr-x 3 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 .. -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 736870e5-84f0-4973-92ec-06879ce3da0b -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 83c83f7f-1356-4975-8b7e-d3a0b54312c6 -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 9553f55d-3da2-43ee-ab5d-ff17f78864d2 [1] https://github.com/tianocore/edk2/commit/01726b6d23d4 --- v6 changes: - Autoload the efi_secret module if the secret area is populated (thanks Greg KH). - efi_secret: Depend on X86_64 because we use ioremap_encrypted() which is only defined for this arch. - efi_secret.c: Remove unneeded tableheader_guid local variable. - Documentation fixes. v5: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-coco/20211118113359.642571-1-dovmurik@linux.ibm.com/ v5 changes: - Simplify EFI code: instead of copying the secret area, the firmware marks the secret area as EFI_RESERVED_TYPE, and then the uefi_init() code just keeps the pointer as it appears in the EFI configuration table. The use of reserved pages is similar to the AMD SEV-SNP patches for handling SNP-Secrets and SNP-CPUID pages. - In order to handle OVMF releases out there which mark the confidential computing secrets page as EFI_BOOT_SERVICES_DATA, add efi/libstub code that detects this and fixes the E820 map to reserve this page. - In the efi_secret module code, map the secrets page using ioremap_encrypted (again, similar to the AMD SEV-SNP guest patches for accessing SNP-Secrets and SNP-CPUID pages). - Add documentation in Documentation/security/coco/efi_secret. v4: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-coco/20211020061408.3447533-1-dovmurik@linux.ibm.com/ v4 changes: - Guard all the new EFI and efi-stub code (patches 1+2) with #ifdef CONFIG_EFI_COCO_SECRET (thanks Greg KH). Selecting CONFIG_EFI_SECRET=m (patch 3) will enable the EFI parts as well. - Guard call to clflush_cache_range() with #ifdef CONFIG_X86 (Reported-by: kernel test robot ) v3: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-coco/20211014130848.592611-1-dovmurik@linux.ibm.com/ v3 changes: - Rename the module to efi_secret - Remove the exporting of clean_cache_range - Use clflush_cache_range in wipe_memory - Document function wipe_memory - Initialize efi.coco_secret to EFI_INVALID_TABLE_ADDR to correctly detect when there's no secret area published in the EFI configuration tables v2: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-coco/20211007061838.1381129-1-dovmurik@linux.ibm.com v2 changes: - Export clean_cache_range() - When deleteing a secret, call clean_cache_range() after explicit_memzero - Add Documentation/ABI/testing/securityfs-coco-sev_secret v1: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-coco/20210809190157.279332-1-dovmurik@linux.ibm.com/ RFC: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-coco/20210628183431.953934-1-dovmurik@linux.ibm.com/ Dov Murik (5): efi: Save location of EFI confidential computing area efi/libstub: Reserve confidential computing secret area virt: Add efi_secret module to expose confidential computing secrets efi: Load efi_secret module if EFI secret area is populated docs: security: Add coco/efi_secret documentation .../ABI/testing/securityfs-coco-efi_secret | 51 +++ Documentation/security/coco/efi_secret.rst | 102 ++++++ Documentation/security/coco/index.rst | 9 + Documentation/security/index.rst | 1 + arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c | 3 + drivers/firmware/efi/Kconfig | 16 + drivers/firmware/efi/Makefile | 1 + drivers/firmware/efi/coco.c | 58 +++ drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c | 6 + drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/x86-stub.c | 28 ++ drivers/virt/Kconfig | 3 + drivers/virt/Makefile | 1 + drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret/Kconfig | 14 + drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret/Makefile | 2 + drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret/efi_secret.c | 337 ++++++++++++++++++ include/linux/efi.h | 10 + 16 files changed, 642 insertions(+) create mode 100644 Documentation/ABI/testing/securityfs-coco-efi_secret create mode 100644 Documentation/security/coco/efi_secret.rst create mode 100644 Documentation/security/coco/index.rst create mode 100644 drivers/firmware/efi/coco.c create mode 100644 drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret/Kconfig create mode 100644 drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret/Makefile create mode 100644 drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret/efi_secret.c base-commit: 42eb8fdac2fc5d62392dcfcf0253753e821a97b0