From patchwork Tue Dec 7 20:21:11 2021 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Stefan Berger X-Patchwork-Id: 12662547 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 71469C433FE for ; Tue, 7 Dec 2021 20:22:11 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S241227AbhLGUZk (ORCPT ); Tue, 7 Dec 2021 15:25:40 -0500 Received: from mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com ([148.163.156.1]:57344 "EHLO mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S231817AbhLGUZj (ORCPT ); Tue, 7 Dec 2021 15:25:39 -0500 Received: from pps.filterd (m0098396.ppops.net [127.0.0.1]) by mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com (8.16.1.2/8.16.1.2) with SMTP id 1B7Jbh8g023014; Tue, 7 Dec 2021 20:21:54 GMT DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=ibm.com; h=from : to : cc : subject : date : message-id : content-transfer-encoding : mime-version; s=pp1; bh=ctKy4vwEZUfMSGNwMWDxzkilOj7nvuFVJ0w/Ro8+3aw=; b=g3RlMXrYzuFVzQ+PLHRYWvWDJxHSwQUNFsQKUju03zZELkThpCvdxQDJeqX38tYESP2O 5FZD8HrFiPQWaodu4uBN0E0IRHf9Ene6vMFpqI8KfMZZLXLCh1BWQ3lB7/RAO1v2KbKF 6HaPGbxJ9Io721yn0dqLn/2/p/hAFfwDE5QJPlD3n7y9wSVzeuRL4iu6kCUwq5OyNuW5 Ayn3A91+PmuJ+Lu63/UIEN/oU4xT5Pgz/Md5EuYDmGN8C73s1pN0KNePcWCYSETKXQKS vEcCH80IgG8V/CsqTSmTElxFl+TSEGkCrhClX5700Egku7rPJJg+igHDenKDejlNaK9Q Pg== Received: from pps.reinject (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com with ESMTP id 3ctajxnse4-1 (version=TLSv1.2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=NOT); Tue, 07 Dec 2021 20:21:53 +0000 Received: from m0098396.ppops.net (m0098396.ppops.net [127.0.0.1]) by pps.reinject (8.16.0.43/8.16.0.43) with SMTP id 1B7KEoY8023044; Tue, 7 Dec 2021 20:21:53 GMT Received: from ppma02wdc.us.ibm.com (aa.5b.37a9.ip4.static.sl-reverse.com [169.55.91.170]) by mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com with ESMTP id 3ctajxnsdr-1 (version=TLSv1.2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=NOT); Tue, 07 Dec 2021 20:21:53 +0000 Received: from pps.filterd (ppma02wdc.us.ibm.com [127.0.0.1]) by ppma02wdc.us.ibm.com (8.16.1.2/8.16.1.2) with SMTP id 1B7K7rG5023097; Tue, 7 Dec 2021 20:21:51 GMT Received: from b03cxnp08027.gho.boulder.ibm.com (b03cxnp08027.gho.boulder.ibm.com [9.17.130.19]) by ppma02wdc.us.ibm.com with ESMTP id 3cqyyam14c-1 (version=TLSv1.2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=NOT); Tue, 07 Dec 2021 20:21:51 +0000 Received: from b03ledav002.gho.boulder.ibm.com (b03ledav002.gho.boulder.ibm.com [9.17.130.233]) by b03cxnp08027.gho.boulder.ibm.com (8.14.9/8.14.9/NCO v10.0) with ESMTP id 1B7KLoqS28181126 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=OK); Tue, 7 Dec 2021 20:21:50 GMT Received: from b03ledav002.gho.boulder.ibm.com (unknown [127.0.0.1]) by IMSVA (Postfix) with ESMTP id 8B61B136053; Tue, 7 Dec 2021 20:21:50 +0000 (GMT) Received: from b03ledav002.gho.boulder.ibm.com (unknown [127.0.0.1]) by IMSVA (Postfix) with ESMTP id EB7E7136059; Tue, 7 Dec 2021 20:21:47 +0000 (GMT) Received: from sbct-3.pok.ibm.com (unknown [9.47.158.153]) by b03ledav002.gho.boulder.ibm.com (Postfix) with ESMTP; Tue, 7 Dec 2021 20:21:47 +0000 (GMT) From: Stefan Berger To: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Cc: zohar@linux.ibm.com, serge@hallyn.com, christian.brauner@ubuntu.com, containers@lists.linux.dev, dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com, ebiederm@xmission.com, krzysztof.struczynski@huawei.com, roberto.sassu@huawei.com, mpeters@redhat.com, lhinds@redhat.com, lsturman@redhat.com, puiterwi@redhat.com, jejb@linux.ibm.com, jamjoom@us.ibm.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, paul@paul-moore.com, rgb@redhat.com, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, jmorris@namei.org, Stefan Berger Subject: [PATCH v4 00/16] ima: Namespace IMA with audit support in IMA-ns Date: Tue, 7 Dec 2021 15:21:11 -0500 Message-Id: <20211207202127.1508689-1-stefanb@linux.ibm.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.31.1 X-TM-AS-GCONF: 00 X-Proofpoint-ORIG-GUID: BWxgFUm6h8BteI3KqlGvYV-eW0a56H9- X-Proofpoint-GUID: 9Yi73JQE1rGnqH1AyDerzsCR3fjke5KJ X-Proofpoint-UnRewURL: 0 URL was un-rewritten MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Proofpoint-Virus-Version: vendor=baseguard engine=ICAP:2.0.205,Aquarius:18.0.790,Hydra:6.0.425,FMLib:17.11.62.513 definitions=2021-12-07_08,2021-12-06_02,2021-12-02_01 X-Proofpoint-Spam-Details: rule=outbound_notspam policy=outbound score=0 malwarescore=0 spamscore=0 priorityscore=1501 suspectscore=0 impostorscore=0 clxscore=1015 mlxlogscore=999 lowpriorityscore=0 adultscore=0 mlxscore=0 phishscore=0 bulkscore=0 classifier=spam adjust=0 reason=mlx scancount=1 engine=8.12.0-2110150000 definitions=main-2112070122 Precedence: bulk List-ID: The goal of this series of patches is to start with the namespacing of IMA and support auditing within an IMA namespace (IMA-ns) as the first step. In this series the IMA namespace is piggy backing on the user namespace and therefore an IMA namespace gets created when a user namespace is created. The advantage of this is that the user namespace can provide the keys infrastructure that IMA appraisal support will need later on. We chose the goal of supporting auditing within an IMA namespace since it requires the least changes to IMA. Following this series, auditing within an IMA namespace can be activated by a user running the following lines that rely on a statically linked busybox to be installed on the host for execution within the minimal container environment: mkdir -p rootfs/{bin,mnt,proc} cp /sbin/busybox rootfs/bin PATH=/bin unshare --user --map-root-user --mount-proc --pid --fork \ --root rootfs busybox sh -c \ "busybox mount -t securityfs /mnt /mnt; \ busybox echo 'audit func=BPRM_CHECK mask=MAY_EXEC' > /mnt/ima/policy; \ busybox cat /mnt/ima/policy" Following the audit log on the host the last line cat'ing the IMA policy inside the namespace would have been audited. Unfortunately the auditing line is not distinguishable from one stemming from actions on the host. The hope here is that Richard Brigg's container id support for auditing would help resolve the problem. The following lines added to a suitable IMA policy on the host would cause the execution of the commands inside the container (by uid 1000) to be measured and audited as well on the host, thus leading to two auditing messages for the 'busybox cat' above and log entries in IMA's system log. echo -e "measure func=BPRM_CHECK mask=MAY_EXEC uid=1000\n" \ "audit func=BPRM_CHECK mask=MAY_EXEC uid=1000\n" \ > /sys/kernel/security/ima/policy The goal of supporting measurement and auditing by the host, of actions occurring within IMA namespaces, is that users, particularly root, should not be able to evade the host's IMA policy just by spawning new IMA namespaces, running programs there, and discarding the namespaces again. This is achieved through 'hierarchical processing' of file accesses that are evaluated against the policy of the namespace where the action occurred and against all namespaces' and their policies leading back to the root IMA namespace (init_ima_ns). The patch series adds support for a virtualized SecurityFS with a few new API calls that are used by IMA namespacing. Only the data relevant to the IMA namespace are shown. The files and directories of other security subsystems (TPM, evm, Tomoyo, safesetid) are not showing up when secruityfs is mounted inside a user namespace. Much of the code leading up to the virtualization of SecurityFS deals with moving IMA's variables from various files into the IMA namespace structure called 'ima_namespace'. When it comes to determining the current IMA namespace I took the approach to get the current IMA namespace (get_current_ns()) on the top level and pass the pointer all the way down to those functions that now need access to the ima_namespace to get to their variables. This later on comes in handy once hierarchical processing is implemented in this series where we walk the list of namespaces backwards and again need to pass the pointer into functions. This patch also introduces usage of CAP_MAC_ADMIN to allow access to the IMA policy via reduced capabilities. We would again later on use this capability to allow users to set file extended attributes for IMA appraisal support. My tree with these patches is here: git clone https://github.com/stefanberger/linux-ima-namespaces v5.15+imans.v4.posted Regards, Stefan v4: - For consistency moved 'ns = get_current_ns()' to top of functions - Merge in James's latest SecurityFS patch v3: - Further modifications to virtualized SecurityFS following James's posted patch - Dropping of early teardown for user_namespaces since not needed anymore v2: - Folllwed Christian's suggestion to virtualize securitytfs; no more securityfs_ns - Followed James's advice for late 'population' of securityfs for IMA namespaces - Squashed 2 patches dealing with capabilities - Added missing 'depends on USER_NS' to Kconfig - Added missing 'static' to several functions Mehmet Kayaalp (2): ima: Define ns_status for storing namespaced iint data ima: Namespace audit status flags Stefan Berger (14): ima: Add IMA namespace support ima: Move delayed work queue and variables into ima_namespace ima: Move IMA's keys queue related variables into ima_namespace ima: Move policy related variables into ima_namespace ima: Move ima_htable into ima_namespace ima: Move measurement list related variables into ima_namespace ima: Only accept AUDIT rules for IMA non-init_ima_ns namespaces for now ima: Implement hierarchical processing of file accesses securityfs: Only use simple_pin_fs/simple_release_fs for init_user_ns securityfs: Extend securityfs with namespacing support ima: Move some IMA policy and filesystem related variables into ima_namespace ima: Use mac_admin_ns_capable() to check corresponding capability ima: Move dentries into ima_namespace ima: Setup securityfs for IMA namespace include/linux/capability.h | 6 + include/linux/ima.h | 140 +++++++++++++++++ include/linux/user_namespace.h | 4 + init/Kconfig | 13 ++ kernel/user.c | 9 +- kernel/user_namespace.c | 16 ++ security/inode.c | 54 +++++-- security/integrity/ima/Makefile | 4 +- security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 145 ++++++++++++------ security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c | 33 ++-- security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 26 ++-- security/integrity/ima/ima_asymmetric_keys.c | 8 +- security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c | 152 +++++++++++-------- security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c | 20 +-- security/integrity/ima/ima_init_ima_ns.c | 73 +++++++++ security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 144 ++++++++++++------ security/integrity/ima/ima_ns.c | 111 ++++++++++++++ security/integrity/ima/ima_ns_status.c | 132 ++++++++++++++++ security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 146 ++++++++++-------- security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c | 75 +++++---- security/integrity/ima/ima_queue_keys.c | 73 ++++----- security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c | 4 +- 22 files changed, 1044 insertions(+), 344 deletions(-) create mode 100644 security/integrity/ima/ima_init_ima_ns.c create mode 100644 security/integrity/ima/ima_ns.c create mode 100644 security/integrity/ima/ima_ns_status.c