| Message ID | 20220331215607.3182232-1-dovmurik@linux.ibm.com (mailing list archive) |
|---|---|
| Headers | show |
| Series | Allow guest access to EFI confidential computing secret area | expand |
On 01/04/2022 0:56, Dov Murik wrote: > Confidential computing (coco) hardware such as AMD SEV (Secure Encrypted > Virtualization) allows guest owners to inject secrets into the VMs > memory without the host/hypervisor being able to read them. In SEV, > secret injection is performed early in the VM launch process, before the > guest starts running. > > OVMF already reserves designated area for secret injection (in its > AmdSev package; see edk2 commit 01726b6d23d4 "OvmfPkg/AmdSev: Expose the > Sev Secret area using a configuration table" [1]), but the secrets were > not available in the guest kernel. > > The patch series keeps the address of the EFI-provided memory for > injected secrets, and exposes the secrets to userspace via securityfs > using a new efi_secret kernel module. The module is autoloaded (by the > EFI driver) if the secret area is populated. > > The first patch in EFI keeps the address of the secret area as passed in > the EFI configuration table. The second patch introduces the new > efi_secret module that exposes the content of the secret entries as > securityfs files, and allows clearing out secrets with a file unlink > interface. The third patch auto-loads the efi_secret module during > startup if the injected secrets area is populated. The last patch > documents the data flow of confidential computing secret injection. > > As a usage example, consider a guest performing computations on > encrypted files. The Guest Owner provides the decryption key (= secret) > using the secret injection mechanism. The guest application reads the > secret from the efi_secret filesystem and proceeds to decrypt the files > into memory and then performs the needed computations on the content. > > In this example, the host can't read the files from the disk image > because they are encrypted. Host can't read the decryption key because > it is passed using the secret injection mechanism (= secure channel). > Host can't read the decrypted content from memory because it's a > confidential (memory-encrypted) guest. > > This has been tested with AMD SEV and SEV-ES guests, but the kernel side > of handling the secret area has no SEV-specific dependencies, and > therefore might be usable (perhaps with minor changes) for any > confidential computing hardware that can publish the secret area via the > standard EFI config table entry. > > To enable this functionality, set CONFIG_EFI_SECRET=m when building the > guest kernel. > > Here is a simple example for usage of the efi_secret module in a guest > to which an EFI secret area with 4 secrets was injected during launch: > > ... > [ 0.000000] efi: EFI v2.70 by EDK II > [ 0.000000] efi: CocoSecret=0x7f222680 SMBIOS=0x7f541000 ACPI=0x7f77e000 ACPI 2.0=0x7f77e014 MEMATTR=0x7ea16418 > ... > [ 1.127627] Run /init as init process > Loading, please wait... > Starting version 245.4-4ubuntu3.15 > ... > [ 0.763204] efi_secret efi_secret.0: Created 4 entries in securityfs secrets/coco > ... > > # ls -la /sys/kernel/security/secrets/coco > total 0 > drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 . > drwxr-xr-x 3 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 .. > -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 736870e5-84f0-4973-92ec-06879ce3da0b > -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 83c83f7f-1356-4975-8b7e-d3a0b54312c6 > -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 9553f55d-3da2-43ee-ab5d-ff17f78864d2 > -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 e6f5a162-d67f-4750-a67c-5d065f2a9910 > > # hd /sys/kernel/security/secrets/coco/e6f5a162-d67f-4750-a67c-5d065f2a9910 > 00000000 74 68 65 73 65 2d 61 72 65 2d 74 68 65 2d 6b 61 |these-are-the-ka| > 00000010 74 61 2d 73 65 63 72 65 74 73 00 01 02 03 04 05 |ta-secrets......| > 00000020 06 07 |..| > 00000022 > > # rm /sys/kernel/security/secrets/coco/e6f5a162-d67f-4750-a67c-5d065f2a9910 > > # ls -la /sys/kernel/security/secrets/coco > total 0 > drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 0 Jun 28 11:55 . > drwxr-xr-x 3 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 .. > -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 736870e5-84f0-4973-92ec-06879ce3da0b > -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 83c83f7f-1356-4975-8b7e-d3a0b54312c6 > -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 9553f55d-3da2-43ee-ab5d-ff17f78864d2 > > > [1] https://github.com/tianocore/edk2/commit/01726b6d23d4 > > > --- > > v9 changes: > - Change the module into a platform driver (thanks Ard) > - Remove special auto-loading code in efi; instead register a platform > device (udev will load the efi_secret module) (thanks Ard) > - Change logging in the efi_secret module to dev_err() etc. > - efi_secret: first check that the secret area header is valid; only then start > creating securityfs dirs. > > v8: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-coco/20220228114254.1099945-1-dovmurik@linux.ibm.com/ > v8 changes: > - Change path of filesystem to <securityfs>/secrets/coco and fix the > documentation accordingly (Thanks Gerd, Matthew) > - Remove patch 2/5 (of v7) because the latest OVMF release (edk2-stable202202) > already contains the fix to mark the launch secret page as EFI_RESERVED_TYPE. > > v7: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-coco/20220201124413.1093099-1-dovmurik@linux.ibm.com/ > v7 changes: > - Improve description of efi_secret module in Kconfig. > - Fix sparse warnings on pointer address space mismatch > (Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>) > > v6: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-coco/20211129114251.3741721-1-dovmurik@linux.ibm.com/ > v6 changes: > - Autoload the efi_secret module if the secret area is populated > (thanks Greg KH). > - efi_secret: Depend on X86_64 because we use ioremap_encrypted() which > is only defined for this arch. > - efi_secret.c: Remove unneeded tableheader_guid local variable. > - Documentation fixes. > > v5: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-coco/20211118113359.642571-1-dovmurik@linux.ibm.com/ > v5 changes: > - Simplify EFI code: instead of copying the secret area, the firmware > marks the secret area as EFI_RESERVED_TYPE, and then the uefi_init() > code just keeps the pointer as it appears in the EFI configuration > table. The use of reserved pages is similar to the AMD SEV-SNP > patches for handling SNP-Secrets and SNP-CPUID pages. > - In order to handle OVMF releases out there which mark the > confidential computing secrets page as EFI_BOOT_SERVICES_DATA, add > efi/libstub code that detects this and fixes the E820 map to reserve > this page. > - In the efi_secret module code, map the secrets page using > ioremap_encrypted (again, similar to the AMD SEV-SNP guest patches > for accessing SNP-Secrets and SNP-CPUID pages). > - Add documentation in Documentation/security/coco/efi_secret. > > v4: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-coco/20211020061408.3447533-1-dovmurik@linux.ibm.com/ > v4 changes: > - Guard all the new EFI and efi-stub code (patches 1+2) with #ifdef > CONFIG_EFI_COCO_SECRET (thanks Greg KH). Selecting > CONFIG_EFI_SECRET=m (patch 3) will enable the EFI parts as well. > - Guard call to clflush_cache_range() with #ifdef CONFIG_X86 > (Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>) > > v3: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-coco/20211014130848.592611-1-dovmurik@linux.ibm.com/ > v3 changes: > - Rename the module to efi_secret > - Remove the exporting of clean_cache_range > - Use clflush_cache_range in wipe_memory > - Document function wipe_memory > - Initialize efi.coco_secret to EFI_INVALID_TABLE_ADDR to correctly detect > when there's no secret area published in the EFI configuration tables > > v2: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-coco/20211007061838.1381129-1-dovmurik@linux.ibm.com > v2 changes: > - Export clean_cache_range() > - When deleteing a secret, call clean_cache_range() after explicit_memzero > - Add Documentation/ABI/testing/securityfs-coco-sev_secret > > v1: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-coco/20210809190157.279332-1-dovmurik@linux.ibm.com/ > > RFC: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-coco/20210628183431.953934-1-dovmurik@linux.ibm.com/ > > > > Dov Murik (4): > efi: Save location of EFI confidential computing area > virt: Add efi_secret module to expose confidential computing secrets > efi: Register efi_secret platform device if EFI secret area is > declared > docs: security: Add secrets/coco documentation > This series has Reviewed-by tags on all patches (though, as I mentioned, there's a missing #ifdef in patch 3). Ard, are you going to take this through the EFI tree? Should I resend the series with the fix for patch 3? Thanks, -Dov > Documentation/ABI/testing/securityfs-secrets-coco | 51 +++ > Documentation/security/index.rst | 1 + > Documentation/security/secrets/coco.rst | 103 ++++++ > Documentation/security/secrets/index.rst | 9 + > arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c | 3 + > drivers/firmware/efi/Kconfig | 16 + > drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c | 9 + > drivers/virt/Kconfig | 3 + > drivers/virt/Makefile | 1 + > drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret/Kconfig | 16 + > drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret/Makefile | 2 + > drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret/efi_secret.c | 349 ++++++++++++++++++++ > include/linux/efi.h | 10 + > 13 files changed, 573 insertions(+) > create mode 100644 Documentation/ABI/testing/securityfs-secrets-coco > create mode 100644 Documentation/security/secrets/coco.rst > create mode 100644 Documentation/security/secrets/index.rst > create mode 100644 drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret/Kconfig > create mode 100644 drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret/Makefile > create mode 100644 drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret/efi_secret.c > > > base-commit: 7e57714cd0ad2d5bb90e50b5096a0e671dec1ef3
On Tue, 12 Apr 2022 at 12:03, Dov Murik <dovmurik@linux.ibm.com> wrote: > > > > On 01/04/2022 0:56, Dov Murik wrote: > > Confidential computing (coco) hardware such as AMD SEV (Secure Encrypted > > Virtualization) allows guest owners to inject secrets into the VMs > > memory without the host/hypervisor being able to read them. In SEV, > > secret injection is performed early in the VM launch process, before the > > guest starts running. > > > > OVMF already reserves designated area for secret injection (in its > > AmdSev package; see edk2 commit 01726b6d23d4 "OvmfPkg/AmdSev: Expose the > > Sev Secret area using a configuration table" [1]), but the secrets were > > not available in the guest kernel. > > > > The patch series keeps the address of the EFI-provided memory for > > injected secrets, and exposes the secrets to userspace via securityfs > > using a new efi_secret kernel module. The module is autoloaded (by the > > EFI driver) if the secret area is populated. > > > > The first patch in EFI keeps the address of the secret area as passed in > > the EFI configuration table. The second patch introduces the new > > efi_secret module that exposes the content of the secret entries as > > securityfs files, and allows clearing out secrets with a file unlink > > interface. The third patch auto-loads the efi_secret module during > > startup if the injected secrets area is populated. The last patch > > documents the data flow of confidential computing secret injection. > > > > As a usage example, consider a guest performing computations on > > encrypted files. The Guest Owner provides the decryption key (= secret) > > using the secret injection mechanism. The guest application reads the > > secret from the efi_secret filesystem and proceeds to decrypt the files > > into memory and then performs the needed computations on the content. > > > > In this example, the host can't read the files from the disk image > > because they are encrypted. Host can't read the decryption key because > > it is passed using the secret injection mechanism (= secure channel). > > Host can't read the decrypted content from memory because it's a > > confidential (memory-encrypted) guest. > > > > This has been tested with AMD SEV and SEV-ES guests, but the kernel side > > of handling the secret area has no SEV-specific dependencies, and > > therefore might be usable (perhaps with minor changes) for any > > confidential computing hardware that can publish the secret area via the > > standard EFI config table entry. > > > > To enable this functionality, set CONFIG_EFI_SECRET=m when building the > > guest kernel. > > > > Here is a simple example for usage of the efi_secret module in a guest > > to which an EFI secret area with 4 secrets was injected during launch: > > > > ... > > [ 0.000000] efi: EFI v2.70 by EDK II > > [ 0.000000] efi: CocoSecret=0x7f222680 SMBIOS=0x7f541000 ACPI=0x7f77e000 ACPI 2.0=0x7f77e014 MEMATTR=0x7ea16418 > > ... > > [ 1.127627] Run /init as init process > > Loading, please wait... > > Starting version 245.4-4ubuntu3.15 > > ... > > [ 0.763204] efi_secret efi_secret.0: Created 4 entries in securityfs secrets/coco > > ... > > > > # ls -la /sys/kernel/security/secrets/coco > > total 0 > > drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 . > > drwxr-xr-x 3 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 .. > > -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 736870e5-84f0-4973-92ec-06879ce3da0b > > -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 83c83f7f-1356-4975-8b7e-d3a0b54312c6 > > -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 9553f55d-3da2-43ee-ab5d-ff17f78864d2 > > -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 e6f5a162-d67f-4750-a67c-5d065f2a9910 > > > > # hd /sys/kernel/security/secrets/coco/e6f5a162-d67f-4750-a67c-5d065f2a9910 > > 00000000 74 68 65 73 65 2d 61 72 65 2d 74 68 65 2d 6b 61 |these-are-the-ka| > > 00000010 74 61 2d 73 65 63 72 65 74 73 00 01 02 03 04 05 |ta-secrets......| > > 00000020 06 07 |..| > > 00000022 > > > > # rm /sys/kernel/security/secrets/coco/e6f5a162-d67f-4750-a67c-5d065f2a9910 > > > > # ls -la /sys/kernel/security/secrets/coco > > total 0 > > drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 0 Jun 28 11:55 . > > drwxr-xr-x 3 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 .. > > -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 736870e5-84f0-4973-92ec-06879ce3da0b > > -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 83c83f7f-1356-4975-8b7e-d3a0b54312c6 > > -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 9553f55d-3da2-43ee-ab5d-ff17f78864d2 > > > > > > [1] https://github.com/tianocore/edk2/commit/01726b6d23d4 > > > > > > --- > > > > v9 changes: > > - Change the module into a platform driver (thanks Ard) > > - Remove special auto-loading code in efi; instead register a platform > > device (udev will load the efi_secret module) (thanks Ard) > > - Change logging in the efi_secret module to dev_err() etc. > > - efi_secret: first check that the secret area header is valid; only then start > > creating securityfs dirs. > > > > v8: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-coco/20220228114254.1099945-1-dovmurik@linux.ibm.com/ > > v8 changes: > > - Change path of filesystem to <securityfs>/secrets/coco and fix the > > documentation accordingly (Thanks Gerd, Matthew) > > - Remove patch 2/5 (of v7) because the latest OVMF release (edk2-stable202202) > > already contains the fix to mark the launch secret page as EFI_RESERVED_TYPE. > > > > v7: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-coco/20220201124413.1093099-1-dovmurik@linux.ibm.com/ > > v7 changes: > > - Improve description of efi_secret module in Kconfig. > > - Fix sparse warnings on pointer address space mismatch > > (Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>) > > > > v6: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-coco/20211129114251.3741721-1-dovmurik@linux.ibm.com/ > > v6 changes: > > - Autoload the efi_secret module if the secret area is populated > > (thanks Greg KH). > > - efi_secret: Depend on X86_64 because we use ioremap_encrypted() which > > is only defined for this arch. > > - efi_secret.c: Remove unneeded tableheader_guid local variable. > > - Documentation fixes. > > > > v5: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-coco/20211118113359.642571-1-dovmurik@linux.ibm.com/ > > v5 changes: > > - Simplify EFI code: instead of copying the secret area, the firmware > > marks the secret area as EFI_RESERVED_TYPE, and then the uefi_init() > > code just keeps the pointer as it appears in the EFI configuration > > table. The use of reserved pages is similar to the AMD SEV-SNP > > patches for handling SNP-Secrets and SNP-CPUID pages. > > - In order to handle OVMF releases out there which mark the > > confidential computing secrets page as EFI_BOOT_SERVICES_DATA, add > > efi/libstub code that detects this and fixes the E820 map to reserve > > this page. > > - In the efi_secret module code, map the secrets page using > > ioremap_encrypted (again, similar to the AMD SEV-SNP guest patches > > for accessing SNP-Secrets and SNP-CPUID pages). > > - Add documentation in Documentation/security/coco/efi_secret. > > > > v4: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-coco/20211020061408.3447533-1-dovmurik@linux.ibm.com/ > > v4 changes: > > - Guard all the new EFI and efi-stub code (patches 1+2) with #ifdef > > CONFIG_EFI_COCO_SECRET (thanks Greg KH). Selecting > > CONFIG_EFI_SECRET=m (patch 3) will enable the EFI parts as well. > > - Guard call to clflush_cache_range() with #ifdef CONFIG_X86 > > (Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>) > > > > v3: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-coco/20211014130848.592611-1-dovmurik@linux.ibm.com/ > > v3 changes: > > - Rename the module to efi_secret > > - Remove the exporting of clean_cache_range > > - Use clflush_cache_range in wipe_memory > > - Document function wipe_memory > > - Initialize efi.coco_secret to EFI_INVALID_TABLE_ADDR to correctly detect > > when there's no secret area published in the EFI configuration tables > > > > v2: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-coco/20211007061838.1381129-1-dovmurik@linux.ibm.com > > v2 changes: > > - Export clean_cache_range() > > - When deleteing a secret, call clean_cache_range() after explicit_memzero > > - Add Documentation/ABI/testing/securityfs-coco-sev_secret > > > > v1: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-coco/20210809190157.279332-1-dovmurik@linux.ibm.com/ > > > > RFC: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-coco/20210628183431.953934-1-dovmurik@linux.ibm.com/ > > > > > > > > Dov Murik (4): > > efi: Save location of EFI confidential computing area > > virt: Add efi_secret module to expose confidential computing secrets > > efi: Register efi_secret platform device if EFI secret area is > > declared > > docs: security: Add secrets/coco documentation > > > > > This series has Reviewed-by tags on all patches (though, as I mentioned, > there's a missing #ifdef in patch 3). > > Ard, are you going to take this through the EFI tree? > > Should I resend the series with the fix for patch 3? > Yes, please send a final version with all tags in place etc, and I will queue it up. Thanks, Ard.
On 12/04/2022 13:04, Ard Biesheuvel wrote: > On Tue, 12 Apr 2022 at 12:03, Dov Murik <dovmurik@linux.ibm.com> wrote: >> >> >> >> On 01/04/2022 0:56, Dov Murik wrote: >>> Confidential computing (coco) hardware such as AMD SEV (Secure Encrypted >>> Virtualization) allows guest owners to inject secrets into the VMs >>> memory without the host/hypervisor being able to read them. In SEV, >>> secret injection is performed early in the VM launch process, before the >>> guest starts running. >>> >>> OVMF already reserves designated area for secret injection (in its >>> AmdSev package; see edk2 commit 01726b6d23d4 "OvmfPkg/AmdSev: Expose the >>> Sev Secret area using a configuration table" [1]), but the secrets were >>> not available in the guest kernel. >>> >>> The patch series keeps the address of the EFI-provided memory for >>> injected secrets, and exposes the secrets to userspace via securityfs >>> using a new efi_secret kernel module. The module is autoloaded (by the >>> EFI driver) if the secret area is populated. >>> >>> The first patch in EFI keeps the address of the secret area as passed in >>> the EFI configuration table. The second patch introduces the new >>> efi_secret module that exposes the content of the secret entries as >>> securityfs files, and allows clearing out secrets with a file unlink >>> interface. The third patch auto-loads the efi_secret module during >>> startup if the injected secrets area is populated. The last patch >>> documents the data flow of confidential computing secret injection. >>> >>> As a usage example, consider a guest performing computations on >>> encrypted files. The Guest Owner provides the decryption key (= secret) >>> using the secret injection mechanism. The guest application reads the >>> secret from the efi_secret filesystem and proceeds to decrypt the files >>> into memory and then performs the needed computations on the content. >>> >>> In this example, the host can't read the files from the disk image >>> because they are encrypted. Host can't read the decryption key because >>> it is passed using the secret injection mechanism (= secure channel). >>> Host can't read the decrypted content from memory because it's a >>> confidential (memory-encrypted) guest. >>> >>> This has been tested with AMD SEV and SEV-ES guests, but the kernel side >>> of handling the secret area has no SEV-specific dependencies, and >>> therefore might be usable (perhaps with minor changes) for any >>> confidential computing hardware that can publish the secret area via the >>> standard EFI config table entry. >>> >>> To enable this functionality, set CONFIG_EFI_SECRET=m when building the >>> guest kernel. >>> >>> Here is a simple example for usage of the efi_secret module in a guest >>> to which an EFI secret area with 4 secrets was injected during launch: >>> >>> ... >>> [ 0.000000] efi: EFI v2.70 by EDK II >>> [ 0.000000] efi: CocoSecret=0x7f222680 SMBIOS=0x7f541000 ACPI=0x7f77e000 ACPI 2.0=0x7f77e014 MEMATTR=0x7ea16418 >>> ... >>> [ 1.127627] Run /init as init process >>> Loading, please wait... >>> Starting version 245.4-4ubuntu3.15 >>> ... >>> [ 0.763204] efi_secret efi_secret.0: Created 4 entries in securityfs secrets/coco >>> ... >>> >>> # ls -la /sys/kernel/security/secrets/coco >>> total 0 >>> drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 . >>> drwxr-xr-x 3 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 .. >>> -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 736870e5-84f0-4973-92ec-06879ce3da0b >>> -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 83c83f7f-1356-4975-8b7e-d3a0b54312c6 >>> -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 9553f55d-3da2-43ee-ab5d-ff17f78864d2 >>> -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 e6f5a162-d67f-4750-a67c-5d065f2a9910 >>> >>> # hd /sys/kernel/security/secrets/coco/e6f5a162-d67f-4750-a67c-5d065f2a9910 >>> 00000000 74 68 65 73 65 2d 61 72 65 2d 74 68 65 2d 6b 61 |these-are-the-ka| >>> 00000010 74 61 2d 73 65 63 72 65 74 73 00 01 02 03 04 05 |ta-secrets......| >>> 00000020 06 07 |..| >>> 00000022 >>> >>> # rm /sys/kernel/security/secrets/coco/e6f5a162-d67f-4750-a67c-5d065f2a9910 >>> >>> # ls -la /sys/kernel/security/secrets/coco >>> total 0 >>> drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 0 Jun 28 11:55 . >>> drwxr-xr-x 3 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 .. >>> -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 736870e5-84f0-4973-92ec-06879ce3da0b >>> -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 83c83f7f-1356-4975-8b7e-d3a0b54312c6 >>> -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 9553f55d-3da2-43ee-ab5d-ff17f78864d2 >>> >>> >>> [1] https://github.com/tianocore/edk2/commit/01726b6d23d4 >>> >>> >>> --- >>> >>> v9 changes: >>> - Change the module into a platform driver (thanks Ard) >>> - Remove special auto-loading code in efi; instead register a platform >>> device (udev will load the efi_secret module) (thanks Ard) >>> - Change logging in the efi_secret module to dev_err() etc. >>> - efi_secret: first check that the secret area header is valid; only then start >>> creating securityfs dirs. >>> >>> v8: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-coco/20220228114254.1099945-1-dovmurik@linux.ibm.com/ >>> v8 changes: >>> - Change path of filesystem to <securityfs>/secrets/coco and fix the >>> documentation accordingly (Thanks Gerd, Matthew) >>> - Remove patch 2/5 (of v7) because the latest OVMF release (edk2-stable202202) >>> already contains the fix to mark the launch secret page as EFI_RESERVED_TYPE. >>> >>> v7: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-coco/20220201124413.1093099-1-dovmurik@linux.ibm.com/ >>> v7 changes: >>> - Improve description of efi_secret module in Kconfig. >>> - Fix sparse warnings on pointer address space mismatch >>> (Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>) >>> >>> v6: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-coco/20211129114251.3741721-1-dovmurik@linux.ibm.com/ >>> v6 changes: >>> - Autoload the efi_secret module if the secret area is populated >>> (thanks Greg KH). >>> - efi_secret: Depend on X86_64 because we use ioremap_encrypted() which >>> is only defined for this arch. >>> - efi_secret.c: Remove unneeded tableheader_guid local variable. >>> - Documentation fixes. >>> >>> v5: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-coco/20211118113359.642571-1-dovmurik@linux.ibm.com/ >>> v5 changes: >>> - Simplify EFI code: instead of copying the secret area, the firmware >>> marks the secret area as EFI_RESERVED_TYPE, and then the uefi_init() >>> code just keeps the pointer as it appears in the EFI configuration >>> table. The use of reserved pages is similar to the AMD SEV-SNP >>> patches for handling SNP-Secrets and SNP-CPUID pages. >>> - In order to handle OVMF releases out there which mark the >>> confidential computing secrets page as EFI_BOOT_SERVICES_DATA, add >>> efi/libstub code that detects this and fixes the E820 map to reserve >>> this page. >>> - In the efi_secret module code, map the secrets page using >>> ioremap_encrypted (again, similar to the AMD SEV-SNP guest patches >>> for accessing SNP-Secrets and SNP-CPUID pages). >>> - Add documentation in Documentation/security/coco/efi_secret. >>> >>> v4: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-coco/20211020061408.3447533-1-dovmurik@linux.ibm.com/ >>> v4 changes: >>> - Guard all the new EFI and efi-stub code (patches 1+2) with #ifdef >>> CONFIG_EFI_COCO_SECRET (thanks Greg KH). Selecting >>> CONFIG_EFI_SECRET=m (patch 3) will enable the EFI parts as well. >>> - Guard call to clflush_cache_range() with #ifdef CONFIG_X86 >>> (Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>) >>> >>> v3: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-coco/20211014130848.592611-1-dovmurik@linux.ibm.com/ >>> v3 changes: >>> - Rename the module to efi_secret >>> - Remove the exporting of clean_cache_range >>> - Use clflush_cache_range in wipe_memory >>> - Document function wipe_memory >>> - Initialize efi.coco_secret to EFI_INVALID_TABLE_ADDR to correctly detect >>> when there's no secret area published in the EFI configuration tables >>> >>> v2: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-coco/20211007061838.1381129-1-dovmurik@linux.ibm.com >>> v2 changes: >>> - Export clean_cache_range() >>> - When deleteing a secret, call clean_cache_range() after explicit_memzero >>> - Add Documentation/ABI/testing/securityfs-coco-sev_secret >>> >>> v1: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-coco/20210809190157.279332-1-dovmurik@linux.ibm.com/ >>> >>> RFC: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-coco/20210628183431.953934-1-dovmurik@linux.ibm.com/ >>> >>> >>> >>> Dov Murik (4): >>> efi: Save location of EFI confidential computing area >>> virt: Add efi_secret module to expose confidential computing secrets >>> efi: Register efi_secret platform device if EFI secret area is >>> declared >>> docs: security: Add secrets/coco documentation >>> >> >> >> This series has Reviewed-by tags on all patches (though, as I mentioned, >> there's a missing #ifdef in patch 3). >> >> Ard, are you going to take this through the EFI tree? >> >> Should I resend the series with the fix for patch 3? >> > > Yes, please send a final version with all tags in place etc, and I > will queue it up. > Great! Thank you, I'll do that shortly. -Dov
Confidential computing (coco) hardware such as AMD SEV (Secure Encrypted Virtualization) allows guest owners to inject secrets into the VMs memory without the host/hypervisor being able to read them. In SEV, secret injection is performed early in the VM launch process, before the guest starts running. OVMF already reserves designated area for secret injection (in its AmdSev package; see edk2 commit 01726b6d23d4 "OvmfPkg/AmdSev: Expose the Sev Secret area using a configuration table" [1]), but the secrets were not available in the guest kernel. The patch series keeps the address of the EFI-provided memory for injected secrets, and exposes the secrets to userspace via securityfs using a new efi_secret kernel module. The module is autoloaded (by the EFI driver) if the secret area is populated. The first patch in EFI keeps the address of the secret area as passed in the EFI configuration table. The second patch introduces the new efi_secret module that exposes the content of the secret entries as securityfs files, and allows clearing out secrets with a file unlink interface. The third patch auto-loads the efi_secret module during startup if the injected secrets area is populated. The last patch documents the data flow of confidential computing secret injection. As a usage example, consider a guest performing computations on encrypted files. The Guest Owner provides the decryption key (= secret) using the secret injection mechanism. The guest application reads the secret from the efi_secret filesystem and proceeds to decrypt the files into memory and then performs the needed computations on the content. In this example, the host can't read the files from the disk image because they are encrypted. Host can't read the decryption key because it is passed using the secret injection mechanism (= secure channel). Host can't read the decrypted content from memory because it's a confidential (memory-encrypted) guest. This has been tested with AMD SEV and SEV-ES guests, but the kernel side of handling the secret area has no SEV-specific dependencies, and therefore might be usable (perhaps with minor changes) for any confidential computing hardware that can publish the secret area via the standard EFI config table entry. To enable this functionality, set CONFIG_EFI_SECRET=m when building the guest kernel. Here is a simple example for usage of the efi_secret module in a guest to which an EFI secret area with 4 secrets was injected during launch: ... [ 0.000000] efi: EFI v2.70 by EDK II [ 0.000000] efi: CocoSecret=0x7f222680 SMBIOS=0x7f541000 ACPI=0x7f77e000 ACPI 2.0=0x7f77e014 MEMATTR=0x7ea16418 ... [ 1.127627] Run /init as init process Loading, please wait... Starting version 245.4-4ubuntu3.15 ... [ 0.763204] efi_secret efi_secret.0: Created 4 entries in securityfs secrets/coco ... # ls -la /sys/kernel/security/secrets/coco total 0 drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 . drwxr-xr-x 3 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 .. -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 736870e5-84f0-4973-92ec-06879ce3da0b -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 83c83f7f-1356-4975-8b7e-d3a0b54312c6 -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 9553f55d-3da2-43ee-ab5d-ff17f78864d2 -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 e6f5a162-d67f-4750-a67c-5d065f2a9910 # hd /sys/kernel/security/secrets/coco/e6f5a162-d67f-4750-a67c-5d065f2a9910 00000000 74 68 65 73 65 2d 61 72 65 2d 74 68 65 2d 6b 61 |these-are-the-ka| 00000010 74 61 2d 73 65 63 72 65 74 73 00 01 02 03 04 05 |ta-secrets......| 00000020 06 07 |..| 00000022 # rm /sys/kernel/security/secrets/coco/e6f5a162-d67f-4750-a67c-5d065f2a9910 # ls -la /sys/kernel/security/secrets/coco total 0 drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 0 Jun 28 11:55 . drwxr-xr-x 3 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 .. -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 736870e5-84f0-4973-92ec-06879ce3da0b -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 83c83f7f-1356-4975-8b7e-d3a0b54312c6 -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 9553f55d-3da2-43ee-ab5d-ff17f78864d2 [1] https://github.com/tianocore/edk2/commit/01726b6d23d4 --- v9 changes: - Change the module into a platform driver (thanks Ard) - Remove special auto-loading code in efi; instead register a platform device (udev will load the efi_secret module) (thanks Ard) - Change logging in the efi_secret module to dev_err() etc. - efi_secret: first check that the secret area header is valid; only then start creating securityfs dirs. v8: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-coco/20220228114254.1099945-1-dovmurik@linux.ibm.com/ v8 changes: - Change path of filesystem to <securityfs>/secrets/coco and fix the documentation accordingly (Thanks Gerd, Matthew) - Remove patch 2/5 (of v7) because the latest OVMF release (edk2-stable202202) already contains the fix to mark the launch secret page as EFI_RESERVED_TYPE. v7: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-coco/20220201124413.1093099-1-dovmurik@linux.ibm.com/ v7 changes: - Improve description of efi_secret module in Kconfig. - Fix sparse warnings on pointer address space mismatch (Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>) v6: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-coco/20211129114251.3741721-1-dovmurik@linux.ibm.com/ v6 changes: - Autoload the efi_secret module if the secret area is populated (thanks Greg KH). - efi_secret: Depend on X86_64 because we use ioremap_encrypted() which is only defined for this arch. - efi_secret.c: Remove unneeded tableheader_guid local variable. - Documentation fixes. v5: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-coco/20211118113359.642571-1-dovmurik@linux.ibm.com/ v5 changes: - Simplify EFI code: instead of copying the secret area, the firmware marks the secret area as EFI_RESERVED_TYPE, and then the uefi_init() code just keeps the pointer as it appears in the EFI configuration table. The use of reserved pages is similar to the AMD SEV-SNP patches for handling SNP-Secrets and SNP-CPUID pages. - In order to handle OVMF releases out there which mark the confidential computing secrets page as EFI_BOOT_SERVICES_DATA, add efi/libstub code that detects this and fixes the E820 map to reserve this page. - In the efi_secret module code, map the secrets page using ioremap_encrypted (again, similar to the AMD SEV-SNP guest patches for accessing SNP-Secrets and SNP-CPUID pages). - Add documentation in Documentation/security/coco/efi_secret. v4: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-coco/20211020061408.3447533-1-dovmurik@linux.ibm.com/ v4 changes: - Guard all the new EFI and efi-stub code (patches 1+2) with #ifdef CONFIG_EFI_COCO_SECRET (thanks Greg KH). Selecting CONFIG_EFI_SECRET=m (patch 3) will enable the EFI parts as well. - Guard call to clflush_cache_range() with #ifdef CONFIG_X86 (Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>) v3: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-coco/20211014130848.592611-1-dovmurik@linux.ibm.com/ v3 changes: - Rename the module to efi_secret - Remove the exporting of clean_cache_range - Use clflush_cache_range in wipe_memory - Document function wipe_memory - Initialize efi.coco_secret to EFI_INVALID_TABLE_ADDR to correctly detect when there's no secret area published in the EFI configuration tables v2: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-coco/20211007061838.1381129-1-dovmurik@linux.ibm.com v2 changes: - Export clean_cache_range() - When deleteing a secret, call clean_cache_range() after explicit_memzero - Add Documentation/ABI/testing/securityfs-coco-sev_secret v1: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-coco/20210809190157.279332-1-dovmurik@linux.ibm.com/ RFC: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-coco/20210628183431.953934-1-dovmurik@linux.ibm.com/ Dov Murik (4): efi: Save location of EFI confidential computing area virt: Add efi_secret module to expose confidential computing secrets efi: Register efi_secret platform device if EFI secret area is declared docs: security: Add secrets/coco documentation Documentation/ABI/testing/securityfs-secrets-coco | 51 +++ Documentation/security/index.rst | 1 + Documentation/security/secrets/coco.rst | 103 ++++++ Documentation/security/secrets/index.rst | 9 + arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c | 3 + drivers/firmware/efi/Kconfig | 16 + drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c | 9 + drivers/virt/Kconfig | 3 + drivers/virt/Makefile | 1 + drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret/Kconfig | 16 + drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret/Makefile | 2 + drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret/efi_secret.c | 349 ++++++++++++++++++++ include/linux/efi.h | 10 + 13 files changed, 573 insertions(+) create mode 100644 Documentation/ABI/testing/securityfs-secrets-coco create mode 100644 Documentation/security/secrets/coco.rst create mode 100644 Documentation/security/secrets/index.rst create mode 100644 drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret/Kconfig create mode 100644 drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret/Makefile create mode 100644 drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret/efi_secret.c base-commit: 7e57714cd0ad2d5bb90e50b5096a0e671dec1ef3