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Thu, 15 Sep 2022 19:32:34 +0000 (GMT) From: Stefan Berger To: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Cc: zohar@linux.ibm.com, serge@hallyn.com, brauner@kernel.org, containers@lists.linux.dev, dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com, ebiederm@xmission.com, krzysztof.struczynski@huawei.com, roberto.sassu@huawei.com, mpeters@redhat.com, lhinds@redhat.com, lsturman@redhat.com, puiterwi@redhat.com, jejb@linux.ibm.com, jamjoom@us.ibm.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, paul@paul-moore.com, rgb@redhat.com, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, jmorris@namei.org, jpenumak@redhat.com, Stefan Berger Subject: [PATCH v14 00/26] ima: Namespace IMA with audit support in IMA-ns Date: Thu, 15 Sep 2022 15:31:55 -0400 Message-Id: <20220915193221.1728029-1-stefanb@linux.ibm.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.37.2 X-TM-AS-GCONF: 00 X-Proofpoint-ORIG-GUID: yq5f5jBIEXlX7I4RttLK7T4XW5vL-ciT X-Proofpoint-GUID: wcqITmyHJ-vOk4e9xXIcwsyGx38XbgLV X-Proofpoint-UnRewURL: 0 URL was un-rewritten MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Proofpoint-Virus-Version: vendor=baseguard engine=ICAP:2.0.205,Aquarius:18.0.895,Hydra:6.0.528,FMLib:17.11.122.1 definitions=2022-09-15_10,2022-09-14_04,2022-06-22_01 X-Proofpoint-Spam-Details: rule=outbound_notspam policy=outbound score=0 adultscore=0 suspectscore=0 bulkscore=0 lowpriorityscore=0 spamscore=0 priorityscore=1501 clxscore=1011 phishscore=0 mlxlogscore=999 mlxscore=0 impostorscore=0 malwarescore=0 classifier=spam adjust=0 reason=mlx scancount=1 engine=8.12.0-2209130000 definitions=main-2209150119 Precedence: bulk List-ID: The goal of this series of patches is to start with the namespacing of IMA and support auditing within an IMA namespace (IMA-ns) as the first step. In this series the IMA namespace is piggybacking on the user namespace and therefore an IMA namespace is created when a user namespace is created, although this is done late when SecurityFS is mounted inside a user namespace. The advantage of piggybacking on the user namespace is that the user namespace can provide the keys infrastructure that IMA appraisal support will need later on. We chose the goal of supporting auditing within an IMA namespace since it requires the least changes to IMA. Following this series, auditing within an IMA namespace can be activated by a root running the following lines that rely on a statically linked busybox to be installed on the host for execution within the minimal container environment: As root (since audit rules may now only be set by root): mkdir -p rootfs/{bin,mnt,proc} cp /sbin/busybox rootfs/bin cp /sbin/busybox rootfs/bin/busybox2 echo >> rootfs/bin/busybox2 PATH=/bin unshare --user --map-root-user --mount-proc --pid --fork \ --root rootfs busybox sh -c \ "busybox mount -t securityfs /mnt /mnt; \ busybox echo 1 > /mnt/ima/active; \ busybox echo 'audit func=BPRM_CHECK mask=MAY_EXEC' > /mnt/ima/policy; \ busybox2 cat /mnt/ima/policy" [busybox2 is used to demonstrate 2 audit messages; see below] Following the audit log on the host the last line cat'ing the IMA policy inside the namespace would have been audited. Unfortunately the auditing line is not distinguishable from one stemming from actions on the host. The hope here is that Richard Brigg's container id support for auditing would help resolve the problem. In the above the writing of '1' to the 'active' file is used to activate the IMA namespace. Future extensions to IMA namespaces will make use of the configuration stage after the mounting of securityfs and before the activation to for example choose the measurement log template. The following lines added to a suitable IMA policy on the host would cause the execution of the commands inside the container (by uid 1000) to be measured and audited as well on the host, thus leading to two auditing messages for the 'busybox2 cat' above and log entries in IMA's system log. echo -e "measure func=BPRM_CHECK mask=MAY_EXEC uid=1000\n" \ "audit func=BPRM_CHECK mask=MAY_EXEC uid=1000\n" \ > /sys/kernel/security/ima/policy The goal of supporting measurement and auditing by the host, of actions occurring within IMA namespaces, is that users, particularly root, should not be able to evade the host's IMA policy just by spawning new IMA namespaces, running programs there, and discarding the namespaces again. This is achieved through 'hierarchical processing' of file accesses that are evaluated against the policy of the namespace where the action occurred and against all namespaces' and their policies leading back to the root IMA namespace (init_ima_ns). The patch series adds support for a virtualized SecurityFS with a few new API calls that are used by IMA namespacing. Only the data relevant to the IMA namespace are shown. The files and directories of other security subsystems (TPM, evm, Tomoyo, safesetid) are not showing up when secruityfs is mounted inside a user namespace. Much of the code following the virtualization of SecurityFS deals with moving IMA's variables from various files into the IMA namespace structure called 'ima_namespace'. When it comes to determining the current IMA namespace I took the approach to get the current IMA namespace (get_current_ns()) on the top level and pass the pointer all the way down to those functions that now need access to the ima_namespace to get to their variables. This later on comes in handy once hierarchical processing is implemented in this series where we walk the list of namespaces backwards and again need to pass the pointer into functions. This patch also introduces usage of CAP_MAC_ADMIN to allow access to the IMA policy via reduced capabilities. We would again later on use this capability to allow users to set file extended attributes for IMA appraisal support. My tree with these patches is here: git fetch https://github.com/stefanberger/linux-ima-namespaces v6.0-rc5+imans.v14.posted Regards, Stefan Christian Brauner (1): securityfs: rework dentry creation Mehmet Kayaalp (2): integrity/ima: Define ns_status for storing namespaced iint data ima: Namespace audit status flags Stefan Berger (23): securityfs: Extend securityfs with namespacing support ima: Define ima_namespace struct and start moving variables into it ima: Move arch_policy_entry into ima_namespace ima: Move ima_htable into ima_namespace ima: Move measurement list related variables into ima_namespace ima: Move some IMA policy and filesystem related variables into ima_namespace ima: Move IMA securityfs files into ima_namespace or onto stack ima: Move ima_lsm_policy_notifier into ima_namespace ima: Switch to lazy lsm policy updates for better performance ima: Define mac_admin_ns_capable() as a wrapper for ns_capable() ima: Only accept AUDIT rules for non-init_ima_ns namespaces for now userns: Add pointer to ima_namespace to user_namespace ima: Implement hierarchical processing of file accesses ima: Implement ima_free_policy_rules() for freeing of an ima_namespace ima: Add functions for creating and freeing of an ima_namespace integrity: Add optional callback function to integrity_inode_free() ima: Remove unused iints from the integrity_iint_cache ima: Setup securityfs for IMA namespace ima: Introduce securityfs file to activate an IMA namespace ima: Show owning user namespace's uid and gid when displaying policy ima: Limit number of policy rules in non-init_ima_ns ima: Restrict informational audit messages to init_ima_ns ima: Enable IMA namespaces include/linux/capability.h | 6 + include/linux/fs.h | 5 + include/linux/ima.h | 36 ++ include/linux/integrity.h | 8 +- include/linux/user_namespace.h | 9 + init/Kconfig | 14 + kernel/user.c | 4 + kernel/user_namespace.c | 2 + security/inode.c | 83 +++- security/integrity/iint.c | 26 +- security/integrity/ima/Makefile | 3 +- security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 256 ++++++++++-- security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c | 44 ++- security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 42 +- security/integrity/ima/ima_asymmetric_keys.c | 8 +- security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c | 255 +++++++++--- security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c | 19 +- security/integrity/ima/ima_init_ima_ns.c | 65 ++++ security/integrity/ima/ima_kexec.c | 15 +- security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 238 +++++++++--- security/integrity/ima/ima_ns.c | 61 +++ security/integrity/ima/ima_ns_status.c | 385 +++++++++++++++++++ security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 314 ++++++++++----- security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c | 63 ++- security/integrity/ima/ima_queue_keys.c | 11 +- security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c | 5 +- security/integrity/integrity.h | 39 +- security/security.c | 2 +- 28 files changed, 1659 insertions(+), 359 deletions(-) create mode 100644 security/integrity/ima/ima_init_ima_ns.c create mode 100644 security/integrity/ima/ima_ns.c create mode 100644 security/integrity/ima/ima_ns_status.c base-commit: 80e78fcce86de0288793a0ef0f6acf37656ee4cf prerequisite-patch-id: 593c4930403a507f88e8cb15ecd32b592ff900b2