mbox series

[RFC,0/3] security: allow a LSM to specify NO-OP return code

Message ID cover.1691082677.git.pabeni@redhat.com (mailing list archive)
Headers show
Series security: allow a LSM to specify NO-OP return code | expand

Message

Paolo Abeni Aug. 3, 2023, 5:12 p.m. UTC
This is another attempt to solve the current problem with eBPF LSM,
already discussed at least in [1].

The basic idea is to introduce the minimum amount of changes to let
the core consider a no-op any LSM hooks returning the
LSM_RET_DEFAULT [2].

AFAICS that is already the case for most int hooks with LSM_RET_DEFAULT
equal to 0 due to the current call_int_hook implementation. Even most
int hook with non zero LSM_RET_DEFAULT are not problematic. Specifically
the hooks [3]:

fs_context_parse_param
dentry_init_security
inode_getsecurity
inode_setsecurity
inode_copy_up_xattr
task_prctl
security_secid_to_secctx 

already have special handling for to basically ignore default return
value from the LSMs, while:

security_getprocattr
security_setprocattr

only operate on the specified LSM.

The only hooks that need some love are:

* hooks that have a 0 LSM_RET_DEFAULT, but with no LSM loaded returns a
  non zero value to the security_<hook> caller:
sb_set_mnt_opts
inode_init_security
inode_getsecctx
socket_getpeersec_stream
socket_getpeersec_dgram

* hooks that have a 0 LSM_RET_DEFAULT, but internally security_<hook>
  uses a non zero return value as a selector to perform a default
  action:
inode_setxattr
inode_removexattr

* hooks the somehow have to reconciliate multiple, non-zero, LSM return
  values to take a single decision:
vm_enough_memory
xfrm_state_pol_flow_match

This series introduces a new variant of the call_int_hook macro and
changes the LSM_RET_DEFAULT for the mentioned hooks, to achieve the
goal [2].

The patches have been split according to the above grouping with the
hope to simplify the reviews, but I guess could be squashed in a single
one.

A simple follow-up would be extend the new hook usage to the hooks [3]
to reduce the code duplication.

Sharing as an early RFC (with almost no testing) to try to understand if
this path is a no go or instead is somewhat viable.

[1] https://patchwork.kernel.org/project/netdevbpf/patch/20220609234601.2026362-1-kpsingh@kernel.org/

Paolo Abeni (3):
  security: introduce and use call_int_hook_ignore_default()
  security: two more call_int_hook_ignore_default use-cases
  security: more call_int_hook_ignore_default use-cases

 include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 16 +++----
 security/security.c           | 83 ++++++++++++++++++-----------------
 2 files changed, 51 insertions(+), 48 deletions(-)

Comments

Casey Schaufler Aug. 7, 2023, 6:57 p.m. UTC | #1
On 8/3/2023 10:12 AM, Paolo Abeni wrote:
> This is another attempt to solve the current problem with eBPF LSM,
> already discussed at least in [1].
>
> The basic idea is to introduce the minimum amount of changes to let
> the core consider a no-op any LSM hooks returning the
> LSM_RET_DEFAULT [2].
>
> AFAICS that is already the case for most int hooks with LSM_RET_DEFAULT
> equal to 0 due to the current call_int_hook implementation. Even most
> int hook with non zero LSM_RET_DEFAULT are not problematic. Specifically
> the hooks [3]:
>
> fs_context_parse_param
> dentry_init_security
> inode_getsecurity
> inode_setsecurity
> inode_copy_up_xattr
> task_prctl
> security_secid_to_secctx 
>
> already have special handling for to basically ignore default return
> value from the LSMs, while:
>
> security_getprocattr
> security_setprocattr
>
> only operate on the specified LSM.
>
> The only hooks that need some love are:
>
> * hooks that have a 0 LSM_RET_DEFAULT, but with no LSM loaded returns a
>   non zero value to the security_<hook> caller:
> sb_set_mnt_opts
> inode_init_security
> inode_getsecctx
> socket_getpeersec_stream
> socket_getpeersec_dgram
>
> * hooks that have a 0 LSM_RET_DEFAULT, but internally security_<hook>
>   uses a non zero return value as a selector to perform a default
>   action:
> inode_setxattr
> inode_removexattr
>
> * hooks the somehow have to reconciliate multiple, non-zero, LSM return
>   values to take a single decision:
> vm_enough_memory
> xfrm_state_pol_flow_match
>
> This series introduces a new variant of the call_int_hook macro and
> changes the LSM_RET_DEFAULT for the mentioned hooks, to achieve the
> goal [2].
>
> The patches have been split according to the above grouping with the
> hope to simplify the reviews, but I guess could be squashed in a single
> one.
>
> A simple follow-up would be extend the new hook usage to the hooks [3]
> to reduce the code duplication.
>
> Sharing as an early RFC (with almost no testing) to try to understand if
> this path is a no go or instead is somewhat viable.

I am not an advocate of adding macros for these special cases.
The only reason the existing macros are used is that open coding
every hook with the exact same logic would have created an enormous
security.c file. Special cases shouldn't be hidden. The reason they
are special should be documented.

Should the stacking patch set ever come in there are going to be
more and more kinds of special cases. I don't see that adding code
macros for each of the peculiar behaviors is a good idea.

>
> [1] https://patchwork.kernel.org/project/netdevbpf/patch/20220609234601.2026362-1-kpsingh@kernel.org/
>
> Paolo Abeni (3):
>   security: introduce and use call_int_hook_ignore_default()
>   security: two more call_int_hook_ignore_default use-cases
>   security: more call_int_hook_ignore_default use-cases
>
>  include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 16 +++----
>  security/security.c           | 83 ++++++++++++++++++-----------------
>  2 files changed, 51 insertions(+), 48 deletions(-)
>
Paolo Abeni Aug. 23, 2023, 3:06 p.m. UTC | #2
Hello,

On Mon, 2023-08-07 at 11:57 -0700, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> On 8/3/2023 10:12 AM, Paolo Abeni wrote:
> > This is another attempt to solve the current problem with eBPF LSM,
> > already discussed at least in [1].
> > 
> > The basic idea is to introduce the minimum amount of changes to let
> > the core consider a no-op any LSM hooks returning the
> > LSM_RET_DEFAULT [2].
> > 
> > AFAICS that is already the case for most int hooks with LSM_RET_DEFAULT
> > equal to 0 due to the current call_int_hook implementation. Even most
> > int hook with non zero LSM_RET_DEFAULT are not problematic. Specifically
> > the hooks [3]:
> > 
> > fs_context_parse_param
> > dentry_init_security
> > inode_getsecurity
> > inode_setsecurity
> > inode_copy_up_xattr
> > task_prctl
> > security_secid_to_secctx 
> > 
> > already have special handling for to basically ignore default return
> > value from the LSMs, while:
> > 
> > security_getprocattr
> > security_setprocattr
> > 
> > only operate on the specified LSM.
> > 
> > The only hooks that need some love are:
> > 
> > * hooks that have a 0 LSM_RET_DEFAULT, but with no LSM loaded returns a
> >   non zero value to the security_<hook> caller:
> > sb_set_mnt_opts
> > inode_init_security
> > inode_getsecctx
> > socket_getpeersec_stream
> > socket_getpeersec_dgram
> > 
> > * hooks that have a 0 LSM_RET_DEFAULT, but internally security_<hook>
> >   uses a non zero return value as a selector to perform a default
> >   action:
> > inode_setxattr
> > inode_removexattr
> > 
> > * hooks the somehow have to reconciliate multiple, non-zero, LSM return
> >   values to take a single decision:
> > vm_enough_memory
> > xfrm_state_pol_flow_match
> > 
> > This series introduces a new variant of the call_int_hook macro and
> > changes the LSM_RET_DEFAULT for the mentioned hooks, to achieve the
> > goal [2].
> > 
> > The patches have been split according to the above grouping with the
> > hope to simplify the reviews, but I guess could be squashed in a single
> > one.
> > 
> > A simple follow-up would be extend the new hook usage to the hooks [3]
> > to reduce the code duplication.
> > 
> > Sharing as an early RFC (with almost no testing) to try to understand if
> > this path is a no go or instead is somewhat viable.
> 
> I am not an advocate of adding macros for these special cases.
> The only reason the existing macros are used is that open coding
> every hook with the exact same logic would have created an enormous
> security.c file. Special cases shouldn't be hidden. The reason they
> are special should be documented.
> 
> Should the stacking patch set ever come in there are going to be
> more and more kinds of special cases. I don't see that adding code
> macros for each of the peculiar behaviors is a good idea.

First things first, thank you for your feedback and I'm sorry for the
very late reply: I have been off for the past few weeks.

I'm unsure how to interpret the above: is that an explicit nack to this
approach, it that almost an ack modulo some needed cleanup or something
in between ?!? ;)

Regarding the new macro introduced in patch 1/3, I think of it more as
a generalization then a special case. In fact it could replace all the
existing:

	call_int_hook(/* */, 0, ...)

call sites with no functional changes expected (modulo bugs).

I avoided that change to keep the series small, but it could clean-up
the code in the longer run and help isolating which code really needs a
special case.

But I guess there is a certain degree of personal style preferences
with this kind changes.

Any additional feedback more then welcome!

Cheers,

Paolo