Show patches with: Submitter = Sean Christopherson       |    State = Action Required       |   26 patches
Patch Series A/R/T S/W/F Date Submitter Delegate State
[RFC,v4,12/12] LSM: x86/sgx: Show line of sight to LSM support SGX2's EAUG security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM - - - --- 2019-06-19 Sean Christopherson New
[RFC,v4,11/12] security/apparmor: Add enclave_load() implementation security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM - - - --- 2019-06-19 Sean Christopherson New
[RFC,v4,10/12] security/selinux: Add enclave_load() implementation security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM - - - --- 2019-06-19 Sean Christopherson New
[RFC,v4,09/12] LSM: x86/sgx: Introduce ->enclave_load() hook for Intel SGX security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM - - - --- 2019-06-19 Sean Christopherson New
[RFC,v4,08/12] security/selinux: Require SGX_MAPWX to map enclave page WX security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM - - - --- 2019-06-19 Sean Christopherson New
[RFC,v4,07/12] LSM: x86/sgx: Introduce ->enclave_map() hook for Intel SGX security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM - - - --- 2019-06-19 Sean Christopherson New
[RFC,v4,06/12] mm: Introduce vm_ops->may_mprotect() security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM - - - --- 2019-06-19 Sean Christopherson New
[RFC,v4,05/12] x86/sgx: Enforce noexec filesystem restriction for enclaves security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM - - - --- 2019-06-19 Sean Christopherson New
[RFC,v4,04/12] x86/sgx: Require userspace to define enclave pages' protection bits security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM - - - --- 2019-06-19 Sean Christopherson New
[RFC,v4,03/12] selftests: x86/sgx: Mark the enclave loader as not needing an exec stack security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM - - - --- 2019-06-19 Sean Christopherson New
[RFC,v4,02/12] x86/sgx: Do not naturally align MAP_FIXED address security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM - - - --- 2019-06-19 Sean Christopherson New
[RFC,v4,01/12] x86/sgx: Use mmu_notifier.release() instead of per-vma refcounting security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM - - - --- 2019-06-19 Sean Christopherson New
[RFC,v2,5/5] security/selinux: Add enclave_load() implementation security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM - - - --- 2019-06-06 Sean Christopherson New
[RFC,v2,4/5] LSM: x86/sgx: Introduce ->enclave_load() hook for Intel SGX security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM - - - --- 2019-06-06 Sean Christopherson New
[RFC,v2,3/5] x86/sgx: Enforce noexec filesystem restriction for enclaves security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM - - - --- 2019-06-06 Sean Christopherson New
[RFC,v2,2/5] x86/sgx: Require userspace to define enclave pages' protection bits security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM - - - --- 2019-06-06 Sean Christopherson New
[RFC,v2,1/5] mm: Introduce vm_ops->may_mprotect() security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM - - - --- 2019-06-06 Sean Christopherson New
[RFC,9/9] security/selinux: Add enclave_load() implementation security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM - - - --- 2019-05-31 Sean Christopherson New
[RFC,8/9] LSM: x86/sgx: Introduce ->enclave_load() hook for Intel SGX security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM - - - --- 2019-05-31 Sean Christopherson New
[RFC,7/9] x86/sgx: Enforce noexec filesystem restriction for enclaves security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM - - - --- 2019-05-31 Sean Christopherson New
[RFC,6/9] x86/sgx: Require userspace to provide allowed prots to ADD_PAGES security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM - - - --- 2019-05-31 Sean Christopherson New
[RFC,5/9] x86/sgx: Restrict mapping without an enclave page to PROT_NONE security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM - - - --- 2019-05-31 Sean Christopherson New
[RFC,4/9] mm: Introduce vm_ops->mprotect() security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM - - - --- 2019-05-31 Sean Christopherson New
[RFC,3/9] x86/sgx: Allow userspace to add multiple pages in single ioctl() security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM - - - --- 2019-05-31 Sean Christopherson New
[RFC,2/9] x86/sgx: Do not naturally align MAP_FIXED address security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM - - - --- 2019-05-31 Sean Christopherson New
[RFC,1/9] x86/sgx: Remove unused local variable in sgx_encl_release() security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM - - - --- 2019-05-31 Sean Christopherson New