From patchwork Tue Jun 2 14:18:23 2020 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Sumit Garg X-Patchwork-Id: 11583961 Return-Path: Received: from mail.kernel.org (pdx-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.123]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id BF372912 for ; Tue, 2 Jun 2020 14:19:20 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 9D28320810 for ; Tue, 2 Jun 2020 14:19:20 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=linaro.org header.i=@linaro.org header.b="rJYlqHQG" Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1728294AbgFBOTQ (ORCPT ); Tue, 2 Jun 2020 10:19:16 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:57580 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1728224AbgFBOTP (ORCPT ); Tue, 2 Jun 2020 10:19:15 -0400 Received: from mail-pj1-x1044.google.com (mail-pj1-x1044.google.com [IPv6:2607:f8b0:4864:20::1044]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id E2800C08C5C1 for ; Tue, 2 Jun 2020 07:19:14 -0700 (PDT) Received: by mail-pj1-x1044.google.com with SMTP id d6so1520163pjs.3 for ; Tue, 02 Jun 2020 07:19:14 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=linaro.org; s=google; h=from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:in-reply-to:references; bh=35Pkqp8XmHYtG77xmdc/rRwZ+Fhbnl13O+ZdPgA6u+8=; b=rJYlqHQGFvFNJpScMfhQjIw+lUfu18645UiEPnApUuKfHZRjvriaS+V8gtJQUxmC3Y /kkexdDLostWxb2LFSWd1LlLLNWvL7Krel5UMOVWKXsJu+d+6PrwvUTNwiOdN5G8P5MM V1F26HgCluau9sQszuR/lSEB+b/9ftEb8zlOBSz7fArv0/h9KNVNlZmJJDnGzFIQY+nM RKWV9gdl8h4qISlF9vy3HCZLoZwjiFEs9Fl8AR8U63A7C9psohityHiYT+4AHpjdVDZI BHkpOWTizOPUDwWN53CMwjNy6vrs3BO5dYrE1VH06tI8hbKd/D4Y5P6nh6vKXQthV/OJ KLVg== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:in-reply-to :references; bh=35Pkqp8XmHYtG77xmdc/rRwZ+Fhbnl13O+ZdPgA6u+8=; b=QUDLt2jJKy1+spZANe0RYJwgYRRYL0uqKLl7DVMVowi5wEeM6mmB7vmuaLNUC5xVRZ 765UAozrCcnKMFJ/4m+FBQM9ppdwxZZMPZRB6lhEXJr1GO8RpHhA4IrSc2w8QtXLLla9 Av6cHkD3BW5vaYwHxThcePncwKz3fcljwkSmxnHZp+PTa4PundRAMUyI7fEua2LXAcLj tcZomduH9m5z/qNwlxB+mRvj35PQP28+pVsV/umL+1DbVmVf5bGvLi+YgN45r/FJCRr/ 0LGI59JJrmcd9z97admUS+tTSr8qLwJXQRBiMqf2AoTcRvJEkBCB2BvDtkE4eo4GH/Sa ElWQ== X-Gm-Message-State: AOAM5331mxAo63F5bcpRiqJI/6QTJJdgTOOOTR/BdmgEoEd85+QuG2zv A1HhShLgoHffRatbhPtzir17Cw== X-Google-Smtp-Source: ABdhPJx3UkAIMicn0KzPrEzlhm6WMMM0eaU2pp8I1PcYK4CFaChzAu9/kZ+Zek7+T7Jsl17l7CRngw== X-Received: by 2002:a17:90b:344d:: with SMTP id lj13mr6047572pjb.160.1591107554264; Tue, 02 Jun 2020 07:19:14 -0700 (PDT) Received: from localhost.localdomain ([117.252.66.248]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id 141sm2529670pfz.171.2020.06.02.07.19.05 (version=TLS1_2 cipher=ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 bits=128/128); Tue, 02 Jun 2020 07:19:13 -0700 (PDT) From: Sumit Garg To: jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com, zohar@linux.ibm.com, jejb@linux.ibm.com Cc: dhowells@redhat.com, jens.wiklander@linaro.org, corbet@lwn.net, jmorris@namei.org, serge@hallyn.com, casey@schaufler-ca.com, janne.karhunen@gmail.com, daniel.thompson@linaro.org, Markus.Wamser@mixed-mode.de, keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, op-tee@lists.trustedfirmware.org, tee-dev@lists.linaro.org, Sumit Garg Subject: [PATCH v5 2/4] KEYS: trusted: Introduce TEE based Trusted Keys Date: Tue, 2 Jun 2020 19:48:23 +0530 Message-Id: <1591107505-6030-3-git-send-email-sumit.garg@linaro.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.7.4 In-Reply-To: <1591107505-6030-1-git-send-email-sumit.garg@linaro.org> References: <1591107505-6030-1-git-send-email-sumit.garg@linaro.org> Sender: owner-linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: Add support for TEE based trusted keys where TEE provides the functionality to seal and unseal trusted keys using hardware unique key. Refer to Documentation/tee.txt for detailed information about TEE. Signed-off-by: Sumit Garg --- include/keys/trusted-type.h | 3 + include/keys/trusted_tee.h | 66 +++++++ security/keys/Kconfig | 10 ++ security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile | 1 + security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c | 2 + security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tee.c | 280 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 6 files changed, 362 insertions(+) create mode 100644 include/keys/trusted_tee.h create mode 100644 security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tee.c diff --git a/include/keys/trusted-type.h b/include/keys/trusted-type.h index 819a102..a1101ac 100644 --- a/include/keys/trusted-type.h +++ b/include/keys/trusted-type.h @@ -67,6 +67,9 @@ extern struct key_type key_type_trusted; #if defined(CONFIG_TRUSTED_TPM) extern struct trusted_key_ops tpm_trusted_key_ops; #endif +#if defined(CONFIG_TRUSTED_TEE) +extern struct trusted_key_ops tee_trusted_key_ops; +#endif #define TRUSTED_DEBUG 0 diff --git a/include/keys/trusted_tee.h b/include/keys/trusted_tee.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ab58ffd --- /dev/null +++ b/include/keys/trusted_tee.h @@ -0,0 +1,66 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +/* + * Copyright (C) 2019 Linaro Ltd. + * + * Author: + * Sumit Garg + */ + +#ifndef __TEE_TRUSTED_KEY_H +#define __TEE_TRUSTED_KEY_H + +#include + +#define DRIVER_NAME "tee-trusted-key" + +/* + * Get random data for symmetric key + * + * [out] memref[0] Random data + * + * Result: + * TEE_SUCCESS - Invoke command success + * TEE_ERROR_BAD_PARAMETERS - Incorrect input param + */ +#define TA_CMD_GET_RANDOM 0x0 + +/* + * Seal trusted key using hardware unique key + * + * [in] memref[0] Plain key + * [out] memref[1] Sealed key datablob + * + * Result: + * TEE_SUCCESS - Invoke command success + * TEE_ERROR_BAD_PARAMETERS - Incorrect input param + */ +#define TA_CMD_SEAL 0x1 + +/* + * Unseal trusted key using hardware unique key + * + * [in] memref[0] Sealed key datablob + * [out] memref[1] Plain key + * + * Result: + * TEE_SUCCESS - Invoke command success + * TEE_ERROR_BAD_PARAMETERS - Incorrect input param + */ +#define TA_CMD_UNSEAL 0x2 + +/** + * struct trusted_key_private - TEE Trusted key private data + * @dev: TEE based Trusted key device. + * @ctx: TEE context handler. + * @session_id: Trusted key TA session identifier. + * @shm_pool: Memory pool shared with TEE device. + */ +struct trusted_key_private { + struct device *dev; + struct tee_context *ctx; + u32 session_id; + u32 data_rate; + struct tee_shm *shm_pool; +}; + +#endif diff --git a/security/keys/Kconfig b/security/keys/Kconfig index 22632c6..4c374f4 100644 --- a/security/keys/Kconfig +++ b/security/keys/Kconfig @@ -95,6 +95,16 @@ config TRUSTED_TPM If you are unsure as to whether this is required, answer N. +config TRUSTED_TEE + bool "TEE based TRUSTED KEYS" + depends on TRUSTED_KEYS && TEE + help + This option provides support for TEE based trusted keys where TEE acts + as the trust source. The keys are sealed to Hardware Unique Key (HUK) + accessible to TEE only. + + If you are unsure as to whether this is required, answer N. + config ENCRYPTED_KEYS tristate "ENCRYPTED KEYS" depends on KEYS diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile b/security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile index 03c3ad4..1818b7d 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile @@ -7,3 +7,4 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS) += trusted.o trusted-y += trusted_core.o trusted-$(CONFIG_TRUSTED_TPM) += trusted_tpm1.o trusted-$(CONFIG_TRUSTED_TPM) += trusted_tpm2.o +trusted-$(CONFIG_TRUSTED_TEE) += trusted_tee.o diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c index 3d07d27..3f37dcb 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c @@ -25,6 +25,8 @@ #if defined(CONFIG_TRUSTED_TPM) static struct trusted_key_ops *trusted_key_ops = &tpm_trusted_key_ops; +#elif defined(CONFIG_TRUSTED_TEE) +static struct trusted_key_ops *trusted_key_ops = &tee_trusted_key_ops; #else static struct trusted_key_ops *trusted_key_ops; #endif diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tee.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tee.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..91075b1 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tee.c @@ -0,0 +1,280 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* + * Copyright (C) 2019 Linaro Ltd. + * + * Author: + * Sumit Garg + */ + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include +#include + +static struct trusted_key_private pvt_data; + +/* + * Have the TEE seal(encrypt) the symmetric key + */ +static int tee_trusted_seal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob) +{ + int ret = 0; + struct tee_ioctl_invoke_arg inv_arg; + struct tee_param param[4]; + struct tee_shm *reg_shm_in = NULL, *reg_shm_out = NULL; + + memset(&inv_arg, 0, sizeof(inv_arg)); + memset(¶m, 0, sizeof(param)); + + reg_shm_in = tee_shm_register(pvt_data.ctx, (unsigned long)p->key, + p->key_len, TEE_SHM_DMA_BUF | + TEE_SHM_KERNEL_MAPPED); + if (IS_ERR(reg_shm_in)) { + dev_err(pvt_data.dev, "key shm register failed\n"); + return PTR_ERR(reg_shm_in); + } + + reg_shm_out = tee_shm_register(pvt_data.ctx, (unsigned long)p->blob, + sizeof(p->blob), TEE_SHM_DMA_BUF | + TEE_SHM_KERNEL_MAPPED); + if (IS_ERR(reg_shm_out)) { + dev_err(pvt_data.dev, "blob shm register failed\n"); + ret = PTR_ERR(reg_shm_out); + goto out; + } + + inv_arg.func = TA_CMD_SEAL; + inv_arg.session = pvt_data.session_id; + inv_arg.num_params = 4; + + param[0].attr = TEE_IOCTL_PARAM_ATTR_TYPE_MEMREF_INPUT; + param[0].u.memref.shm = reg_shm_in; + param[0].u.memref.size = p->key_len; + param[0].u.memref.shm_offs = 0; + param[1].attr = TEE_IOCTL_PARAM_ATTR_TYPE_MEMREF_OUTPUT; + param[1].u.memref.shm = reg_shm_out; + param[1].u.memref.size = sizeof(p->blob); + param[1].u.memref.shm_offs = 0; + + ret = tee_client_invoke_func(pvt_data.ctx, &inv_arg, param); + if ((ret < 0) || (inv_arg.ret != 0)) { + dev_err(pvt_data.dev, "TA_CMD_SEAL invoke err: %x\n", + inv_arg.ret); + ret = -EFAULT; + } else { + p->blob_len = param[1].u.memref.size; + } + +out: + if (reg_shm_out) + tee_shm_free(reg_shm_out); + if (reg_shm_in) + tee_shm_free(reg_shm_in); + + return ret; +} + +/* + * Have the TEE unseal(decrypt) the symmetric key + */ +static int tee_trusted_unseal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob) +{ + int ret = 0; + struct tee_ioctl_invoke_arg inv_arg; + struct tee_param param[4]; + struct tee_shm *reg_shm_in = NULL, *reg_shm_out = NULL; + + memset(&inv_arg, 0, sizeof(inv_arg)); + memset(¶m, 0, sizeof(param)); + + reg_shm_in = tee_shm_register(pvt_data.ctx, (unsigned long)p->blob, + p->blob_len, TEE_SHM_DMA_BUF | + TEE_SHM_KERNEL_MAPPED); + if (IS_ERR(reg_shm_in)) { + dev_err(pvt_data.dev, "blob shm register failed\n"); + return PTR_ERR(reg_shm_in); + } + + reg_shm_out = tee_shm_register(pvt_data.ctx, (unsigned long)p->key, + sizeof(p->key), TEE_SHM_DMA_BUF | + TEE_SHM_KERNEL_MAPPED); + if (IS_ERR(reg_shm_out)) { + dev_err(pvt_data.dev, "key shm register failed\n"); + ret = PTR_ERR(reg_shm_out); + goto out; + } + + inv_arg.func = TA_CMD_UNSEAL; + inv_arg.session = pvt_data.session_id; + inv_arg.num_params = 4; + + param[0].attr = TEE_IOCTL_PARAM_ATTR_TYPE_MEMREF_INPUT; + param[0].u.memref.shm = reg_shm_in; + param[0].u.memref.size = p->blob_len; + param[0].u.memref.shm_offs = 0; + param[1].attr = TEE_IOCTL_PARAM_ATTR_TYPE_MEMREF_OUTPUT; + param[1].u.memref.shm = reg_shm_out; + param[1].u.memref.size = sizeof(p->key); + param[1].u.memref.shm_offs = 0; + + ret = tee_client_invoke_func(pvt_data.ctx, &inv_arg, param); + if ((ret < 0) || (inv_arg.ret != 0)) { + dev_err(pvt_data.dev, "TA_CMD_UNSEAL invoke err: %x\n", + inv_arg.ret); + ret = -EFAULT; + } else { + p->key_len = param[1].u.memref.size; + } + +out: + if (reg_shm_out) + tee_shm_free(reg_shm_out); + if (reg_shm_in) + tee_shm_free(reg_shm_in); + + return ret; +} + +/* + * Have the TEE generate random symmetric key + */ +static int tee_trusted_get_random(unsigned char *key, size_t key_len) +{ + int ret = 0; + struct tee_ioctl_invoke_arg inv_arg; + struct tee_param param[4]; + struct tee_shm *reg_shm = NULL; + + memset(&inv_arg, 0, sizeof(inv_arg)); + memset(¶m, 0, sizeof(param)); + + reg_shm = tee_shm_register(pvt_data.ctx, (unsigned long)key, key_len, + TEE_SHM_DMA_BUF | TEE_SHM_KERNEL_MAPPED); + if (IS_ERR(reg_shm)) { + dev_err(pvt_data.dev, "random key shm register failed\n"); + return PTR_ERR(reg_shm); + } + + inv_arg.func = TA_CMD_GET_RANDOM; + inv_arg.session = pvt_data.session_id; + inv_arg.num_params = 4; + + param[0].attr = TEE_IOCTL_PARAM_ATTR_TYPE_MEMREF_OUTPUT; + param[0].u.memref.shm = reg_shm; + param[0].u.memref.size = key_len; + param[0].u.memref.shm_offs = 0; + + ret = tee_client_invoke_func(pvt_data.ctx, &inv_arg, param); + if ((ret < 0) || (inv_arg.ret != 0)) { + dev_err(pvt_data.dev, "TA_CMD_GET_RANDOM invoke err: %x\n", + inv_arg.ret); + ret = -EFAULT; + } else { + ret = param[0].u.memref.size; + } + + tee_shm_free(reg_shm); + + return ret; +} + +static int optee_ctx_match(struct tee_ioctl_version_data *ver, const void *data) +{ + if (ver->impl_id == TEE_IMPL_ID_OPTEE) + return 1; + else + return 0; +} + +static int trusted_key_probe(struct device *dev) +{ + struct tee_client_device *rng_device = to_tee_client_device(dev); + int ret = 0, err = -ENODEV; + struct tee_ioctl_open_session_arg sess_arg; + + memset(&sess_arg, 0, sizeof(sess_arg)); + + pvt_data.ctx = tee_client_open_context(NULL, optee_ctx_match, NULL, + NULL); + if (IS_ERR(pvt_data.ctx)) + return -ENODEV; + + memcpy(sess_arg.uuid, rng_device->id.uuid.b, TEE_IOCTL_UUID_LEN); + sess_arg.clnt_login = TEE_IOCTL_LOGIN_REE_KERNEL; + sess_arg.num_params = 0; + + ret = tee_client_open_session(pvt_data.ctx, &sess_arg, NULL); + if ((ret < 0) || (sess_arg.ret != 0)) { + dev_err(dev, "tee_client_open_session failed, err: %x\n", + sess_arg.ret); + err = -EINVAL; + goto out_ctx; + } + pvt_data.session_id = sess_arg.session; + + ret = register_key_type(&key_type_trusted); + if (ret < 0) + goto out_sess; + + pvt_data.dev = dev; + + return 0; + +out_sess: + tee_client_close_session(pvt_data.ctx, pvt_data.session_id); +out_ctx: + tee_client_close_context(pvt_data.ctx); + + return err; +} + +static int trusted_key_remove(struct device *dev) +{ + unregister_key_type(&key_type_trusted); + tee_client_close_session(pvt_data.ctx, pvt_data.session_id); + tee_client_close_context(pvt_data.ctx); + + return 0; +} + +static const struct tee_client_device_id trusted_key_id_table[] = { + {UUID_INIT(0xf04a0fe7, 0x1f5d, 0x4b9b, + 0xab, 0xf7, 0x61, 0x9b, 0x85, 0xb4, 0xce, 0x8c)}, + {} +}; + +MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE(tee, trusted_key_id_table); + +static struct tee_client_driver trusted_key_driver = { + .id_table = trusted_key_id_table, + .driver = { + .name = DRIVER_NAME, + .bus = &tee_bus_type, + .probe = trusted_key_probe, + .remove = trusted_key_remove, + }, +}; + +static int __init init_tee_trusted(void) +{ + return driver_register(&trusted_key_driver.driver); +} + +static void __exit exit_tee_trusted(void) +{ + driver_unregister(&trusted_key_driver.driver); +} + +struct trusted_key_ops tee_trusted_key_ops = { + .migratable = 0, /* non-migratable */ + .init = init_tee_trusted, + .seal = tee_trusted_seal, + .unseal = tee_trusted_unseal, + .get_random = tee_trusted_get_random, + .exit = exit_tee_trusted, +}; +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tee_trusted_key_ops);