| Message ID | 161610014360.55424.10461367636187076938.stgit@olly (mailing list archive) |
|---|---|
| State | New, archived |
| Headers | show |
| Series | Split security_task_getsecid() into subj and obj variants | expand |
On 3/18/2021 1:42 PM, Paul Moore wrote: > Of the three LSMs that implement the security_task_getsecid() LSM > hook, all three LSMs provide the task's objective security > credentials. This turns out to be unfortunate as most of the hook's > callers seem to expect the task's subjective credentials, although > a small handful of callers do correctly expect the objective > credentials. > > This patch is the first step towards fixing the problem: it splits > the existing security_task_getsecid() hook into two variants, one > for the subjective creds, one for the objective creds. > > void security_task_getsecid_subj(struct task_struct *p, > u32 *secid); > void security_task_getsecid_obj(struct task_struct *p, > u32 *secid); > > While this patch does fix all of the callers to use the correct > variant, in order to keep this patch focused on the callers and to > ease review, the LSMs continue to use the same implementation for > both hooks. The net effect is that this patch should not change > the behavior of the kernel in any way, it will be up to the latter > LSM specific patches in this series to change the hook > implementations and return the correct credentials. > > Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> (IMA) > Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> > --- > drivers/android/binder.c | 11 ++++++++++- > include/linux/cred.h | 2 +- > include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 5 ++++- > include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 12 +++++++++--- > include/linux/security.h | 10 ++++++++-- > kernel/audit.c | 4 ++-- > kernel/auditfilter.c | 3 ++- > kernel/auditsc.c | 8 ++++---- > kernel/bpf/bpf_lsm.c | 3 ++- > net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c | 2 +- > net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h | 2 +- > security/apparmor/lsm.c | 3 ++- > security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 2 +- > security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 14 +++++++------- > security/security.c | 13 ++++++++++--- > security/selinux/hooks.c | 3 ++- > security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 3 ++- > 17 files changed, 68 insertions(+), 32 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/drivers/android/binder.c b/drivers/android/binder.c > index c119736ca56a..61d235b6ccd8 100644 > --- a/drivers/android/binder.c > +++ b/drivers/android/binder.c > @@ -2700,7 +2700,16 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc, > u32 secid; > size_t added_size; > > - security_task_getsecid(proc->tsk, &secid); > + /* > + * Arguably this should be the task's subjective LSM secid but > + * we can't reliably access the subjective creds of a task > + * other than our own so we must use the objective creds, which > + * are safe to access. The downside is that if a task is > + * temporarily overriding it's creds it will not be reflected > + * here; however, it isn't clear that binder would handle that > + * case well anyway. > + */ > + security_task_getsecid_obj(proc->tsk, &secid); > ret = security_secid_to_secctx(secid, &secctx, &secctx_sz); > if (ret) { > return_error = BR_FAILED_REPLY; > diff --git a/include/linux/cred.h b/include/linux/cred.h > index 4c6350503697..ac0e5f97d7d8 100644 > --- a/include/linux/cred.h > +++ b/include/linux/cred.h > @@ -140,7 +140,7 @@ struct cred { > struct key *request_key_auth; /* assumed request_key authority */ > #endif > #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY > - void *security; /* subjective LSM security */ > + void *security; /* LSM security */ > #endif > struct user_struct *user; /* real user ID subscription */ > struct user_namespace *user_ns; /* user_ns the caps and keyrings are relative to. */ > diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h > index 477a597db013..3ad8085e85e1 100644 > --- a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h > +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h > @@ -203,7 +203,10 @@ LSM_HOOK(int, 0, task_fix_setgid, struct cred *new, const struct cred * old, > LSM_HOOK(int, 0, task_setpgid, struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid) > LSM_HOOK(int, 0, task_getpgid, struct task_struct *p) > LSM_HOOK(int, 0, task_getsid, struct task_struct *p) > -LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, task_getsecid, struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid) > +LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, task_getsecid_subj, > + struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid) > +LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, task_getsecid_obj, > + struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid) > LSM_HOOK(int, 0, task_setnice, struct task_struct *p, int nice) > LSM_HOOK(int, 0, task_setioprio, struct task_struct *p, int ioprio) > LSM_HOOK(int, 0, task_getioprio, struct task_struct *p) > diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h > index fb7f3193753d..e25d31fe787e 100644 > --- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h > +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h > @@ -707,9 +707,15 @@ > * @p. > * @p contains the task_struct for the process. > * Return 0 if permission is granted. > - * @task_getsecid: > - * Retrieve the security identifier of the process @p. > - * @p contains the task_struct for the process and place is into @secid. > + * @task_getsecid_subj: > + * Retrieve the subjective security identifier of the task_struct in @p > + * and return it in @secid. Special care must be taken to ensure that @p > + * is the either the "current" task, or the caller has exclusive access > + * to @p. > + * In case of failure, @secid will be set to zero. > + * @task_getsecid_obj: > + * Retrieve the objective security identifier of the task_struct in @p > + * and return it in @secid. > * In case of failure, @secid will be set to zero. > * > * @task_setnice: > diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h > index 8aeebd6646dc..9c490bc437f5 100644 > --- a/include/linux/security.h > +++ b/include/linux/security.h > @@ -414,7 +414,8 @@ int security_task_fix_setgid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, > int security_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid); > int security_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p); > int security_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p); > -void security_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid); > +void security_task_getsecid_subj(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid); > +void security_task_getsecid_obj(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid); > int security_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice); > int security_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio); > int security_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p); > @@ -1098,7 +1099,12 @@ static inline int security_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p) > return 0; > } > > -static inline void security_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid) > +static inline void security_task_getsecid_subj(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid) > +{ > + *secid = 0; > +} > + > +static inline void security_task_getsecid_obj(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid) > { > *secid = 0; > } > diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c > index 551a394bc8f4..121d37e700a6 100644 > --- a/kernel/audit.c > +++ b/kernel/audit.c > @@ -2132,7 +2132,7 @@ int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab) > int error; > u32 sid; > > - security_task_getsecid(current, &sid); > + security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &sid); > if (!sid) > return 0; > > @@ -2353,7 +2353,7 @@ int audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t) > audit_sig_uid = auid; > else > audit_sig_uid = uid; > - security_task_getsecid(current, &audit_sig_sid); > + security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &audit_sig_sid); > } > > return audit_signal_info_syscall(t); > diff --git a/kernel/auditfilter.c b/kernel/auditfilter.c > index 333b3bcfc545..db2c6b59dfc3 100644 > --- a/kernel/auditfilter.c > +++ b/kernel/auditfilter.c > @@ -1359,7 +1359,8 @@ int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype) > case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN: > case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR: > if (f->lsm_rule) { > - security_task_getsecid(current, &sid); > + security_task_getsecid_subj(current, > + &sid); > result = security_audit_rule_match(sid, > f->type, f->op, f->lsm_rule); > } > diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c > index 47fb48f42c93..9973865cbf13 100644 > --- a/kernel/auditsc.c > +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c > @@ -667,7 +667,7 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk, > logged upon error */ > if (f->lsm_rule) { > if (need_sid) { > - security_task_getsecid(tsk, &sid); > + security_task_getsecid_subj(tsk, &sid); > need_sid = 0; > } > result = security_audit_rule_match(sid, f->type, > @@ -2400,7 +2400,7 @@ void __audit_ptrace(struct task_struct *t) > context->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t); > context->target_uid = task_uid(t); > context->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t); > - security_task_getsecid(t, &context->target_sid); > + security_task_getsecid_obj(t, &context->target_sid); > memcpy(context->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN); > } > > @@ -2427,7 +2427,7 @@ int audit_signal_info_syscall(struct task_struct *t) > ctx->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t); > ctx->target_uid = t_uid; > ctx->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t); > - security_task_getsecid(t, &ctx->target_sid); > + security_task_getsecid_obj(t, &ctx->target_sid); > memcpy(ctx->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN); > return 0; > } > @@ -2448,7 +2448,7 @@ int audit_signal_info_syscall(struct task_struct *t) > axp->target_auid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_loginuid(t); > axp->target_uid[axp->pid_count] = t_uid; > axp->target_sessionid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_sessionid(t); > - security_task_getsecid(t, &axp->target_sid[axp->pid_count]); > + security_task_getsecid_obj(t, &axp->target_sid[axp->pid_count]); > memcpy(axp->target_comm[axp->pid_count], t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN); > axp->pid_count++; > > diff --git a/kernel/bpf/bpf_lsm.c b/kernel/bpf/bpf_lsm.c > index 1622a44d1617..0ff58259ccf8 100644 > --- a/kernel/bpf/bpf_lsm.c > +++ b/kernel/bpf/bpf_lsm.c > @@ -209,7 +209,8 @@ BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_socket_socketpair) > > BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_syslog) > BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_task_alloc) > -BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_task_getsecid) > +BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_task_getsecid_subj) > +BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_task_getsecid_obj) > BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_task_prctl) > BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_task_setscheduler) > BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_task_to_inode) > diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c > index ccb491642811..3e6ac9b790b1 100644 > --- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c > +++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c > @@ -1539,7 +1539,7 @@ int __init netlbl_unlabel_defconf(void) > /* Only the kernel is allowed to call this function and the only time > * it is called is at bootup before the audit subsystem is reporting > * messages so don't worry to much about these values. */ > - security_task_getsecid(current, &audit_info.secid); > + security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &audit_info.secid); > audit_info.loginuid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID; > audit_info.sessionid = 0; > > diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h b/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h > index 3c67afce64f1..b9ba8112b3c5 100644 > --- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h > +++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h > @@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ > static inline void netlbl_netlink_auditinfo(struct sk_buff *skb, > struct netlbl_audit *audit_info) > { > - security_task_getsecid(current, &audit_info->secid); > + security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &audit_info->secid); > audit_info->loginuid = audit_get_loginuid(current); > audit_info->sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(current); > } > diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c > index 240a53387e6b..f72406fe1bf2 100644 > --- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c > +++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c > @@ -1252,7 +1252,8 @@ static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = { > > LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_free, apparmor_task_free), > LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_alloc, apparmor_task_alloc), > - LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsecid, apparmor_task_getsecid), > + LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsecid_subj, apparmor_task_getsecid), > + LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsecid_obj, apparmor_task_getsecid), > LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setrlimit, apparmor_task_setrlimit), > LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_kill, apparmor_task_kill), > > diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c > index 565e33ff19d0..4e5eb0236278 100644 > --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c > +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c > @@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ int ima_must_appraise(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *inode, > if (!ima_appraise) > return 0; > > - security_task_getsecid(current, &secid); > + security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &secid); > return ima_match_policy(mnt_userns, inode, current_cred(), secid, func, > mask, IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_HASH, NULL, NULL, NULL); > } > diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c > index 9ef748ea829f..b85d9e429426 100644 > --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c > +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c > @@ -391,7 +391,7 @@ int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot) > u32 secid; > > if (file && (prot & PROT_EXEC)) { > - security_task_getsecid(current, &secid); > + security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &secid); > return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, NULL, > 0, MAY_EXEC, MMAP_CHECK); > } > @@ -429,7 +429,7 @@ int ima_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long prot) > !(prot & PROT_EXEC) || (vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) > return 0; > > - security_task_getsecid(current, &secid); > + security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &secid); > inode = file_inode(vma->vm_file); > action = ima_get_action(file_mnt_user_ns(vma->vm_file), inode, > current_cred(), secid, MAY_EXEC, MMAP_CHECK, > @@ -470,7 +470,7 @@ int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm) > int ret; > u32 secid; > > - security_task_getsecid(current, &secid); > + security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &secid); > ret = process_measurement(bprm->file, current_cred(), secid, NULL, 0, > MAY_EXEC, BPRM_CHECK); > if (ret) > @@ -495,7 +495,7 @@ int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask) > { > u32 secid; > > - security_task_getsecid(current, &secid); > + security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &secid); > return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, NULL, 0, > mask & (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC | > MAY_APPEND), FILE_CHECK); > @@ -686,7 +686,7 @@ int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id read_id, > > /* Read entire file for all partial reads. */ > func = read_idmap[read_id] ?: FILE_CHECK; > - security_task_getsecid(current, &secid); > + security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &secid); > return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, NULL, > 0, MAY_READ, func); > } > @@ -729,7 +729,7 @@ int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size, > } > > func = read_idmap[read_id] ?: FILE_CHECK; > - security_task_getsecid(current, &secid); > + security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &secid); > return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, buf, size, > MAY_READ, func); > } > @@ -872,7 +872,7 @@ void process_buffer_measurement(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, > * buffer measurements. > */ > if (func) { > - security_task_getsecid(current, &secid); > + security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &secid); > action = ima_get_action(mnt_userns, inode, current_cred(), > secid, 0, func, &pcr, &template, > func_data); > diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c > index 5ac96b16f8fa..ee76d6c2f852 100644 > --- a/security/security.c > +++ b/security/security.c > @@ -1762,12 +1762,19 @@ int security_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p) > return call_int_hook(task_getsid, 0, p); > } > > -void security_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid) > +void security_task_getsecid_subj(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid) > { > *secid = 0; > - call_void_hook(task_getsecid, p, secid); > + call_void_hook(task_getsecid_subj, p, secid); > } > -EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_task_getsecid); > +EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_task_getsecid_subj); > + > +void security_task_getsecid_obj(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid) > +{ > + *secid = 0; > + call_void_hook(task_getsecid_obj, p, secid); > +} > +EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_task_getsecid_obj); > > int security_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice) > { > diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c > index eca9fc0ba764..24ca545c6e1b 100644 > --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c > +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c > @@ -7149,7 +7149,8 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = { > LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setpgid, selinux_task_setpgid), > LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getpgid, selinux_task_getpgid), > LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsid, selinux_task_getsid), > - LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsecid, selinux_task_getsecid), > + LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsecid_subj, selinux_task_getsecid), > + LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsecid_obj, selinux_task_getsecid), > LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setnice, selinux_task_setnice), > LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setioprio, selinux_task_setioprio), > LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getioprio, selinux_task_getioprio), > diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c > index 12a45e61c1a5..f546fb832f30 100644 > --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c > +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c > @@ -4759,7 +4759,8 @@ static struct security_hook_list smack_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = { > LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setpgid, smack_task_setpgid), > LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getpgid, smack_task_getpgid), > LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsid, smack_task_getsid), > - LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsecid, smack_task_getsecid), > + LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsecid_subj, smack_task_getsecid), > + LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsecid_obj, smack_task_getsecid), > LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setnice, smack_task_setnice), > LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setioprio, smack_task_setioprio), > LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getioprio, smack_task_getioprio), >
On Thu, Mar 18, 2021 at 4:57 PM Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> wrote: > > On 3/18/2021 1:42 PM, Paul Moore wrote: > > Of the three LSMs that implement the security_task_getsecid() LSM > > hook, all three LSMs provide the task's objective security > > credentials. This turns out to be unfortunate as most of the hook's > > callers seem to expect the task's subjective credentials, although > > a small handful of callers do correctly expect the objective > > credentials. > > > > This patch is the first step towards fixing the problem: it splits > > the existing security_task_getsecid() hook into two variants, one > > for the subjective creds, one for the objective creds. > > > > void security_task_getsecid_subj(struct task_struct *p, > > u32 *secid); > > void security_task_getsecid_obj(struct task_struct *p, > > u32 *secid); > > > > While this patch does fix all of the callers to use the correct > > variant, in order to keep this patch focused on the callers and to > > ease review, the LSMs continue to use the same implementation for > > both hooks. The net effect is that this patch should not change > > the behavior of the kernel in any way, it will be up to the latter > > LSM specific patches in this series to change the hook > > implementations and return the correct credentials. > > > > Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> (IMA) > > Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> > > Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Thanks Casey.
On 2021-03-18 16:42, Paul Moore wrote: > Of the three LSMs that implement the security_task_getsecid() LSM > hook, all three LSMs provide the task's objective security > credentials. This turns out to be unfortunate as most of the hook's > callers seem to expect the task's subjective credentials, although > a small handful of callers do correctly expect the objective > credentials. > > This patch is the first step towards fixing the problem: it splits > the existing security_task_getsecid() hook into two variants, one > for the subjective creds, one for the objective creds. > > void security_task_getsecid_subj(struct task_struct *p, > u32 *secid); > void security_task_getsecid_obj(struct task_struct *p, > u32 *secid); > > While this patch does fix all of the callers to use the correct > variant, in order to keep this patch focused on the callers and to > ease review, the LSMs continue to use the same implementation for > both hooks. The net effect is that this patch should not change > the behavior of the kernel in any way, it will be up to the latter > LSM specific patches in this series to change the hook > implementations and return the correct credentials. > > Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> (IMA) > Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Audit: Acked-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> > --- > drivers/android/binder.c | 11 ++++++++++- > include/linux/cred.h | 2 +- > include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 5 ++++- > include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 12 +++++++++--- > include/linux/security.h | 10 ++++++++-- > kernel/audit.c | 4 ++-- > kernel/auditfilter.c | 3 ++- > kernel/auditsc.c | 8 ++++---- > kernel/bpf/bpf_lsm.c | 3 ++- > net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c | 2 +- > net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h | 2 +- > security/apparmor/lsm.c | 3 ++- > security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 2 +- > security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 14 +++++++------- > security/security.c | 13 ++++++++++--- > security/selinux/hooks.c | 3 ++- > security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 3 ++- > 17 files changed, 68 insertions(+), 32 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/drivers/android/binder.c b/drivers/android/binder.c > index c119736ca56a..61d235b6ccd8 100644 > --- a/drivers/android/binder.c > +++ b/drivers/android/binder.c > @@ -2700,7 +2700,16 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc, > u32 secid; > size_t added_size; > > - security_task_getsecid(proc->tsk, &secid); > + /* > + * Arguably this should be the task's subjective LSM secid but > + * we can't reliably access the subjective creds of a task > + * other than our own so we must use the objective creds, which > + * are safe to access. The downside is that if a task is > + * temporarily overriding it's creds it will not be reflected > + * here; however, it isn't clear that binder would handle that > + * case well anyway. > + */ > + security_task_getsecid_obj(proc->tsk, &secid); > ret = security_secid_to_secctx(secid, &secctx, &secctx_sz); > if (ret) { > return_error = BR_FAILED_REPLY; > diff --git a/include/linux/cred.h b/include/linux/cred.h > index 4c6350503697..ac0e5f97d7d8 100644 > --- a/include/linux/cred.h > +++ b/include/linux/cred.h > @@ -140,7 +140,7 @@ struct cred { > struct key *request_key_auth; /* assumed request_key authority */ > #endif > #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY > - void *security; /* subjective LSM security */ > + void *security; /* LSM security */ > #endif > struct user_struct *user; /* real user ID subscription */ > struct user_namespace *user_ns; /* user_ns the caps and keyrings are relative to. */ > diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h > index 477a597db013..3ad8085e85e1 100644 > --- a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h > +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h > @@ -203,7 +203,10 @@ LSM_HOOK(int, 0, task_fix_setgid, struct cred *new, const struct cred * old, > LSM_HOOK(int, 0, task_setpgid, struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid) > LSM_HOOK(int, 0, task_getpgid, struct task_struct *p) > LSM_HOOK(int, 0, task_getsid, struct task_struct *p) > -LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, task_getsecid, struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid) > +LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, task_getsecid_subj, > + struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid) > +LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, task_getsecid_obj, > + struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid) > LSM_HOOK(int, 0, task_setnice, struct task_struct *p, int nice) > LSM_HOOK(int, 0, task_setioprio, struct task_struct *p, int ioprio) > LSM_HOOK(int, 0, task_getioprio, struct task_struct *p) > diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h > index fb7f3193753d..e25d31fe787e 100644 > --- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h > +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h > @@ -707,9 +707,15 @@ > * @p. > * @p contains the task_struct for the process. > * Return 0 if permission is granted. > - * @task_getsecid: > - * Retrieve the security identifier of the process @p. > - * @p contains the task_struct for the process and place is into @secid. > + * @task_getsecid_subj: > + * Retrieve the subjective security identifier of the task_struct in @p > + * and return it in @secid. Special care must be taken to ensure that @p > + * is the either the "current" task, or the caller has exclusive access > + * to @p. > + * In case of failure, @secid will be set to zero. > + * @task_getsecid_obj: > + * Retrieve the objective security identifier of the task_struct in @p > + * and return it in @secid. > * In case of failure, @secid will be set to zero. > * > * @task_setnice: > diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h > index 8aeebd6646dc..9c490bc437f5 100644 > --- a/include/linux/security.h > +++ b/include/linux/security.h > @@ -414,7 +414,8 @@ int security_task_fix_setgid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, > int security_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid); > int security_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p); > int security_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p); > -void security_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid); > +void security_task_getsecid_subj(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid); > +void security_task_getsecid_obj(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid); > int security_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice); > int security_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio); > int security_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p); > @@ -1098,7 +1099,12 @@ static inline int security_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p) > return 0; > } > > -static inline void security_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid) > +static inline void security_task_getsecid_subj(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid) > +{ > + *secid = 0; > +} > + > +static inline void security_task_getsecid_obj(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid) > { > *secid = 0; > } > diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c > index 551a394bc8f4..121d37e700a6 100644 > --- a/kernel/audit.c > +++ b/kernel/audit.c > @@ -2132,7 +2132,7 @@ int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab) > int error; > u32 sid; > > - security_task_getsecid(current, &sid); > + security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &sid); > if (!sid) > return 0; > > @@ -2353,7 +2353,7 @@ int audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t) > audit_sig_uid = auid; > else > audit_sig_uid = uid; > - security_task_getsecid(current, &audit_sig_sid); > + security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &audit_sig_sid); > } > > return audit_signal_info_syscall(t); > diff --git a/kernel/auditfilter.c b/kernel/auditfilter.c > index 333b3bcfc545..db2c6b59dfc3 100644 > --- a/kernel/auditfilter.c > +++ b/kernel/auditfilter.c > @@ -1359,7 +1359,8 @@ int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype) > case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN: > case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR: > if (f->lsm_rule) { > - security_task_getsecid(current, &sid); > + security_task_getsecid_subj(current, > + &sid); > result = security_audit_rule_match(sid, > f->type, f->op, f->lsm_rule); > } > diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c > index 47fb48f42c93..9973865cbf13 100644 > --- a/kernel/auditsc.c > +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c > @@ -667,7 +667,7 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk, > logged upon error */ > if (f->lsm_rule) { > if (need_sid) { > - security_task_getsecid(tsk, &sid); > + security_task_getsecid_subj(tsk, &sid); > need_sid = 0; > } > result = security_audit_rule_match(sid, f->type, > @@ -2400,7 +2400,7 @@ void __audit_ptrace(struct task_struct *t) > context->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t); > context->target_uid = task_uid(t); > context->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t); > - security_task_getsecid(t, &context->target_sid); > + security_task_getsecid_obj(t, &context->target_sid); > memcpy(context->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN); > } > > @@ -2427,7 +2427,7 @@ int audit_signal_info_syscall(struct task_struct *t) > ctx->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t); > ctx->target_uid = t_uid; > ctx->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t); > - security_task_getsecid(t, &ctx->target_sid); > + security_task_getsecid_obj(t, &ctx->target_sid); > memcpy(ctx->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN); > return 0; > } > @@ -2448,7 +2448,7 @@ int audit_signal_info_syscall(struct task_struct *t) > axp->target_auid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_loginuid(t); > axp->target_uid[axp->pid_count] = t_uid; > axp->target_sessionid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_sessionid(t); > - security_task_getsecid(t, &axp->target_sid[axp->pid_count]); > + security_task_getsecid_obj(t, &axp->target_sid[axp->pid_count]); > memcpy(axp->target_comm[axp->pid_count], t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN); > axp->pid_count++; > > diff --git a/kernel/bpf/bpf_lsm.c b/kernel/bpf/bpf_lsm.c > index 1622a44d1617..0ff58259ccf8 100644 > --- a/kernel/bpf/bpf_lsm.c > +++ b/kernel/bpf/bpf_lsm.c > @@ -209,7 +209,8 @@ BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_socket_socketpair) > > BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_syslog) > BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_task_alloc) > -BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_task_getsecid) > +BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_task_getsecid_subj) > +BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_task_getsecid_obj) > BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_task_prctl) > BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_task_setscheduler) > BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_task_to_inode) > diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c > index ccb491642811..3e6ac9b790b1 100644 > --- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c > +++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c > @@ -1539,7 +1539,7 @@ int __init netlbl_unlabel_defconf(void) > /* Only the kernel is allowed to call this function and the only time > * it is called is at bootup before the audit subsystem is reporting > * messages so don't worry to much about these values. */ > - security_task_getsecid(current, &audit_info.secid); > + security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &audit_info.secid); > audit_info.loginuid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID; > audit_info.sessionid = 0; > > diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h b/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h > index 3c67afce64f1..b9ba8112b3c5 100644 > --- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h > +++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h > @@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ > static inline void netlbl_netlink_auditinfo(struct sk_buff *skb, > struct netlbl_audit *audit_info) > { > - security_task_getsecid(current, &audit_info->secid); > + security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &audit_info->secid); > audit_info->loginuid = audit_get_loginuid(current); > audit_info->sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(current); > } > diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c > index 240a53387e6b..f72406fe1bf2 100644 > --- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c > +++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c > @@ -1252,7 +1252,8 @@ static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = { > > LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_free, apparmor_task_free), > LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_alloc, apparmor_task_alloc), > - LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsecid, apparmor_task_getsecid), > + LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsecid_subj, apparmor_task_getsecid), > + LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsecid_obj, apparmor_task_getsecid), > LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setrlimit, apparmor_task_setrlimit), > LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_kill, apparmor_task_kill), > > diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c > index 565e33ff19d0..4e5eb0236278 100644 > --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c > +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c > @@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ int ima_must_appraise(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *inode, > if (!ima_appraise) > return 0; > > - security_task_getsecid(current, &secid); > + security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &secid); > return ima_match_policy(mnt_userns, inode, current_cred(), secid, func, > mask, IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_HASH, NULL, NULL, NULL); > } > diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c > index 9ef748ea829f..b85d9e429426 100644 > --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c > +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c > @@ -391,7 +391,7 @@ int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot) > u32 secid; > > if (file && (prot & PROT_EXEC)) { > - security_task_getsecid(current, &secid); > + security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &secid); > return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, NULL, > 0, MAY_EXEC, MMAP_CHECK); > } > @@ -429,7 +429,7 @@ int ima_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long prot) > !(prot & PROT_EXEC) || (vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) > return 0; > > - security_task_getsecid(current, &secid); > + security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &secid); > inode = file_inode(vma->vm_file); > action = ima_get_action(file_mnt_user_ns(vma->vm_file), inode, > current_cred(), secid, MAY_EXEC, MMAP_CHECK, > @@ -470,7 +470,7 @@ int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm) > int ret; > u32 secid; > > - security_task_getsecid(current, &secid); > + security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &secid); > ret = process_measurement(bprm->file, current_cred(), secid, NULL, 0, > MAY_EXEC, BPRM_CHECK); > if (ret) > @@ -495,7 +495,7 @@ int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask) > { > u32 secid; > > - security_task_getsecid(current, &secid); > + security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &secid); > return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, NULL, 0, > mask & (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC | > MAY_APPEND), FILE_CHECK); > @@ -686,7 +686,7 @@ int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id read_id, > > /* Read entire file for all partial reads. */ > func = read_idmap[read_id] ?: FILE_CHECK; > - security_task_getsecid(current, &secid); > + security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &secid); > return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, NULL, > 0, MAY_READ, func); > } > @@ -729,7 +729,7 @@ int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size, > } > > func = read_idmap[read_id] ?: FILE_CHECK; > - security_task_getsecid(current, &secid); > + security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &secid); > return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, buf, size, > MAY_READ, func); > } > @@ -872,7 +872,7 @@ void process_buffer_measurement(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, > * buffer measurements. > */ > if (func) { > - security_task_getsecid(current, &secid); > + security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &secid); > action = ima_get_action(mnt_userns, inode, current_cred(), > secid, 0, func, &pcr, &template, > func_data); > diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c > index 5ac96b16f8fa..ee76d6c2f852 100644 > --- a/security/security.c > +++ b/security/security.c > @@ -1762,12 +1762,19 @@ int security_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p) > return call_int_hook(task_getsid, 0, p); > } > > -void security_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid) > +void security_task_getsecid_subj(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid) > { > *secid = 0; > - call_void_hook(task_getsecid, p, secid); > + call_void_hook(task_getsecid_subj, p, secid); > } > -EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_task_getsecid); > +EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_task_getsecid_subj); > + > +void security_task_getsecid_obj(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid) > +{ > + *secid = 0; > + call_void_hook(task_getsecid_obj, p, secid); > +} > +EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_task_getsecid_obj); > > int security_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice) > { > diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c > index eca9fc0ba764..24ca545c6e1b 100644 > --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c > +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c > @@ -7149,7 +7149,8 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = { > LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setpgid, selinux_task_setpgid), > LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getpgid, selinux_task_getpgid), > LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsid, selinux_task_getsid), > - LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsecid, selinux_task_getsecid), > + LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsecid_subj, selinux_task_getsecid), > + LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsecid_obj, selinux_task_getsecid), > LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setnice, selinux_task_setnice), > LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setioprio, selinux_task_setioprio), > LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getioprio, selinux_task_getioprio), > diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c > index 12a45e61c1a5..f546fb832f30 100644 > --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c > +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c > @@ -4759,7 +4759,8 @@ static struct security_hook_list smack_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = { > LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setpgid, smack_task_setpgid), > LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getpgid, smack_task_getpgid), > LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsid, smack_task_getsid), > - LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsecid, smack_task_getsecid), > + LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsecid_subj, smack_task_getsecid), > + LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsecid_obj, smack_task_getsecid), > LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setnice, smack_task_setnice), > LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setioprio, smack_task_setioprio), > LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getioprio, smack_task_getioprio), > > -- > Linux-audit mailing list > Linux-audit@redhat.com > https://listman.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit - RGB -- Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> Sr. S/W Engineer, Kernel Security, Base Operating Systems Remote, Ottawa, Red Hat Canada IRC: rgb, SunRaycer Voice: +1.647.777.2635, Internal: (81) 32635
diff --git a/drivers/android/binder.c b/drivers/android/binder.c index c119736ca56a..61d235b6ccd8 100644 --- a/drivers/android/binder.c +++ b/drivers/android/binder.c @@ -2700,7 +2700,16 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc, u32 secid; size_t added_size; - security_task_getsecid(proc->tsk, &secid); + /* + * Arguably this should be the task's subjective LSM secid but + * we can't reliably access the subjective creds of a task + * other than our own so we must use the objective creds, which + * are safe to access. The downside is that if a task is + * temporarily overriding it's creds it will not be reflected + * here; however, it isn't clear that binder would handle that + * case well anyway. + */ + security_task_getsecid_obj(proc->tsk, &secid); ret = security_secid_to_secctx(secid, &secctx, &secctx_sz); if (ret) { return_error = BR_FAILED_REPLY; diff --git a/include/linux/cred.h b/include/linux/cred.h index 4c6350503697..ac0e5f97d7d8 100644 --- a/include/linux/cred.h +++ b/include/linux/cred.h @@ -140,7 +140,7 @@ struct cred { struct key *request_key_auth; /* assumed request_key authority */ #endif #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY - void *security; /* subjective LSM security */ + void *security; /* LSM security */ #endif struct user_struct *user; /* real user ID subscription */ struct user_namespace *user_ns; /* user_ns the caps and keyrings are relative to. */ diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h index 477a597db013..3ad8085e85e1 100644 --- a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h @@ -203,7 +203,10 @@ LSM_HOOK(int, 0, task_fix_setgid, struct cred *new, const struct cred * old, LSM_HOOK(int, 0, task_setpgid, struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid) LSM_HOOK(int, 0, task_getpgid, struct task_struct *p) LSM_HOOK(int, 0, task_getsid, struct task_struct *p) -LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, task_getsecid, struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid) +LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, task_getsecid_subj, + struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid) +LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, task_getsecid_obj, + struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid) LSM_HOOK(int, 0, task_setnice, struct task_struct *p, int nice) LSM_HOOK(int, 0, task_setioprio, struct task_struct *p, int ioprio) LSM_HOOK(int, 0, task_getioprio, struct task_struct *p) diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h index fb7f3193753d..e25d31fe787e 100644 --- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h @@ -707,9 +707,15 @@ * @p. * @p contains the task_struct for the process. * Return 0 if permission is granted. - * @task_getsecid: - * Retrieve the security identifier of the process @p. - * @p contains the task_struct for the process and place is into @secid. + * @task_getsecid_subj: + * Retrieve the subjective security identifier of the task_struct in @p + * and return it in @secid. Special care must be taken to ensure that @p + * is the either the "current" task, or the caller has exclusive access + * to @p. + * In case of failure, @secid will be set to zero. + * @task_getsecid_obj: + * Retrieve the objective security identifier of the task_struct in @p + * and return it in @secid. * In case of failure, @secid will be set to zero. * * @task_setnice: diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h index 8aeebd6646dc..9c490bc437f5 100644 --- a/include/linux/security.h +++ b/include/linux/security.h @@ -414,7 +414,8 @@ int security_task_fix_setgid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, int security_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid); int security_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p); int security_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p); -void security_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid); +void security_task_getsecid_subj(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid); +void security_task_getsecid_obj(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid); int security_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice); int security_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio); int security_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p); @@ -1098,7 +1099,12 @@ static inline int security_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p) return 0; } -static inline void security_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid) +static inline void security_task_getsecid_subj(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid) +{ + *secid = 0; +} + +static inline void security_task_getsecid_obj(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid) { *secid = 0; } diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c index 551a394bc8f4..121d37e700a6 100644 --- a/kernel/audit.c +++ b/kernel/audit.c @@ -2132,7 +2132,7 @@ int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab) int error; u32 sid; - security_task_getsecid(current, &sid); + security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &sid); if (!sid) return 0; @@ -2353,7 +2353,7 @@ int audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t) audit_sig_uid = auid; else audit_sig_uid = uid; - security_task_getsecid(current, &audit_sig_sid); + security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &audit_sig_sid); } return audit_signal_info_syscall(t); diff --git a/kernel/auditfilter.c b/kernel/auditfilter.c index 333b3bcfc545..db2c6b59dfc3 100644 --- a/kernel/auditfilter.c +++ b/kernel/auditfilter.c @@ -1359,7 +1359,8 @@ int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype) case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN: case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR: if (f->lsm_rule) { - security_task_getsecid(current, &sid); + security_task_getsecid_subj(current, + &sid); result = security_audit_rule_match(sid, f->type, f->op, f->lsm_rule); } diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c index 47fb48f42c93..9973865cbf13 100644 --- a/kernel/auditsc.c +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c @@ -667,7 +667,7 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk, logged upon error */ if (f->lsm_rule) { if (need_sid) { - security_task_getsecid(tsk, &sid); + security_task_getsecid_subj(tsk, &sid); need_sid = 0; } result = security_audit_rule_match(sid, f->type, @@ -2400,7 +2400,7 @@ void __audit_ptrace(struct task_struct *t) context->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t); context->target_uid = task_uid(t); context->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t); - security_task_getsecid(t, &context->target_sid); + security_task_getsecid_obj(t, &context->target_sid); memcpy(context->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN); } @@ -2427,7 +2427,7 @@ int audit_signal_info_syscall(struct task_struct *t) ctx->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t); ctx->target_uid = t_uid; ctx->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t); - security_task_getsecid(t, &ctx->target_sid); + security_task_getsecid_obj(t, &ctx->target_sid); memcpy(ctx->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN); return 0; } @@ -2448,7 +2448,7 @@ int audit_signal_info_syscall(struct task_struct *t) axp->target_auid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_loginuid(t); axp->target_uid[axp->pid_count] = t_uid; axp->target_sessionid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_sessionid(t); - security_task_getsecid(t, &axp->target_sid[axp->pid_count]); + security_task_getsecid_obj(t, &axp->target_sid[axp->pid_count]); memcpy(axp->target_comm[axp->pid_count], t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN); axp->pid_count++; diff --git a/kernel/bpf/bpf_lsm.c b/kernel/bpf/bpf_lsm.c index 1622a44d1617..0ff58259ccf8 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/bpf_lsm.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/bpf_lsm.c @@ -209,7 +209,8 @@ BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_socket_socketpair) BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_syslog) BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_task_alloc) -BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_task_getsecid) +BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_task_getsecid_subj) +BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_task_getsecid_obj) BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_task_prctl) BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_task_setscheduler) BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_task_to_inode) diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c index ccb491642811..3e6ac9b790b1 100644 --- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c +++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c @@ -1539,7 +1539,7 @@ int __init netlbl_unlabel_defconf(void) /* Only the kernel is allowed to call this function and the only time * it is called is at bootup before the audit subsystem is reporting * messages so don't worry to much about these values. */ - security_task_getsecid(current, &audit_info.secid); + security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &audit_info.secid); audit_info.loginuid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID; audit_info.sessionid = 0; diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h b/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h index 3c67afce64f1..b9ba8112b3c5 100644 --- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h +++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h @@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ static inline void netlbl_netlink_auditinfo(struct sk_buff *skb, struct netlbl_audit *audit_info) { - security_task_getsecid(current, &audit_info->secid); + security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &audit_info->secid); audit_info->loginuid = audit_get_loginuid(current); audit_info->sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(current); } diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c index 240a53387e6b..f72406fe1bf2 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c +++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c @@ -1252,7 +1252,8 @@ static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = { LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_free, apparmor_task_free), LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_alloc, apparmor_task_alloc), - LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsecid, apparmor_task_getsecid), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsecid_subj, apparmor_task_getsecid), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsecid_obj, apparmor_task_getsecid), LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setrlimit, apparmor_task_setrlimit), LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_kill, apparmor_task_kill), diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c index 565e33ff19d0..4e5eb0236278 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c @@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ int ima_must_appraise(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *inode, if (!ima_appraise) return 0; - security_task_getsecid(current, &secid); + security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &secid); return ima_match_policy(mnt_userns, inode, current_cred(), secid, func, mask, IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_HASH, NULL, NULL, NULL); } diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c index 9ef748ea829f..b85d9e429426 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c @@ -391,7 +391,7 @@ int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot) u32 secid; if (file && (prot & PROT_EXEC)) { - security_task_getsecid(current, &secid); + security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &secid); return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, NULL, 0, MAY_EXEC, MMAP_CHECK); } @@ -429,7 +429,7 @@ int ima_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long prot) !(prot & PROT_EXEC) || (vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) return 0; - security_task_getsecid(current, &secid); + security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &secid); inode = file_inode(vma->vm_file); action = ima_get_action(file_mnt_user_ns(vma->vm_file), inode, current_cred(), secid, MAY_EXEC, MMAP_CHECK, @@ -470,7 +470,7 @@ int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm) int ret; u32 secid; - security_task_getsecid(current, &secid); + security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &secid); ret = process_measurement(bprm->file, current_cred(), secid, NULL, 0, MAY_EXEC, BPRM_CHECK); if (ret) @@ -495,7 +495,7 @@ int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask) { u32 secid; - security_task_getsecid(current, &secid); + security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &secid); return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, NULL, 0, mask & (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC | MAY_APPEND), FILE_CHECK); @@ -686,7 +686,7 @@ int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id read_id, /* Read entire file for all partial reads. */ func = read_idmap[read_id] ?: FILE_CHECK; - security_task_getsecid(current, &secid); + security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &secid); return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, NULL, 0, MAY_READ, func); } @@ -729,7 +729,7 @@ int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size, } func = read_idmap[read_id] ?: FILE_CHECK; - security_task_getsecid(current, &secid); + security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &secid); return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, buf, size, MAY_READ, func); } @@ -872,7 +872,7 @@ void process_buffer_measurement(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, * buffer measurements. */ if (func) { - security_task_getsecid(current, &secid); + security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &secid); action = ima_get_action(mnt_userns, inode, current_cred(), secid, 0, func, &pcr, &template, func_data); diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index 5ac96b16f8fa..ee76d6c2f852 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -1762,12 +1762,19 @@ int security_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p) return call_int_hook(task_getsid, 0, p); } -void security_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid) +void security_task_getsecid_subj(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid) { *secid = 0; - call_void_hook(task_getsecid, p, secid); + call_void_hook(task_getsecid_subj, p, secid); } -EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_task_getsecid); +EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_task_getsecid_subj); + +void security_task_getsecid_obj(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid) +{ + *secid = 0; + call_void_hook(task_getsecid_obj, p, secid); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_task_getsecid_obj); int security_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice) { diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index eca9fc0ba764..24ca545c6e1b 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -7149,7 +7149,8 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = { LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setpgid, selinux_task_setpgid), LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getpgid, selinux_task_getpgid), LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsid, selinux_task_getsid), - LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsecid, selinux_task_getsecid), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsecid_subj, selinux_task_getsecid), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsecid_obj, selinux_task_getsecid), LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setnice, selinux_task_setnice), LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setioprio, selinux_task_setioprio), LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getioprio, selinux_task_getioprio), diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c index 12a45e61c1a5..f546fb832f30 100644 --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c @@ -4759,7 +4759,8 @@ static struct security_hook_list smack_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = { LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setpgid, smack_task_setpgid), LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getpgid, smack_task_getpgid), LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsid, smack_task_getsid), - LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsecid, smack_task_getsecid), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsecid_subj, smack_task_getsecid), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsecid_obj, smack_task_getsecid), LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setnice, smack_task_setnice), LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setioprio, smack_task_setioprio), LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getioprio, smack_task_getioprio),