From patchwork Sun Apr 23 23:54:17 2017 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Matt Brown X-Patchwork-Id: 9695351 Return-Path: Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.125]) by pdx-korg-patchwork.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id ED409602A7 for ; Sun, 23 Apr 2017 23:55:38 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id C5ABD262AE for ; Sun, 23 Apr 2017 23:55:38 +0000 (UTC) Received: by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix, from userid 486) id BA7682654B; Sun, 23 Apr 2017 23:55:38 +0000 (UTC) X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-6.9 required=2.0 tests=BAYES_00,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 0C0C2262AE for ; Sun, 23 Apr 2017 23:55:37 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1163582AbdDWXzY (ORCPT ); Sun, 23 Apr 2017 19:55:24 -0400 Received: from relay2-d.mail.gandi.net ([217.70.183.194]:47342 "EHLO relay2-d.mail.gandi.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1163589AbdDWXzG (ORCPT ); Sun, 23 Apr 2017 19:55:06 -0400 Received: from mfilter18-d.gandi.net (mfilter18-d.gandi.net [217.70.178.146]) by relay2-d.mail.gandi.net (Postfix) with ESMTP id C3038C5A49; Mon, 24 Apr 2017 01:55:04 +0200 (CEST) X-Virus-Scanned: Debian amavisd-new at mfilter18-d.gandi.net Received: from relay2-d.mail.gandi.net ([IPv6:::ffff:217.70.183.194]) by mfilter18-d.gandi.net (mfilter18-d.gandi.net [::ffff:10.0.15.180]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id 6SdrxBaX5pje; Mon, 24 Apr 2017 01:55:02 +0200 (CEST) X-Originating-IP: 72.66.113.207 Received: from vfio.nmatt.com.com (pool-72-66-113-207.washdc.fios.verizon.net [72.66.113.207]) (Authenticated sender: matt@nmatt.com) by relay2-d.mail.gandi.net (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 97EFDC5A4F; Mon, 24 Apr 2017 01:54:59 +0200 (CEST) From: Matt Brown To: serge@hallyn.com, jmorris@namei.org, gregkh@linuxfoundation.org, jslaby@suse.com, corbet@lwn.net, keescook@chromium.org Cc: akpm@linux-foundation.org, jannh@google.com, kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, Matt Brown Subject: [PATCH v3 2/2] tiocsti-restrict : make TIOCSTI ioctl require CAP_SYS_ADMIN Date: Sun, 23 Apr 2017 19:54:17 -0400 Message-Id: <20170423235417.12809-3-matt@nmatt.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.10.2 In-Reply-To: <20170423235417.12809-1-matt@nmatt.com> References: <20170423235417.12809-1-matt@nmatt.com> Sender: owner-linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Virus-Scanned: ClamAV using ClamSMTP This introduces the tiocsti_restrict sysctl, whose default is controlled via CONFIG_SECURITY_TIOCSTI_RESTRICT. When activated, this control restricts all TIOCSTI ioctl calls from non CAP_SYS_ADMIN users. This patch was inspired from GRKERNSEC_HARDEN_TTY. This patch would have prevented https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1411256 under the following conditions: * non-privileged container * container run inside new user namespace Possible effects on userland: There could be a few user programs that would be effected by this change. See: notable programs are: agetty, csh, xemacs and tcsh However, I still believe that this change is worth it given that the Kconfig defaults to n. This will be a feature that is turned on for the same reason that people activate it when using grsecurity. Users of this opt-in feature will realize that they are choosing security over some OS features like unprivileged TIOCSTI ioctls, as should be clear in the Kconfig help message. Threat Model/Patch Rational: From grsecurity's config for GRKERNSEC_HARDEN_TTY. | There are very few legitimate uses for this functionality and it | has made vulnerabilities in several 'su'-like programs possible in | the past. Even without these vulnerabilities, it provides an | attacker with an easy mechanism to move laterally among other | processes within the same user's compromised session. So if one process within a tty session becomes compromised it can follow that additional processes, that are thought to be in different security boundaries, can be compromised as a result. When using a program like su or sudo, these additional processes could be in a tty session where TTY file descriptors are indeed shared over privilege boundaries. This is also an excellent writeup about the issue: When user namespaces are in use, the check for the capability CAP_SYS_ADMIN is done against the user namespace that originally opened the tty. Signed-off-by: Matt Brown Acked-by: Serge Hallyn --- Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt | 21 +++++++++++++++++++++ drivers/tty/tty_io.c | 6 ++++++ include/linux/tty.h | 2 ++ kernel/sysctl.c | 12 ++++++++++++ security/Kconfig | 13 +++++++++++++ 5 files changed, 54 insertions(+) diff --git a/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt b/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt index bac23c1..c15c660 100644 --- a/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt +++ b/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt @@ -89,6 +89,7 @@ show up in /proc/sys/kernel: - sysctl_writes_strict - tainted - threads-max +- tiocsti_restrict - unknown_nmi_panic - watchdog - watchdog_thresh @@ -987,6 +988,26 @@ available RAM pages threads-max is reduced accordingly. ============================================================== +tiocsti_restrict: + +This toggle indicates whether unprivileged users are prevented +from using the TIOCSTI ioctl to inject commands into otherprocesses +which share a tty session. + +When tiocsti_restrict is set to (0) there are no restrictions(accept +the default restriction of only being able to injection commands into +one's own tty). When tiocsti_restrict is set to (1), users must +have CAP_SYS_ADMIN to use the TIOCSTI ioctl. + +When user namespaces are in use, the check for the capability +CAP_SYS_ADMIN is done against the user namespace that originally +opened the tty. + +The kernel config option CONFIG_SECURITY_TIOCSTI_RESTRICT sets the +default value of tiocsti_restrict. + +============================================================== + unknown_nmi_panic: The value in this file affects behavior of handling NMI. When the diff --git a/drivers/tty/tty_io.c b/drivers/tty/tty_io.c index 03d5ea2..5667a5e 100644 --- a/drivers/tty/tty_io.c +++ b/drivers/tty/tty_io.c @@ -2298,11 +2298,17 @@ static int tty_fasync(int fd, struct file *filp, int on) * FIXME: may race normal receive processing */ +int tiocsti_restrict = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_TIOCSTI_RESTRICT); + static int tiocsti(struct tty_struct *tty, char __user *p) { char ch, mbz = 0; struct tty_ldisc *ld; + if (tiocsti_restrict && !ns_capable(tty->owner_user_ns,CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) { + pr_warn_ratelimited("TIOCSTI ioctl call blocked for non-privileged process\n"); + return -EPERM; + } if ((current->signal->tty != tty) && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) return -EPERM; if (get_user(ch, p)) diff --git a/include/linux/tty.h b/include/linux/tty.h index d902d42..2fd7f49 100644 --- a/include/linux/tty.h +++ b/include/linux/tty.h @@ -344,6 +344,8 @@ struct tty_file_private { struct list_head list; }; +extern int tiocsti_restrict; + /* tty magic number */ #define TTY_MAGIC 0x5401 diff --git a/kernel/sysctl.c b/kernel/sysctl.c index acf0a5a..68d1363 100644 --- a/kernel/sysctl.c +++ b/kernel/sysctl.c @@ -67,6 +67,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include @@ -833,6 +834,17 @@ static struct ctl_table kern_table[] = { .extra2 = &two, }, #endif +#if defined CONFIG_TTY + { + .procname = "tiocsti_restrict", + .data = &tiocsti_restrict, + .maxlen = sizeof(int), + .mode = 0644, + .proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax_sysadmin, + .extra1 = &zero, + .extra2 = &one, + }, +#endif { .procname = "ngroups_max", .data = &ngroups_max, diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig index 3ff1bf9..7d13331 100644 --- a/security/Kconfig +++ b/security/Kconfig @@ -18,6 +18,19 @@ config SECURITY_DMESG_RESTRICT If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N. +config SECURITY_TIOCSTI_RESTRICT + bool "Restrict unprivileged use of tiocsti command injection" + default n + help + This enforces restrictions on unprivileged users injecting commands + into other processes which share a tty session using the TIOCSTI + ioctl. This option makes TIOCSTI use require CAP_SYS_ADMIN. + + If this option is not selected, no restrictions will be enforced + unless the tiocsti_restrict sysctl is explicitly set to (1). + + If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N. + config SECURITY bool "Enable different security models" depends on SYSFS