From patchwork Wed Sep 20 14:58:39 2017 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: "Jason A. Donenfeld" X-Patchwork-Id: 9961601 Return-Path: Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.125]) by pdx-korg-patchwork.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 23BCB60234 for ; Wed, 20 Sep 2017 14:59:16 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 155442917B for ; Wed, 20 Sep 2017 14:59:16 +0000 (UTC) Received: by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix, from userid 486) id 0A00A2918D; Wed, 20 Sep 2017 14:59:16 +0000 (UTC) X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-6.8 required=2.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI,T_DKIM_INVALID autolearn=unavailable version=3.3.1 Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 594682917B for ; Wed, 20 Sep 2017 14:59:15 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1751845AbdITO7C (ORCPT ); Wed, 20 Sep 2017 10:59:02 -0400 Received: from frisell.zx2c4.com ([192.95.5.64]:55671 "EHLO frisell.zx2c4.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1751650AbdITO66 (ORCPT ); Wed, 20 Sep 2017 10:58:58 -0400 Received: by frisell.zx2c4.com (ZX2C4 Mail Server) with ESMTP id a993848b; Wed, 20 Sep 2017 14:50:42 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha1; c=relaxed; d=zx2c4.com; h=from:to:cc :subject:date:message-id:in-reply-to:references; s=mail; bh=kRAl S2yAwEkhs10yfTuBDfcJDYI=; b=rZM0oDB2Pl6OXqQGqMvSySNq154u55sMQ0cE 3rxnAdqluzaNTThZotirq4xJtzRCZ92YSp2ZJItQAm5FCDiwL0kWTrsMBUOTOurd 3Gruv9eIwufRWC1BAznK+NyryAG6dZvbh9lndcmzW/hvRrpIbgbElM/75hBTPYGj PORIKJQFOYqI27KNeIeE2l/Ke6clQaO7KYFKmmvRimftc3vWx+8YswbLQ+zLXstu fvM6mKmSqN8fWqO8lr0Cw8yqqy4jWjBX4BGuAadVg+Qk+AJ44IKwgM2YU9EMliQD ipWA3uKSefrjB1zdTWBJrJRarb9qvJ9kFonMuLJdpLeOKGkygA== Received: by frisell.zx2c4.com (ZX2C4 Mail Server) with ESMTPSA id a888a0fd (TLSv1.2:ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:256:NO); Wed, 20 Sep 2017 14:50:41 +0000 (UTC) From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" To: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org, kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, dhowells@redhat.com, ebiggers3@gmail.com Cc: "Jason A. Donenfeld" , Herbert Xu , Kirill Marinushkin , security@kernel.org, stable@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v7 2/2] security/keys: rewrite all of big_key crypto Date: Wed, 20 Sep 2017 16:58:39 +0200 Message-Id: <20170920145839.27511-2-Jason@zx2c4.com> In-Reply-To: <20170920145839.27511-1-Jason@zx2c4.com> References: <20170920145839.27511-1-Jason@zx2c4.com> Sender: owner-linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Virus-Scanned: ClamAV using ClamSMTP This started out as just replacing the use of crypto/rng with get_random_bytes_wait, so that we wouldn't use bad randomness at boot time. But, upon looking further, it appears that there were even deeper underlying cryptographic problems, and that this seems to have been committed with very little crypto review. So, I rewrote the whole thing, trying to keep to the conventions introduced by the previous author, to fix these cryptographic flaws. It makes no sense to seed crypto/rng at boot time and then keep using it like this, when in fact there's already get_random_bytes_wait, which can ensure there's enough entropy and be a much more standard way of generating keys. Since this sensitive material is being stored untrusted, using ECB and no authentication is simply not okay at all. I find it surprising and a bit horrifying that this code even made it past basic crypto review, which perhaps points to some larger issues. This patch moves from using AES-ECB to using AES-GCM. Since keys are uniquely generated each time, we can set the nonce to zero. There was also a race condition in which the same key would be reused at the same time in different threads. A mutex fixes this issue now. So, to summarize, this commit fixes the following vulnerabilities: * Low entropy key generation, allowing an attacker to potentially guess or predict keys. * Unauthenticated encryption, allowing an attacker to modify the cipher text in particular ways in order to manipulate the plaintext, which is is even more frightening considering the next point. * Use of ECB mode, allowing an attacker to trivially swap blocks or compare identical plaintext blocks. * Key re-use. * Faulty memory zeroing. Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers Cc: David Howells Cc: Herbert Xu Cc: Kirill Marinushkin Cc: security@kernel.org Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org --- security/keys/Kconfig | 4 +- security/keys/big_key.c | 127 ++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------------- 2 files changed, 60 insertions(+), 71 deletions(-) diff --git a/security/keys/Kconfig b/security/keys/Kconfig index a7a23b5541f8..91eafada3164 100644 --- a/security/keys/Kconfig +++ b/security/keys/Kconfig @@ -45,10 +45,8 @@ config BIG_KEYS bool "Large payload keys" depends on KEYS depends on TMPFS - depends on (CRYPTO_ANSI_CPRNG = y || CRYPTO_DRBG = y) select CRYPTO_AES - select CRYPTO_ECB - select CRYPTO_RNG + select CRYPTO_GCM help This option provides support for holding large keys within the kernel (for example Kerberos ticket caches). The data may be stored out to diff --git a/security/keys/big_key.c b/security/keys/big_key.c index 507d6fb86a4f..e607830b6154 100644 --- a/security/keys/big_key.c +++ b/security/keys/big_key.c @@ -1,5 +1,6 @@ /* Large capacity key type * + * Copyright (C) 2017 Jason A. Donenfeld . All Rights Reserved. * Copyright (C) 2013 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved. * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com) * @@ -16,10 +17,10 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include -#include -#include +#include /* * Layout of key payload words. @@ -49,7 +50,12 @@ enum big_key_op { /* * Key size for big_key data encryption */ -#define ENC_KEY_SIZE 16 +#define ENC_KEY_SIZE 32 + +/* + * Authentication tag length + */ +#define ENC_AUTHTAG_SIZE 16 /* * big_key defined keys take an arbitrary string as the description and an @@ -64,57 +70,62 @@ struct key_type key_type_big_key = { .destroy = big_key_destroy, .describe = big_key_describe, .read = big_key_read, + /* no ->update(); don't add it without changing big_key_crypt() nonce */ }; /* - * Crypto names for big_key data encryption + * Crypto names for big_key data authenticated encryption */ -static const char big_key_rng_name[] = "stdrng"; -static const char big_key_alg_name[] = "ecb(aes)"; +static const char big_key_alg_name[] = "gcm(aes)"; /* - * Crypto algorithms for big_key data encryption + * Crypto algorithms for big_key data authenticated encryption */ -static struct crypto_rng *big_key_rng; -static struct crypto_skcipher *big_key_skcipher; +static struct crypto_aead *big_key_aead; /* - * Generate random key to encrypt big_key data + * Since changing the key affects the entire object, we need a mutex. */ -static inline int big_key_gen_enckey(u8 *key) -{ - return crypto_rng_get_bytes(big_key_rng, key, ENC_KEY_SIZE); -} +static DEFINE_MUTEX(big_key_aead_lock); /* * Encrypt/decrypt big_key data */ static int big_key_crypt(enum big_key_op op, u8 *data, size_t datalen, u8 *key) { - int ret = -EINVAL; + int ret; struct scatterlist sgio; - SKCIPHER_REQUEST_ON_STACK(req, big_key_skcipher); - - if (crypto_skcipher_setkey(big_key_skcipher, key, ENC_KEY_SIZE)) { + struct aead_request *aead_req; + /* We always use a zero nonce. The reason we can get away with this is + * because we're using a different randomly generated key for every + * different encryption. Notably, too, key_type_big_key doesn't define + * an .update function, so there's no chance we'll wind up reusing the + * key to encrypt updated data. Simply put: one key, one encryption. + */ + u8 zero_nonce[crypto_aead_ivsize(big_key_aead)]; + + aead_req = aead_request_alloc(big_key_aead, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!aead_req) + return -ENOMEM; + + memset(zero_nonce, 0, sizeof(zero_nonce)); + sg_init_one(&sgio, data, datalen + (op == BIG_KEY_ENC ? ENC_AUTHTAG_SIZE : 0)); + aead_request_set_crypt(aead_req, &sgio, &sgio, datalen, zero_nonce); + aead_request_set_callback(aead_req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP, NULL, NULL); + aead_request_set_ad(aead_req, 0); + + mutex_lock(&big_key_aead_lock); + if (crypto_aead_setkey(big_key_aead, key, ENC_KEY_SIZE)) { ret = -EAGAIN; goto error; } - - skcipher_request_set_tfm(req, big_key_skcipher); - skcipher_request_set_callback(req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP, - NULL, NULL); - - sg_init_one(&sgio, data, datalen); - skcipher_request_set_crypt(req, &sgio, &sgio, datalen, NULL); - if (op == BIG_KEY_ENC) - ret = crypto_skcipher_encrypt(req); + ret = crypto_aead_encrypt(aead_req); else - ret = crypto_skcipher_decrypt(req); - - skcipher_request_zero(req); - + ret = crypto_aead_decrypt(aead_req); error: + mutex_unlock(&big_key_aead_lock); + aead_request_free(aead_req); return ret; } @@ -146,16 +157,13 @@ int big_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) * * File content is stored encrypted with randomly generated key. */ - size_t enclen = ALIGN(datalen, crypto_skcipher_blocksize(big_key_skcipher)); + size_t enclen = datalen + ENC_AUTHTAG_SIZE; loff_t pos = 0; - /* prepare aligned data to encrypt */ data = kmalloc(enclen, GFP_KERNEL); if (!data) return -ENOMEM; - memcpy(data, prep->data, datalen); - memset(data + datalen, 0x00, enclen - datalen); /* generate random key */ enckey = kmalloc(ENC_KEY_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL); @@ -163,13 +171,12 @@ int big_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) ret = -ENOMEM; goto error; } - - ret = big_key_gen_enckey(enckey); - if (ret) + ret = get_random_bytes_wait(enckey, ENC_KEY_SIZE); + if (unlikely(ret)) goto err_enckey; /* encrypt aligned data */ - ret = big_key_crypt(BIG_KEY_ENC, data, enclen, enckey); + ret = big_key_crypt(BIG_KEY_ENC, data, datalen, enckey); if (ret) goto err_enckey; @@ -295,7 +302,7 @@ long big_key_read(const struct key *key, char __user *buffer, size_t buflen) struct file *file; u8 *data; u8 *enckey = (u8 *)key->payload.data[big_key_data]; - size_t enclen = ALIGN(datalen, crypto_skcipher_blocksize(big_key_skcipher)); + size_t enclen = datalen + ENC_AUTHTAG_SIZE; loff_t pos = 0; data = kmalloc(enclen, GFP_KERNEL); @@ -344,47 +351,31 @@ long big_key_read(const struct key *key, char __user *buffer, size_t buflen) */ static int __init big_key_init(void) { - struct crypto_skcipher *cipher; - struct crypto_rng *rng; int ret; - rng = crypto_alloc_rng(big_key_rng_name, 0, 0); - if (IS_ERR(rng)) { - pr_err("Can't alloc rng: %ld\n", PTR_ERR(rng)); - return PTR_ERR(rng); - } - - big_key_rng = rng; - - /* seed RNG */ - ret = crypto_rng_reset(rng, NULL, crypto_rng_seedsize(rng)); - if (ret) { - pr_err("Can't reset rng: %d\n", ret); - goto error_rng; - } - /* init block cipher */ - cipher = crypto_alloc_skcipher(big_key_alg_name, 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC); - if (IS_ERR(cipher)) { - ret = PTR_ERR(cipher); + big_key_aead = crypto_alloc_aead(big_key_alg_name, 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC); + if (IS_ERR(big_key_aead)) { + ret = PTR_ERR(big_key_aead); pr_err("Can't alloc crypto: %d\n", ret); - goto error_rng; + return ret; + } + ret = crypto_aead_setauthsize(big_key_aead, ENC_AUTHTAG_SIZE); + if (ret < 0) { + pr_err("Can't set crypto auth tag len: %d\n", ret); + goto free_aead; } - - big_key_skcipher = cipher; ret = register_key_type(&key_type_big_key); if (ret < 0) { pr_err("Can't register type: %d\n", ret); - goto error_cipher; + goto free_aead; } return 0; -error_cipher: - crypto_free_skcipher(big_key_skcipher); -error_rng: - crypto_free_rng(big_key_rng); +free_aead: + crypto_free_aead(big_key_aead); return ret; }