From patchwork Tue Oct 17 14:02:47 2017 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Richard Haines X-Patchwork-Id: 10012155 Return-Path: Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.125]) by pdx-korg-patchwork.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id A35D160235 for ; Tue, 17 Oct 2017 14:03:28 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 8FA1F288EE for ; Tue, 17 Oct 2017 14:03:28 +0000 (UTC) Received: by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix, from userid 486) id 8404A288F1; Tue, 17 Oct 2017 14:03:28 +0000 (UTC) X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-6.8 required=2.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI,T_DKIM_INVALID autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 1ED88288EE for ; Tue, 17 Oct 2017 14:03:27 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1758723AbdJQODT (ORCPT ); Tue, 17 Oct 2017 10:03:19 -0400 Received: from rgout0701.bt.lon5.cpcloud.co.uk ([65.20.0.141]:61836 "EHLO rgout0701.bt.lon5.cpcloud.co.uk" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1755269AbdJQODS (ORCPT ); Tue, 17 Oct 2017 10:03:18 -0400 X-OWM-Source-IP: 86.134.53.162 (GB) X-OWM-Env-Sender: richard_c_haines@btinternet.com Received: from localhost.localdomain (86.134.53.162) by rgout07.bt.lon5.cpcloud.co.uk (9.0.019.13-1) (authenticated as richard_c_haines@btinternet.com) id 598528DE072CB3DD; Tue, 17 Oct 2017 15:02:54 +0100 DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=btinternet.com; s=btcpcloud; t=1508248998; bh=1srgP6aNfxzp3izkiZL7i2i3tXkAK0W2zxl+hmYsh94=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:Message-Id:X-Mailer; b=AC1jL74ytwwDOSj67zj/Bf3sETDCqvvD0AtQS0ap4pdaWSLLDxllhv2/eOkDdyuZdU29AiRvTMrHSxdl535WQNx/8kARInnOF6sAS25YHUYme36XT3Av1p12Po+fILHeXn+lU2lUjsz39NJrH4fxdSh6kp5lT15qPavbK0ORyBc= From: Richard Haines To: selinux@tycho.nsa.gov, netdev@vger.kernel.org, linux-sctp@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Cc: paul@paul-moore.com, vyasevich@gmail.com, nhorman@tuxdriver.com, sds@tycho.nsa.gov, eparis@parisplace.org, marcelo.leitner@gmail.com, Richard Haines Subject: [RFC PATCH 1/5] security: Add support for SCTP security hooks Date: Tue, 17 Oct 2017 15:02:47 +0100 Message-Id: <20171017140247.4604-1-richard_c_haines@btinternet.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.13.6 Sender: owner-linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Virus-Scanned: ClamAV using ClamSMTP The SCTP security hooks are explained in: Documentation/security/LSM-sctp.txt Signed-off-by: Richard Haines Reviewed-by: James Morris --- Documentation/security/LSM-sctp.txt | 212 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 37 +++++++ include/linux/security.h | 27 +++++ security/security.c | 23 ++++ 4 files changed, 299 insertions(+) create mode 100644 Documentation/security/LSM-sctp.txt diff --git a/Documentation/security/LSM-sctp.txt b/Documentation/security/LSM-sctp.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..30fe9b5 --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/security/LSM-sctp.txt @@ -0,0 +1,212 @@ + SCTP LSM Support + ================== + +For security module support, three sctp specific hooks have been implemented: + security_sctp_assoc_request() + security_sctp_bind_connect() + security_sctp_sk_clone() + +Also the following security hook has been utilised: + security_inet_conn_established() + +The usage of these hooks are described below with the SELinux implementation +described in Documentation/security/SELinux-sctp.txt + + +security_sctp_assoc_request() +------------------------------ +This new hook has been added to net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c where it passes the +@ep and @chunk->skb (the association INIT or INIT ACK packet) to the security +module. Returns 0 on success, error on failure. + + @ep - pointer to sctp endpoint structure. + @skb - pointer to skbuff of association packet. + @sctp_cid - set to sctp packet type (SCTP_CID_INIT or SCTP_CID_INIT_ACK). + +The security module performs the following operations: + 1) If this is the first association on @ep->base.sk, then set the peer sid + to that in @skb. This will ensure there is only one peer sid assigned + to @ep->base.sk that may support multiple associations. + + 2) If not the first association, validate the @ep->base.sk peer_sid against + the @skb peer sid to determine whether the association should be allowed + or denied. + + 3) If @sctp_cid = SCTP_CID_INIT, then set the sctp @ep sid to socket's sid + (from ep->base.sk) with MLS portion taken from @skb peer sid. This will + only be used by SCTP TCP style sockets and peeled off connections as they + cause a new socket to be generated. + + If IP security options are configured (CIPSO/CALIPSO), then the ip options + are set on the socket. + + To support this hook include/net/sctp/structs.h "struct sctp_endpoint" + has been updated with the following: + + /* Security identifiers from incoming (INIT). These are set by + * security_sctp_assoc_request(). These will only be used by + * SCTP TCP type sockets and peeled off connections as they + * cause a new socket to be generated. security_sctp_sk_clone() + * will then plug these into the new socket. + */ + u32 secid; + u32 peer_secid; + + +security_sctp_bind_connect() +----------------------------- +This new hook has been added to net/sctp/socket.c and net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c. +It passes one or more ipv4/ipv6 addresses to the security module for +validation based on the @optname that will result in either a bind or connect +service as shown in the permission check tables below. +Returns 0 on success, error on failure. + + @sk - Pointer to sock structure. + @optname - Name of the option to validate. + @address - One or more ipv4 / ipv6 addresses. + @addrlen - The total length of address(s). This is calculated on each + ipv4 or ipv6 address using sizeof(struct sockaddr_in) or + sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6). + + ------------------------------------------------------------------ + | BIND Type Checks | + | @optname | @address contains | + |----------------------------|-----------------------------------| + | SCTP_SOCKOPT_BINDX_ADD | One or more ipv4 / ipv6 addresses | + | SCTP_PRIMARY_ADDR | Single ipv4 or ipv6 address | + | SCTP_SET_PEER_PRIMARY_ADDR | Single ipv4 or ipv6 address | + ------------------------------------------------------------------ + + ------------------------------------------------------------------ + | CONNECT Type Checks | + | @optname | @address contains | + |----------------------------|-----------------------------------| + | SCTP_SOCKOPT_CONNECTX | One or more ipv4 / ipv6 addresses | + | SCTP_PARAM_ADD_IP | One or more ipv4 / ipv6 addresses | + | SCTP_SENDMSG_CONNECT | Single ipv4 or ipv6 address | + | SCTP_PARAM_SET_PRIMARY | Single ipv4 or ipv6 address | + ------------------------------------------------------------------ + +A summary of the @optname entries is as follows: + + SCTP_SOCKOPT_BINDX_ADD - Allows additional bind addresses to be + associated after (optionally) calling + bind(3). + sctp_bindx(3) adds a set of bind + addresses on a socket. + + SCTP_SOCKOPT_CONNECTX - Allows the allocation of multiple + addresses for reaching a peer + (multi-homed). + sctp_connectx(3) initiates a connection + on an SCTP socket using multiple + destination addresses. + + SCTP_SENDMSG_CONNECT - Initiate a connection that is generated by a + sendmsg(2) or sctp_sendmsg(3) on a new asociation. + + SCTP_PRIMARY_ADDR - Set local primary address. + + SCTP_SET_PEER_PRIMARY_ADDR - Request peer sets address as + association primary. + + SCTP_PARAM_ADD_IP - These are used when Dynamic Address + SCTP_PARAM_SET_PRIMARY - Reconfiguration is enabled as explained below. + + +To support Dynamic Address Reconfiguration the following parameters must be +enabled on both endpoints (or use the appropriate setsockopts): + /proc/sys/net/sctp/addip_enable + /proc/sys/net/sctp/addip_noauth_enable + +then the following *_PARAM_*'s are sent to the peer in an +ASCONF chunk when the corresponding @optname's are present: + + @optname ASCONF Parameter + SCTP_SOCKOPT_BINDX_ADD -> SCTP_PARAM_ADD_IP + SCTP_SET_PEER_PRIMARY_ADDR -> SCTP_PARAM_SET_PRIMARY + + +security_sctp_sk_clone() +------------------------- +This new hook has been added to net/sctp/socket.c sctp_sock_migrate() that is +called whenever a new socket is created by accept(2) (i.e. a TCP style socket) +or when a socket is 'peeled off' e.g userspace calls sctp_peeloff(3). +security_sctp_sk_clone() will set the new sockets sid and peer sid to that +contained in the @ep sid and @ep peer sid respectively. + + @ep - pointer to old sctp endpoint structure. + @sk - pointer to old sock structure. + @sk - pointer to new sock structure. + +security_inet_conn_established() +--------------------------------- +This hook has been added to net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c COOKIE ECHO processing +where it sets the connection's peer sid to that in @skb. + + @sk - pointer to sock structure. + @skb - pointer to skbuff of the COOKIE ECHO packet. + + +Security Hooks used for Association Establishment +================================================== +The following diagram shows the use of security_sctp_connect_bind(), +security_sctp_assoc_request(), security_inet_conn_established() in +net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c and security_sctp_sk_clone() in net/sctp/socket.c, +when establishing an association. + + SCTP endpoint "A" SCTP endpoint "Z" + ================= ================= + sctp_sf_do_prm_asoc() + Association setup can be initiated + by a connect(2), sctp_connectx(3), + sendmsg(2) or sctp_sendmsg(3). + These will result in a call to + security_sctp_bind_connect() to + initiate an association to + SCTP peer endpoint "Z". + INIT ---------------------------------------------> + sctp_sf_do_5_1B_init() + Respond to an INIT chunk. + SCTP peer endpoint "A" is + asking for an association. Call + security_sctp_assoc_request() + to set the peer label if first + association. + If not first association, check + whether allowed, IF so send: + <----------------------------------------------- INIT ACK + | ELSE audit event and silently + | discard the packet. + sctp_sf_do_5_1C_ack + Respond to an INIT ACK chunk. + SCTP peer endpoint"A" initiated + this association to SCTP peer + endpoint "Z". Call + security_sctp_assoc_request() + to set the peer label if first + association. If not first + association, check whether + allowed, IF so send: + COOKIE ECHO ------------------------------------------> + ELSE audit event and silently | + discard the packet. | + | + <------------------------------------------- COOKIE ACK + | | + sctp_sf_do_5_1E_ca | + Call security_inet_conn_established() | + to set the correct peer sid. | + | | + | net/sctp/socket.c sctp_copy_sock() + | If SCTP_SOCKET_TCP or peeled off + | socket security_sctp_sk_clone() is + | called to clone the new socket. + | | + ESTABLISHED ESTABLISHED + | | + ------------------------------------------------------------------ + | Association Established | + ------------------------------------------------------------------ + + diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h index 3a90feb..42370a7 100644 --- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h @@ -913,6 +913,33 @@ * associated with the TUN device's security structure. * @security pointer to the TUN devices's security structure. * + * Security hooks for SCTP + * + * @sctp_assoc_request: + * If first association, then set the peer sid to that in @skb. If + * @sctp_cid is from an INIT chunk, then set the sctp endpoint sid to + * socket's sid (ep->base.sk) with MLS portion taken from peer sid. + * @ep pointer to sctp endpoint structure. + * @skb pointer to skbuff of association packet. + * @sctp_cid whether association from INIT or INIT_ACK chunk. + * Return 0 on success, error on failure. + * @sctp_bind_connect: + * Validiate permissions required for each address associated with sock + * @sk. Depending on @optname, the addresses will be treated as either + * for a connect or bind service. The @addrlen is calculated on each + * ipv4 and ipv6 address using sizeof(struct sockaddr_in) or + * sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6). + * @sk pointer to sock structure. + * @optname name of the option to validate. + * @address list containing one or more ipv4/ipv6 addresses. + * @addrlen total length of address(s). + * Return 0 on success, error on failure. + * @sctp_sk_clone: + * Sets the new child socket's sid to the old endpoint sid. + * @ep pointer to old sctp endpoint structure. + * @sk pointer to old sock structure. + * @sk pointer to new sock structure. + * * Security hooks for Infiniband * * @ib_pkey_access: @@ -1640,6 +1667,13 @@ union security_list_options { int (*tun_dev_attach_queue)(void *security); int (*tun_dev_attach)(struct sock *sk, void *security); int (*tun_dev_open)(void *security); + int (*sctp_assoc_request)(struct sctp_endpoint *ep, + struct sk_buff *skb, + int sctp_cid); + int (*sctp_bind_connect)(struct sock *sk, int optname, + struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen); + void (*sctp_sk_clone)(struct sctp_endpoint *ep, struct sock *sk, + struct sock *newsk); #endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK */ #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND @@ -1880,6 +1914,9 @@ struct security_hook_heads { struct list_head tun_dev_attach_queue; struct list_head tun_dev_attach; struct list_head tun_dev_open; + struct list_head sctp_assoc_request; + struct list_head sctp_bind_connect; + struct list_head sctp_sk_clone; #endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK */ #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND struct list_head ib_pkey_access; diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h index 834b355..2054023 100644 --- a/include/linux/security.h +++ b/include/linux/security.h @@ -114,6 +114,7 @@ struct xfrm_policy; struct xfrm_state; struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx; struct seq_file; +struct sctp_endpoint; #ifdef CONFIG_MMU extern unsigned long mmap_min_addr; @@ -1240,6 +1241,12 @@ int security_tun_dev_create(void); int security_tun_dev_attach_queue(void *security); int security_tun_dev_attach(struct sock *sk, void *security); int security_tun_dev_open(void *security); +int security_sctp_assoc_request(struct sctp_endpoint *ep, struct sk_buff *skb, + int sctp_cid); +int security_sctp_bind_connect(struct sock *sk, int optname, + struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen); +void security_sctp_sk_clone(struct sctp_endpoint *ep, struct sock *sk, + struct sock *newsk); #else /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK */ static inline int security_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock, @@ -1432,6 +1439,26 @@ static inline int security_tun_dev_open(void *security) { return 0; } + +static inline int security_sctp_assoc_request(struct sctp_endpoint *ep, + struct sk_buff *skb, + int sctp_cid) +{ + return 0; +} + +static inline int security_sctp_bind_connect(struct sock *sk, int optname, + struct sockaddr *address, + int addrlen) +{ + return 0; +} + +static inline void security_sctp_sk_clone(struct sctp_endpoint *ep, + struct sock *sk, + struct sock *newsk) +{ +} #endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK */ #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index 3013237..798fc6e 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -1482,6 +1482,7 @@ void security_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk, { call_void_hook(inet_conn_established, sk, skb); } +EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inet_conn_established); int security_secmark_relabel_packet(u32 secid) { @@ -1537,6 +1538,28 @@ int security_tun_dev_open(void *security) } EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_tun_dev_open); +int security_sctp_assoc_request(struct sctp_endpoint *ep, struct sk_buff *skb, + int sctp_cid) +{ + return call_int_hook(sctp_assoc_request, 0, ep, skb, sctp_cid); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sctp_assoc_request); + +int security_sctp_bind_connect(struct sock *sk, int optname, + struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen) +{ + return call_int_hook(sctp_bind_connect, 0, sk, optname, + address, addrlen); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sctp_bind_connect); + +void security_sctp_sk_clone(struct sctp_endpoint *ep, struct sock *sk, + struct sock *newsk) +{ + call_void_hook(sctp_sk_clone, ep, sk, newsk); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sctp_sk_clone); + #endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK */ #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND