| Message ID | 20180527225510.25612-1-colin.king@canonical.com (mailing list archive) |
|---|---|
| State | New, archived |
| Headers | show |
Not really related to this patch except I was looking at the function:
security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c
191 ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_INTEGRITY_EVM_XATTR);
192 if (IS_ERR(ab))
193 return PTR_ERR(ab);
194
195 xattr = kmalloc(sizeof(struct xattr_list), GFP_KERNEL);
196 if (!xattr) {
197 err = -ENOMEM;
198 goto out;
199 }
200
201 xattr->name = memdup_user_nul(buf, count);
202 if (IS_ERR(xattr->name)) {
203 err = PTR_ERR(xattr->name);
204 xattr->name = NULL;
205 goto out;
206 }
207
208 /* Remove any trailing newline */
209 len = strlen(xattr->name);
210 if (xattr->name[len-1] == '\n')
strlen() could be zero, leading to a read underflow here.
211 xattr->name[len-1] = '\0';
212
213 if (strcmp(xattr->name, ".") == 0) {
214 evm_xattrs_locked = 1;
215 newattrs.ia_mode = S_IFREG | 0440;
216 newattrs.ia_valid = ATTR_MODE;
217 inode = evm_xattrs->d_inode;
218 inode_lock(inode);
219 err = simple_setattr(evm_xattrs, &newattrs);
220 inode_unlock(inode);
221 audit_log_format(ab, "locked");
222 if (!err)
223 err = count;
224 goto out;
225 }
regards,
dan carpenter
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Hi Colin, On Sun, 2018-05-27 at 23:55 +0100, Colin King wrote: > From: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com> > > In the case where the allocation of xattr fails and xattr is NULL, the > error exit return path via label 'out' will dereference xattr when > kfree'ing xattr-name. Fix this by only kfree'ing xattr->name and xattr > when xattr is non-null. > > Detected by CoverityScan, CID#1469366 ("Dereference after null check") > > Fixes: fa516b66a1bf ("EVM: Allow runtime modification of the set of verified xattrs") > Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com> > --- > security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c | 6 ++++-- > 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c > index fb8bc950aceb..cf5cd303d7c0 100644 > --- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c > +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c > @@ -253,8 +253,10 @@ static ssize_t evm_write_xattrs(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, > out: > audit_log_format(ab, " res=%d", err); > audit_log_end(ab); > - kfree(xattr->name); > - kfree(xattr); > + if (xattr) { > + kfree(xattr->name); > + kfree(xattr); > + } > return err; > } > Thanks! To fix this problem, I think more is needed. Without the xattr, there is nothing to audit except the attempt to extend the xattr list. Failure to allocate the xattr or xattr->name should either result in a different audit message or return immediately without any audit message. Mimi -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-security-module" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
Hi Dan, On Tue, 2018-05-29 at 12:05 +0300, Dan Carpenter wrote: > Not really related to this patch except I was looking at the function: > > security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c > 191 ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_INTEGRITY_EVM_XATTR); > 192 if (IS_ERR(ab)) > 193 return PTR_ERR(ab); > 194 > 195 xattr = kmalloc(sizeof(struct xattr_list), GFP_KERNEL); > 196 if (!xattr) { > 197 err = -ENOMEM; > 198 goto out; > 199 } > 200 > 201 xattr->name = memdup_user_nul(buf, count); > 202 if (IS_ERR(xattr->name)) { > 203 err = PTR_ERR(xattr->name); > 204 xattr->name = NULL; > 205 goto out; > 206 } > 207 > 208 /* Remove any trailing newline */ > 209 len = strlen(xattr->name); > 210 if (xattr->name[len-1] == '\n') > > strlen() could be zero, leading to a read underflow here. Thanks! Could you modify the maximum xattr size check (before this code snippet) to check for underflow? Mimi > > 211 xattr->name[len-1] = '\0'; > 212 > 213 if (strcmp(xattr->name, ".") == 0) { > 214 evm_xattrs_locked = 1; > 215 newattrs.ia_mode = S_IFREG | 0440; > 216 newattrs.ia_valid = ATTR_MODE; > 217 inode = evm_xattrs->d_inode; > 218 inode_lock(inode); > 219 err = simple_setattr(evm_xattrs, &newattrs); > 220 inode_unlock(inode); > 221 audit_log_format(ab, "locked"); > 222 if (!err) > 223 err = count; > 224 goto out; > 225 } > > regards, > dan carpenter > -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-security-module" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c index fb8bc950aceb..cf5cd303d7c0 100644 --- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c @@ -253,8 +253,10 @@ static ssize_t evm_write_xattrs(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, out: audit_log_format(ab, " res=%d", err); audit_log_end(ab); - kfree(xattr->name); - kfree(xattr); + if (xattr) { + kfree(xattr->name); + kfree(xattr); + } return err; }