From patchwork Thu Dec 13 02:09:04 2018 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Thiago Jung Bauermann X-Patchwork-Id: 10727579 Return-Path: Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.125]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 2866513AF for ; Thu, 13 Dec 2018 02:12:05 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 181EB2BA42 for ; Thu, 13 Dec 2018 02:12:05 +0000 (UTC) Received: by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix, from userid 486) id 0BF1C2BA51; Thu, 13 Dec 2018 02:12:05 +0000 (UTC) X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-6.9 required=2.0 tests=BAYES_00,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id E143E2BA42 for ; Thu, 13 Dec 2018 02:12:03 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1726662AbeLMCMC (ORCPT ); Wed, 12 Dec 2018 21:12:02 -0500 Received: from mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com ([148.163.156.1]:55262 "EHLO mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1726593AbeLMCMB (ORCPT ); Wed, 12 Dec 2018 21:12:01 -0500 Received: from pps.filterd (m0098393.ppops.net [127.0.0.1]) by mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com (8.16.0.22/8.16.0.22) with SMTP id wBD23sXx134826 for ; Wed, 12 Dec 2018 21:11:58 -0500 Received: from e34.co.us.ibm.com (e34.co.us.ibm.com [32.97.110.152]) by mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com with ESMTP id 2pb9t03vxf-1 (version=TLSv1.2 cipher=AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=NOT) for ; Wed, 12 Dec 2018 21:11:58 -0500 Received: from localhost by e34.co.us.ibm.com with IBM ESMTP SMTP Gateway: Authorized Use Only! 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Violators will be prosecuted; (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256/256) Thu, 13 Dec 2018 02:11:53 -0000 Received: from b03ledav006.gho.boulder.ibm.com (b03ledav006.gho.boulder.ibm.com [9.17.130.237]) by b03cxnp08027.gho.boulder.ibm.com (8.14.9/8.14.9/NCO v10.0) with ESMTP id wBD2BpPM15597802 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=FAIL); Thu, 13 Dec 2018 02:11:51 GMT Received: from b03ledav006.gho.boulder.ibm.com (unknown [127.0.0.1]) by IMSVA (Postfix) with ESMTP id 56B90C605A; Thu, 13 Dec 2018 02:11:51 +0000 (GMT) Received: from b03ledav006.gho.boulder.ibm.com (unknown [127.0.0.1]) by IMSVA (Postfix) with ESMTP id 1A184C6059; Thu, 13 Dec 2018 02:11:47 +0000 (GMT) Received: from morokweng.localdomain.com (unknown [9.80.227.60]) by b03ledav006.gho.boulder.ibm.com (Postfix) with ESMTP; Thu, 13 Dec 2018 02:11:46 +0000 (GMT) From: Thiago Jung Bauermann To: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Mimi Zohar , Dmitry Kasatkin , James Morris , "Serge E. Hallyn" , David Howells , David Woodhouse , Jessica Yu , Herbert Xu , "David S. Miller" , Jonathan Corbet , "AKASHI, Takahiro" , Thiago Jung Bauermann Subject: [PATCH v9 11/14] ima: Implement support for module-style appended signatures Date: Thu, 13 Dec 2018 00:09:04 -0200 X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.17.2 In-Reply-To: <20181213020907.13601-1-bauerman@linux.ibm.com> References: <20181213020907.13601-1-bauerman@linux.ibm.com> X-TM-AS-GCONF: 00 x-cbid: 18121302-0016-0000-0000-00000963A3FA X-IBM-SpamModules-Scores: X-IBM-SpamModules-Versions: BY=3.00010217; HX=3.00000242; KW=3.00000007; PH=3.00000004; SC=3.00000270; SDB=6.01130951; UDB=6.00587714; IPR=6.00911085; MB=3.00024674; MTD=3.00000008; XFM=3.00000015; UTC=2018-12-13 02:11:57 X-IBM-AV-DETECTION: SAVI=unused REMOTE=unused XFE=unused x-cbparentid: 18121302-0017-0000-0000-00004162A0D1 Message-Id: <20181213020907.13601-12-bauerman@linux.ibm.com> X-Proofpoint-Virus-Version: vendor=fsecure engine=2.50.10434:,, definitions=2018-12-12_04:,, signatures=0 X-Proofpoint-Spam-Details: rule=outbound_notspam policy=outbound score=0 priorityscore=1501 malwarescore=0 suspectscore=4 phishscore=0 bulkscore=0 spamscore=0 clxscore=1015 lowpriorityscore=0 mlxscore=0 impostorscore=0 mlxlogscore=999 adultscore=0 classifier=spam adjust=0 reason=mlx scancount=1 engine=8.0.1-1810050000 definitions=main-1812130017 Sender: owner-linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Virus-Scanned: ClamAV using ClamSMTP Implement the appraise_type=imasig|modsig option, allowing IMA to read and verify modsig signatures. In case a file has both an xattr signature and an appended modsig, IMA will only use the appended signature if the key used by the xattr signature isn't present in the IMA keyring. Also enable building the sign-file tool when CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_MODSIG is enabled, so that the user can sign files using this format. Signed-off-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann --- scripts/Makefile | 4 +- security/integrity/digsig.c | 3 + security/integrity/ima/Kconfig | 3 + security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 31 ++++- security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 68 ++++++++++- security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 18 ++- security/integrity/ima/ima_modsig.c | 162 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++ security/integrity/integrity.h | 10 ++ 8 files changed, 291 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/scripts/Makefile b/scripts/Makefile index ece52ff20171..a2cf10661925 100644 --- a/scripts/Makefile +++ b/scripts/Makefile @@ -17,7 +17,9 @@ hostprogs-$(CONFIG_VT) += conmakehash hostprogs-$(BUILD_C_RECORDMCOUNT) += recordmcount hostprogs-$(CONFIG_BUILDTIME_EXTABLE_SORT) += sortextable hostprogs-$(CONFIG_ASN1) += asn1_compiler -hostprogs-$(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG) += sign-file +ifneq ($(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG)$(CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_MODSIG),) +hostprogs-y += sign-file +endif hostprogs-$(CONFIG_SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING) += extract-cert hostprogs-$(CONFIG_SYSTEM_EXTRA_CERTIFICATE) += insert-sys-cert diff --git a/security/integrity/digsig.c b/security/integrity/digsig.c index bbfa3085d1b5..c5585e75d5d9 100644 --- a/security/integrity/digsig.c +++ b/security/integrity/digsig.c @@ -75,6 +75,9 @@ int integrity_digsig_verify(const unsigned int id, const char *sig, int siglen, if (IS_ERR(keyring)) return PTR_ERR(keyring); + if (sig[0] == IMA_MODSIG) + return ima_modsig_verify(keyring, sig); + switch (sig[1]) { case 1: /* v1 API expect signature without xattr type */ diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig index bba19f9ea184..0fb542455698 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig +++ b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig @@ -234,6 +234,9 @@ config IMA_APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM config IMA_APPRAISE_MODSIG bool "Support module-style signatures for appraisal" depends on IMA_APPRAISE + depends on INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS + select PKCS7_MESSAGE_PARSER + select MODULE_SIG_FORMAT default n help Adds support for signatures appended to files. The format of the diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h index 69c06e2d7bd6..753d59352718 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h @@ -156,7 +156,8 @@ void ima_init_template_list(void); static inline bool is_signed(const struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value) { - return xattr_value && xattr_value->type == EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG; + return xattr_value && (xattr_value->type == EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG || + xattr_value->type == IMA_MODSIG); } /* @@ -253,6 +254,9 @@ enum integrity_status ima_get_cache_status(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, enum ima_hooks func); enum hash_algo ima_get_hash_algo(struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, int xattr_len); +bool ima_xattr_sig_known_key(enum ima_hooks func, + const struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, + int xattr_len); int ima_read_xattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct evm_ima_xattr_data **xattr_value); @@ -291,6 +295,13 @@ ima_get_hash_algo(struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, int xattr_len) return ima_hash_algo; } +static inline bool ima_xattr_sig_known_key(enum ima_hooks func, + const struct evm_ima_xattr_data + *xattr_value, int xattr_len) +{ + return false; +} + static inline int ima_read_xattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct evm_ima_xattr_data **xattr_value) { @@ -301,11 +312,29 @@ static inline int ima_read_xattr(struct dentry *dentry, #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_MODSIG bool ima_hook_supports_modsig(enum ima_hooks func); +int ima_read_collect_modsig(enum ima_hooks func, const void *buf, + loff_t buf_len, + struct evm_ima_xattr_data **xattr_value, + int *xattr_len); +void ima_free_xattr_data(struct evm_ima_xattr_data *hdr); #else static inline bool ima_hook_supports_modsig(enum ima_hooks func) { return false; } + +static inline int ima_read_collect_modsig(enum ima_hooks func, const void *buf, + loff_t buf_len, + struct evm_ima_xattr_data **xattr_value, + int *xattr_len) +{ + return -EOPNOTSUPP; +} + +static inline void ima_free_xattr_data(struct evm_ima_xattr_data *hdr) +{ + kfree(hdr); +} #endif /* CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_MODSIG */ /* LSM based policy rules require audit */ diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c index 085386c77b0b..ad3310ebca97 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c @@ -189,6 +189,37 @@ enum hash_algo ima_get_hash_algo(struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, return ima_hash_algo; } +bool ima_xattr_sig_known_key(enum ima_hooks func, + const struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, + int xattr_len) +{ + struct key *keyring; + unsigned int keyring_id = INTEGRITY_KEYRING_IMA; + bool ret; + + if (xattr_value->type != EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG) + return false; + + retry: + keyring = integrity_keyring_from_id(keyring_id); + if (IS_ERR(keyring)) + return false; + + ret = asymmetric_sig_has_known_key(keyring, (const char *) xattr_value, + xattr_len); + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING) && !ret && + func == KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK && keyring_id == INTEGRITY_KEYRING_IMA) { + /* + * When verifying a kexec kernel signature, IMA also looks for + * the key in the platform keyring. + */ + keyring_id = INTEGRITY_KEYRING_PLATFORM; + goto retry; + } + + return ret; +} + int ima_read_xattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct evm_ima_xattr_data **xattr_value) { @@ -198,6 +229,14 @@ int ima_read_xattr(struct dentry *dentry, 0, GFP_NOFS); if (ret == -EOPNOTSUPP) ret = 0; + /* IMA_MODSIG is only allowed when appended to files. */ + else if (ret > 0 && (*xattr_value)->type == IMA_MODSIG) { + ret = -EINVAL; + + kfree(*xattr_value); + *xattr_value = NULL; + } + return ret; } @@ -221,8 +260,12 @@ int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func, struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry); enum integrity_status status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN; int rc = xattr_len, hash_start = 0; + size_t xattr_contents_len; + void *xattr_contents; - if (!(inode->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR)) + /* If not appraising a modsig, we need an xattr. */ + if ((xattr_value == NULL || xattr_value->type != IMA_MODSIG) && + !(inode->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR)) return INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN; if (rc <= 0) { @@ -241,13 +284,30 @@ int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func, goto out; } - status = evm_verifyxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_IMA, xattr_value, rc, iint); + /* + * If it's a modsig, we don't have the xattr contents to pass to + * evm_verifyxattr(). + */ + if (xattr_value->type == IMA_MODSIG) { + xattr_contents = NULL; + xattr_contents_len = 0; + } else { + xattr_contents = xattr_value; + xattr_contents_len = xattr_len; + } + + status = evm_verifyxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_IMA, xattr_contents, + xattr_contents_len, iint); switch (status) { case INTEGRITY_PASS: case INTEGRITY_PASS_IMMUTABLE: case INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN: break; case INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS: /* No EVM protected xattrs. */ + /* It's fine not to have xattrs when using a modsig. */ + if (xattr_value->type == IMA_MODSIG) + break; + /* fall through */ case INTEGRITY_NOLABEL: /* No security.evm xattr. */ cause = "missing-HMAC"; goto out; @@ -288,6 +348,7 @@ int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func, status = INTEGRITY_PASS; break; case EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG: + case IMA_MODSIG: set_bit(IMA_DIGSIG, &iint->atomic_flags); rc = integrity_digsig_verify(INTEGRITY_KEYRING_IMA, (const char *)xattr_value, @@ -454,7 +515,8 @@ int ima_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name, result = ima_protect_xattr(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value, xattr_value_len); if (result == 1) { - if (!xattr_value_len || (xvalue->type >= IMA_XATTR_LAST)) + if (!xattr_value_len || xvalue->type == IMA_MODSIG || + xvalue->type >= IMA_XATTR_LAST) return -EINVAL; ima_reset_appraise_flags(d_backing_inode(dentry), is_signed(xvalue)); diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c index bd9bd5f88206..448be1e00bab 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c @@ -181,6 +181,7 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred, struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value = NULL; int xattr_len = 0; bool violation_check; + bool read_sig; enum hash_algo hash_algo; if (!ima_policy_flag || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode)) @@ -274,13 +275,24 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred, } template_desc = ima_template_desc_current(); - if ((action & IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK) || - strcmp(template_desc->name, IMA_TEMPLATE_IMA_NAME) != 0) + read_sig = action & IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK || + strcmp(template_desc->name, IMA_TEMPLATE_IMA_NAME) != 0; + if (read_sig) /* read 'security.ima' */ xattr_len = ima_read_xattr(file_dentry(file), &xattr_value); hash_algo = ima_get_hash_algo(xattr_value, xattr_len); + /* + * Try to find a modsig if there's no xattr sig or if it is signed by an + * unknown key. + */ + if (read_sig && iint->flags & IMA_MODSIG_ALLOWED && + (xattr_len <= 0 || !ima_xattr_sig_known_key(func, xattr_value, + xattr_len))) + ima_read_collect_modsig(func, buf, size, &xattr_value, + &xattr_len); + rc = ima_collect_measurement(iint, file, buf, size, hash_algo); if (rc != 0 && rc != -EBADF && rc != -EINVAL) goto out_locked; @@ -307,7 +319,7 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred, !(iint->flags & IMA_NEW_FILE)) rc = -EACCES; mutex_unlock(&iint->mutex); - kfree(xattr_value); + ima_free_xattr_data(xattr_value); out: if (pathbuf) __putname(pathbuf); diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_modsig.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_modsig.c index 08182bd7f445..f228f333509d 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_modsig.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_modsig.c @@ -8,8 +8,25 @@ * Thiago Jung Bauermann */ +#include +#include +#include +#include + #include "ima.h" +struct modsig_hdr { + uint8_t type; /* Should be IMA_MODSIG. */ + struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7_msg; + int raw_pkcs7_len; + + /* + * This is what will go to the measurement list if the template requires + * storing the signature. + */ + struct evm_ima_xattr_data raw_pkcs7; +}; + /** * ima_hook_supports_modsig - can the policy allow modsig for this hook? * @@ -29,3 +46,148 @@ bool ima_hook_supports_modsig(enum ima_hooks func) return false; } } + +static bool modsig_has_known_key(enum ima_hooks func, struct modsig_hdr *hdr) +{ + unsigned int keyring_id = INTEGRITY_KEYRING_IMA; + const struct public_key_signature *pks; + struct key *keyring; + struct key *key; + + retry: + keyring = integrity_keyring_from_id(keyring_id); + if (IS_ERR(keyring)) + return false; + + pks = pkcs7_get_message_sig(hdr->pkcs7_msg); + if (!pks) + return false; + + key = find_asymmetric_key(keyring, pks->auth_ids[0], NULL, false); + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING) && IS_ERR(key) && + func == KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK && keyring_id == INTEGRITY_KEYRING_IMA) { + /* + * When verifying a kexec kernel signature, IMA also looks for + * the key in the platform keyring. + */ + keyring_id = INTEGRITY_KEYRING_PLATFORM; + goto retry; + } else if (IS_ERR(key)) + return false; + + key_put(key); + + return true; +} + +/** + * ima_read_collect_modsig - Read modsig from buf and calculate the file hash. + * + * Since the modsig is part of the file contents, the hash used in its signature + * isn't the same one calculated in ima_collect_measurement(). Therefore PKCS7 + * code calculates a separate one for signature verification. + */ +int ima_read_collect_modsig(enum ima_hooks func, const void *buf, + loff_t buf_len, + struct evm_ima_xattr_data **xattr_value, + int *xattr_len) +{ + const size_t marker_len = sizeof(MODULE_SIG_STRING) - 1; + const struct module_signature *sig; + struct modsig_hdr *hdr; + size_t sig_len; + const void *p; + int rc; + + /* + * Not supposed to happen. Hooks that support modsig are whitelisted + * when parsing the policy using ima_hooks_supports_modsig(). + */ + if (!buf || !buf_len) { + WARN_ONCE(true, "%s doesn't support modsig\n", + func_tokens[func]); + return -ENOENT; + } else if (buf_len <= marker_len + sizeof(*sig)) + return -ENOENT; + + p = buf + buf_len - marker_len; + if (memcmp(p, MODULE_SIG_STRING, marker_len)) + return -ENOENT; + + buf_len -= marker_len; + sig = (const struct module_signature *) (p - sizeof(*sig)); + + rc = mod_check_sig(sig, buf_len, func_tokens[func]); + if (rc) + return rc; + + sig_len = be32_to_cpu(sig->sig_len); + buf_len -= sig_len + sizeof(*sig); + + /* Allocate sig_len additional bytes to hold the raw PKCS#7 data. */ + hdr = kmalloc(sizeof(*hdr) + sig_len, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!hdr) + return -ENOMEM; + + hdr->pkcs7_msg = pkcs7_parse_message(buf + buf_len, sig_len); + if (IS_ERR(hdr->pkcs7_msg)) { + rc = PTR_ERR(hdr->pkcs7_msg); + goto err_no_msg; + } + + rc = pkcs7_supply_detached_data(hdr->pkcs7_msg, buf, buf_len); + if (rc) + goto err; + + if (!modsig_has_known_key(func, hdr)) { + rc = -ENOKEY; + goto err; + } + + /* Cause the PKCS7 code to calculate the file hash. */ + rc = pkcs7_get_digest(hdr->pkcs7_msg, NULL, NULL); + if (rc) + goto err; + + memcpy(hdr->raw_pkcs7.data, buf + buf_len, sig_len); + hdr->raw_pkcs7_len = sig_len + 1; + hdr->raw_pkcs7.type = IMA_MODSIG; + + hdr->type = IMA_MODSIG; + + *xattr_value = (typeof(*xattr_value)) hdr; + *xattr_len = sizeof(*hdr); + + return 0; + + err: + pkcs7_free_message(hdr->pkcs7_msg); + err_no_msg: + kfree(hdr); + return rc; +} + +int ima_modsig_verify(struct key *keyring, const void *hdr) +{ + const struct modsig_hdr *modsig = (const struct modsig_hdr *) hdr; + + if (!modsig || modsig->type != IMA_MODSIG) + return -EINVAL; + + return verify_pkcs7_message_sig(NULL, 0, modsig->pkcs7_msg, keyring, + VERIFYING_MODULE_SIGNATURE, NULL, NULL); +} + +void ima_free_xattr_data(struct evm_ima_xattr_data *hdr) +{ + if (!hdr) + return; + + if (hdr->type == IMA_MODSIG) { + struct modsig_hdr *modsig = (struct modsig_hdr *) hdr; + + pkcs7_free_message(modsig->pkcs7_msg); + } + + kfree(hdr); +} diff --git a/security/integrity/integrity.h b/security/integrity/integrity.h index 4549488a048a..8e37ad5e52bd 100644 --- a/security/integrity/integrity.h +++ b/security/integrity/integrity.h @@ -75,6 +75,7 @@ enum evm_ima_xattr_type { EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG, IMA_XATTR_DIGEST_NG, EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG, + IMA_MODSIG, IMA_XATTR_LAST }; @@ -264,3 +265,12 @@ static inline void __init add_to_platform_keyring(const char *source, { } #endif + +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_MODSIG +int ima_modsig_verify(struct key *keyring, const void *hdr); +#else +static inline int ima_modsig_verify(struct key *keyring, const void *hdr) +{ + return -EOPNOTSUPP; +} +#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_MODSIG */