From patchwork Thu Jan 17 00:32:51 2019 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: "Edgecombe, Rick P" X-Patchwork-Id: 10767309 Return-Path: Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.125]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 1A153186E for ; Thu, 17 Jan 2019 00:34:54 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id A63272E1E1 for ; Thu, 17 Jan 2019 00:34:53 +0000 (UTC) Received: by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix, from userid 486) id 974F12E297; Thu, 17 Jan 2019 00:34:53 +0000 (UTC) X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-6.9 required=2.0 tests=BAYES_00,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI autolearn=unavailable version=3.3.1 Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 396BC2DDDC for ; Thu, 17 Jan 2019 00:34:53 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1730876AbfAQAel (ORCPT ); Wed, 16 Jan 2019 19:34:41 -0500 Received: from mga05.intel.com ([192.55.52.43]:42206 "EHLO mga05.intel.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1729982AbfAQAdj (ORCPT ); Wed, 16 Jan 2019 19:33:39 -0500 X-Amp-Result: SKIPPED(no attachment in message) X-Amp-File-Uploaded: False Received: from orsmga005.jf.intel.com ([10.7.209.41]) by fmsmga105.fm.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 16 Jan 2019 16:33:37 -0800 X-ExtLoop1: 1 X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.56,488,1539673200"; d="scan'208";a="292166037" Received: from rpedgeco-desk5.jf.intel.com ([10.54.75.79]) by orsmga005.jf.intel.com with ESMTP; 16 Jan 2019 16:33:36 -0800 From: Rick Edgecombe To: Andy Lutomirski , Ingo Molnar Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org, hpa@zytor.com, Thomas Gleixner , Borislav Petkov , Nadav Amit , Dave Hansen , Peter Zijlstra , linux_dti@icloud.com, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, akpm@linux-foundation.org, kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com, linux-mm@kvack.org, will.deacon@arm.com, ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org, kristen@linux.intel.com, deneen.t.dock@intel.com, Nadav Amit , Masami Hiramatsu , Rick Edgecombe Subject: [PATCH 09/17] x86/kprobes: Instruction pages initialization enhancements Date: Wed, 16 Jan 2019 16:32:51 -0800 Message-Id: <20190117003259.23141-10-rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.17.1 In-Reply-To: <20190117003259.23141-1-rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com> References: <20190117003259.23141-1-rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com> Sender: owner-linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Virus-Scanned: ClamAV using ClamSMTP From: Nadav Amit This patch is a preparatory patch for a following patch that makes module allocated pages non-executable. The patch sets the page as executable after allocation. In the future, we may get better protection of executables. For example, by using hypercalls to request the hypervisor to protect VM executable pages from modifications using nested page-tables. This would allow us to ensure the executable has not changed between allocation and its write-protection. While at it, do some small cleanup of what appears to be unnecessary masking. Cc: Masami Hiramatsu Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit Signed-off-by: Rick Edgecombe Acked-by: Masami Hiramatsu --- arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/core.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/core.c b/arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/core.c index 4ba75afba527..fac692e36833 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/core.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/core.c @@ -431,8 +431,20 @@ void *alloc_insn_page(void) void *page; page = module_alloc(PAGE_SIZE); - if (page) - set_memory_ro((unsigned long)page & PAGE_MASK, 1); + if (page == NULL) + return NULL; + + /* + * First make the page read-only, and then only then make it executable + * to prevent it from being W+X in between. + */ + set_memory_ro((unsigned long)page, 1); + + /* + * TODO: Once additional kernel code protection mechanisms are set, ensure + * that the page was not maliciously altered and it is still zeroed. + */ + set_memory_x((unsigned long)page, 1); return page; } @@ -440,8 +452,12 @@ void *alloc_insn_page(void) /* Recover page to RW mode before releasing it */ void free_insn_page(void *page) { - set_memory_nx((unsigned long)page & PAGE_MASK, 1); - set_memory_rw((unsigned long)page & PAGE_MASK, 1); + /* + * First make the page non-executable, and then only then make it + * writable to prevent it from being W+X in between. + */ + set_memory_nx((unsigned long)page, 1); + set_memory_rw((unsigned long)page, 1); module_memfree(page); }