From patchwork Mon Mar 25 22:09:29 2019 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Matthew Garrett X-Patchwork-Id: 10870253 Return-Path: Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.125]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id BECCA1708 for ; Mon, 25 Mar 2019 22:12:57 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id A93542905C for ; Mon, 25 Mar 2019 22:12:57 +0000 (UTC) Received: by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix, from userid 486) id 9D14C28C1D; Mon, 25 Mar 2019 22:12:57 +0000 (UTC) X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-14.5 required=2.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI,USER_IN_DEF_DKIM_WL autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 3131828C1D for ; Mon, 25 Mar 2019 22:12:57 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1730260AbfCYWKE (ORCPT ); Mon, 25 Mar 2019 18:10:04 -0400 Received: from mail-pf1-f202.google.com ([209.85.210.202]:53746 "EHLO mail-pf1-f202.google.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1730515AbfCYWKE (ORCPT ); Mon, 25 Mar 2019 18:10:04 -0400 Received: by mail-pf1-f202.google.com with SMTP id o67so10568399pfa.20 for ; Mon, 25 Mar 2019 15:10:03 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=google.com; s=20161025; h=date:in-reply-to:message-id:mime-version:references:subject:from:to :cc; bh=7kY2QswyjJGeL+pn4tYPdCA7RsaJvP9HYM3SbJBAroA=; b=fH0qiocHX6D+ppy2Eb2sLQX8da74DNy4n+Yf3JdgbVVnZVss6gDkp1UF1+MGC2phbK 2NBWddi7f2z/Wu3m54i5eKH/R4ZFC0dfsbWbsi7wjjvdiXztgfcwoANfoRbKTWGV11Ox O7ujjDZ+mouLArSBowSQ4PA+vt20BnzkqiisjM/P8QlkDazsrGEnu22inRsXUFU58SKo npGx7kKT6YGhJ5/PFGUpQNyqmLnNdDrYsK6YhukC5jDlhucYthSguWENoUMr1AxXeOQL 7F5RzqoGTTPj6r5z8tby7xgqZCjecOc7zlaPi/sKuGLihdVXmTOAnj3cDW/s0XM89yz/ XjJw== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:date:in-reply-to:message-id:mime-version :references:subject:from:to:cc; bh=7kY2QswyjJGeL+pn4tYPdCA7RsaJvP9HYM3SbJBAroA=; b=aR/TZmUm2GrhesaxPQiRqj8Tsnkee63xnollbsqJDlQXwBXuQzxEsHZOOjCmJPP7Ar LAGS+iFLW6EguxBe9jtmvkrYs4/yG8MBZVksG4m85tanxdNnlgq7NCGidmEcyIMnDRgk aXbWuuJrseWIabRVJkYFJDkj/EQkpfzDOFpXWD8Me0cEo/Fb+1MBbH2Kfm/ZGflShBug vqQsIYDuoh2bbvKEgM1KLBZ774w7SbvrPMMwvTri0nAagcPqBLhKjEkoV1LJcdWyabQq JpsjRMgdU0UdXOEgHjNVvUvTiU3HTDCpG8nZyZ0m8e3SkS0lMdESzuX1xGCAmsuWj6VI LcDA== X-Gm-Message-State: APjAAAVanYwRz6OPcWgYvn1tx2sShE0le4SJSb+kKnA17N6bi0tQ40pO gC02NEPtyHJhdyrczhLNbPfgHyZ2UXyswpR9JU5xug== X-Google-Smtp-Source: APXvYqwAjwGZ2XuHEZMf2N4nC+utrAZ0fFynLHMvG+jRgiNluH5cNZofkgpugK8PHpKGPY6luT5eHt7GND8ndB/OLW+FpQ== X-Received: by 2002:a65:4547:: with SMTP id x7mr24808022pgr.350.1553551803393; Mon, 25 Mar 2019 15:10:03 -0700 (PDT) Date: Mon, 25 Mar 2019 15:09:29 -0700 In-Reply-To: <20190325220954.29054-1-matthewgarrett@google.com> Message-Id: <20190325220954.29054-3-matthewgarrett@google.com> Mime-Version: 1.0 References: <20190325220954.29054-1-matthewgarrett@google.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.21.0.392.gf8f6787159e-goog Subject: [PATCH 02/27] Enforce module signatures if the kernel is locked down From: Matthew Garrett To: jmorris@namei.org Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, dhowells@redhat.com, Jiri Bohac , Matthew Garrett , Jessica Yu Sender: owner-linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Virus-Scanned: ClamAV using ClamSMTP From: David Howells If the kernel is locked down, require that all modules have valid signatures that we can verify. I have adjusted the errors generated: (1) If there's no signature (ENODATA) or we can't check it (ENOPKG, ENOKEY), then: (a) If signatures are enforced then EKEYREJECTED is returned. (b) If there's no signature or we can't check it, but the kernel is locked down then EPERM is returned (this is then consistent with other lockdown cases). (2) If the signature is unparseable (EBADMSG, EINVAL), the signature fails the check (EKEYREJECTED) or a system error occurs (eg. ENOMEM), we return the error we got. Note that the X.509 code doesn't check for key expiry as the RTC might not be valid or might not have been transferred to the kernel's clock yet. This does not yet integrate with setups that pin module loading to dm-verity backed filesystems. If lockdown is enabled, loading unsigned modules from an integrity-assured filesystem will fail. [Modified by Matthew Garrett to remove the IMA integration. This will be replaced with integration with the IMA architecture policy patchset.] Signed-off-by: David Howells Reviewed-by: Jiri Bohac Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett Cc: Jessica Yu --- kernel/module.c | 39 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------- 1 file changed, 32 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/kernel/module.c b/kernel/module.c index 2ad1b5239910..9a377c6ea200 100644 --- a/kernel/module.c +++ b/kernel/module.c @@ -2767,8 +2767,9 @@ static inline void kmemleak_load_module(const struct module *mod, #ifdef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG static int module_sig_check(struct load_info *info, int flags) { - int err = -ENOKEY; + int err = -ENODATA; const unsigned long markerlen = sizeof(MODULE_SIG_STRING) - 1; + const char *reason; const void *mod = info->hdr; /* @@ -2783,16 +2784,40 @@ static int module_sig_check(struct load_info *info, int flags) err = mod_verify_sig(mod, info); } - if (!err) { + switch (err) { + case 0: info->sig_ok = true; return 0; - } - /* Not having a signature is only an error if we're strict. */ - if (err == -ENOKEY && !is_module_sig_enforced()) - err = 0; + /* We don't permit modules to be loaded into trusted kernels + * without a valid signature on them, but if we're not + * enforcing, certain errors are non-fatal. + */ + case -ENODATA: + reason = "Loading of unsigned module"; + goto decide; + case -ENOPKG: + reason = "Loading of module with unsupported crypto"; + goto decide; + case -ENOKEY: + reason = "Loading of module with unavailable key"; + decide: + if (is_module_sig_enforced()) { + pr_notice("%s is rejected\n", reason); + return -EKEYREJECTED; + } - return err; + if (kernel_is_locked_down(reason)) + return -EPERM; + return 0; + + /* All other errors are fatal, including nomem, unparseable + * signatures and signature check failures - even if signatures + * aren't required. + */ + default: + return err; + } } #else /* !CONFIG_MODULE_SIG */ static int module_sig_check(struct load_info *info, int flags)