From patchwork Mon Mar 25 22:09:32 2019 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Matthew Garrett X-Patchwork-Id: 10870243 Return-Path: Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.125]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 02767186D for ; Mon, 25 Mar 2019 22:12:39 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id DEB4828C1D for ; Mon, 25 Mar 2019 22:12:38 +0000 (UTC) Received: by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix, from userid 486) id D2F0D2905C; Mon, 25 Mar 2019 22:12:38 +0000 (UTC) X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-14.5 required=2.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI,USER_IN_DEF_DKIM_WL autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 84DF429053 for ; Mon, 25 Mar 2019 22:12:38 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1730733AbfCYWMh (ORCPT ); Mon, 25 Mar 2019 18:12:37 -0400 Received: from mail-ot1-f73.google.com ([209.85.210.73]:36011 "EHLO mail-ot1-f73.google.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1730700AbfCYWKL (ORCPT ); Mon, 25 Mar 2019 18:10:11 -0400 Received: by mail-ot1-f73.google.com with SMTP id i4so7325534otf.3 for ; Mon, 25 Mar 2019 15:10:11 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=google.com; s=20161025; h=date:in-reply-to:message-id:mime-version:references:subject:from:to :cc; bh=zcfKxdpFss4fpHHRB0+Lld7eiBsD+1c7SytE6cVbYAQ=; b=pU/fGwEeJo9W057Fiz2WhB5YvIlTU26ECcXPrtXpWYJgVMbu/bjoyYznMie0JvzhO/ RMWldH0Yt0MU7YLBeDyWytBHuMzqJERlwFdmfJJbi+ZbOAUjxFR/HBN5ujwrCkiJxwOL VRT4+Jfgx18zSIZ6t/4LruqHwEooU53sBrBvTqizKQLihltKb4R4UhhHC2dT1e03v6tw ba42wMht7Dbvh018RXehhlCnq6oZpGQ5iQRkbDEaHPGBfbFXqo2WGwghiUe0Z2ELy1q+ qDbcd2uG+W2swTs872ukoJgbdOqFSd9dVTBjUcrMZelQnG/pbmRs7A9z1NDqna2/ivZI SSfQ== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:date:in-reply-to:message-id:mime-version :references:subject:from:to:cc; bh=zcfKxdpFss4fpHHRB0+Lld7eiBsD+1c7SytE6cVbYAQ=; b=E+XZZ7tM2t3UecKQvkc2SS38ai8/jvnE5qXq3rBE30nWip4dqNH19xVI8bP4Hv+bIB MwymYRJCOacio8d7asTCr7MLtBLrN6Uu+KNWS6PyLV/R6Dn0OD0xRCWnky5u9TuAx3jv KAss1mWdUJT1yllDGFyYbpEMh+PzgYG2vnFYPKIYvLy9g1gnJ+0V5IQIqAA0xFXCBGbm 8OeQa6D9mU+cEYVUy94+u+45I7CwnLoAoUNbp1h5t2F2SjmLqAbQEGkVZDXhpfAWvfz1 hvOySRzgjlvT7DJTyzlF9M50ua7mP7Sb2Wm2xqGPrMViZzv951HTCSq2/EY3K4DfEEDG t7cw== X-Gm-Message-State: APjAAAUV5V6YhCNpOIn6KJIbE4FCqJwWP5zq/wAq/mH/FVbb/rZ3fM8a FEZ2U+MMQ8oQob0YoNgAJ+QV+yHnRsf1b9GkQAMKmw== X-Google-Smtp-Source: APXvYqwktqdQX/p1H08SM6z/cXSn1zOYuT+GzSkXGL8oTth/89sdx8ETR6kIXHqW7yX4nGJrq537WoWTTNpL5yyI3e2xdQ== X-Received: by 2002:aca:ed4e:: with SMTP id l75mr13734881oih.62.1553551810951; Mon, 25 Mar 2019 15:10:10 -0700 (PDT) Date: Mon, 25 Mar 2019 15:09:32 -0700 In-Reply-To: <20190325220954.29054-1-matthewgarrett@google.com> Message-Id: <20190325220954.29054-6-matthewgarrett@google.com> Mime-Version: 1.0 References: <20190325220954.29054-1-matthewgarrett@google.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.21.0.392.gf8f6787159e-goog Subject: [PATCH 05/27] Copy secure_boot flag in boot params across kexec reboot From: Matthew Garrett To: jmorris@namei.org Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, dhowells@redhat.com, Dave Young , kexec@lists.infradead.org, Matthew Garrett Sender: owner-linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Virus-Scanned: ClamAV using ClamSMTP From: Dave Young Kexec reboot in case secure boot being enabled does not keep the secure boot mode in new kernel, so later one can load unsigned kernel via legacy kexec_load. In this state, the system is missing the protections provided by secure boot. Adding a patch to fix this by retain the secure_boot flag in original kernel. secure_boot flag in boot_params is set in EFI stub, but kexec bypasses the stub. Fixing this issue by copying secure_boot flag across kexec reboot. Signed-off-by: Dave Young Signed-off-by: David Howells cc: kexec@lists.infradead.org Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett --- arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c index 278cd07228dd..d49554b948fd 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c @@ -179,6 +179,7 @@ setup_efi_state(struct boot_params *params, unsigned long params_load_addr, if (efi_enabled(EFI_OLD_MEMMAP)) return 0; + params->secure_boot = boot_params.secure_boot; ei->efi_loader_signature = current_ei->efi_loader_signature; ei->efi_systab = current_ei->efi_systab; ei->efi_systab_hi = current_ei->efi_systab_hi;