From patchwork Tue Mar 26 18:27:21 2019 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Matthew Garrett X-Patchwork-Id: 10871931 Return-Path: Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.125]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id CA0DB13B5 for ; Tue, 26 Mar 2019 18:28:10 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id B6DB728DD7 for ; Tue, 26 Mar 2019 18:28:10 +0000 (UTC) Received: by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix, from userid 486) id AB4F128DF9; Tue, 26 Mar 2019 18:28:10 +0000 (UTC) X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-14.5 required=2.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI,USER_IN_DEF_DKIM_WL autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 556E728DD7 for ; Tue, 26 Mar 2019 18:28:10 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1732614AbfCZS2J (ORCPT ); Tue, 26 Mar 2019 14:28:09 -0400 Received: from mail-vs1-f74.google.com ([209.85.217.74]:33598 "EHLO mail-vs1-f74.google.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1732608AbfCZS2J (ORCPT ); Tue, 26 Mar 2019 14:28:09 -0400 Received: by mail-vs1-f74.google.com with SMTP id r17so3899412vsk.0 for ; Tue, 26 Mar 2019 11:28:08 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=google.com; s=20161025; h=date:in-reply-to:message-id:mime-version:references:subject:from:to :cc; bh=ZxYq8cG2sFhGgbw0k3aUDfwIzpbQidarvZYq7w9bkW0=; b=XKxuTIw96/3+PO2e8Ya9M0C6H/BRKjbA7yCgb6ScDY71OKQu5O1qKynqYWdRZD1PkT 6X/9B1zYux3mu1aFjig8XS7q3DMLwHqMmXUvoGtAgZTiVqAXOPlB39jvB0b2LcsukNoL pPWqayoIdW9Nge+E83siRCq3NRELl3ui1CHNEgvGTxCphitA1+OlZJQrBFj2IxpBsuI7 OqL6q+lDn6kFhRlnMVUGjoMx6N8teAVHCUvVXD+VM8jpkzW3SOP0RUjD2LSxBoRDE4M5 OP99Uwtyx2pNjnZ+DqkkO4GZpT9A9MLxfN2L8AWVWnyv+Fsq/32fW8wpw4Kzu4Khwxel 8K+w== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:date:in-reply-to:message-id:mime-version :references:subject:from:to:cc; bh=ZxYq8cG2sFhGgbw0k3aUDfwIzpbQidarvZYq7w9bkW0=; b=aMgJPP12PT0nQ4RT7EYcAR2CGRTl5T3IJJv9wxsKfxXQtUZufEDwhF4w+JcXYAJ2MG EoiHZIuaj55buNylOuRVcxSKfTsxllNG4bph9cxvm7sTmAdtRWCLtrHygFOqcJcX6vRP 8otEyEqhHf+lfvOcNeUEkK8b8+/rxArClmu2aUymalNuGsa/DaOuiRtB0pYG3zIDV0d3 Q3Zf5jq3UgyCv/UWAhI59D7LXau4zL2bQfeaSX6v91RiMd1Mnofq21Jv0ncoiznquqhU c+oU8ctGRzRSMFtzC4xi9ma+qEpw+ltk+XdrYo1xh77HZYdVflkhjqFcsuPgD8x3JAVP UVnw== X-Gm-Message-State: APjAAAV62L/TJ/aF3A7lbbhhhEvgZFx3ltvHp8JotCls3A+9SaUaEVW5 BJU/Sis9phIMIKFmkCIhXdwC4R9tIf+1zkGXmH88Fw== X-Google-Smtp-Source: APXvYqxlissl0NjOJ+77xdIz+6/F0YGZJeXa8wrNGBsNkoGBnW975xjqFKfU2vra4AZjmcWWJ9+pVUMa08cHnkbiVaF4kQ== X-Received: by 2002:a67:f3c3:: with SMTP id j3mr10831580vsn.206.1553624888095; Tue, 26 Mar 2019 11:28:08 -0700 (PDT) Date: Tue, 26 Mar 2019 11:27:21 -0700 In-Reply-To: <20190326182742.16950-1-matthewgarrett@google.com> Message-Id: <20190326182742.16950-6-matthewgarrett@google.com> Mime-Version: 1.0 References: <20190326182742.16950-1-matthewgarrett@google.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.21.0.392.gf8f6787159e-goog Subject: [PATCH V31 05/25] Copy secure_boot flag in boot params across kexec reboot From: Matthew Garrett To: jmorris@namei.org Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, dhowells@redhat.com, linux-api@vger.kernel.org, luto@kernel.org, Dave Young , Matthew Garrett , kexec@lists.infradead.org Sender: owner-linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Virus-Scanned: ClamAV using ClamSMTP From: Dave Young Kexec reboot in case secure boot being enabled does not keep the secure boot mode in new kernel, so later one can load unsigned kernel via legacy kexec_load. In this state, the system is missing the protections provided by secure boot. Adding a patch to fix this by retain the secure_boot flag in original kernel. secure_boot flag in boot_params is set in EFI stub, but kexec bypasses the stub. Fixing this issue by copying secure_boot flag across kexec reboot. Signed-off-by: Dave Young Signed-off-by: David Howells Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett cc: kexec@lists.infradead.org --- arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c index 278cd07228dd..d49554b948fd 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c @@ -179,6 +179,7 @@ setup_efi_state(struct boot_params *params, unsigned long params_load_addr, if (efi_enabled(EFI_OLD_MEMMAP)) return 0; + params->secure_boot = boot_params.secure_boot; ei->efi_loader_signature = current_ei->efi_loader_signature; ei->efi_systab = current_ei->efi_systab; ei->efi_systab_hi = current_ei->efi_systab_hi;