From patchwork Tue Mar 26 18:27:22 2019 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Matthew Garrett X-Patchwork-Id: 10871933 Return-Path: Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.125]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 02EC21669 for ; Tue, 26 Mar 2019 18:28:14 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id E05E228DD7 for ; Tue, 26 Mar 2019 18:28:13 +0000 (UTC) Received: by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix, from userid 486) id D4AB028DF9; Tue, 26 Mar 2019 18:28:13 +0000 (UTC) X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-14.5 required=2.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI,USER_IN_DEF_DKIM_WL autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 2E4D328DD7 for ; Tue, 26 Mar 2019 18:28:13 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1732610AbfCZS2M (ORCPT ); Tue, 26 Mar 2019 14:28:12 -0400 Received: from mail-ot1-f73.google.com ([209.85.210.73]:37994 "EHLO mail-ot1-f73.google.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1732624AbfCZS2L (ORCPT ); Tue, 26 Mar 2019 14:28:11 -0400 Received: by mail-ot1-f73.google.com with SMTP id u18so8868762otq.5 for ; Tue, 26 Mar 2019 11:28:10 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=google.com; s=20161025; h=date:in-reply-to:message-id:mime-version:references:subject:from:to :cc; bh=DR3rBb2V8Dk77n+84nIF0+Znm0UqE9/8zaxdQ5CO2lo=; b=qYJW/xs+nLDcVGGTYVEVD05T/qerxpSxu5bGyCDyqRIN2PQcO/8rizPMkEG5e9Q/K0 SFoDzqGhV+38csuM69grnxhhFT4BiwC+wwvUHZrsP2a+ElcfMDnOkJdguaVu2IjpjD0s 4wPlkPUTr2mESbl6ovuAdSF4bYbUZGmG7/erzjPE1iAdak1g83oCJZUEO6DVBhoUeB9z cw9AEgwlYCfHOS4TfzcHpZ+K9aDyCNS0FK2N4LaxlfjnZiVI0S8KvIXG+PGcu3zB6ILk JFIPhAeLRMIB8hYAG10DKu4KsQCQcgb5ie1C+bK/xLY0vr2tSMWjeAQxgrNQBlYjpf4B HH6g== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:date:in-reply-to:message-id:mime-version :references:subject:from:to:cc; bh=DR3rBb2V8Dk77n+84nIF0+Znm0UqE9/8zaxdQ5CO2lo=; b=aiaW3cTqTzPdQQjuUNIL9oVqIQd0PXWCCzze9dkDHZI2JQz3vf2lVdpEYkQhCwaoy9 Ae7Xz4g6aHgE4w/yQloLhZ11RlCso54lyeuBvzdsru2lvtp1EACdi76dZ39pbHEfXa3x uf5sYOvYmkr003UUDRVU2Ke9hE2anwcU0Jk4ePkyoPGd8bQA8ASQpNjSuMA3CSWENZyR ndjH8zVx5IBos5OQPnqYsbppQ/7PMNyT+ya9vLJD/kSF5yeSwzXCSNdVwXPjhuc043Qv uAleUDc6lBkvNagNdzSCiA2bDUc0mHUwzg0yzzERg+Elz0Fmc0aOcLwKEMJ5vuWVGsQb +UQw== X-Gm-Message-State: APjAAAX/zI5sFOKsECelK0FtzzT7jwEqPoD2KNTE0E1D2EzeDc5DE0gn vVmPG1HKCT36pSEIsrE12V44Rut3yUIm0/oi3XwJeg== X-Google-Smtp-Source: APXvYqw4gd1ZERpUGHBC5v8fMRulSwVLUw0V07pXZdOQJYCMHhe2tsQoihJIKx5WNOGpIu0Wee6WW9kbDcKmvL2X64t7og== X-Received: by 2002:a9d:76cb:: with SMTP id p11mr8330720otl.248.1553624890542; Tue, 26 Mar 2019 11:28:10 -0700 (PDT) Date: Tue, 26 Mar 2019 11:27:22 -0700 In-Reply-To: <20190326182742.16950-1-matthewgarrett@google.com> Message-Id: <20190326182742.16950-7-matthewgarrett@google.com> Mime-Version: 1.0 References: <20190326182742.16950-1-matthewgarrett@google.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.21.0.392.gf8f6787159e-goog Subject: [PATCH V31 06/25] kexec_file: split KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG into KEXEC_SIG and KEXEC_SIG_FORCE From: Matthew Garrett To: jmorris@namei.org Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, dhowells@redhat.com, linux-api@vger.kernel.org, luto@kernel.org, Jiri Bohac , Matthew Garrett , kexec@lists.infradead.org Sender: owner-linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Virus-Scanned: ClamAV using ClamSMTP From: Jiri Bohac This is a preparatory patch for kexec_file_load() lockdown. A locked down kernel needs to prevent unsigned kernel images from being loaded with kexec_file_load(). Currently, the only way to force the signature verification is compiling with KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG. This prevents loading usigned images even when the kernel is not locked down at runtime. This patch splits KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG into KEXEC_SIG and KEXEC_SIG_FORCE. Analogous to the MODULE_SIG and MODULE_SIG_FORCE for modules, KEXEC_SIG turns on the signature verification but allows unsigned images to be loaded. KEXEC_SIG_FORCE disallows images without a valid signature. [Modified by David Howells such that: (1) verify_pefile_signature() differentiates between no-signature and sig-didn't-match in its returned errors. (2) kexec fails with EKEYREJECTED and logs an appropriate message if signature checking is enforced and an signature is not found, uses unsupported crypto or has no matching key. (3) kexec fails with EKEYREJECTED if there is a signature for which we have a key, but signature doesn't match - even if in non-forcing mode. (4) kexec fails with EBADMSG or some other error if there is a signature which cannot be parsed - even if in non-forcing mode. (5) kexec fails with ELIBBAD if the PE file cannot be parsed to extract the signature - even if in non-forcing mode. ] Signed-off-by: Jiri Bohac Signed-off-by: David Howells Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett Reviewed-by: Jiri Bohac cc: kexec@lists.infradead.org --- arch/x86/Kconfig | 20 ++++++++--- crypto/asymmetric_keys/verify_pefile.c | 4 ++- include/linux/kexec.h | 4 +-- kernel/kexec_file.c | 48 ++++++++++++++++++++++---- 4 files changed, 61 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig index 4b4a7f32b68e..735d04a4b18f 100644 --- a/arch/x86/Kconfig +++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig @@ -2016,20 +2016,30 @@ config KEXEC_FILE config ARCH_HAS_KEXEC_PURGATORY def_bool KEXEC_FILE -config KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG +config KEXEC_SIG bool "Verify kernel signature during kexec_file_load() syscall" depends on KEXEC_FILE ---help--- - This option makes kernel signature verification mandatory for - the kexec_file_load() syscall. - In addition to that option, you need to enable signature + This option makes the kexec_file_load() syscall check for a valid + signature of the kernel image. The image can still be loaded without + a valid signature unless you also enable KEXEC_SIG_FORCE, though if + there's a signature that we can check, then it must be valid. + + In addition to this option, you need to enable signature verification for the corresponding kernel image type being loaded in order for this to work. +config KEXEC_SIG_FORCE + bool "Require a valid signature in kexec_file_load() syscall" + depends on KEXEC_SIG + ---help--- + This option makes kernel signature verification mandatory for + the kexec_file_load() syscall. + config KEXEC_BZIMAGE_VERIFY_SIG bool "Enable bzImage signature verification support" - depends on KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG + depends on KEXEC_SIG depends on SIGNED_PE_FILE_VERIFICATION select SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING ---help--- diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/verify_pefile.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/verify_pefile.c index d178650fd524..4473cea1e877 100644 --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/verify_pefile.c +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/verify_pefile.c @@ -100,7 +100,7 @@ static int pefile_parse_binary(const void *pebuf, unsigned int pelen, if (!ddir->certs.virtual_address || !ddir->certs.size) { pr_debug("Unsigned PE binary\n"); - return -EKEYREJECTED; + return -ENODATA; } chkaddr(ctx->header_size, ddir->certs.virtual_address, @@ -408,6 +408,8 @@ static int pefile_digest_pe(const void *pebuf, unsigned int pelen, * (*) 0 if at least one signature chain intersects with the keys in the trust * keyring, or: * + * (*) -ENODATA if there is no signature present. + * * (*) -ENOPKG if a suitable crypto module couldn't be found for a check on a * chain. * diff --git a/include/linux/kexec.h b/include/linux/kexec.h index b9b1bc5f9669..58b27c7bdc2b 100644 --- a/include/linux/kexec.h +++ b/include/linux/kexec.h @@ -125,7 +125,7 @@ typedef void *(kexec_load_t)(struct kimage *image, char *kernel_buf, unsigned long cmdline_len); typedef int (kexec_cleanup_t)(void *loader_data); -#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG +#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG typedef int (kexec_verify_sig_t)(const char *kernel_buf, unsigned long kernel_len); #endif @@ -134,7 +134,7 @@ struct kexec_file_ops { kexec_probe_t *probe; kexec_load_t *load; kexec_cleanup_t *cleanup; -#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG +#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG kexec_verify_sig_t *verify_sig; #endif }; diff --git a/kernel/kexec_file.c b/kernel/kexec_file.c index f1d0e00a3971..67f3a866eabe 100644 --- a/kernel/kexec_file.c +++ b/kernel/kexec_file.c @@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ int __weak arch_kimage_file_post_load_cleanup(struct kimage *image) return kexec_image_post_load_cleanup_default(image); } -#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG +#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG static int kexec_image_verify_sig_default(struct kimage *image, void *buf, unsigned long buf_len) { @@ -188,7 +188,8 @@ kimage_file_prepare_segments(struct kimage *image, int kernel_fd, int initrd_fd, const char __user *cmdline_ptr, unsigned long cmdline_len, unsigned flags) { - int ret = 0; + const char *reason; + int ret; void *ldata; loff_t size; @@ -207,15 +208,48 @@ kimage_file_prepare_segments(struct kimage *image, int kernel_fd, int initrd_fd, if (ret) goto out; -#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG +#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG ret = arch_kexec_kernel_verify_sig(image, image->kernel_buf, image->kernel_buf_len); - if (ret) { - pr_debug("kernel signature verification failed.\n"); +#else + ret = -ENODATA; +#endif + + switch (ret) { + case 0: + break; + + /* Certain verification errors are non-fatal if we're not + * checking errors, provided we aren't mandating that there + * must be a valid signature. + */ + case -ENODATA: + reason = "kexec of unsigned image"; + goto decide; + case -ENOPKG: + reason = "kexec of image with unsupported crypto"; + goto decide; + case -ENOKEY: + reason = "kexec of image with unavailable key"; + decide: + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG_FORCE)) { + pr_notice("%s rejected\n", reason); + ret = -EKEYREJECTED; + goto out; + } + + ret = 0; + break; + + /* All other errors are fatal, including nomem, unparseable + * signatures and signature check failures - even if signatures + * aren't required. + */ + default: + pr_notice("kernel signature verification failed (%d).\n", ret); goto out; } - pr_debug("kernel signature verification successful.\n"); -#endif + /* It is possible that there no initramfs is being loaded */ if (!(flags & KEXEC_FILE_NO_INITRAMFS)) { ret = kernel_read_file_from_fd(initrd_fd, &image->initrd_buf,