diff mbox series

[V32,09/27] uswsusp: Disable when the kernel is locked down

Message ID	20190404003249.14356-10-matthewgarrett@google.com (mailing list archive)
State	New, archived
Headers	show Return-Path: <linux-security-module-owner@kernel.org> Date: Wed, 3 Apr 2019 17:32:31 -0700 In-Reply-To: <20190404003249.14356-1-matthewgarrett@google.com> Message-Id: <20190404003249.14356-10-matthewgarrett@google.com> Mime-Version: 1.0 References: <20190404003249.14356-1-matthewgarrett@google.com> Subject: [PATCH V32 09/27] uswsusp: Disable when the kernel is locked down From: Matthew Garrett <matthewgarrett@google.com> To: jmorris@namei.org Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, dhowells@redhat.com, linux-api@vger.kernel.org, luto@kernel.org, Matthew Garrett <mjg59@srcf.ucam.org>, Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>, linux-pm@vger.kernel.org, pavel@ucw.cz, rjw@rjwysocki.net Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Sender: owner-linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk
Series	Lockdown patches for 5.2 \| expand [V32,0/27] Lockdown patches for 5.2 [V32,01/27] Add the ability to lock down access to the running kernel image [V32,02/27] Enforce module signatures if the kernel is locked down [V32,03/27] Restrict /dev/{mem,kmem,port} when the kernel is locked down [V32,04/27] kexec_load: Disable at runtime if the kernel is locked down [V32,05/27] Copy secure_boot flag in boot params across kexec reboot [V32,06/27] kexec_file: split KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG into KEXEC_SIG and KEXEC_SIG_FORCE [V32,07/27] kexec_file: Restrict at runtime if the kernel is locked down [V32,08/27] hibernate: Disable when the kernel is locked down [V32,09/27] uswsusp: Disable when the kernel is locked down [V32,10/27] PCI: Lock down BAR access when the kernel is locked down [V32,11/27] x86: Lock down IO port access when the kernel is locked down [V32,12/27] x86/msr: Restrict MSR access when the kernel is locked down [V32,13/27] ACPI: Limit access to custom_method when the kernel is locked down [V32,14/27] acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel param when the kernel has been locked down [V32,15/27] acpi: Disable ACPI table override if the kernel is locked down [V32,16/27] Prohibit PCMCIA CIS storage when the kernel is locked down [V32,17/27] Lock down TIOCSSERIAL [V32,18/27] Lock down module params that specify hardware parameters (eg. ioport) [V32,19/27] x86/mmiotrace: Lock down the testmmiotrace module [V32,20/27] Lock down /proc/kcore [V32,21/27] Lock down tracing and perf kprobes when in confidentiality mode [V32,22/27] bpf: Restrict bpf when kernel lockdown is in confidentiality mode [V32,23/27] Lock down perf when in confidentiality mode [V32,24/27] kexec: Allow kexec_file() with appropriate IMA policy when locked down [V32,25/27] lockdown: Print current->comm in restriction messages [V32,26/27] debugfs: Restrict debugfs when the kernel is locked down [V32,27/27] tracefs: Restrict tracefs when the kernel is locked down

Commit Message

Matthew Garrett April 4, 2019, 12:32 a.m. UTC

From: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@srcf.ucam.org>

uswsusp allows a user process to dump and then restore kernel state, which
makes it possible to modify the running kernel.  Disable this if the kernel
is locked down.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
cc: linux-pm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: pavel@ucw.cz
Cc: rjw@rjwysocki.net
---
 kernel/power/user.c | 3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)

diff mbox series

Patch

diff --git a/kernel/power/user.c b/kernel/power/user.c
index 2d8b60a3c86b..99e13fd13237 100644
--- a/kernel/power/user.c
+++ b/kernel/power/user.c
@@ -52,6 +52,9 @@  static int snapshot_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)
 	if (!hibernation_available())
 		return -EPERM;
 
+	if (kernel_is_locked_down("/dev/snapshot", LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY))
+		return -EPERM;
+
 	lock_system_sleep();
 
 	if (!atomic_add_unless(&snapshot_device_available, -1, 0)) {