From patchwork Thu Apr 4 00:32:27 2019 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Matthew Garrett X-Patchwork-Id: 10884695 Return-Path: Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.125]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 53A99922 for ; Thu, 4 Apr 2019 00:35:30 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 3C908262F2 for ; Thu, 4 Apr 2019 00:35:30 +0000 (UTC) Received: by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix, from userid 486) id 30E59289AF; Thu, 4 Apr 2019 00:35:30 +0000 (UTC) X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-14.5 required=2.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI,USER_IN_DEF_DKIM_WL autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id D0424285A6 for ; Thu, 4 Apr 2019 00:35:29 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1726670AbfDDAfY (ORCPT ); Wed, 3 Apr 2019 20:35:24 -0400 Received: from mail-oi1-f202.google.com ([209.85.167.202]:45374 "EHLO mail-oi1-f202.google.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1726602AbfDDAdH (ORCPT ); Wed, 3 Apr 2019 20:33:07 -0400 Received: by mail-oi1-f202.google.com with SMTP id v1so339348oif.12 for ; Wed, 03 Apr 2019 17:33:07 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=google.com; s=20161025; h=date:in-reply-to:message-id:mime-version:references:subject:from:to :cc; bh=ZxYq8cG2sFhGgbw0k3aUDfwIzpbQidarvZYq7w9bkW0=; b=cTbmRxtu2jUwcJETn1cw2HiL44MplIt+di+W0OqpKWmtj0D+RjaWKI6JUmwDvqOjgc Rl96fi5FPAJb06vs3tp+PtGIXumG8NcOOZdl96kpieo3+S/JUj6mocPiKjl0ZUYS40Gy 9Bi3BAPvZVKk8p6ORLM1tRfxHvU55s9pgGNijeTtpD4/UCgvsJ5LLMGhqk0gLL6/3nSO eZvDEvkUN/JIr/KgnIbcdcF5qWY+SiuWdu8O/9z1tVt2QFjSefCCnpamKII+wI6rIG8c oEPm3tbJ2jTPZch5fe5hzqK76tr/s3RmZkXLbhe92GGHVvJyD0BNCPAMfcmoyIZLa2W5 w+/Q== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:date:in-reply-to:message-id:mime-version :references:subject:from:to:cc; bh=ZxYq8cG2sFhGgbw0k3aUDfwIzpbQidarvZYq7w9bkW0=; b=ZFRC5O6kK44nM5EbUAqCYBrzx5UrohdZLPYpQgCCOShg060Jt5TUwIwBb9heueUQmN +f4ieu/dqfylxvIYztv+G1X6ptDnlgnBFsrUEF97wSjgIJE4tDVpxYyYaKQ+KIRXSKWD Zn2UCwN+B29+ijYISFQgTIFKYBF3m0052qd5WU9Hf5KNIBXiQ6CbCD+saQAlsXwifNon KqNsWY82EftfGhyhOHD8Nkfpny4anQpBDu1FslcMwEVOt6HPe6RDU07sE5Jm/YFoPwZj WnBtF4ok3g2XEv5YJ2RUMy2WPLx0gUML7a3P7AdPmjwDqoLSDkVf8teJpKYtdG4hjeSi C27A== X-Gm-Message-State: APjAAAWllUY81UqKRhpG9CRjwMWnOFfJY9v99QVxRbjiFypmteDp0D3b pfCUdX1GIP6nMmqjD60PyRsD6qKWdbmCpFUXmjL7rw== X-Google-Smtp-Source: APXvYqzeF/5ARGboj1rgaNG0wh8/NpDdVQj41bbjjfIzlbjV3l72O+FbucqOLXfi3OQDi/HWRtdsLh1FkxcoQ+FI+UeeQA== X-Received: by 2002:a9d:6208:: with SMTP id g8mr289988otj.15.1554337987036; Wed, 03 Apr 2019 17:33:07 -0700 (PDT) Date: Wed, 3 Apr 2019 17:32:27 -0700 In-Reply-To: <20190404003249.14356-1-matthewgarrett@google.com> Message-Id: <20190404003249.14356-6-matthewgarrett@google.com> Mime-Version: 1.0 References: <20190404003249.14356-1-matthewgarrett@google.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.21.0.392.gf8f6787159e-goog Subject: [PATCH V32 05/27] Copy secure_boot flag in boot params across kexec reboot From: Matthew Garrett To: jmorris@namei.org Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, dhowells@redhat.com, linux-api@vger.kernel.org, luto@kernel.org, Dave Young , Matthew Garrett , kexec@lists.infradead.org Sender: owner-linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Virus-Scanned: ClamAV using ClamSMTP From: Dave Young Kexec reboot in case secure boot being enabled does not keep the secure boot mode in new kernel, so later one can load unsigned kernel via legacy kexec_load. In this state, the system is missing the protections provided by secure boot. Adding a patch to fix this by retain the secure_boot flag in original kernel. secure_boot flag in boot_params is set in EFI stub, but kexec bypasses the stub. Fixing this issue by copying secure_boot flag across kexec reboot. Signed-off-by: Dave Young Signed-off-by: David Howells Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett cc: kexec@lists.infradead.org --- arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c index 278cd07228dd..d49554b948fd 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c @@ -179,6 +179,7 @@ setup_efi_state(struct boot_params *params, unsigned long params_load_addr, if (efi_enabled(EFI_OLD_MEMMAP)) return 0; + params->secure_boot = boot_params.secure_boot; ei->efi_loader_signature = current_ei->efi_loader_signature; ei->efi_systab = current_ei->efi_systab; ei->efi_systab_hi = current_ei->efi_systab_hi;