| Message ID | 20190410165558.211483-1-mortonm@chromium.org (mailing list archive) |
|---|---|
| State | New, archived |
| Headers | show |
| Series | [01/10] LSM: SafeSetID: fix pr_warn() to include newline | expand |
On Wed, Apr 10, 2019 at 9:56 AM Micah Morton <mortonm@chromium.org> wrote: > > From: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> > > Looking at current_cred() in write handlers is bad form, stop doing that. > > Also, let's just require that the write is coming from the initial user > namespace. Especially SAFESETID_WHITELIST_FLUSH requires privilege over all > namespaces, and SAFESETID_WHITELIST_ADD should probably require it as well. > > Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> > Signed-off-by: Micah Morton <mortonm@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> -Kees > --- > security/safesetid/securityfs.c | 6 +++--- > 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/security/safesetid/securityfs.c b/security/safesetid/securityfs.c > index 87e42b7f3e33..76c1e8a6ab93 100644 > --- a/security/safesetid/securityfs.c > +++ b/security/safesetid/securityfs.c > @@ -59,8 +59,8 @@ static int parse_policy_line( > if (ret) > return ret; > > - *parent = make_kuid(current_user_ns(), parsed_parent); > - *child = make_kuid(current_user_ns(), parsed_child); > + *parent = make_kuid(file->f_cred->user_ns, parsed_parent); > + *child = make_kuid(file->f_cred->user_ns, parsed_child); > if (!uid_valid(*parent) || !uid_valid(*child)) > return -EINVAL; > > @@ -92,7 +92,7 @@ static ssize_t safesetid_file_write(struct file *file, > kuid_t child; > int ret; > > - if (!ns_capable(current_user_ns(), CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) > + if (!file_ns_capable(file, &init_user_ns, CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) > return -EPERM; > > if (*ppos != 0) > -- > 2.21.0.392.gf8f6787159e-goog >
Ready for merge. On Wed, Apr 10, 2019 at 10:16 AM Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> wrote: > > On Wed, Apr 10, 2019 at 9:56 AM Micah Morton <mortonm@chromium.org> wrote: > > > > From: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> > > > > Looking at current_cred() in write handlers is bad form, stop doing that. > > > > Also, let's just require that the write is coming from the initial user > > namespace. Especially SAFESETID_WHITELIST_FLUSH requires privilege over all > > namespaces, and SAFESETID_WHITELIST_ADD should probably require it as well. > > > > Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> > > Signed-off-by: Micah Morton <mortonm@chromium.org> > > Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> > > -Kees > > > --- > > security/safesetid/securityfs.c | 6 +++--- > > 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) > > > > diff --git a/security/safesetid/securityfs.c b/security/safesetid/securityfs.c > > index 87e42b7f3e33..76c1e8a6ab93 100644 > > --- a/security/safesetid/securityfs.c > > +++ b/security/safesetid/securityfs.c > > @@ -59,8 +59,8 @@ static int parse_policy_line( > > if (ret) > > return ret; > > > > - *parent = make_kuid(current_user_ns(), parsed_parent); > > - *child = make_kuid(current_user_ns(), parsed_child); > > + *parent = make_kuid(file->f_cred->user_ns, parsed_parent); > > + *child = make_kuid(file->f_cred->user_ns, parsed_child); > > if (!uid_valid(*parent) || !uid_valid(*child)) > > return -EINVAL; > > > > @@ -92,7 +92,7 @@ static ssize_t safesetid_file_write(struct file *file, > > kuid_t child; > > int ret; > > > > - if (!ns_capable(current_user_ns(), CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) > > + if (!file_ns_capable(file, &init_user_ns, CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) > > return -EPERM; > > > > if (*ppos != 0) > > -- > > 2.21.0.392.gf8f6787159e-goog > > > > > -- > Kees Cook
diff --git a/security/safesetid/securityfs.c b/security/safesetid/securityfs.c index 87e42b7f3e33..76c1e8a6ab93 100644 --- a/security/safesetid/securityfs.c +++ b/security/safesetid/securityfs.c @@ -59,8 +59,8 @@ static int parse_policy_line( if (ret) return ret; - *parent = make_kuid(current_user_ns(), parsed_parent); - *child = make_kuid(current_user_ns(), parsed_child); + *parent = make_kuid(file->f_cred->user_ns, parsed_parent); + *child = make_kuid(file->f_cred->user_ns, parsed_child); if (!uid_valid(*parent) || !uid_valid(*child)) return -EINVAL; @@ -92,7 +92,7 @@ static ssize_t safesetid_file_write(struct file *file, kuid_t child; int ret; - if (!ns_capable(current_user_ns(), CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) + if (!file_ns_capable(file, &init_user_ns, CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) return -EPERM; if (*ppos != 0)