From patchwork Mon Apr 22 18:58:04 2019 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: "Edgecombe, Rick P" X-Patchwork-Id: 10911415 Return-Path: Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.125]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 809521515 for ; Mon, 22 Apr 2019 18:59:18 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 756DC28762 for ; Mon, 22 Apr 2019 18:59:18 +0000 (UTC) Received: by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix, from userid 486) id 68CD928793; Mon, 22 Apr 2019 18:59:18 +0000 (UTC) X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-6.9 required=2.0 tests=BAYES_00,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI autolearn=unavailable version=3.3.1 Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 0285B28762 for ; Mon, 22 Apr 2019 18:59:18 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1728821AbfDVS7H (ORCPT ); Mon, 22 Apr 2019 14:59:07 -0400 Received: from mga11.intel.com ([192.55.52.93]:60347 "EHLO mga11.intel.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1728772AbfDVS6s (ORCPT ); Mon, 22 Apr 2019 14:58:48 -0400 X-Amp-Result: SKIPPED(no attachment in message) X-Amp-File-Uploaded: False Received: from orsmga008.jf.intel.com ([10.7.209.65]) by fmsmga102.fm.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 22 Apr 2019 11:58:47 -0700 X-ExtLoop1: 1 X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.60,382,1549958400"; d="scan'208";a="136417182" Received: from linksys13920.jf.intel.com (HELO rpedgeco-DESK5.jf.intel.com) ([10.54.75.11]) by orsmga008.jf.intel.com with ESMTP; 22 Apr 2019 11:58:42 -0700 From: Rick Edgecombe To: Borislav Petkov , Andy Lutomirski , Ingo Molnar Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org, hpa@zytor.com, Thomas Gleixner , Nadav Amit , Dave Hansen , Peter Zijlstra , linux_dti@icloud.com, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, akpm@linux-foundation.org, kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com, linux-mm@kvack.org, will.deacon@arm.com, ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org, kristen@linux.intel.com, deneen.t.dock@intel.com, Nadav Amit , Rick Edgecombe Subject: [PATCH v4 22/23] tlb: provide default nmi_uaccess_okay() Date: Mon, 22 Apr 2019 11:58:04 -0700 Message-Id: <20190422185805.1169-23-rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.17.1 In-Reply-To: <20190422185805.1169-1-rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com> References: <20190422185805.1169-1-rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com> Sender: owner-linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Virus-Scanned: ClamAV using ClamSMTP From: Nadav Amit x86 has an nmi_uaccess_okay(), but other architectures do not. Arch-independent code might need to know whether access to user addresses is ok in an NMI context or in other code whose execution context is unknown. Specifically, this function is needed for bpf_probe_write_user(). Add a default implementation of nmi_uaccess_okay() for architectures that do not have such a function. Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit Signed-off-by: Rick Edgecombe --- arch/x86/include/asm/tlbflush.h | 2 ++ include/asm-generic/tlb.h | 9 +++++++++ 2 files changed, 11 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/tlbflush.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/tlbflush.h index 90926e8dd1f8..dee375831962 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/tlbflush.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/tlbflush.h @@ -274,6 +274,8 @@ static inline bool nmi_uaccess_okay(void) return true; } +#define nmi_uaccess_okay nmi_uaccess_okay + /* Initialize cr4 shadow for this CPU. */ static inline void cr4_init_shadow(void) { diff --git a/include/asm-generic/tlb.h b/include/asm-generic/tlb.h index b9edc7608d90..480e5b2a5748 100644 --- a/include/asm-generic/tlb.h +++ b/include/asm-generic/tlb.h @@ -21,6 +21,15 @@ #include #include +/* + * Blindly accessing user memory from NMI context can be dangerous + * if we're in the middle of switching the current user task or switching + * the loaded mm. + */ +#ifndef nmi_uaccess_okay +# define nmi_uaccess_okay() true +#endif + #ifdef CONFIG_MMU /*