| Message ID | 20190516161257.6640-4-roberto.sassu@huawei.com (mailing list archive) |
|---|---|
| State | New, archived |
| Headers | show |
| Series | [1/4] evm: check hash algorithm passed to init_desc() | expand |
On Thu, 2019-05-16 at 18:12 +0200, Roberto Sassu wrote: > This patch ensures that integrity_audit_msg() is called only when the > status is not INTEGRITY_PASS. > > Fixes: 8606404fa555c ("ima: digital signature verification support") > Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> > Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org > --- > security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 5 +++-- > 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c > index a32ed5d7afd1..f5f4506bcb8e 100644 > --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c > +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c > @@ -359,8 +359,9 @@ int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func, > status = INTEGRITY_PASS; > } > > - integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_DATA, inode, filename, > - op, cause, rc, 0); > + if (status != INTEGRITY_PASS) > + integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_DATA, inode, > + filename, op, cause, rc, 0); For some reason, the integrity verification has failed. In some specific cases, we'll let it pass, but do we really want to remove any indication that it failed in all cases? Mimi > } else { > ima_cache_flags(iint, func); > }
On 5/20/2019 11:20 PM, Mimi Zohar wrote: > On Thu, 2019-05-16 at 18:12 +0200, Roberto Sassu wrote: >> This patch ensures that integrity_audit_msg() is called only when the >> status is not INTEGRITY_PASS. >> >> Fixes: 8606404fa555c ("ima: digital signature verification support") >> Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> >> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org >> --- >> security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 5 +++-- >> 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) >> >> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c >> index a32ed5d7afd1..f5f4506bcb8e 100644 >> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c >> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c >> @@ -359,8 +359,9 @@ int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func, >> status = INTEGRITY_PASS; >> } >> >> - integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_DATA, inode, filename, >> - op, cause, rc, 0); >> + if (status != INTEGRITY_PASS) >> + integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_DATA, inode, >> + filename, op, cause, rc, 0); > > For some reason, the integrity verification has failed. In some > specific cases, we'll let it pass, but do we really want to remove any > indication that it failed in all cases? Ok. It is fine for me to discard the patch. Roberto
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c index a32ed5d7afd1..f5f4506bcb8e 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c @@ -359,8 +359,9 @@ int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func, status = INTEGRITY_PASS; } - integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_DATA, inode, filename, - op, cause, rc, 0); + if (status != INTEGRITY_PASS) + integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_DATA, inode, + filename, op, cause, rc, 0); } else { ima_cache_flags(iint, func); }
This patch ensures that integrity_audit_msg() is called only when the status is not INTEGRITY_PASS. Fixes: 8606404fa555c ("ima: digital signature verification support") Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org --- security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 5 +++-- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)