Message ID | 20190622000358.19895-3-matthewgarrett@google.com (mailing list archive) |
---|---|
State | New, archived |
Headers | show |
Series | Lockdown as an LSM | expand |
On Fri, Jun 21, 2019 at 05:03:31PM -0700, Matthew Garrett wrote: > Add a mechanism to allow LSMs to make a policy decision around whether > kernel functionality that would allow tampering with or examining the > runtime state of the kernel should be permitted. > > Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> -Kees > --- > include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 2 ++ > include/linux/security.h | 11 +++++++++++ > security/security.c | 6 ++++++ > 3 files changed, 19 insertions(+) > > diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h > index 66fd1eac7a32..df2aebc99838 100644 > --- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h > +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h > @@ -1790,6 +1790,7 @@ union security_list_options { > int (*bpf_prog_alloc_security)(struct bpf_prog_aux *aux); > void (*bpf_prog_free_security)(struct bpf_prog_aux *aux); > #endif /* CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL */ > + int (*locked_down)(enum lockdown_reason what); > }; > > struct security_hook_heads { > @@ -2027,6 +2028,7 @@ struct security_hook_heads { > struct hlist_head bpf_prog_alloc_security; > struct hlist_head bpf_prog_free_security; > #endif /* CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL */ > + struct hlist_head locked_down; > } __randomize_layout; > > /* > diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h > index 1bb6fb2f1523..9eaf02e70707 100644 > --- a/include/linux/security.h > +++ b/include/linux/security.h > @@ -76,6 +76,12 @@ enum lsm_event { > LSM_POLICY_CHANGE, > }; > > +enum lockdown_reason { > + LOCKDOWN_NONE, > + LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX, > + LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX, > +}; > + > /* These functions are in security/commoncap.c */ > extern int cap_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns, > int cap, unsigned int opts); > @@ -389,6 +395,7 @@ void security_inode_invalidate_secctx(struct inode *inode); > int security_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen); > int security_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen); > int security_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen); > +int security_locked_down(enum lockdown_reason what); > #else /* CONFIG_SECURITY */ > > static inline int call_lsm_notifier(enum lsm_event event, void *data) > @@ -1189,6 +1196,10 @@ static inline int security_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 > { > return -EOPNOTSUPP; > } > +static inline int security_locked_down(enum lockdown_reason what) > +{ > + return 0; > +} > #endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY */ > > #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK > diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c > index 487e1f3eb2df..553f50e9a106 100644 > --- a/security/security.c > +++ b/security/security.c > @@ -2382,3 +2382,9 @@ void security_bpf_prog_free(struct bpf_prog_aux *aux) > call_void_hook(bpf_prog_free_security, aux); > } > #endif /* CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL */ > + > +int security_locked_down(enum lockdown_reason what) > +{ > + return call_int_hook(locked_down, 0, what); > +} > +EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_locked_down); > -- > 2.22.0.410.gd8fdbe21b5-goog >
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h index 66fd1eac7a32..df2aebc99838 100644 --- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h @@ -1790,6 +1790,7 @@ union security_list_options { int (*bpf_prog_alloc_security)(struct bpf_prog_aux *aux); void (*bpf_prog_free_security)(struct bpf_prog_aux *aux); #endif /* CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL */ + int (*locked_down)(enum lockdown_reason what); }; struct security_hook_heads { @@ -2027,6 +2028,7 @@ struct security_hook_heads { struct hlist_head bpf_prog_alloc_security; struct hlist_head bpf_prog_free_security; #endif /* CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL */ + struct hlist_head locked_down; } __randomize_layout; /* diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h index 1bb6fb2f1523..9eaf02e70707 100644 --- a/include/linux/security.h +++ b/include/linux/security.h @@ -76,6 +76,12 @@ enum lsm_event { LSM_POLICY_CHANGE, }; +enum lockdown_reason { + LOCKDOWN_NONE, + LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX, + LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX, +}; + /* These functions are in security/commoncap.c */ extern int cap_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns, int cap, unsigned int opts); @@ -389,6 +395,7 @@ void security_inode_invalidate_secctx(struct inode *inode); int security_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen); int security_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen); int security_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen); +int security_locked_down(enum lockdown_reason what); #else /* CONFIG_SECURITY */ static inline int call_lsm_notifier(enum lsm_event event, void *data) @@ -1189,6 +1196,10 @@ static inline int security_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 { return -EOPNOTSUPP; } +static inline int security_locked_down(enum lockdown_reason what) +{ + return 0; +} #endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY */ #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index 487e1f3eb2df..553f50e9a106 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -2382,3 +2382,9 @@ void security_bpf_prog_free(struct bpf_prog_aux *aux) call_void_hook(bpf_prog_free_security, aux); } #endif /* CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL */ + +int security_locked_down(enum lockdown_reason what) +{ + return call_int_hook(locked_down, 0, what); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_locked_down);
Add a mechanism to allow LSMs to make a policy decision around whether kernel functionality that would allow tampering with or examining the runtime state of the kernel should be permitted. Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com> --- include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 2 ++ include/linux/security.h | 11 +++++++++++ security/security.c | 6 ++++++ 3 files changed, 19 insertions(+)