new file mode 100644
@@ -0,0 +1,150 @@
+.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+
+.. Copyright 2019 Google LLC.
+
+==========================
+eBPF Linux Security Module
+==========================
+
+This LSM allows runtime instrumentation of the LSM hooks by privileged users to
+implement system-wide MAC (Mandatory Access Control) and Audit policies using
+eBPF. The LSM is privileged and stackable and requires both ``CAP_SYS_ADMIN``
+and ``CAP_MAC_ADMIN`` for the loading of BPF programs and modification of MAC
+policies respectively.
+
+eBPF Programs
+==============
+
+`eBPF (extended BPF) <https://cilium.readthedocs.io/en/latest/bpf>`_ is a
+virtual machine-like construct in the Linux Kernel allowing the execution of
+verifiable, just-in-time compiled byte code at various points in the Kernel.
+
+The eBPF LSM adds a new type, ``BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM``, of eBPF programs which
+have the following characteristics:
+
+ * Multiple eBPF programs can be attached to the same LSM hook
+ * The programs are always run after the static hooks (i.e. the ones
+ registered by SELinux, AppArmor, Smack etc.)
+ * LSM hooks can return an ``-EPERM`` to indicate the decision of the
+ MAC policy being enforced or simply be used for auditing
+ * If ``CONFIG_SECURITY_BPF_ENFORCE`` is enabled and a non-zero error
+ code is returned from the BPF program, no further BPF programs for the hook are executed
+ * Allowing the eBPF programs to be attached to all the LSM hooks by
+ making :doc:`/bpf/btf` type information available for all LSM hooks
+ and allowing the BPF verifier to perform runtime relocations and
+ validation on the programs
+
+Structure
+---------
+
+The example shows an eBPF program that can be attached to the ``file_mprotect``
+LSM hook:
+
+.. c:function:: int file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long reqprot, unsigned long prot);
+
+eBPF programs that use :doc:`/bpf/btf` do not need to include kernel headers
+for accessing information from the attached eBPF program's context. They can
+simply declare the structures in the eBPF program and only specify the fields
+that need to be accessed.
+
+.. code-block:: c
+
+ struct mm_struct {
+ unsigned long start_brk, brk, start_stack;
+ } __attribute__((preserve_access_index));
+
+ struct vm_area_struct {
+ unsigned long start_brk, brk, start_stack;
+ unsigned long vm_start, vm_end;
+ struct mm_struct *vm_mm;
+ } __attribute__((preserve_access_index));
+
+
+.. note:: Only the size and the names of the fields must match the type in the
+ kernel and the order of the fields is irrelevant.
+
+The eBPF programs can be declared using macros similar to the ``BPF_TRACE_<N>``
+macros defined in `tools/testing/selftests/bpf/bpf_trace_helpers.h`_. In this
+example:
+
+ * The LSM hook takes 3 args so we use ``BPF_TRACE_3``
+ * ``"lsm/file_mprotect"`` indicates the LSM hook that the program must
+ be attached to
+ * ``mprotect_audit`` is the name of the eBPF program
+
+.. code-block:: c
+
+ SEC("lsm/file_mprotect")
+ int BPF_PROG(mprotect_audit, struct vm_area_struct *vma,
+ unsigned long reqprot, unsigned long prot)
+ {
+ int is_heap;
+
+ is_heap = (vma->vm_start >= vma->vm_mm->start_brk &&
+ vma->vm_end <= vma->vm_mm->brk);
+
+ /*
+ * Return an -EPERM or write information to the perf events buffer
+ * for auditing
+ */
+ }
+
+The ``__attribute__((preserve_access_index))`` is a clang feature that allows
+the BPF verifier to update the offsets for the access at runtime using the
+:doc:`/bpf/btf` information. Since the BPF verifier is aware of the types, it
+also validates all the accesses made to the various types in the eBPF program.
+
+Loading
+-------
+
+eBPP programs can be loaded with the :manpage:`bpf(2)` syscall's
+``BPF_PROG_LOAD`` operation or more simply by using the the libbpf helper
+``bpf_prog_load_xattr``:
+
+
+.. code-block:: c
+
+ struct bpf_prog_load_attr attr = {
+ .file = "./prog.o",
+ };
+ struct bpf_object *prog_obj;
+ struct bpf_program *prog;
+ int prog_fd;
+
+ bpf_prog_load_xattr(&attr, &prog_obj, &prog_fd);
+
+Attachment to LSM Hooks
+-----------------------
+
+The LSM allows attachment of eBPF programs as LSM hooks using :manpage:`bpf(2)`
+syscall's ``BPF_PROG_ATTACH`` operation or more simply by
+using the libbpf helper ``bpf_program__attach_lsm``. In the code shown below
+``prog`` is the eBPF program loaded using ``BPF_PROG_LOAD``:
+
+.. code-block:: c
+
+ struct bpf_link *link;
+
+ link = bpf_program__attach_lsm(prog);
+
+The program can be detached from the LSM hook by *destroying* the ``link``
+link returned by ``bpf_program__attach_lsm``:
+
+.. code-block:: c
+
+ link->destroy();
+
+Examples
+--------
+
+An example eBPF program can be found in
+`tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/lsm_mprotect_audit.c`_ and the corresponding
+userspace code in
+`tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/lsm_mprotect_audit.c`_
+
+.. Links
+.. _tools/testing/selftests/bpf/bpf_trace_helpers.h:
+ https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/tree/tools/testing/selftests/selftests/bpf/bpf_trace_helpers.h
+.. _tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/lsm_mprotect_audit.c:
+ https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/tree/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/lsm_mprotect_audit.c
+.. _tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/lsm_mprotect_audit.c:
+ https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/tree/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/lsm_mprotect_audit.c
@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ Security Documentation
.. toctree::
:maxdepth: 1
+ bpf
credentials
IMA-templates
keys/index
@@ -3212,6 +3212,7 @@ F: security/bpf/
F: include/linux/bpf_lsm.h
F: tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/lsm_mprotect_audit.c
F: tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/lsm_mprotect_audit.c
+F: Documentation/security/bpf.rst
BROADCOM B44 10/100 ETHERNET DRIVER
M: Michael Chan <michael.chan@broadcom.com>