From patchwork Wed Mar 4 01:55:25 2020 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: KP Singh X-Patchwork-Id: 11419087 Return-Path: Received: from mail.kernel.org (pdx-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.123]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 571ED92A for ; Wed, 4 Mar 2020 01:55:45 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 38A65208C3 for ; Wed, 4 Mar 2020 01:55:45 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=chromium.org header.i=@chromium.org header.b="Qj2MnbGG" Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S2387608AbgCDBzo (ORCPT ); Tue, 3 Mar 2020 20:55:44 -0500 Received: from mail-wm1-f66.google.com ([209.85.128.66]:53943 "EHLO mail-wm1-f66.google.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S2387580AbgCDBzm (ORCPT ); Tue, 3 Mar 2020 20:55:42 -0500 Received: by mail-wm1-f66.google.com with SMTP id g134so147821wme.3 for ; Tue, 03 Mar 2020 17:55:41 -0800 (PST) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=chromium.org; s=google; h=from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:in-reply-to:references :mime-version:content-transfer-encoding; bh=LFwEDFxwFXmUVLWHUZGmwB/3Av3jfmxGtvvX+N4FdrI=; b=Qj2MnbGGaVof30dTj27lh/GZBYLE3PIXTsAxY968A4WBF2LCnLGMHNx5w536mCOBWJ kWzWp+sIQJ0HY2sfzs6Gv0oivqxnZ48PvtYlJSfAqI0rLyefi4arTvONE9v+n/Wmrnzl 54vExE7YOctQs++jGd+knO1HDUin25BmGNJWI= X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:in-reply-to :references:mime-version:content-transfer-encoding; bh=LFwEDFxwFXmUVLWHUZGmwB/3Av3jfmxGtvvX+N4FdrI=; b=NpkJtoek5Zj5pc+nofEKLS/SyKMt1Ti0frHNLq+Bh776y/2s14mm1XsMxqfVX+Ff06 F00dO8EkMHW+/yMSP60PNDQMmUx9B51N/0QVmqMP9OBhVy9vFCD8mZkaPR/vaam1bxF0 Y+s2lF0nYlM/rr1HolKSU7LUaKwN5cZFJVghBjdkxJRmaCFRNVRykN55ZjudG3S5joRI Tc0hVk4uOQJlsLhJAwcolPPvhucx7P1FpVMwHto1MgUB8bl3/JABqvJiGBhJJvmNd/Z0 3+yNjhO9foeRkUJ1WywlW0VN8y30f1d1KBHXZIj+FD7wq90GyZzjKrxZC92bwuISaBbT dZWg== X-Gm-Message-State: ANhLgQ0PFNuCj6GCMEVz33MslI6CNmiy0fafwq9+igpKDIvWdBx15ooC UV48sxAAJ/eG5OBC3sO3OIkCRSjjyi0= X-Google-Smtp-Source: ADFU+vtP1w+hxhEvIU1HHqb6T0eu+C852+A3z482LZmcNH4X4lYJTf3fu9OeA25zRoU99Q/fgMWESQ== X-Received: by 2002:a1c:9dcb:: with SMTP id g194mr623325wme.114.1583286940417; Tue, 03 Mar 2020 17:55:40 -0800 (PST) Received: from kpsingh-kernel.localdomain (77-56-209-237.dclient.hispeed.ch. [77.56.209.237]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id a184sm1475444wmf.29.2020.03.03.17.55.39 (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 bits=256/256); Tue, 03 Mar 2020 17:55:39 -0800 (PST) From: KP Singh To: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, bpf@vger.kernel.org Cc: Alexei Starovoitov , Daniel Borkmann , Paul Turner , Jann Horn , Florent Revest , Brendan Jackman Subject: [PATCH bpf-next v2 4/7] bpf: Attachment verification for BPF_MODIFY_RETURN Date: Wed, 4 Mar 2020 02:55:25 +0100 Message-Id: <20200304015528.29661-5-kpsingh@chromium.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.20.1 In-Reply-To: <20200304015528.29661-1-kpsingh@chromium.org> References: <20200304015528.29661-1-kpsingh@chromium.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Sender: owner-linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: From: KP Singh - Allow BPF_MODIFY_RETURN attachment only to functions that are: * Whitelisted by for error injection i.e. by checking within_error_injection_list. Similar disucssions happened for the bpf_overrie_return helper. * security hooks, this is expected to be cleaned up with the LSM changes after the KRSI patches introduce the LSM_HOOK macro: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200220175250.10795-1-kpsingh@chromium.org/ - The attachment is currently limited to functions that return an int. This can be extended later other types (e.g. PTR). Signed-off-by: KP Singh Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko --- kernel/bpf/btf.c | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++-------- kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 31 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 51 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/kernel/bpf/btf.c b/kernel/bpf/btf.c index 30841fb8b3c0..50080add2ab9 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/btf.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/btf.c @@ -3710,14 +3710,26 @@ bool btf_ctx_access(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type, nr_args--; } - if ((prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_TRACE_FEXIT || - prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_MODIFY_RETURN) && - arg == nr_args) { - if (!t) - /* Default prog with 5 args. 6th arg is retval. */ - return true; - /* function return type */ - t = btf_type_by_id(btf, t->type); + if (arg == nr_args) { + if (prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_TRACE_FEXIT) { + if (!t) + return true; + t = btf_type_by_id(btf, t->type); + } else if (prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_MODIFY_RETURN) { + /* For now the BPF_MODIFY_RETURN can only be attached to + * functions that return an int. + */ + if (!t) + return false; + + t = btf_type_skip_modifiers(btf, t->type, NULL); + if (!btf_type_is_int(t)) { + bpf_log(log, + "ret type %s not allowed for fmod_ret\n", + btf_kind_str[BTF_INFO_KIND(t->info)]); + return false; + } + } } else if (arg >= nr_args) { bpf_log(log, "func '%s' doesn't have %d-th argument\n", tname, arg + 1); diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c index 2460c8e6b5be..ae32517d4ccd 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c @@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include "disasm.h" @@ -9800,6 +9801,33 @@ static int check_struct_ops_btf_id(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) return 0; } +#define SECURITY_PREFIX "security_" + +static int check_attach_modify_return(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) +{ + struct bpf_prog *prog = env->prog; + unsigned long addr = (unsigned long) prog->aux->trampoline->func.addr; + + if (within_error_injection_list(addr)) + return 0; + + /* This is expected to be cleaned up in the future with the KRSI effort + * introducing the LSM_HOOK macro for cleaning up lsm_hooks.h. + */ + if (!strncmp(SECURITY_PREFIX, prog->aux->attach_func_name, + sizeof(SECURITY_PREFIX) - 1)) { + + if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) + return -EPERM; + + return 0; + } + + verbose(env, "fmod_ret attach_btf_id %u (%s) is not modifiable\n", + prog->aux->attach_btf_id, prog->aux->attach_func_name); + + return -EINVAL; +} static int check_attach_btf_id(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) { @@ -10000,6 +10028,9 @@ static int check_attach_btf_id(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) } tr->func.addr = (void *)addr; prog->aux->trampoline = tr; + + if (prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_MODIFY_RETURN) + ret = check_attach_modify_return(env); out: mutex_unlock(&tr->mutex); if (ret)