From patchwork Fri Mar 20 19:19:03 2020 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Waiman Long X-Patchwork-Id: 11450209 Return-Path: Received: from mail.kernel.org (pdx-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.123]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 446491668 for ; Fri, 20 Mar 2020 19:19:30 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 19F0E20739 for ; Fri, 20 Mar 2020 19:19:30 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=redhat.com header.i=@redhat.com header.b="anm9V0gj" Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1727240AbgCTTT2 (ORCPT ); Fri, 20 Mar 2020 15:19:28 -0400 Received: from us-smtp-delivery-74.mimecast.com ([63.128.21.74]:58787 "EHLO us-smtp-delivery-74.mimecast.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1727357AbgCTTT2 (ORCPT ); Fri, 20 Mar 2020 15:19:28 -0400 DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=redhat.com; s=mimecast20190719; t=1584731966; h=from:from:reply-to:subject:subject:date:date:message-id:message-id: to:to:cc:cc:in-reply-to:in-reply-to:references:references; bh=QRTCx7iUFxWApQLdwBhGyDxdNRfn8szKdemehtnU9Mo=; b=anm9V0gjYxDmr+c16m7VLEOcZ71+magfFYQkppIBsaGpZW4FJCJh486lTI5+YN+CkYxf9x DRGvthGyv55UwMzXbgon5NgWpK8Nyyt4OVksKKikYBs35pFlJZsIWutnDb3vCAo2SP4x/0 54WLheAsMFnCBlfzA6ZUeFy7EBea9Dg= Received: from mimecast-mx01.redhat.com (mimecast-mx01.redhat.com [209.132.183.4]) (Using TLS) by relay.mimecast.com with ESMTP id us-mta-358-oi80VyK-P_SJHLTY9NPDjQ-1; Fri, 20 Mar 2020 15:19:22 -0400 X-MC-Unique: oi80VyK-P_SJHLTY9NPDjQ-1 Received: from smtp.corp.redhat.com (int-mx03.intmail.prod.int.phx2.redhat.com [10.5.11.13]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher AECDH-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mimecast-mx01.redhat.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 1C1A1800D53; Fri, 20 Mar 2020 19:19:20 +0000 (UTC) Received: from llong.com (ovpn-118-190.rdu2.redhat.com [10.10.118.190]) by smtp.corp.redhat.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 308A45C1AB; Fri, 20 Mar 2020 19:19:18 +0000 (UTC) From: Waiman Long To: David Howells , Jarkko Sakkinen , James Morris , "Serge E. Hallyn" , Mimi Zohar , "David S. Miller" , Jakub Kicinski Cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, netdev@vger.kernel.org, linux-afs@lists.infradead.org, Sumit Garg , Jerry Snitselaar , Roberto Sassu , Eric Biggers , Chris von Recklinghausen , Waiman Long Subject: [PATCH v6 2/2] KEYS: Avoid false positive ENOMEM error on key read Date: Fri, 20 Mar 2020 15:19:03 -0400 Message-Id: <20200320191903.19494-3-longman@redhat.com> In-Reply-To: <20200320191903.19494-1-longman@redhat.com> References: <20200320191903.19494-1-longman@redhat.com> X-Scanned-By: MIMEDefang 2.79 on 10.5.11.13 Sender: owner-linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: By allocating a kernel buffer with a user-supplied buffer length, it is possible that a false positive ENOMEM error may be returned because the user-supplied length is just too large even if the system do have enough memory to hold the actual key data. Moreover, if the buffer length is larger than the maximum amount of memory that can be returned by kmalloc() (2^(MAX_ORDER-1) number of pages), a warning message will also be printed. To reduce this possibility, we set a threshold (page size) over which we do check the actual key length first before allocating a buffer of the right size to hold it. The threshold is arbitrary, it is just used to trigger a buffer length check. It does not limit the actual key length as long as there is enough memory to satisfy the memory request. To further avoid large buffer allocation failure due to page fragmentation, kvmalloc() is used to allocate the buffer so that vmapped pages can be used when there is not a large enough contiguous set of pages available for allocation. Signed-off-by: Waiman Long --- security/keys/internal.h | 12 ++++++++++++ security/keys/keyctl.c | 39 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------- 2 files changed, 43 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/security/keys/internal.h b/security/keys/internal.h index ba3e2da14cef..6d0ca48ae9a5 100644 --- a/security/keys/internal.h +++ b/security/keys/internal.h @@ -16,6 +16,8 @@ #include #include #include +#include +#include struct iovec; @@ -349,4 +351,14 @@ static inline void key_check(const struct key *key) #endif +/* + * Helper function to clear and free a kvmalloc'ed memory object. + */ +static inline void __kvzfree(const void *addr, size_t len) +{ + if (addr) { + memset((void *)addr, 0, len); + kvfree(addr); + } +} #endif /* _INTERNAL_H */ diff --git a/security/keys/keyctl.c b/security/keys/keyctl.c index 5a0794cb8815..ded69108db0d 100644 --- a/security/keys/keyctl.c +++ b/security/keys/keyctl.c @@ -339,7 +339,7 @@ long keyctl_update_key(key_serial_t id, payload = NULL; if (plen) { ret = -ENOMEM; - payload = kmalloc(plen, GFP_KERNEL); + payload = kvmalloc(plen, GFP_KERNEL); if (!payload) goto error; @@ -360,7 +360,7 @@ long keyctl_update_key(key_serial_t id, key_ref_put(key_ref); error2: - kzfree(payload); + __kvzfree(payload, plen); error: return ret; } @@ -877,13 +877,23 @@ long keyctl_read_key(key_serial_t keyid, char __user *buffer, size_t buflen) * transferring them to user buffer to avoid potential * deadlock involving page fault and mmap_sem. */ - char *key_data = kmalloc(buflen, GFP_KERNEL); + char *key_data = NULL; + size_t key_data_len = buflen; - if (!key_data) { - ret = -ENOMEM; - goto error2; + /* + * When the user-supplied key length is larger than + * PAGE_SIZE, we get the actual key length first before + * allocating a right-sized key data buffer. + */ + if (buflen <= PAGE_SIZE) { +allocbuf: + key_data = kvmalloc(key_data_len, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!key_data) { + ret = -ENOMEM; + goto error2; + } } - ret = __keyctl_read_key(key, key_data, buflen); + ret = __keyctl_read_key(key, key_data, key_data_len); /* * Read methods will just return the required length @@ -891,10 +901,23 @@ long keyctl_read_key(key_serial_t keyid, char __user *buffer, size_t buflen) * enough. */ if (ret > 0 && ret <= buflen) { + /* + * The key may change (unlikely) in between 2 + * consecutive __keyctl_read_key() calls. We will + * need to allocate a larger buffer and redo the key + * read when key_data_len < ret <= buflen. + */ + if (!key_data || unlikely(ret > key_data_len)) { + if (unlikely(key_data)) + __kvzfree(key_data, key_data_len); + key_data_len = ret; + goto allocbuf; + } + if (copy_to_user(buffer, key_data, ret)) ret = -EFAULT; } - kzfree(key_data); + __kvzfree(key_data, key_data_len); } error2: