From patchwork Mon Apr 13 16:51:50 2020 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo X-Patchwork-Id: 11485999 Return-Path: Received: from mail.kernel.org (pdx-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.123]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 4055414B4 for ; Mon, 13 Apr 2020 16:54:54 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 28D9D20857 for ; Mon, 13 Apr 2020 16:54:54 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1586796894; bh=y2LqQNgk7M38l+vhlpVjFxZa1rdjNePBdEMgUzSLdhY=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:List-ID:From; b=ggZ6x5Awje780EZMC7AgmapZIU4nCuasWTPdLrvFZmd6ihLSe/DWchlyo1NZzIk6Z xaH6/WA1Is0zKax77YhCoWsEPvG1WHph5p67xAIdAaQ928AXgeL3pTM71qx3UX7+/t 3sqM48rt8Aqu2MklUP8hRB/vPZfiCzo7JRkRMEEI= Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1731991AbgDMQx2 (ORCPT ); Mon, 13 Apr 2020 12:53:28 -0400 Received: from mail.kernel.org ([198.145.29.99]:45592 "EHLO mail.kernel.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1731974AbgDMQxW (ORCPT ); Mon, 13 Apr 2020 12:53:22 -0400 Received: from quaco.ghostprotocols.net (unknown [179.97.37.151]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 27DB420CC7; Mon, 13 Apr 2020 16:53:15 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1586796801; bh=y2LqQNgk7M38l+vhlpVjFxZa1rdjNePBdEMgUzSLdhY=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=gf00ILlPD+tw4dTCkmvmJw9cku82m25z+7AzM4+Qo9wakJ5R6VzkURmb8vBobA4iR agrrFP76NA6nNYGjqOfgeQj1zM6YqvGpDe2HZcZ0mCcmIR4o2lIlNM5kfNW/SnUQRi WXBK72fU+WvAcACMSNReHvnIDBZlRn25tJiXC+qI= From: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo To: Ingo Molnar , Thomas Gleixner Cc: Jiri Olsa , Namhyung Kim , Clark Williams , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-perf-users@vger.kernel.org, Alexey Budankov , James Morris , Will Deacon , Alexei Starovoitov , Andi Kleen , Igor Lubashev , Jiri Olsa , Peter Zijlstra , Serge Hallyn , Song Liu , Stephane Eranian , intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-man@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org, Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo Subject: [PATCH 13/26] drivers/perf: Open access for CAP_PERFMON privileged process Date: Mon, 13 Apr 2020 13:51:50 -0300 Message-Id: <20200413165203.1816-14-acme@kernel.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.21.1 In-Reply-To: <20200413165203.1816-1-acme@kernel.org> References: <20200413165203.1816-1-acme@kernel.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Sender: owner-linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: From: Alexey Budankov Open access to monitoring for CAP_PERFMON privileged process. Providing the access under CAP_PERFMON capability singly, without the rest of CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials, excludes chances to misuse the credentials and makes operation more secure. CAP_PERFMON implements the principle of least privilege for performance monitoring and observability operations (POSIX IEEE 1003.1e 2.2.2.39 principle of least privilege: A security design principle that states that a process or program be granted only those privileges (e.g., capabilities) necessary to accomplish its legitimate function, and only for the time that such privileges are actually required) For backward compatibility reasons access to the monitoring remains open for CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged processes but CAP_SYS_ADMIN usage for secure monitoring is discouraged with respect to CAP_PERFMON capability. Signed-off-by: Alexey Budankov Reviewed-by: James Morris Acked-by: Will Deacon Cc: Alexei Starovoitov Cc: Andi Kleen Cc: Igor Lubashev Cc: Jiri Olsa Cc: Namhyung Kim Cc: Peter Zijlstra Cc: Serge Hallyn Cc: Song Liu Cc: Stephane Eranian Cc: Thomas Gleixner Cc: intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-man@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Cc: selinux@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lore.kernel.org/lkml/4ec1d6f7-548c-8d1c-f84a-cebeb9674e4e@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo --- drivers/perf/arm_spe_pmu.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/perf/arm_spe_pmu.c b/drivers/perf/arm_spe_pmu.c index b72c04852599..0e0961a2b405 100644 --- a/drivers/perf/arm_spe_pmu.c +++ b/drivers/perf/arm_spe_pmu.c @@ -274,7 +274,7 @@ static u64 arm_spe_event_to_pmscr(struct perf_event *event) if (!attr->exclude_kernel) reg |= BIT(SYS_PMSCR_EL1_E1SPE_SHIFT); - if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PID_IN_CONTEXTIDR) && capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PID_IN_CONTEXTIDR) && perfmon_capable()) reg |= BIT(SYS_PMSCR_EL1_CX_SHIFT); return reg; @@ -700,7 +700,7 @@ static int arm_spe_pmu_event_init(struct perf_event *event) return -EOPNOTSUPP; reg = arm_spe_event_to_pmscr(event); - if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) && + if (!perfmon_capable() && (reg & (BIT(SYS_PMSCR_EL1_PA_SHIFT) | BIT(SYS_PMSCR_EL1_CX_SHIFT) | BIT(SYS_PMSCR_EL1_PCT_SHIFT))))