[v26,13/25] IMA: Change internal interfaces to use lsmblobs

Message ID	20210513200807.15910-14-casey@schaufler-ca.com (mailing list archive)
State	New, archived
Headers	show Return-Path: <linux-security-module-owner@kernel.org> From: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> To: casey.schaufler@intel.com, jmorris@namei.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org Cc: casey@schaufler-ca.com, linux-audit@redhat.com, keescook@chromium.org, john.johansen@canonical.com, penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp, paul@paul-moore.com, sds@tycho.nsa.gov, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v26 13/25] IMA: Change internal interfaces to use lsmblobs Date: Thu, 13 May 2021 13:07:55 -0700 Message-Id: <20210513200807.15910-14-casey@schaufler-ca.com> In-Reply-To: <20210513200807.15910-1-casey@schaufler-ca.com> References: <20210513200807.15910-1-casey@schaufler-ca.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Precedence: bulk
Series	LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor \| expand [v26,00/25] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor [v26,01/25] LSM: Infrastructure management of the sock security [v26,02/25] LSM: Add the lsmblob data structure. [v26,03/25] LSM: provide lsm name and id slot mappings [v26,04/25] IMA: avoid label collisions with stacked LSMs [v26,05/25] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_audit_rule_match [v26,06/25] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_kernel_act_as [v26,07/25] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_secctx_to_secid [v26,08/25] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_secid_to_secctx [v26,09/25] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_ipc_getsecid [v26,10/25] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_task_getsecid [v26,11/25] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_inode_getsecid [v26,12/25] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_cred_getsecid [v26,13/25] IMA: Change internal interfaces to use lsmblobs [v26,14/25] LSM: Specify which LSM to display [v26,15/25] LSM: Ensure the correct LSM context releaser [v26,16/25] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_secid_to_secctx [v26,17/25] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_inode_getsecctx [v26,18/25] LSM: security_secid_to_secctx in netlink netfilter [v26,19/25] NET: Store LSM netlabel data in a lsmblob [v26,20/25] LSM: Verify LSM display sanity in binder [v26,21/25] audit: add support for non-syscall auxiliary records [v26,22/25] Audit: Add new record for multiple process LSM attributes [v26,23/25] Audit: Add a new record for multiple object LSM attributes [v26,24/25] LSM: Add /proc attr entry for full LSM context [v26,25/25] AppArmor: Remove the exclusive flag

diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h index 55f3bd4f0b01..a6b59fcaf62a 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h @@ -251,7 +251,7 @@ static inline void ima_process_queued_keys(void) {} /* LIM API function definitions */ int ima_get_action(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *inode, - const struct cred *cred, u32 secid, int mask, + const struct cred *cred, struct lsmblob *blob, int mask, enum ima_hooks func, int *pcr, struct ima_template_desc **template_desc, const char *func_data); @@ -282,8 +282,8 @@ const char *ima_d_path(const struct path *path, char **pathbuf, char *filename); /* IMA policy related functions */ int ima_match_policy(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *inode, - const struct cred *cred, u32 secid, enum ima_hooks func, - int mask, int flags, int *pcr, + const struct cred *cred, struct lsmblob *blob, + enum ima_hooks func, int mask, int flags, int *pcr, struct ima_template_desc **template_desc, const char *func_data); void ima_init_policy(void); diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c index d8e321cc6936..691f68d478f1 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c @@ -165,7 +165,7 @@ void ima_add_violation(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename, * @mnt_userns: user namespace of the mount the inode was found from * @inode: pointer to the inode associated with the object being validated * @cred: pointer to credentials structure to validate - * @secid: secid of the task being validated + * @blob: LSM data of the task being validated * @mask: contains the permission mask (MAY_READ, MAY_WRITE, MAY_EXEC, * MAY_APPEND) * @func: caller identifier @@ -185,7 +185,7 @@ void ima_add_violation(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename, * */ int ima_get_action(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *inode, - const struct cred *cred, u32 secid, int mask, + const struct cred *cred, struct lsmblob *blob, int mask, enum ima_hooks func, int *pcr, struct ima_template_desc **template_desc, const char *func_data) @@ -194,7 +194,7 @@ int ima_get_action(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *inode, flags &= ima_policy_flag; - return ima_match_policy(mnt_userns, inode, cred, secid, func, mask, + return ima_match_policy(mnt_userns, inode, cred, blob, func, mask, flags, pcr, template_desc, func_data); } diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c index f8c7b593175f..b2af72289f00 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c @@ -77,10 +77,9 @@ int ima_must_appraise(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *inode, return 0; security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &blob); - /* scaffolding the .secid[0] */ return ima_match_policy(mnt_userns, inode, current_cred(), - blob.secid[0], func, mask, - IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_HASH, NULL, NULL, NULL); + &blob, func, mask, IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_HASH, + NULL, NULL, NULL); } static int ima_fix_xattr(struct dentry *dentry, diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c index b3e00340a97c..b63f73d43bd2 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c @@ -194,8 +194,8 @@ void ima_file_free(struct file *file) } static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred, - u32 secid, char *buf, loff_t size, int mask, - enum ima_hooks func) + struct lsmblob *blob, char *buf, loff_t size, + int mask, enum ima_hooks func) { struct inode *inode = file_inode(file); struct integrity_iint_cache *iint = NULL; @@ -218,7 +218,7 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred, * bitmask based on the appraise/audit/measurement policy. * Included is the appraise submask. */ - action = ima_get_action(file_mnt_user_ns(file), inode, cred, secid, + action = ima_get_action(file_mnt_user_ns(file), inode, cred, blob, mask, func, &pcr, &template_desc, NULL); violation_check = ((func == FILE_CHECK || func == MMAP_CHECK) && (ima_policy_flag & IMA_MEASURE)); @@ -392,8 +392,7 @@ int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot) if (file && (prot & PROT_EXEC)) { security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &blob); - /* scaffolding - until process_measurement changes */ - return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), blob.secid[0], + return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), &blob, NULL, 0, MAY_EXEC, MMAP_CHECK); } @@ -434,7 +433,7 @@ int ima_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long prot) inode = file_inode(vma->vm_file); /* scaffolding */ action = ima_get_action(file_mnt_user_ns(vma->vm_file), inode, - current_cred(), blob.secid[0], MAY_EXEC, + current_cred(), &blob, MAY_EXEC, MMAP_CHECK, &pcr, &template, 0); /* Is the mmap'ed file in policy? */ @@ -473,16 +472,14 @@ int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm) struct lsmblob blob; security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &blob); - /* scaffolding until process_measurement changes */ - ret = process_measurement(bprm->file, current_cred(), blob.secid[0], - NULL, 0, MAY_EXEC, BPRM_CHECK); + ret = process_measurement(bprm->file, current_cred(), &blob, NULL, 0, + MAY_EXEC, BPRM_CHECK); if (ret) return ret; security_cred_getsecid(bprm->cred, &blob); - /* scaffolding until process_measurement changes */ - return process_measurement(bprm->file, bprm->cred, blob.secid[0], - NULL, 0, MAY_EXEC, CREDS_CHECK); + return process_measurement(bprm->file, bprm->cred, &blob, NULL, 0, + MAY_EXEC, CREDS_CHECK); } /** @@ -500,8 +497,7 @@ int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask) struct lsmblob blob; security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &blob); - /* scaffolding until process_measurement changes */ - return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), blob.secid[0], NULL, 0, + return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), &blob, NULL, 0, mask & (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC | MAY_APPEND), FILE_CHECK); } @@ -698,9 +694,8 @@ int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id read_id, /* Read entire file for all partial reads. */ func = read_idmap[read_id] ?: FILE_CHECK; security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &blob); - /* scaffolding - until process_measurement changes */ - return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), blob.secid[0], NULL, - 0, MAY_READ, func); + return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), &blob, NULL, 0, + MAY_READ, func); } const int read_idmap[READING_MAX_ID] = { @@ -742,9 +737,8 @@ int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size, func = read_idmap[read_id] ?: FILE_CHECK; security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &blob); - /* scaffolding until process_measurement changes */ - return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), blob.secid[0], buf, - size, MAY_READ, func); + return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), &blob, buf, size, + MAY_READ, func); } /** @@ -889,7 +883,7 @@ void process_buffer_measurement(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &blob); /* scaffolding */ action = ima_get_action(mnt_userns, inode, current_cred(), - blob.secid[0], 0, func, &pcr, &template, + &blob, 0, func, &pcr, &template, func_data); if (!(action & IMA_MEASURE)) return; diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c index 5ee7629fd782..caacd8bf0462 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c @@ -546,7 +546,7 @@ static bool ima_match_rule_data(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, * @mnt_userns: user namespace of the mount the inode was found from * @inode: a pointer to an inode * @cred: a pointer to a credentials structure for user validation - * @secid: the secid of the task to be validated + * @blob: the lsm data of the task to be validated * @func: LIM hook identifier * @mask: requested action (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_APPEND | MAY_EXEC) * @func_data: func specific data, may be NULL @@ -556,8 +556,8 @@ static bool ima_match_rule_data(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred, - u32 secid, enum ima_hooks func, int mask, - const char *func_data) + struct lsmblob *blob, enum ima_hooks func, + int mask, const char *func_data) { int i; @@ -626,8 +626,7 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, case LSM_SUBJ_USER: case LSM_SUBJ_ROLE: case LSM_SUBJ_TYPE: - lsmblob_init(&lsmdata, secid); - rc = ima_filter_rule_match(&lsmdata, rule->lsm[i].type, + rc = ima_filter_rule_match(blob, rule->lsm[i].type, Audit_equal, rule->lsm[i].rule); break; @@ -671,7 +670,7 @@ static int get_subaction(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, enum ima_hooks func) * @inode: pointer to an inode for which the policy decision is being made * @cred: pointer to a credentials structure for which the policy decision is * being made - * @secid: LSM secid of the task to be validated + * @blob: LSM data of the task to be validated * @func: IMA hook identifier * @mask: requested action (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_APPEND | MAY_EXEC) * @pcr: set the pcr to extend @@ -686,8 +685,8 @@ static int get_subaction(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, enum ima_hooks func) * than writes so ima_match_policy() is classical RCU candidate. */ int ima_match_policy(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *inode, - const struct cred *cred, u32 secid, enum ima_hooks func, - int mask, int flags, int *pcr, + const struct cred *cred, struct lsmblob *blob, + enum ima_hooks func, int mask, int flags, int *pcr, struct ima_template_desc **template_desc, const char *func_data) { @@ -703,7 +702,7 @@ int ima_match_policy(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *inode, if (!(entry->action & actmask)) continue; - if (!ima_match_rules(entry, mnt_userns, inode, cred, secid, + if (!ima_match_rules(entry, mnt_userns, inode, cred, blob, func, mask, func_data)) continue;

[v26,13/25] IMA: Change internal interfaces to use lsmblobs

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