From patchwork Mon Jun 28 18:34:29 2021 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Dov Murik X-Patchwork-Id: 12348481 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-16.8 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,INCLUDES_CR_TRAILER,INCLUDES_PATCH, MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 65AD4C11F65 for ; Mon, 28 Jun 2021 18:35:00 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 4B71761C87 for ; Mon, 28 Jun 2021 18:35:00 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S234594AbhF1ShX (ORCPT ); Mon, 28 Jun 2021 14:37:23 -0400 Received: from mx0b-001b2d01.pphosted.com ([148.163.158.5]:61986 "EHLO mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-FAIL) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S234532AbhF1ShW (ORCPT ); Mon, 28 Jun 2021 14:37:22 -0400 Received: from pps.filterd (m0098419.ppops.net [127.0.0.1]) by mx0b-001b2d01.pphosted.com (8.16.0.43/8.16.0.43) with SMTP id 15SIYLDv083139; Mon, 28 Jun 2021 14:34:42 -0400 DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=ibm.com; h=from : to : cc : subject : date : message-id : in-reply-to : references : mime-version : content-transfer-encoding; s=pp1; bh=mTHEHqZPDmYqt/tWItKKjdDa5/ESAOzeT5/F7ccqY0M=; b=AvompGET82QF11fpf+ET2aA6wfstg4ZCQtG+Sg1koaoQhtWh3LoAAqwpWnn8Omq4zbxw lF2Be+3D9l3zxsmWas8B05LssRejoYGDeaINwKdH6iibUeOTPn2o6egVdz5imx781MfF 3yChmKlmJNHfOD+W1OK5IYBGnWUI2H2lfspBa7NNWUncxiBtIDw013MUIUzIs+7m8Ztu Q4yigIw327ljJIenV0YhFkcrGxHRy4g30fMqY2NXz/UlyP/dgcwEXXhGwQ80YupI1U+s /22UmUjn+KjIqFWpQ8e3IAfBeC6wIYZ7qJTMQsJHMWwhhL4XonE7ZU2MoPuGXR1jJ7Ju mw== Received: from pps.reinject (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mx0b-001b2d01.pphosted.com with ESMTP id 39fd08dm8t-1 (version=TLSv1.2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=NOT); Mon, 28 Jun 2021 14:34:42 -0400 Received: from m0098419.ppops.net (m0098419.ppops.net [127.0.0.1]) by pps.reinject (8.16.0.43/8.16.0.43) with SMTP id 15SIYgTS083905; Mon, 28 Jun 2021 14:34:42 -0400 Received: from ppma02dal.us.ibm.com (a.bd.3ea9.ip4.static.sl-reverse.com [169.62.189.10]) by mx0b-001b2d01.pphosted.com with ESMTP id 39fd08dm8f-1 (version=TLSv1.2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=NOT); Mon, 28 Jun 2021 14:34:41 -0400 Received: from pps.filterd (ppma02dal.us.ibm.com [127.0.0.1]) by ppma02dal.us.ibm.com (8.16.1.2/8.16.1.2) with SMTP id 15SISBMe027439; Mon, 28 Jun 2021 18:34:41 GMT Received: from b01cxnp23033.gho.pok.ibm.com (b01cxnp23033.gho.pok.ibm.com [9.57.198.28]) by ppma02dal.us.ibm.com with ESMTP id 39duvb8mtg-1 (version=TLSv1.2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=NOT); Mon, 28 Jun 2021 18:34:41 +0000 Received: from b01ledav006.gho.pok.ibm.com (b01ledav006.gho.pok.ibm.com [9.57.199.111]) by b01cxnp23033.gho.pok.ibm.com (8.14.9/8.14.9/NCO v10.0) with ESMTP id 15SIYej237355992 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=OK); Mon, 28 Jun 2021 18:34:40 GMT Received: from b01ledav006.gho.pok.ibm.com (unknown [127.0.0.1]) by IMSVA (Postfix) with ESMTP id EBB86AC069; Mon, 28 Jun 2021 18:34:39 +0000 (GMT) Received: from b01ledav006.gho.pok.ibm.com (unknown [127.0.0.1]) by IMSVA (Postfix) with ESMTP id A3E08AC062; Mon, 28 Jun 2021 18:34:39 +0000 (GMT) Received: from localhost.localdomain (unknown [9.2.130.16]) by b01ledav006.gho.pok.ibm.com (Postfix) with ESMTP; Mon, 28 Jun 2021 18:34:39 +0000 (GMT) From: Dov Murik To: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Cc: Dov Murik , Laszlo Ersek , Ashish Kalra , Brijesh Singh , Tom Lendacky , Ard Biesheuvel , James Morris , "Serge E. Hallyn" , Andi Kleen , "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" , James Bottomley , Tobin Feldman-Fitzthum , Jim Cadden , linux-coco@lists.linux.dev, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: [RFC PATCH v2 1/3] efi/libstub: Copy confidential computing secret area Date: Mon, 28 Jun 2021 18:34:29 +0000 Message-Id: <20210628183431.953934-2-dovmurik@linux.ibm.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.25.1 In-Reply-To: <20210628183431.953934-1-dovmurik@linux.ibm.com> References: <20210628183431.953934-1-dovmurik@linux.ibm.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 X-TM-AS-GCONF: 00 X-Proofpoint-GUID: Sjv0tWuw2YY8xBRTAjrP5FQ5T9ZgF0GO X-Proofpoint-ORIG-GUID: xbvnbsO7Rlu_jCuypXybUjEijIhzZyfd X-Proofpoint-Virus-Version: vendor=fsecure engine=2.50.10434:6.0.391,18.0.790 definitions=2021-06-28_14:2021-06-25,2021-06-28 signatures=0 X-Proofpoint-Spam-Details: rule=outbound_notspam policy=outbound score=0 clxscore=1015 spamscore=0 priorityscore=1501 mlxscore=0 adultscore=0 suspectscore=0 lowpriorityscore=0 phishscore=0 malwarescore=0 impostorscore=0 mlxlogscore=999 bulkscore=0 classifier=spam adjust=0 reason=mlx scancount=1 engine=8.12.0-2104190000 definitions=main-2106280121 Precedence: bulk List-ID: Confidential computing hardware such as AMD SEV (Secure Encrypted Virtualization) allows a guest owner to inject secrets into the VMs memory without the host/hypervisor being able to read them. Firmware support for secret injection is available in OVMF, which reserves a memory area for secret injection and includes a pointer to it the in EFI config table entry LINUX_EFI_CONFIDENTIAL_COMPUTING_SECRET_TABLE_GUID. However, OVMF doesn't force the guest OS to keep this memory area reserved. If EFI exposes such a table entry, efi/libstub will copy this area to a reserved memory for future use inside the kernel. A pointer to the new copy is kept in the EFI table under LINUX_EFI_CONFIDENTIAL_COMPUTING_SECRET_AREA_GUID. Signed-off-by: Dov Murik --- drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile | 3 +- .../efi/libstub/confidential-computing.c | 68 +++++++++++++++++++ drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/efi-stub.c | 2 + drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/efistub.h | 2 + drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/x86-stub.c | 2 + include/linux/efi.h | 7 ++ 6 files changed, 83 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) create mode 100644 drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/confidential-computing.c diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile index d0537573501e..938ed23dd135 100644 --- a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile +++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile @@ -55,7 +55,8 @@ KCOV_INSTRUMENT := n lib-y := efi-stub-helper.o gop.o secureboot.o tpm.o \ file.o mem.o random.o randomalloc.o pci.o \ skip_spaces.o lib-cmdline.o lib-ctype.o \ - alignedmem.o relocate.o vsprintf.o + alignedmem.o relocate.o vsprintf.o \ + confidential-computing.o # include the stub's generic dependencies from lib/ when building for ARM/arm64 efi-deps-y := fdt_rw.c fdt_ro.c fdt_wip.c fdt.c fdt_empty_tree.c fdt_sw.c diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/confidential-computing.c b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/confidential-computing.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..96b97ff5d503 --- /dev/null +++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/confidential-computing.c @@ -0,0 +1,68 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* + * Confidential computing secret area handling + * + * Copyright (C) 2021 IBM Corporation + * Author: Dov Murik + */ + +#include +#include +#include + +#include "efistub.h" + +#define LINUX_EFI_CONFIDENTIAL_COMPUTING_SECRET_TABLE_GUID \ + EFI_GUID(0xadf956ad, 0xe98c, 0x484c, 0xae, 0x11, 0xb5, 0x1c, 0x7d, 0x33, 0x64, 0x47) + +/** + * struct efi_confidential_computing_secret_table - EFI config table that + * points to the confidential computing secret area. The guid + * LINUX_EFI_CONFIDENTIAL_COMPUTING_SECRET_TABLE_GUID holds this table. + * @base: Physical address of the EFI secret area + * @size: Size (in bytes) of the EFI secret area + */ +struct efi_confidential_computing_secret_table { + u64 base; + u64 size; +} __attribute((packed)); + +/* + * Create a copy of EFI's confidential computing secret area (if available) so + * that the secrets are accessible in the kernel after ExitBootServices. + */ +void efi_copy_confidential_computing_secret_area(void) +{ + efi_guid_t linux_secret_area_guid = LINUX_EFI_CONFIDENTIAL_COMPUTING_SECRET_AREA_GUID; + efi_status_t status; + struct efi_confidential_computing_secret_table *secret_table; + struct linux_efi_confidential_computing_secret_area *secret_area; + + secret_table = get_efi_config_table(LINUX_EFI_CONFIDENTIAL_COMPUTING_SECRET_TABLE_GUID); + if (!secret_table) + return; + + if (secret_table->size == 0 || secret_table->size >= SZ_4G) + return; + + /* Allocate space for the secret area and copy it */ + status = efi_bs_call(allocate_pool, EFI_LOADER_DATA, + sizeof(*secret_area) + secret_table->size, (void **)&secret_area); + + if (status != EFI_SUCCESS) { + efi_err("Unable to allocate memory for confidential computing secret area copy\n"); + return; + } + + secret_area->size = secret_table->size; + memcpy(secret_area->area, (void *)(unsigned long)secret_table->base, secret_table->size); + + status = efi_bs_call(install_configuration_table, &linux_secret_area_guid, secret_area); + if (status != EFI_SUCCESS) + goto err_free; + + return; + +err_free: + efi_bs_call(free_pool, secret_area); +} diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/efi-stub.c b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/efi-stub.c index 26e69788f27a..56bcd94a387e 100644 --- a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/efi-stub.c +++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/efi-stub.c @@ -205,6 +205,8 @@ efi_status_t __efiapi efi_pe_entry(efi_handle_t handle, efi_retrieve_tpm2_eventlog(); + efi_copy_confidential_computing_secret_area(); + /* Ask the firmware to clear memory on unclean shutdown */ efi_enable_reset_attack_mitigation(); diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/efistub.h b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/efistub.h index cde0a2ef507d..1c02658042ea 100644 --- a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/efistub.h +++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/efistub.h @@ -858,4 +858,6 @@ efi_enable_reset_attack_mitigation(void) { } void efi_retrieve_tpm2_eventlog(void); +void efi_copy_confidential_computing_secret_area(void); + #endif diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/x86-stub.c b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/x86-stub.c index f14c4ff5839f..c663bf47370a 100644 --- a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/x86-stub.c +++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/x86-stub.c @@ -793,6 +793,8 @@ unsigned long efi_main(efi_handle_t handle, efi_retrieve_tpm2_eventlog(); + efi_copy_confidential_computing_secret_area(); + setup_graphics(boot_params); setup_efi_pci(boot_params); diff --git a/include/linux/efi.h b/include/linux/efi.h index 6b5d36babfcc..4f647f1ee298 100644 --- a/include/linux/efi.h +++ b/include/linux/efi.h @@ -359,6 +359,8 @@ void efi_native_runtime_setup(void); #define LINUX_EFI_MEMRESERVE_TABLE_GUID EFI_GUID(0x888eb0c6, 0x8ede, 0x4ff5, 0xa8, 0xf0, 0x9a, 0xee, 0x5c, 0xb9, 0x77, 0xc2) #define LINUX_EFI_INITRD_MEDIA_GUID EFI_GUID(0x5568e427, 0x68fc, 0x4f3d, 0xac, 0x74, 0xca, 0x55, 0x52, 0x31, 0xcc, 0x68) #define LINUX_EFI_MOK_VARIABLE_TABLE_GUID EFI_GUID(0xc451ed2b, 0x9694, 0x45d3, 0xba, 0xba, 0xed, 0x9f, 0x89, 0x88, 0xa3, 0x89) +#define LINUX_EFI_CONFIDENTIAL_COMPUTING_SECRET_AREA_GUID \ + EFI_GUID(0x940ed1e9, 0xd3da, 0x408b, 0xb3, 0x07, 0xe3, 0x2d, 0x25, 0x4a, 0x65, 0x16) /* OEM GUIDs */ #define DELLEMC_EFI_RCI2_TABLE_GUID EFI_GUID(0x2d9f28a2, 0xa886, 0x456a, 0x97, 0xa8, 0xf1, 0x1e, 0xf2, 0x4f, 0xf4, 0x55) @@ -1282,4 +1284,9 @@ static inline struct efi_mokvar_table_entry *efi_mokvar_entry_find( } #endif +struct linux_efi_confidential_computing_secret_area { + u32 size; + u8 area[]; +}; + #endif /* _LINUX_EFI_H */