From patchwork Tue Jul 6 18:22:17 2021 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: =?utf-8?q?Micka=C3=ABl_Sala=C3=BCn?= X-Patchwork-Id: 12361093 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-16.8 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00, HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,INCLUDES_CR_TRAILER,INCLUDES_PATCH, MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,URIBL_BLOCKED,USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id B365CC07E96 for ; Tue, 6 Jul 2021 18:23:15 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 9764A61C69 for ; Tue, 6 Jul 2021 18:23:15 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S231341AbhGFSZx (ORCPT ); Tue, 6 Jul 2021 14:25:53 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:56328 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S231328AbhGFSZx (ORCPT ); Tue, 6 Jul 2021 14:25:53 -0400 Received: from smtp-bc0b.mail.infomaniak.ch (smtp-bc0b.mail.infomaniak.ch [IPv6:2001:1600:3:17::bc0b]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 6B603C06175F for ; Tue, 6 Jul 2021 11:23:14 -0700 (PDT) Received: from smtp-3-0001.mail.infomaniak.ch (unknown [10.4.36.108]) by smtp-2-3000.mail.infomaniak.ch (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 4GK9sX163QzMqJf4; Tue, 6 Jul 2021 20:23:12 +0200 (CEST) Received: from localhost (unknown [23.97.221.149]) by smtp-3-0001.mail.infomaniak.ch (Postfix) with ESMTPA id 4GK9sW69gqzlmrrn; Tue, 6 Jul 2021 20:23:11 +0200 (CEST) From: =?utf-8?q?Micka=C3=ABl_Sala=C3=BCn?= To: Alejandro Colomar , Michael Kerrisk Cc: =?utf-8?q?Micka=C3=ABl_Sala=C3=BCn?= , Jann Horn , Jonathan Corbet , Kees Cook , Randy Dunlap , Vincent Dagonneau , landlock@lists.linux.dev, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-man@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, =?utf-8?q?Micka=C3=ABl_Sala=C3=BCn?= Subject: [PATCH v1 4/4] landlock_restrict_self.2: Document new syscall Date: Tue, 6 Jul 2021 20:22:17 +0200 Message-Id: <20210706182217.32338-5-mic@digikod.net> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.32.0 In-Reply-To: <20210706182217.32338-1-mic@digikod.net> References: <20210706182217.32338-1-mic@digikod.net> MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: From: Mickaël Salaün This is an adaptation of https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/v5.13/userspace-api/landlock.html Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210706182217.32338-5-mic@digikod.net --- man2/landlock_restrict_self.2 | 125 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 125 insertions(+) create mode 100644 man2/landlock_restrict_self.2 diff --git a/man2/landlock_restrict_self.2 b/man2/landlock_restrict_self.2 new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..589fe972487c --- /dev/null +++ b/man2/landlock_restrict_self.2 @@ -0,0 +1,125 @@ +.\" Copyright © 2017-2020 Mickaël Salaün +.\" Copyright © 2019-2020 ANSSI +.\" Copyright © 2021 Microsoft Corporation +.\" +.\" %%%LICENSE_START(VERBATIM) +.\" Permission is granted to make and distribute verbatim copies of this +.\" manual provided the copyright notice and this permission notice are +.\" preserved on all copies. +.\" +.\" Permission is granted to copy and distribute modified versions of this +.\" manual under the conditions for verbatim copying, provided that the +.\" entire resulting derived work is distributed under the terms of a +.\" permission notice identical to this one. +.\" +.\" Since the Linux kernel and libraries are constantly changing, this +.\" manual page may be incorrect or out-of-date. The author(s) assume no +.\" responsibility for errors or omissions, or for damages resulting from +.\" the use of the information contained herein. The author(s) may not +.\" have taken the same level of care in the production of this manual, +.\" which is licensed free of charge, as they might when working +.\" professionally. +.\" +.\" Formatted or processed versions of this manual, if unaccompanied by +.\" the source, must acknowledge the copyright and authors of this work. +.\" %%%LICENSE_END +.\" +.TH LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF 2 2021-06-27 Linux "Linux Programmer's Manual" +.SH NAME +landlock_restrict_self \- enforce a Landlock ruleset +.SH SYNOPSIS +.nf +.BR "#include " " /* Definition of " LANDLOCK_* " constants */" +.BR "#include " " /* Definition of " SYS_* " constants */" +.PP +.BI "int syscall(SYS_landlock_restrict_self, int " ruleset_fd , +.BI " __u32 " flags ); +.SH DESCRIPTION +Once a Landlock ruleset is populated with the desired rules, the +.BR landlock_restrict_self (2) +system call enables enforcing this ruleset on the calling thread. See +.BR landlock (7) +for a global overview. +.PP +A thread can be restricted with multiple rulesets that are then composed +together to form the thread's Landlock domain. This can be seen as a stack +of rulesets but it is implemented in a more efficient way. A domain can +only be updated in such a way that the constraints of each past and future +composed rulesets will restrict the thread and its future children for +their entire life. It is then possible to gradually enforce tailored +access control policies with multiple independant rulesets coming from +different sources (e.g., init system configuration, user session policy, +built-in application policy). However, most applications should only need +one call to +.BR landlock_restrict_self (2) +and they should avoid arbitrary numbers of such calls because of the +composed rulesets limit. Instead, developers are encouraged to build a +tailored ruleset thanks to multiple calls to +.BR landlock_add_rule (2) +\&. +.PP +In order to enforce a ruleset, either the caller must have the +.BR CAP_SYS_ADMIN +capability in its user namespace, or the thread must already have the +.I no_new_privs +bit set. As for +.BR seccomp (2) +, this avoids scenarios where unprivileged processes can affect the +behavior of privileged children (e.g., because of set-user-ID binaries). +If that bit was not already set by an ancestor of this thread, the thread +must make the following call: +.IP +.EX +prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0); +.EE +.PP +.I ruleset_fd +is a Landlock ruleset file descriptor obtained with +.BR landlock_create_ruleset (2) +and fully populated with a set of calls to +.BR landlock_add_rule (2) +\&. +.PP +.I flags +must be 0. +.SH RETURN VALUE +On success, +.BR landlock_restrict_self (2) +returns 0. +.SH ERRORS +.BR landlock_restrict_self (2) +can failed for the following reasons: +.TP +.BR EOPNOTSUPP +Landlock is supported by the kernel but disabled at boot time. +.TP +.BR EINVAL +.I flags +is not 0. +.TP +.BR EBADF +.I ruleset_fd +is not a file descriptor for the current thread. +.TP +.BR EBADFD +.I ruleset_fd +is not a ruleset file descriptor. +.TP +.BR EPERM +.I ruleset_fd +has no read access to the underlying ruleset, or the calling thread is not +running with +.I no_new_privs +, or it doesn't have the +.BR CAP_SYS_ADMIN +in its user namespace. +.TP +.BR E2BIG +The maximum number of composed rulesets is reached for the calling thread. +This limit is currently 64. +.SH VERSIONS +Landlock was added in Linux 5.13. +.SH SEE ALSO +.BR landlock (7), +.BR landlock_create_ruleset (2), +.BR landlock_add_rule (2)