diff mbox series

[v29,13/28] IMA: Change internal interfaces to use lsmblobs

Message ID 20210924175441.7943-14-casey@schaufler-ca.com (mailing list archive)
State New, archived
Headers show
Series LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor | expand

Commit Message

Casey Schaufler Sept. 24, 2021, 5:54 p.m. UTC 
The IMA interfaces ima_get_action() and ima_match_policy()
call LSM functions that use lsmblobs. Change the IMA functions
to pass the lsmblob to be compatible with the LSM functions.

Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
To: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
---
 security/integrity/ima/ima.h          |  6 ++---
 security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c      |  6 ++---
 security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c |  3 +--
 security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c     | 38 +++++++++++----------------
 security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c   | 17 ++++++------
 5 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 39 deletions(-)
diff mbox series

Patch

diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
index 1f025ff1f011..dfa6cf5115c3 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
@@ -255,7 +255,7 @@  static inline void ima_process_queued_keys(void) {}
 
 /* LIM API function definitions */
 int ima_get_action(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *inode,
-		   const struct cred *cred, u32 secid, int mask,
+		   const struct cred *cred, struct lsmblob *blob, int mask,
 		   enum ima_hooks func, int *pcr,
 		   struct ima_template_desc **template_desc,
 		   const char *func_data, unsigned int *allowed_algos);
@@ -286,8 +286,8 @@  const char *ima_d_path(const struct path *path, char **pathbuf, char *filename);
 
 /* IMA policy related functions */
 int ima_match_policy(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *inode,
-		     const struct cred *cred, u32 secid, enum ima_hooks func,
-		     int mask, int flags, int *pcr,
+		     const struct cred *cred, struct lsmblob *blob,
+		     enum ima_hooks func, int mask, int flags, int *pcr,
 		     struct ima_template_desc **template_desc,
 		     const char *func_data, unsigned int *allowed_algos);
 void ima_init_policy(void);
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
index 2c6c3a5228b5..aa27f2144476 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
@@ -165,7 +165,7 @@  void ima_add_violation(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
  * @mnt_userns:	user namespace of the mount the inode was found from
  * @inode: pointer to the inode associated with the object being validated
  * @cred: pointer to credentials structure to validate
- * @secid: secid of the task being validated
+ * @blob: LSM data of the task being validated
  * @mask: contains the permission mask (MAY_READ, MAY_WRITE, MAY_EXEC,
  *        MAY_APPEND)
  * @func: caller identifier
@@ -186,7 +186,7 @@  void ima_add_violation(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
  *
  */
 int ima_get_action(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *inode,
-		   const struct cred *cred, u32 secid, int mask,
+		   const struct cred *cred, struct lsmblob *blob, int mask,
 		   enum ima_hooks func, int *pcr,
 		   struct ima_template_desc **template_desc,
 		   const char *func_data, unsigned int *allowed_algos)
@@ -195,7 +195,7 @@  int ima_get_action(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *inode,
 
 	flags &= ima_policy_flag;
 
-	return ima_match_policy(mnt_userns, inode, cred, secid, func, mask,
+	return ima_match_policy(mnt_userns, inode, cred, blob, func, mask,
 				flags, pcr, template_desc, func_data,
 				allowed_algos);
 }
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
index 2fedda131a39..d7244a5eb69d 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
@@ -77,9 +77,8 @@  int ima_must_appraise(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *inode,
 		return 0;
 
 	security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &blob);
-	/* scaffolding the .secid[0] */
 	return ima_match_policy(mnt_userns, inode, current_cred(),
-				blob.secid[0], func, mask,
+				&blob, func, mask,
 				IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_HASH, NULL, NULL, NULL,
 				NULL);
 }
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index 1a4f7b00253b..4789d5256693 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -199,8 +199,8 @@  void ima_file_free(struct file *file)
 }
 
 static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred,
-			       u32 secid, char *buf, loff_t size, int mask,
-			       enum ima_hooks func)
+			       struct lsmblob *blob, char *buf, loff_t size,
+			       int mask, enum ima_hooks func)
 {
 	struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
 	struct integrity_iint_cache *iint = NULL;
@@ -224,7 +224,7 @@  static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred,
 	 * bitmask based on the appraise/audit/measurement policy.
 	 * Included is the appraise submask.
 	 */
-	action = ima_get_action(file_mnt_user_ns(file), inode, cred, secid,
+	action = ima_get_action(file_mnt_user_ns(file), inode, cred, blob,
 				mask, func, &pcr, &template_desc, NULL,
 				&allowed_algos);
 	violation_check = ((func == FILE_CHECK || func == MMAP_CHECK) &&
@@ -409,8 +409,7 @@  int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot)
 
 	if (file && (prot & PROT_EXEC)) {
 		security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &blob);
-		/* scaffolding - until process_measurement changes */
-		return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), blob.secid[0],
+		return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), &blob,
 					   NULL, 0, MAY_EXEC, MMAP_CHECK);
 	}
 
@@ -450,8 +449,8 @@  int ima_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long prot)
 	security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &blob);
 	inode = file_inode(vma->vm_file);
 	action = ima_get_action(file_mnt_user_ns(vma->vm_file), inode,
-				current_cred(), blob.secid[0], MAY_EXEC,
-				MMAP_CHECK, &pcr, &template, NULL, NULL);
+				current_cred(), &blob, MAY_EXEC, MMAP_CHECK,
+				&pcr, &template, NULL, NULL);
 
 	/* Is the mmap'ed file in policy? */
 	if (!(action & (IMA_MEASURE | IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK)))
@@ -489,16 +488,14 @@  int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 	struct lsmblob blob;
 
 	security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &blob);
-	/* scaffolding until process_measurement changes */
-	ret = process_measurement(bprm->file, current_cred(), blob.secid[0],
-				  NULL, 0, MAY_EXEC, BPRM_CHECK);
+	ret = process_measurement(bprm->file, current_cred(), &blob, NULL, 0,
+				  MAY_EXEC, BPRM_CHECK);
 	if (ret)
 		return ret;
 
 	security_cred_getsecid(bprm->cred, &blob);
-	/* scaffolding until process_measurement changes */
-	return process_measurement(bprm->file, bprm->cred, blob.secid[0],
-				   NULL, 0, MAY_EXEC, CREDS_CHECK);
+	return process_measurement(bprm->file, bprm->cred, &blob, NULL, 0,
+				   MAY_EXEC, CREDS_CHECK);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -516,8 +513,7 @@  int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask)
 	struct lsmblob blob;
 
 	security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &blob);
-	/* scaffolding until process_measurement changes */
-	return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), blob.secid[0], NULL, 0,
+	return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), &blob, NULL, 0,
 				   mask & (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC |
 					   MAY_APPEND), FILE_CHECK);
 }
@@ -714,9 +710,8 @@  int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id read_id,
 	/* Read entire file for all partial reads. */
 	func = read_idmap[read_id] ?: FILE_CHECK;
 	security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &blob);
-	/* scaffolding - until process_measurement changes */
-	return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), blob.secid[0], NULL,
-				   0, MAY_READ, func);
+	return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), &blob, NULL, 0,
+				   MAY_READ, func);
 }
 
 const int read_idmap[READING_MAX_ID] = {
@@ -758,9 +753,8 @@  int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
 
 	func = read_idmap[read_id] ?: FILE_CHECK;
 	security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &blob);
-	/* scaffolding until process_measurement changes */
-	return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), blob.secid[0], buf,
-				   size, MAY_READ, func);
+	return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), &blob, buf, size,
+				   MAY_READ, func);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -914,7 +908,7 @@  int process_buffer_measurement(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
 		security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &blob);
 		/* scaffolding */
 		action = ima_get_action(mnt_userns, inode, current_cred(),
-					blob.secid[0], 0, func, &pcr, &template,
+					&blob, 0, func, &pcr, &template,
 					func_data, NULL);
 		if (!(action & IMA_MEASURE) && !digest)
 			return -ENOENT;
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index 67c7762b2533..99d6f6499094 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -560,7 +560,7 @@  static bool ima_match_rule_data(struct ima_rule_entry *rule,
  * @mnt_userns:	user namespace of the mount the inode was found from
  * @inode: a pointer to an inode
  * @cred: a pointer to a credentials structure for user validation
- * @secid: the secid of the task to be validated
+ * @blob: the lsm data of the task to be validated
  * @func: LIM hook identifier
  * @mask: requested action (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_APPEND | MAY_EXEC)
  * @func_data: func specific data, may be NULL
@@ -570,8 +570,8 @@  static bool ima_match_rule_data(struct ima_rule_entry *rule,
 static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule,
 			    struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
 			    struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred,
-			    u32 secid, enum ima_hooks func, int mask,
-			    const char *func_data)
+			    struct lsmblob *blob, enum ima_hooks func,
+			    int mask, const char *func_data)
 {
 	int i;
 
@@ -640,8 +640,7 @@  static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule,
 		case LSM_SUBJ_USER:
 		case LSM_SUBJ_ROLE:
 		case LSM_SUBJ_TYPE:
-			lsmblob_init(&lsmdata, secid);
-			rc = ima_filter_rule_match(&lsmdata, rule->lsm[i].type,
+			rc = ima_filter_rule_match(blob, rule->lsm[i].type,
 						   Audit_equal,
 						   rule->lsm[i].rule);
 			break;
@@ -685,7 +684,7 @@  static int get_subaction(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, enum ima_hooks func)
  * @inode: pointer to an inode for which the policy decision is being made
  * @cred: pointer to a credentials structure for which the policy decision is
  *        being made
- * @secid: LSM secid of the task to be validated
+ * @blob: LSM data of the task to be validated
  * @func: IMA hook identifier
  * @mask: requested action (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_APPEND | MAY_EXEC)
  * @pcr: set the pcr to extend
@@ -701,8 +700,8 @@  static int get_subaction(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, enum ima_hooks func)
  * than writes so ima_match_policy() is classical RCU candidate.
  */
 int ima_match_policy(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *inode,
-		     const struct cred *cred, u32 secid, enum ima_hooks func,
-		     int mask, int flags, int *pcr,
+		     const struct cred *cred, struct lsmblob *blob,
+		     enum ima_hooks func, int mask, int flags, int *pcr,
 		     struct ima_template_desc **template_desc,
 		     const char *func_data, unsigned int *allowed_algos)
 {
@@ -718,7 +717,7 @@  int ima_match_policy(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *inode,
 		if (!(entry->action & actmask))
 			continue;
 
-		if (!ima_match_rules(entry, mnt_userns, inode, cred, secid,
+		if (!ima_match_rules(entry, mnt_userns, inode, cred, blob,
 				     func, mask, func_data))
 			continue;