| Message ID | 20220301173651.3435350-5-eric.snowberg@oracle.com (mailing list archive) |
|---|---|
| State | New, archived |
| Headers | show |
| Series | Add CA enforcement in the machine keyring | expand |
On 3/1/22 12:36, Eric Snowberg wrote: > When INTEGRITY_MACHINE_KEYRING is set, all Machine Owner Keys (MOK) > are loaded into the machine keyring. Add a new > INTEGRITY_MACHINE_KEYRING_CA_ENFORCED option where only MOK CA keys are > added. > > Set the restriction check to restrict_link_by_ca. This will only allow > CA keys into the machine keyring. Unlike when INTEGRITY_MACHINE_KEYRING > is enabled, IMA_KEYRINGS_PERMIT_SIGNED_BY_BUILTIN_OR_SECONDARY may > also be enabled, allowing IMA to use keys in the machine keyring as > another trust anchor. I tried to test this but could only do it by disabling the MokListTrustedRT variable check and then also the check for secure boot. It did load the expected keys onto the .machine keyring, enforcing the x509 indicating a self-signed CA if the compile time option CONFIG_INTEGRITY_MACHINE_KEYRING_CA_ENFORCED=y was set, loading all keys in the case of CONFIG_INTEGRITY_MACHINE_KEYRING=y. I tried with this branch here from mokutils https://github.com/esnowberg/mokutil/tree/trust-mok but this seems to create an EFI variable with a different name. I guess this is the wrong branch? Stefan > Signed-off-by: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com> > --- > certs/system_keyring.c | 9 +++++--- > include/keys/system_keyring.h | 3 ++- > security/integrity/Kconfig | 21 +++++++++++++++++++ > security/integrity/Makefile | 1 + > security/integrity/digsig.c | 14 ++++++++++--- > security/integrity/integrity.h | 3 ++- > .../platform_certs/keyring_handler.c | 4 +++- > 7 files changed, 46 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/certs/system_keyring.c b/certs/system_keyring.c > index 05b66ce9d1c9..0811b44cf3bf 100644 > --- a/certs/system_keyring.c > +++ b/certs/system_keyring.c > @@ -22,7 +22,8 @@ static struct key *builtin_trusted_keys; > #ifdef CONFIG_SECONDARY_TRUSTED_KEYRING > static struct key *secondary_trusted_keys; > #endif > -#ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_MACHINE_KEYRING > +#if defined(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_MACHINE_KEYRING) || \ > + defined(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_MACHINE_KEYRING_CA_ENFORCED) > static struct key *machine_trusted_keys; > #endif > #ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING > @@ -89,7 +90,8 @@ static __init struct key_restriction *get_builtin_and_secondary_restriction(void > if (!restriction) > panic("Can't allocate secondary trusted keyring restriction\n"); > > - if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_MACHINE_KEYRING)) > + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_MACHINE_KEYRING) || > + IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_MACHINE_KEYRING_CA_ENFORCED)) > restriction->check = restrict_link_by_builtin_secondary_and_machine; > else > restriction->check = restrict_link_by_builtin_and_secondary_trusted; > @@ -97,7 +99,8 @@ static __init struct key_restriction *get_builtin_and_secondary_restriction(void > return restriction; > } > #endif > -#ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_MACHINE_KEYRING > +#if defined(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_MACHINE_KEYRING) || \ > + defined(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_MACHINE_KEYRING_CA_ENFORCED) > void __init set_machine_trusted_keys(struct key *keyring) > { > machine_trusted_keys = keyring; > diff --git a/include/keys/system_keyring.h b/include/keys/system_keyring.h > index 91e080efb918..e4a6574bbcb6 100644 > --- a/include/keys/system_keyring.h > +++ b/include/keys/system_keyring.h > @@ -45,7 +45,8 @@ extern int restrict_link_by_builtin_and_secondary_trusted( > #define restrict_link_by_builtin_and_secondary_trusted restrict_link_by_builtin_trusted > #endif > > -#ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_MACHINE_KEYRING > +#if defined(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_MACHINE_KEYRING) || \ > + defined(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_MACHINE_KEYRING_CA_ENFORCED) > extern int restrict_link_by_builtin_secondary_and_machine( > struct key *dest_keyring, > const struct key_type *type, > diff --git a/security/integrity/Kconfig b/security/integrity/Kconfig > index 599429f99f99..14c927eea5ee 100644 > --- a/security/integrity/Kconfig > +++ b/security/integrity/Kconfig > @@ -62,6 +62,14 @@ config INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING > provided by the platform for verifying the kexec'ed kerned image > and, possibly, the initramfs signature. > > + > +choice > + prompt "Machine keyring" > + default INTEGRITY_MACHINE_NONE > + > +config INTEGRITY_MACHINE_NONE > + bool "Do not enable the Machine Owner Keyring" > + > config INTEGRITY_MACHINE_KEYRING > bool "Provide a keyring to which Machine Owner Keys may be added" > depends on SECONDARY_TRUSTED_KEYRING > @@ -75,6 +83,19 @@ config INTEGRITY_MACHINE_KEYRING > in the platform keyring, keys contained in the .machine keyring will > be trusted within the kernel. > > +config INTEGRITY_MACHINE_KEYRING_CA_ENFORCED > + bool "Provide a keyring to which Machine Owner CA Keys may be added" > + depends on SECONDARY_TRUSTED_KEYRING > + depends on INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS > + depends on SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_KEYRING > + depends on LOAD_UEFI_KEYS > + help > + If set, provide a keyring to which CA Machine Owner Keys (MOK) may > + be added. This keyring shall contain just CA MOK keys. Unlike keys > + in the platform keyring, keys contained in the .machine keyring will > + be trusted within the kernel. > +endchoice > + > config LOAD_UEFI_KEYS > depends on INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING > depends on EFI > diff --git a/security/integrity/Makefile b/security/integrity/Makefile > index d0ffe37dc1d6..370ee63774c3 100644 > --- a/security/integrity/Makefile > +++ b/security/integrity/Makefile > @@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ integrity-$(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_SIGNATURE) += digsig.o > integrity-$(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS) += digsig_asymmetric.o > integrity-$(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING) += platform_certs/platform_keyring.o > integrity-$(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_MACHINE_KEYRING) += platform_certs/machine_keyring.o > +integrity-$(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_MACHINE_KEYRING_CA_ENFORCED) += platform_certs/machine_keyring.o > integrity-$(CONFIG_LOAD_UEFI_KEYS) += platform_certs/efi_parser.o \ > platform_certs/load_uefi.o \ > platform_certs/keyring_handler.o > diff --git a/security/integrity/digsig.c b/security/integrity/digsig.c > index c8c8a4a4e7a0..041edd9744db 100644 > --- a/security/integrity/digsig.c > +++ b/security/integrity/digsig.c > @@ -34,7 +34,11 @@ static const char * const keyring_name[INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MAX] = { > }; > > #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_KEYRINGS_PERMIT_SIGNED_BY_BUILTIN_OR_SECONDARY > +#ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_MACHINE_KEYRING_CA_ENFORCED > +#define restrict_link_to_ima restrict_link_by_builtin_secondary_and_machine > +#else > #define restrict_link_to_ima restrict_link_by_builtin_and_secondary_trusted > +#endif > #else > #define restrict_link_to_ima restrict_link_by_builtin_trusted > #endif > @@ -130,19 +134,23 @@ int __init integrity_init_keyring(const unsigned int id) > | KEY_USR_READ | KEY_USR_SEARCH; > > if (id == INTEGRITY_KEYRING_PLATFORM || > - id == INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MACHINE) { > + (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_MACHINE_KEYRING))) { > restriction = NULL; > goto out; > } > > - if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING)) > + if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING) && > + id != INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MACHINE) > return 0; > > restriction = kzalloc(sizeof(struct key_restriction), GFP_KERNEL); > if (!restriction) > return -ENOMEM; > > - restriction->check = restrict_link_to_ima; > + if (id == INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MACHINE) > + restriction->check = restrict_link_by_ca; > + else > + restriction->check = restrict_link_to_ima; > > /* > * MOK keys can only be added through a read-only runtime services > diff --git a/security/integrity/integrity.h b/security/integrity/integrity.h > index 2e214c761158..ca4d72fbd045 100644 > --- a/security/integrity/integrity.h > +++ b/security/integrity/integrity.h > @@ -285,7 +285,8 @@ static inline void __init add_to_platform_keyring(const char *source, > } > #endif > > -#ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_MACHINE_KEYRING > +#if defined(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_MACHINE_KEYRING) || \ > + defined(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_MACHINE_KEYRING_CA_ENFORCED) > void __init add_to_machine_keyring(const char *source, const void *data, size_t len); > bool __init trust_moklist(void); > #else > diff --git a/security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.c b/security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.c > index a2464f3e66cc..9c456ad0ab67 100644 > --- a/security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.c > +++ b/security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.c > @@ -61,7 +61,9 @@ __init efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_db(const efi_guid_t *sig_type) > __init efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_mok(const efi_guid_t *sig_type) > { > if (efi_guidcmp(*sig_type, efi_cert_x509_guid) == 0) { > - if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_MACHINE_KEYRING) && trust_moklist()) > + if ((IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_MACHINE_KEYRING) || > + IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_MACHINE_KEYRING_CA_ENFORCED)) && > + trust_moklist()) > return add_to_machine_keyring; > else > return add_to_platform_keyring;
> On Mar 4, 2022, at 4:19 PM, Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com> wrote: > > > On 3/1/22 12:36, Eric Snowberg wrote: >> When INTEGRITY_MACHINE_KEYRING is set, all Machine Owner Keys (MOK) >> are loaded into the machine keyring. Add a new >> INTEGRITY_MACHINE_KEYRING_CA_ENFORCED option where only MOK CA keys are >> added. >> >> Set the restriction check to restrict_link_by_ca. This will only allow >> CA keys into the machine keyring. Unlike when INTEGRITY_MACHINE_KEYRING >> is enabled, IMA_KEYRINGS_PERMIT_SIGNED_BY_BUILTIN_OR_SECONDARY may >> also be enabled, allowing IMA to use keys in the machine keyring as >> another trust anchor. > > I tried to test this but could only do it by disabling the MokListTrustedRT variable check and then also the check for secure boot. It did load the expected keys onto the .machine keyring, enforcing the x509 indicating a self-signed CA if the compile time option CONFIG_INTEGRITY_MACHINE_KEYRING_CA_ENFORCED=y was set, loading all keys in the case of CONFIG_INTEGRITY_MACHINE_KEYRING=y. > > I tried with this branch here from mokutils https://github.com/esnowberg/mokutil/tree/trust-mok but this seems to create an EFI variable with a different name. I guess this is the wrong branch? Thanks for testing. During the shim review, Peter requested an EFI variable name change. This did not impact anything in the kernel. However it did impact mokutil. The necessary mokutil changes are available in this pull request: https://github.com/lcp/mokutil/pull/49
On 3/7/22 13:13, Eric Snowberg wrote: > > >> On Mar 4, 2022, at 4:19 PM, Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com> wrote: >> >> >> On 3/1/22 12:36, Eric Snowberg wrote: >>> When INTEGRITY_MACHINE_KEYRING is set, all Machine Owner Keys (MOK) >>> are loaded into the machine keyring. Add a new >>> INTEGRITY_MACHINE_KEYRING_CA_ENFORCED option where only MOK CA keys are >>> added. >>> >>> Set the restriction check to restrict_link_by_ca. This will only allow >>> CA keys into the machine keyring. Unlike when INTEGRITY_MACHINE_KEYRING >>> is enabled, IMA_KEYRINGS_PERMIT_SIGNED_BY_BUILTIN_OR_SECONDARY may >>> also be enabled, allowing IMA to use keys in the machine keyring as >>> another trust anchor. >> >> I tried to test this but could only do it by disabling the MokListTrustedRT variable check and then also the check for secure boot. It did load the expected keys onto the .machine keyring, enforcing the x509 indicating a self-signed CA if the compile time option CONFIG_INTEGRITY_MACHINE_KEYRING_CA_ENFORCED=y was set, loading all keys in the case of CONFIG_INTEGRITY_MACHINE_KEYRING=y. >> >> I tried with this branch here from mokutils https://github.com/esnowberg/mokutil/tree/trust-mok but this seems to create an EFI variable with a different name. I guess this is the wrong branch? > > Thanks for testing. During the shim review, Peter requested an EFI variable name > change. This did not impact anything in the kernel. However it did impact mokutil. > The necessary mokutil changes are available in this pull request: > > https://github.com/lcp/mokutil/pull/49 > The following is in Jarkko's tree: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jarkko/linux-tpmdd.git/commit/?id=4d83e5144e224b90f6589d11b5fecde33c0dd211 + +/* + * Try to load the MokListTrustedRT MOK variable to see if we should trust + * the MOK keys within the kernel. It is not an error if this variable + * does not exist. If it does not exist, MOK keys should not be trusted + * within the machine keyring. + */ +static __init bool uefi_check_trust_mok_keys(void) +{ + struct efi_mokvar_table_entry *mokvar_entry; + + mokvar_entry = efi_mokvar_entry_find("MokListTrustedRT"); + + if (mokvar_entry) + return true; + + return false; +} I don't think this works with your mokutil PR: static int trust_mok_keys() { return set_toggle("MokListTrustedNew", 0); } From what I saw, MokListTrustedRT searches for a mok-variable entry in the MOK-specific directory in sysfs while MokListTrustedNew creates one in the EFI dir... Stefan
> On Mar 7, 2022, at 11:36 AM, Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com> wrote: > > > > On 3/7/22 13:13, Eric Snowberg wrote: >>> On Mar 4, 2022, at 4:19 PM, Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com> wrote: >>> >>> >>> On 3/1/22 12:36, Eric Snowberg wrote: >>>> When INTEGRITY_MACHINE_KEYRING is set, all Machine Owner Keys (MOK) >>>> are loaded into the machine keyring. Add a new >>>> INTEGRITY_MACHINE_KEYRING_CA_ENFORCED option where only MOK CA keys are >>>> added. >>>> >>>> Set the restriction check to restrict_link_by_ca. This will only allow >>>> CA keys into the machine keyring. Unlike when INTEGRITY_MACHINE_KEYRING >>>> is enabled, IMA_KEYRINGS_PERMIT_SIGNED_BY_BUILTIN_OR_SECONDARY may >>>> also be enabled, allowing IMA to use keys in the machine keyring as >>>> another trust anchor. >>> >>> I tried to test this but could only do it by disabling the MokListTrustedRT variable check and then also the check for secure boot. It did load the expected keys onto the .machine keyring, enforcing the x509 indicating a self-signed CA if the compile time option CONFIG_INTEGRITY_MACHINE_KEYRING_CA_ENFORCED=y was set, loading all keys in the case of CONFIG_INTEGRITY_MACHINE_KEYRING=y. >>> >>> I tried with this branch here from mokutils https://github.com/esnowberg/mokutil/tree/trust-mok but this seems to create an EFI variable with a different name. I guess this is the wrong branch? >> Thanks for testing. During the shim review, Peter requested an EFI variable name >> change. This did not impact anything in the kernel. However it did impact mokutil. >> The necessary mokutil changes are available in this pull request: >> https://github.com/lcp/mokutil/pull/49 > > The following is in Jarkko's tree: > > https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jarkko/linux-tpmdd.git/commit/?id=4d83e5144e224b90f6589d11b5fecde33c0dd211 > > > + > +/* > + * Try to load the MokListTrustedRT MOK variable to see if we should trust > + * the MOK keys within the kernel. It is not an error if this variable > + * does not exist. If it does not exist, MOK keys should not be trusted > + * within the machine keyring. > + */ > +static __init bool uefi_check_trust_mok_keys(void) > +{ > + struct efi_mokvar_table_entry *mokvar_entry; > + > + mokvar_entry = efi_mokvar_entry_find("MokListTrustedRT"); > + > + if (mokvar_entry) > + return true; > + > + return false; > +} > > I don't think this works with your mokutil PR: > > static int > trust_mok_keys() > { > return set_toggle("MokListTrustedNew", 0); > } > > From what I saw, MokListTrustedRT searches for a mok-variable entry in the MOK-specific directory in sysfs while MokListTrustedNew creates one in the EFI dir… MokListTrustedNew is set by mokutil. The variable is then used by MokManager. When shim boots and sees the variable is set, it loads MokManager instead of grub. The MokManager then asks the user if they want to make the change. If the user accepts the change, shim stores a new boot services variable and the MokListTrustedNew variable is deleted. Afterwards the machine is rebooted, shim creates the MokListTrustedRT based on the boot services variable previously set.
diff --git a/certs/system_keyring.c b/certs/system_keyring.c index 05b66ce9d1c9..0811b44cf3bf 100644 --- a/certs/system_keyring.c +++ b/certs/system_keyring.c @@ -22,7 +22,8 @@ static struct key *builtin_trusted_keys; #ifdef CONFIG_SECONDARY_TRUSTED_KEYRING static struct key *secondary_trusted_keys; #endif -#ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_MACHINE_KEYRING +#if defined(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_MACHINE_KEYRING) || \ + defined(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_MACHINE_KEYRING_CA_ENFORCED) static struct key *machine_trusted_keys; #endif #ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING @@ -89,7 +90,8 @@ static __init struct key_restriction *get_builtin_and_secondary_restriction(void if (!restriction) panic("Can't allocate secondary trusted keyring restriction\n"); - if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_MACHINE_KEYRING)) + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_MACHINE_KEYRING) || + IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_MACHINE_KEYRING_CA_ENFORCED)) restriction->check = restrict_link_by_builtin_secondary_and_machine; else restriction->check = restrict_link_by_builtin_and_secondary_trusted; @@ -97,7 +99,8 @@ static __init struct key_restriction *get_builtin_and_secondary_restriction(void return restriction; } #endif -#ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_MACHINE_KEYRING +#if defined(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_MACHINE_KEYRING) || \ + defined(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_MACHINE_KEYRING_CA_ENFORCED) void __init set_machine_trusted_keys(struct key *keyring) { machine_trusted_keys = keyring; diff --git a/include/keys/system_keyring.h b/include/keys/system_keyring.h index 91e080efb918..e4a6574bbcb6 100644 --- a/include/keys/system_keyring.h +++ b/include/keys/system_keyring.h @@ -45,7 +45,8 @@ extern int restrict_link_by_builtin_and_secondary_trusted( #define restrict_link_by_builtin_and_secondary_trusted restrict_link_by_builtin_trusted #endif -#ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_MACHINE_KEYRING +#if defined(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_MACHINE_KEYRING) || \ + defined(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_MACHINE_KEYRING_CA_ENFORCED) extern int restrict_link_by_builtin_secondary_and_machine( struct key *dest_keyring, const struct key_type *type, diff --git a/security/integrity/Kconfig b/security/integrity/Kconfig index 599429f99f99..14c927eea5ee 100644 --- a/security/integrity/Kconfig +++ b/security/integrity/Kconfig @@ -62,6 +62,14 @@ config INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING provided by the platform for verifying the kexec'ed kerned image and, possibly, the initramfs signature. + +choice + prompt "Machine keyring" + default INTEGRITY_MACHINE_NONE + +config INTEGRITY_MACHINE_NONE + bool "Do not enable the Machine Owner Keyring" + config INTEGRITY_MACHINE_KEYRING bool "Provide a keyring to which Machine Owner Keys may be added" depends on SECONDARY_TRUSTED_KEYRING @@ -75,6 +83,19 @@ config INTEGRITY_MACHINE_KEYRING in the platform keyring, keys contained in the .machine keyring will be trusted within the kernel. +config INTEGRITY_MACHINE_KEYRING_CA_ENFORCED + bool "Provide a keyring to which Machine Owner CA Keys may be added" + depends on SECONDARY_TRUSTED_KEYRING + depends on INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS + depends on SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_KEYRING + depends on LOAD_UEFI_KEYS + help + If set, provide a keyring to which CA Machine Owner Keys (MOK) may + be added. This keyring shall contain just CA MOK keys. Unlike keys + in the platform keyring, keys contained in the .machine keyring will + be trusted within the kernel. +endchoice + config LOAD_UEFI_KEYS depends on INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING depends on EFI diff --git a/security/integrity/Makefile b/security/integrity/Makefile index d0ffe37dc1d6..370ee63774c3 100644 --- a/security/integrity/Makefile +++ b/security/integrity/Makefile @@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ integrity-$(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_SIGNATURE) += digsig.o integrity-$(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS) += digsig_asymmetric.o integrity-$(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING) += platform_certs/platform_keyring.o integrity-$(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_MACHINE_KEYRING) += platform_certs/machine_keyring.o +integrity-$(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_MACHINE_KEYRING_CA_ENFORCED) += platform_certs/machine_keyring.o integrity-$(CONFIG_LOAD_UEFI_KEYS) += platform_certs/efi_parser.o \ platform_certs/load_uefi.o \ platform_certs/keyring_handler.o diff --git a/security/integrity/digsig.c b/security/integrity/digsig.c index c8c8a4a4e7a0..041edd9744db 100644 --- a/security/integrity/digsig.c +++ b/security/integrity/digsig.c @@ -34,7 +34,11 @@ static const char * const keyring_name[INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MAX] = { }; #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_KEYRINGS_PERMIT_SIGNED_BY_BUILTIN_OR_SECONDARY +#ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_MACHINE_KEYRING_CA_ENFORCED +#define restrict_link_to_ima restrict_link_by_builtin_secondary_and_machine +#else #define restrict_link_to_ima restrict_link_by_builtin_and_secondary_trusted +#endif #else #define restrict_link_to_ima restrict_link_by_builtin_trusted #endif @@ -130,19 +134,23 @@ int __init integrity_init_keyring(const unsigned int id) | KEY_USR_READ | KEY_USR_SEARCH; if (id == INTEGRITY_KEYRING_PLATFORM || - id == INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MACHINE) { + (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_MACHINE_KEYRING))) { restriction = NULL; goto out; } - if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING)) + if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING) && + id != INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MACHINE) return 0; restriction = kzalloc(sizeof(struct key_restriction), GFP_KERNEL); if (!restriction) return -ENOMEM; - restriction->check = restrict_link_to_ima; + if (id == INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MACHINE) + restriction->check = restrict_link_by_ca; + else + restriction->check = restrict_link_to_ima; /* * MOK keys can only be added through a read-only runtime services diff --git a/security/integrity/integrity.h b/security/integrity/integrity.h index 2e214c761158..ca4d72fbd045 100644 --- a/security/integrity/integrity.h +++ b/security/integrity/integrity.h @@ -285,7 +285,8 @@ static inline void __init add_to_platform_keyring(const char *source, } #endif -#ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_MACHINE_KEYRING +#if defined(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_MACHINE_KEYRING) || \ + defined(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_MACHINE_KEYRING_CA_ENFORCED) void __init add_to_machine_keyring(const char *source, const void *data, size_t len); bool __init trust_moklist(void); #else diff --git a/security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.c b/security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.c index a2464f3e66cc..9c456ad0ab67 100644 --- a/security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.c +++ b/security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.c @@ -61,7 +61,9 @@ __init efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_db(const efi_guid_t *sig_type) __init efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_mok(const efi_guid_t *sig_type) { if (efi_guidcmp(*sig_type, efi_cert_x509_guid) == 0) { - if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_MACHINE_KEYRING) && trust_moklist()) + if ((IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_MACHINE_KEYRING) || + IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_MACHINE_KEYRING_CA_ENFORCED)) && + trust_moklist()) return add_to_machine_keyring; else return add_to_platform_keyring;
When INTEGRITY_MACHINE_KEYRING is set, all Machine Owner Keys (MOK) are loaded into the machine keyring. Add a new INTEGRITY_MACHINE_KEYRING_CA_ENFORCED option where only MOK CA keys are added. Set the restriction check to restrict_link_by_ca. This will only allow CA keys into the machine keyring. Unlike when INTEGRITY_MACHINE_KEYRING is enabled, IMA_KEYRINGS_PERMIT_SIGNED_BY_BUILTIN_OR_SECONDARY may also be enabled, allowing IMA to use keys in the machine keyring as another trust anchor. Signed-off-by: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com> --- certs/system_keyring.c | 9 +++++--- include/keys/system_keyring.h | 3 ++- security/integrity/Kconfig | 21 +++++++++++++++++++ security/integrity/Makefile | 1 + security/integrity/digsig.c | 14 ++++++++++--- security/integrity/integrity.h | 3 ++- .../platform_certs/keyring_handler.c | 4 +++- 7 files changed, 46 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)